Move to shared libmincrypt

Remove mincrypt source from TWRP and add rule to make
libmincrypt as a shared library.
No more crashes during zip signature verification and
less code to maintain in TWRP.
diff --git a/twinstall.cpp b/twinstall.cpp
index 967528e..af53256 100644
--- a/twinstall.cpp
+++ b/twinstall.cpp
@@ -26,8 +26,8 @@
 #include <stdio.h>
 
 #include "common.h"
-#include "twmincrypt/twrsa.h"
-#include "twmincrypt/twsha.h"
+#include "mincrypt/rsa.h"
+#include "mincrypt/sha.h"
 #include "minui/minui.h"
 #include "minzip/SysUtil.h"
 #include "minzip/Zip.h"
@@ -59,165 +59,6 @@
 
 enum { INSTALL_SUCCESS, INSTALL_ERROR, INSTALL_CORRUPT };
 
-// Look for an RSA signature embedded in the .ZIP file comment given
-// the path to the zip.  Verify it matches one of the given public
-// keys.
-//
-// Return VERIFY_SUCCESS, VERIFY_FAILURE (if any error is encountered
-// or no key matches the signature).
-
-int TWverify_file(const char* path, const RSAPublicKey *pKeys, unsigned int numKeys) {
-    ui->SetProgress(0.0);
-
-    FILE* f = fopen(path, "rb");
-    if (f == NULL) {
-        LOGE("failed to open %s (%s)\n", path, strerror(errno));
-        return VERIFY_FAILURE;
-    }
-
-    // An archive with a whole-file signature will end in six bytes:
-    //
-    //   (2-byte signature start) $ff $ff (2-byte comment size)
-    //
-    // (As far as the ZIP format is concerned, these are part of the
-    // archive comment.)  We start by reading this footer, this tells
-    // us how far back from the end we have to start reading to find
-    // the whole comment.
-
-#define FOOTER_SIZE 6
-
-    if (fseek(f, -FOOTER_SIZE, SEEK_END) != 0) {
-        LOGE("failed to seek in %s (%s)\n", path, strerror(errno));
-        fclose(f);
-        return VERIFY_FAILURE;
-    }
-
-    unsigned char footer[FOOTER_SIZE];
-    if (fread(footer, 1, FOOTER_SIZE, f) != FOOTER_SIZE) {
-        LOGE("failed to read footer from %s (%s)\n", path, strerror(errno));
-        fclose(f);
-        return VERIFY_FAILURE;
-    }
-
-    if (footer[2] != 0xff || footer[3] != 0xff) {
-        fclose(f);
-        return VERIFY_FAILURE;
-    }
-
-    size_t comment_size = footer[4] + (footer[5] << 8);
-    size_t signature_start = footer[0] + (footer[1] << 8);
-    LOGI("comment is %d bytes; signature %d bytes from end\n",
-         comment_size, signature_start);
-
-    if (signature_start - FOOTER_SIZE < RSANUMBYTES) {
-        // "signature" block isn't big enough to contain an RSA block.
-        LOGE("signature is too short\n");
-        fclose(f);
-        return VERIFY_FAILURE;
-    }
-
-#define EOCD_HEADER_SIZE 22
-
-    // The end-of-central-directory record is 22 bytes plus any
-    // comment length.
-    size_t eocd_size = comment_size + EOCD_HEADER_SIZE;
-
-    if (fseek(f, -eocd_size, SEEK_END) != 0) {
-        LOGE("failed to seek in %s (%s)\n", path, strerror(errno));
-        fclose(f);
-        return VERIFY_FAILURE;
-    }
-
-    // Determine how much of the file is covered by the signature.
-    // This is everything except the signature data and length, which
-    // includes all of the EOCD except for the comment length field (2
-    // bytes) and the comment data.
-    size_t signed_len = ftell(f) + EOCD_HEADER_SIZE - 2;
-
-    unsigned char* eocd = (unsigned char*)malloc(eocd_size);
