FsCrypt update: support fscrypt policies v1 and v2
This patchset introduces support decryption for Android 11.
In this update we deprecate ext4crypt. To specify the
policy version to use, use TW_USE_FSCRYPT_POLICY := 1 or
TW_USE_FSCRYPT_POLICY := 2. By default policy version will
be set to 2 if this variable is omitted.
Change-Id: I62a29c1bef36c259ec4b11259f71be613d20a112
diff --git a/Android.mk b/Android.mk
index ed63d54..038daaa 100755
--- a/Android.mk
+++ b/Android.mk
@@ -100,7 +100,6 @@
LOCAL_C_INCLUDES += \
bionic \
- system/vold \
system/extras \
system/core/adb \
system/core/libsparse \
@@ -287,10 +286,10 @@
endif
ifeq ($(TW_INCLUDE_CRYPTO), true)
LOCAL_CFLAGS += -DTW_INCLUDE_CRYPTO -DUSE_FSCRYPT -Wno-macro-redefined
- # LOCAL_SHARED_LIBRARIES += libcryptfsfde
- LOCAL_SHARED_LIBRARIES += libgpt_twrp
- LOCAL_C_INCLUDES += external/boringssl/src/include bootable/recovery/crypto/fscrypt \
- bootable/recovery/crypto
+ LOCAL_SHARED_LIBRARIES += libcryptfsfde
+ LOCAL_SHARED_LIBRARIES += libgpt_twrp libstatssocket.recovery
+ LOCAL_C_INCLUDES += external/boringssl/src/include bootable/recovery/crypto
+ LOCAL_C_INCLUDES += $(commands_TWRP_local_path)/crypto/fscrypt
TW_INCLUDE_CRYPTO_FBE := true
LOCAL_CFLAGS += -DTW_INCLUDE_FBE
LOCAL_SHARED_LIBRARIES += libtwrpfscrypt android.frameworks.stats@1.0 android.hardware.authsecret@1.0 \
@@ -375,6 +374,8 @@
LOCAL_CFLAGS += -DTW_EXCLUDE_NANO
endif
+LOCAL_C_INCLUDES += system/vold \
+
TWRP_REQUIRED_MODULES += \
relink_libraries \
relink_binaries \
@@ -638,7 +639,7 @@
endif
ifeq ($(TW_INCLUDE_CRYPTO), true)
- # include $(commands_TWRP_local_path)/crypto/fde/Android.mk
+ include $(commands_TWRP_local_path)/crypto/fde/Android.mk
include $(commands_TWRP_local_path)/crypto/scrypt/Android.mk
ifeq ($(TW_INCLUDE_CRYPTO_FBE), true)
include $(commands_TWRP_local_path)/crypto/fscrypt/Android.mk
diff --git a/crypto/ext4crypt/Android.mk b/crypto/ext4crypt/Android.mk
deleted file mode 100755
index 8b1372b..0000000
--- a/crypto/ext4crypt/Android.mk
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,111 +0,0 @@
-LOCAL_PATH := $(call my-dir)
-ifeq ($(TW_INCLUDE_CRYPTO), true)
-include $(CLEAR_VARS)
-
-LOCAL_MODULE := libe4crypt
-LOCAL_MODULE_TAGS := optional
-LOCAL_CFLAGS :=
-LOCAL_SRC_FILES := Decrypt.cpp ScryptParameters.cpp Utils.cpp HashPassword.cpp ext4_crypt.cpp
-LOCAL_SHARED_LIBRARIES := libselinux libc libc++ libext4_utils libbase libcrypto libcutils libkeymaster_messages libhardware libprotobuf-cpp-lite
-LOCAL_STATIC_LIBRARIES := libscrypt_static
-LOCAL_C_INCLUDES := system/extras/ext4_utils \
- system/extras/ext4_utils/include/ext4_utils \
- external/scrypt/lib/crypto \
- system/security/keystore/include \
- hardware/libhardware/include/hardware \
- system/security/softkeymaster/include/keymaster \
- system/keymaster/include
-
-ifneq ($(wildcard hardware/libhardware/include/hardware/keymaster0.h),)
- LOCAL_CFLAGS += -DTW_CRYPTO_HAVE_KEYMASTERX
- LOCAL_C_INCLUDES += external/boringssl/src/include
-endif
-ifeq ($(shell test $(PLATFORM_SDK_VERSION) -ge 26; echo $$?),0)
- #8.0 or higher
- LOCAL_CFLAGS += -DHAVE_GATEKEEPER1
- ifeq ($(shell test $(PLATFORM_SDK_VERSION) -ge 29; echo $$?),0)
- LOCAL_SHARED_LIBRARIES += android.hardware.confirmationui@1.0
- endif
- LOCAL_SHARED_LIBRARIES += android.hardware.keymaster@3.0 libkeystore_binder libhidlbase libutils libbinder android.hardware.gatekeeper@1.0
- ifeq ($(shell test $(PLATFORM_SDK_VERSION) -ge 28; echo $$?),0)
- #9.0 rules
- LOCAL_CFLAGS += -DUSE_KEYSTORAGE_4 -Wno-unused-variable -Wno-sign-compare -Wno-unused-parameter -Wno-comment
- LOCAL_SRC_FILES += Ext4CryptPie.cpp Keymaster4.cpp KeyStorage4.cpp KeyUtil.cpp MetadataCrypt.cpp KeyBuffer.cpp
- LOCAL_SHARED_LIBRARIES += android.hardware.keymaster@4.0 libkeymaster4support
- LOCAL_SHARED_LIBRARIES += android.hardware.gatekeeper@1.0 libkeystore_parcelables libkeystore_aidl
- LOCAL_CFLAGS += -DHAVE_SYNTH_PWD_SUPPORT
- LOCAL_SRC_FILES += Weaver1.cpp
- LOCAL_SHARED_LIBRARIES += android.hardware.weaver@1.0
- LOCAL_CFLAGS += -DHAVE_LIBKEYUTILS
- LOCAL_SHARED_LIBRARIES += libkeyutils
- else
- #8.0 rules
- LOCAL_CFLAGS += -DUSE_KEYSTORAGE_3
- LOCAL_SRC_FILES += Ext4Crypt.cpp Keymaster3.cpp KeyStorage3.cpp
- ifneq ($(wildcard hardware/interfaces/weaver/Android.bp),)
- #only present in some 8.0 trees and should be in all 8.1 trees
- LOCAL_CFLAGS += -DHAVE_SYNTH_PWD_SUPPORT
- LOCAL_SRC_FILES += Weaver1.cpp
- LOCAL_SHARED_LIBRARIES += android.hardware.weaver@1.0
- endif
- ifneq ($(wildcard system/core/libkeyutils/Android.bp),)
- #only present in some 8.0 trees and should be in all 8.1 trees
- LOCAL_CFLAGS += -DHAVE_LIBKEYUTILS
- LOCAL_SHARED_LIBRARIES += libkeyutils
- endif
- endif
- ifeq ($(shell test $(PLATFORM_SDK_VERSION) -ge 28; echo $$?),0)
- LOCAL_REQUIRED_MODULES := keystore_auth
- else
- LOCAL_ADDITIONAL_DEPENDENCIES := keystore_auth
- endif
-else
- #7.x rules
- LOCAL_SRC_FILES += Ext4Crypt.cpp Keymaster.cpp KeyStorage.cpp
-endif
-ifeq ($(shell test $(PLATFORM_SDK_VERSION) -lt 28; echo $$?),0)
- LOCAL_SHARED_LIBRARIES += libsoftkeymaster
-endif
-
-include $(BUILD_SHARED_LIBRARY)
-
-
-
-include $(CLEAR_VARS)
-LOCAL_MODULE := twrpfbe
-LOCAL_MODULE_TAGS := optional
-LOCAL_MODULE_CLASS := RECOVERY_EXECUTABLES
-LOCAL_MODULE_PATH := $(TARGET_RECOVERY_ROOT_OUT)/
-LOCAL_SRC_FILES := main.cpp
-LOCAL_SHARED_LIBRARIES := libe4crypt
-
-include $(BUILD_EXECUTABLE)
-
-include $(CLEAR_VARS)
-LOCAL_MODULE := e4policyget
-LOCAL_MODULE_TAGS := optional
-LOCAL_MODULE_CLASS := RECOVERY_EXECUTABLES
-LOCAL_MODULE_PATH := $(TARGET_RECOVERY_ROOT_OUT)/
-LOCAL_SRC_FILES := e4policyget.cpp
-LOCAL_SHARED_LIBRARIES := libe4crypt
-LOCAL_LDFLAGS += -Wl,-dynamic-linker,/system/bin/linker64
-
-include $(BUILD_EXECUTABLE)
-
-include $(CLEAR_VARS)
-LOCAL_MODULE := keystore_auth
-LOCAL_MODULE_TAGS := optional
-LOCAL_MODULE_CLASS := RECOVERY_EXECUTABLES
-LOCAL_MODULE_PATH := $(TARGET_RECOVERY_ROOT_OUT)/
-LOCAL_SRC_FILES := keystore_auth.cpp
-LOCAL_SHARED_LIBRARIES := libc libkeystore_binder libutils libbinder liblog
-ifeq ($(shell test $(PLATFORM_SDK_VERSION) -ge 28; echo $$?),0)
- #9.0
- LOCAL_CFLAGS += -DUSE_SECURITY_NAMESPACE
- LOCAL_SHARED_LIBRARIES += libkeystore_aidl
-endif
-LOCAL_LDFLAGS += -Wl,-dynamic-linker,/system/bin/linker64