-    if (eocd == NULL) {
-        LOGE("malloc for EOCD record failed\n");
-        fclose(f);
-        return VERIFY_FAILURE;
-    }
-    if (fread(eocd, 1, eocd_size, f) != eocd_size) {
-        LOGE("failed to read eocd from %s (%s)\n", path, strerror(errno));
-        fclose(f);
-        return VERIFY_FAILURE;
-    }
-
-    // If this is really is the EOCD record, it will begin with the
-    // magic number $50 $4b $05 $06.
-    if (eocd[0] != 0x50 || eocd[1] != 0x4b ||
-        eocd[2] != 0x05 || eocd[3] != 0x06) {
-        LOGE("signature length doesn't match EOCD marker\n");
-        fclose(f);
-        return VERIFY_FAILURE;
-    }
-
-    size_t i;
-    for (i = 4; i < eocd_size-3; ++i) {
-        if (eocd[i  ] == 0x50 && eocd[i+1] == 0x4b &&
-            eocd[i+2] == 0x05 && eocd[i+3] == 0x06) {
-            // if the sequence $50 $4b $05 $06 appears anywhere after
-            // the real one, minzip will find the later (wrong) one,
-            // which could be exploitable.  Fail verification if
-            // this sequence occurs anywhere after the real one.
-            LOGE("EOCD marker occurs after start of EOCD\n");
-            fclose(f);
-            return VERIFY_FAILURE;
-        }
-    }
-
-#define BUFFER_SIZE 4096
-
-    SHA_CTX ctx;
-    SHA_init(&ctx);
-    unsigned char* buffer = (unsigned char*)malloc(BUFFER_SIZE);
-    if (buffer == NULL) {
-        LOGE("failed to alloc memory for sha1 buffer\n");
-        fclose(f);
-        return VERIFY_FAILURE;
-    }
-
-    double frac = -1.0;
-    size_t so_far = 0;
-    fseek(f, 0, SEEK_SET);
-    while (so_far < signed_len) {
-        size_t size = BUFFER_SIZE;
-        if (signed_len - so_far < size) size = signed_len - so_far;
-        if (fread(buffer, 1, size, f) != size) {
-            LOGE("failed to read data from %s (%s)\n", path, strerror(errno));
-            fclose(f);
-            return VERIFY_FAILURE;
-        }
-        SHA_update(&ctx, buffer, size);
-        so_far += size;
-        double f = so_far / (double)signed_len;
-        if (f > frac + 0.02 || size == so_far) {
-            ui->SetProgress(f);
-            frac = f;
-        }
-    }
-    fclose(f);
-    free(buffer);
-
-    const uint8_t* sha1 = SHA_final(&ctx);
-    for (i = 0; i < numKeys; ++i) {
-        // The 6 bytes is the "(signature_start) $ff $ff (comment_size)" that
-        // the signing tool appends after the signature itself.
-        if (RSA_verify(pKeys+i, eocd + eocd_size - 6 - RSANUMBYTES,
-                       RSANUMBYTES, sha1)) {
-            LOGI("whole-file signature verified against key %d\n", i);
-            free(eocd);
-            return VERIFY_SUCCESS;
-        }
-    }
-    free(eocd);
-    LOGE("failed to verify whole-file signature\n");
-    return VERIFY_FAILURE;
-}
-
 // If the package contains an update binary, extract it and run it.
 static int
 try_update_binary(const char *path, ZipArchive *zip, int* wipe_cache) {
@@ -466,7 +307,7 @@
 		ui->SetProgressType(RecoveryUI::DETERMINATE);
 		ui->ShowProgress(VERIFICATION_PROGRESS_FRACTION, VERIFICATION_PROGRESS_TIME);
 
-		err = TWverify_file(path, loadedKeys, numKeys);
+		err = verify_file(path, loadedKeys, numKeys);
 		free(loadedKeys);
 		LOGI("verify_file returned %d\n", err);
 		if (err != VERIFY_SUCCESS) {