-
-include $(BUILD_EXECUTABLE)
-
-endif
diff --git a/crypto/ext4crypt/Decrypt.cpp b/crypto/ext4crypt/Decrypt.cpp
deleted file mode 100755
index 3f82aa1..0000000
--- a/crypto/ext4crypt/Decrypt.cpp
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,1361 +0,0 @@
-/*
- * Copyright (C) 2016 The Team Win Recovery Project
- *
- * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
- * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
- * You may obtain a copy of the License at
- *
- * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
- *
- * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
- * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
- * WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
- * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
- * limitations under the License.
- */
-
-#include "Decrypt.h"
-#ifdef USE_KEYSTORAGE_4
-#include "Ext4CryptPie.h"
-#else
-#include "Ext4Crypt.h"
-#endif
-
-#include <map>
-#include <string>
-
-#include <errno.h>
-#include <stdio.h>
-#include <stdlib.h>
-#include <sys/stat.h>
-#include <sys/types.h>
-
-#ifndef HAVE_LIBKEYUTILS
-#include "key_control.h"
-#else
-#include <keyutils.h>
-#endif
-
-#ifdef HAVE_SYNTH_PWD_SUPPORT
-#include "Weaver1.h"
-#include "cutils/properties.h"
-
-#include <openssl/sha.h>
-#include <openssl/aes.h>
-#include <openssl/evp.h>
-#include <openssl/rand.h>
-
-#include <dirent.h>
-#include <stdio.h>
-#include <stdint.h>
-#include <string.h>
-#include <sys/types.h>
-#include <fstream>
-
-#include "ext4_crypt.h"
-
-#ifdef USE_KEYSTORAGE_4
-#include <android/hardware/confirmationui/1.0/types.h>
-#include <android/security/BnConfirmationPromptCallback.h>
-#include <android/security/keystore/IKeystoreService.h>
-#else
-#include <keystore/IKeystoreService.h>
-#include <keystore/authorization_set.h>
-#endif
-#include <binder/IPCThreadState.h>
-#include <binder/IServiceManager.h>
-
-#include <keystore/keystore.h>
-
-#include <algorithm>
-extern "C" {
-#include "crypto_scrypt.h"
-}
-#else
-#include "ext4_crypt.h"
-#endif //ifdef HAVE_SYNTH_PWD_SUPPORT
-
-#ifdef HAVE_GATEKEEPER1
-#include <android/hardware/gatekeeper/1.0/IGatekeeper.h>
-#else
-#include <hardware/gatekeeper.h>
-#endif
-#include "HashPassword.h"
-
-#include <android-base/file.h>
-
-#ifdef USE_KEYSTORAGE_4
-using android::security::keystore::IKeystoreService;
-#endif
-
-// Store main DE raw ref / policy
-extern std::string de_raw_ref;
-extern std::map<userid_t, std::string> s_de_key_raw_refs;
-extern std::map<userid_t, std::string> s_ce_key_raw_refs;
-
-static bool lookup_ref_key_internal(std::map<userid_t, std::string>& key_map, const char* policy, userid_t* user_id) {
- for (std::map<userid_t, std::string>::iterator it=key_map.begin(); it!=key_map.end(); ++it) {
- if (strncmp(it->second.c_str(), policy, it->second.size()) == 0) {
- *user_id = it->first;
- return true;
- }
- }
- return false;
-}
-
-extern "C" bool lookup_ref_key(const char* policy, char* policy_type) {
- userid_t user_id = 0;
- if (strncmp(de_raw_ref.c_str(), policy, de_raw_ref.size()) == 0) {
- strcpy(policy_type, "1DK");
- return true;
- }
- if (!lookup_ref_key_internal(s_de_key_raw_refs, policy, &user_id)) {
- if (!lookup_ref_key_internal(s_ce_key_raw_refs, policy, &user_id)) {
- return false;
- } else
- sprintf(policy_type, "1CE%d", user_id);
- } else
- sprintf(policy_type, "1DE%d", user_id);
- return true;
-}
-
-extern "C" bool lookup_ref_tar(const char* policy_type, char* policy) {
- if (strncmp(policy_type, "1", 1) != 0) {
- printf("Unexpected version %c\n", policy_type[0]);
- return false;
- }
- const char* ptr = policy_type + 1; // skip past the version number
- if (strncmp(ptr, "DK", 2) == 0) {
- strncpy(policy, de_raw_ref.data(), de_raw_ref.size());
- return true;
- }
- userid_t user_id = atoi(ptr + 2);
- std::string raw_ref;
- if (*ptr == 'D') {
- if (lookup_key_ref(s_de_key_raw_refs, user_id, &raw_ref)) {
- strncpy(policy, raw_ref.data(), raw_ref.size());
- } else
- return false;
- } else if (*ptr == 'C') {
- if (lookup_key_ref(s_ce_key_raw_refs, user_id, &raw_ref)) {
- strncpy(policy, raw_ref.data(), raw_ref.size());
- } else
- return false;
- } else {
- printf("unknown policy type '%s'\n", policy_type);
- return false;
- }
- return true;
-}
-
-#ifndef HAVE_GATEKEEPER1
-int gatekeeper_device_initialize(gatekeeper_device_t **dev) {
- int ret;
- const hw_module_t *mod;
- ret = hw_get_module_by_class(GATEKEEPER_HARDWARE_MODULE_ID, NULL, &mod);
-
- if (ret!=0) {
- printf("failed to get hw module\n");
- return ret;
- }
-
- ret = gatekeeper_open(mod, dev);
-
- if (ret!=0)
- printf("failed to open gatekeeper\n");
- return ret;
-}
-#endif //ifndef HAVE_GATEKEEPER1
-
-bool Decrypt_DE() {
- if (!e4crypt_initialize_global_de()) { // this deals with the overarching device encryption
- printf("e4crypt_initialize_global_de returned fail\n");
- return false;
- }
- if (!e4crypt_init_user0()) {
- printf("e4crypt_init_user0 returned fail\n");
- return false;
- }
- return true;
-}
-
-#ifdef HAVE_SYNTH_PWD_SUPPORT
-// Crappy functions for debugging, please ignore unless you need to debug
-/*void output_hex(const std::string& in) {
- const char *buf = in.data();
- char hex[in.size() * 2 + 1];
- unsigned int index;
- for (index = 0; index < in.size(); index++)
- sprintf(&hex[2 * index], "%02X", buf[index]);
- printf("%s", hex);
-}
-
-void output_hex(const char* buf, const int size) {
- char hex[size * 2 + 1];
- int index;
- for (index = 0; index < size; index++)
- sprintf(&hex[2 * index], "%02X", buf[index]);
- printf("%s", hex);
-}
-
-void output_hex(const unsigned char* buf, const int size) {
- char hex[size * 2 + 1];
- int index;
- for (index = 0; index < size; index++)
- sprintf(&hex[2 * index], "%02X", buf[index]);
- printf("%s", hex);
-}
-
-void output_hex(std::vector<uint8_t>* vec) {
- char hex[3];
- unsigned int index;
- for (index = 0; index < vec->size(); index++) {
- sprintf(&hex[0], "%02X", vec->at(index));
- printf("%s", hex);
- }
-}*/
-
-/* An alternative is to use:
- * sqlite3 /data/system/locksettings.db "SELECT value FROM locksettings WHERE name='sp-handle' AND user=0;"
- * but we really don't want to include the 1.1MB libsqlite in TWRP. We scan the spblob folder for the
- * password data file (*.pwd) and get the handle from the filename instead. This is a replacement for
- * https://android.googlesource.com/platform/frameworks/base/+/android-8.0.0_r23/services/core/java/com/android/server/locksettings/LockSettingsService.java#2017
- * We never use this data as an actual long. We always use it as a string. */
-bool Find_Handle(const std::string& spblob_path, std::string& handle_str) {
- DIR* dir = opendir(spblob_path.c_str());
- if (!dir) {
- printf("Error opening '%s'\n", spblob_path.c_str());
- return false;
- }
-
- struct dirent* de = 0;
-
- while ((de = readdir(dir)) != 0) {
- if (strcmp(de->d_name, ".") == 0 || strcmp(de->d_name, "..") == 0)
- continue;
- size_t len = strlen(de->d_name);
- if (len <= 4)
- continue;
- char* p = de->d_name;
- p += len - 4;
- if (strncmp(p, ".pwd", 4) == 0) {
- handle_str = de->d_name;
- handle_str = handle_str.substr(0, len - 4);
- //*handle = strtoull(handle_str.c_str(), 0 , 16);
- closedir(dir);
- return true;
- }
- }
- closedir(dir);
- return false;
-}
-
-/* This is the structure of the data in the password data (*.pwd) file which the structure can be found
- * https://android.googlesource.com/platform/frameworks/base/+/android-8.0.0_r23/services/core/java/com/android/server/locksettings/SyntheticPasswordManager.java#187 */
-struct password_data_struct {
- int password_type;
- unsigned char scryptN;
- unsigned char scryptR;
- unsigned char scryptP;
- int salt_len;
- void* salt;
- int handle_len;
- void* password_handle;
-};
-
-/* C++ replacement for
- * https://android.googlesource.com/platform/frameworks/base/+/android-8.0.0_r23/services/core/java/com/android/server/locksettings/SyntheticPasswordManager.java#764 */
-bool Get_Password_Data(const std::string& spblob_path, const std::string& handle_str, password_data_struct *pwd) {
- std::string pwd_file = spblob_path + handle_str + ".pwd";
- std::string pwd_data;
- if (!android::base::ReadFileToString(pwd_file, &pwd_data)) {
- printf("Failed to read '%s'\n", pwd_file.c_str());
- return false;
- }
- //output_hex(pwd_data.data(), pwd_data.size());printf("\n");
- const int* intptr = (const int*)pwd_data.data();
- pwd->password_type = *intptr;
- endianswap(&pwd->password_type);
- //printf("password type %i\n", pwd->password_type); // 2 was PIN, 1 for pattern, 2 also for password, -1 for default password
- const unsigned char* byteptr = (const unsigned char*)pwd_data.data() + sizeof(int);
- pwd->scryptN = *byteptr;
- byteptr++;
- pwd->scryptR = *byteptr;
- byteptr++;
- pwd->scryptP = *byteptr;
- byteptr++;
- intptr = (const int*)byteptr;
- pwd->salt_len = *intptr;
- endianswap(&pwd->salt_len);
- if (pwd->salt_len != 0) {
- pwd->salt = malloc(pwd->salt_len);
- if (!pwd->salt) {
- printf("Get_Password_Data malloc salt\n");
- return false;
- }
- memcpy(pwd->salt, intptr + 1, pwd->salt_len);
- intptr++;
- byteptr = (const unsigned char*)intptr;
- byteptr += pwd->salt_len;
- } else {
- printf("Get_Password_Data salt_len is 0\n");
- return false;
- }
- intptr = (const int*)byteptr;
- pwd->handle_len = *intptr;
- endianswap(&pwd->handle_len);
- if (pwd->handle_len != 0) {
- pwd->password_handle = malloc(pwd->handle_len);
- if (!pwd->password_handle) {
- printf("Get_Password_Data malloc password_handle\n");
- return false;
- }
- memcpy(pwd->password_handle, intptr + 1, pwd->handle_len);
- } else {
- printf("Get_Password_Data handle_len is 0\n");
- // Not an error if using weaver
- }
- return true;
-}
-
-/* C++ replacement for
- * https://android.googlesource.com/platform/frameworks/base/+/android-8.0.0_r23/services/core/java/com/android/server/locksettings/SyntheticPasswordManager.java#765
- * called here
- * https://android.googlesource.com/platform/frameworks/base/+/android-8.0.0_r23/services/core/java/com/android/server/locksettings/SyntheticPasswordManager.java#1050 */
-bool Get_Password_Token(const password_data_struct *pwd, const std::string& Password, unsigned char* password_token) {
- if (!password_token) {
- printf("password_token is null\n");
- return false;
- }
- unsigned int N = 1 << pwd->scryptN;
- unsigned int r = 1 << pwd->scryptR;
- unsigned int p = 1 << pwd->scryptP;
- //printf("N %i r %i p %i\n", N, r, p);
- int ret = crypto_scrypt(reinterpret_cast<const uint8_t*>(Password.data()), Password.size(),
- reinterpret_cast<const uint8_t*>(pwd->salt), pwd->salt_len,
- N, r, p,
- password_token, 32);
- if (ret != 0) {
- printf("scrypt error\n");
- return false;
- }
- return true;
-}
-
-// Data structure for the *.weaver file, see Get_Weaver_Data below
-struct weaver_data_struct {
- unsigned char version;
- int slot;
-};
-
-/* C++ replacement for
- * https://android.googlesource.com/platform/frameworks/base/+/android-8.0.0_r23/services/core/java/com/android/server/locksettings/SyntheticPasswordManager.java#501
- * called here
- * https://android.googlesource.com/platform/frameworks/base/+/android-8.0.0_r23/services/core/java/com/android/server/locksettings/SyntheticPasswordManager.java#768 */
-bool Get_Weaver_Data(const std::string& spblob_path, const std::string& handle_str, weaver_data_struct *wd) {
- std::string weaver_file = spblob_path + handle_str + ".weaver";
- std::string weaver_data;
- if (!android::base::ReadFileToString(weaver_file, &weaver_data)) {
- printf("Failed to read '%s'\n", weaver_file.c_str());
- return false;
- }
- //output_hex(weaver_data.data(), weaver_data.size());printf("\n");
- const unsigned char* byteptr = (const unsigned char*)weaver_data.data();
- wd->version = *byteptr;
- //printf("weaver version %i\n", wd->version);
- const int* intptr = (const int*)weaver_data.data() + sizeof(unsigned char);
- wd->slot = *intptr;
- //endianswap(&wd->slot); not needed
- //printf("weaver slot %i\n", wd->slot);
- return true;
-}
-
-namespace android {
-
-// On Android 8.0 for some reason init can't seem to completely stop keystore
-// so we have to kill it too if it doesn't die on its own.
-static void kill_keystore() {
- DIR* dir = opendir("/proc");
- if (dir) {
- struct dirent* de = 0;
-
- while ((de = readdir(dir)) != 0) {
- if (strcmp(de->d_name, ".") == 0 || strcmp(de->d_name, "..") == 0)
- continue;
-
- int pid = -1;
- int ret = sscanf(de->d_name, "%d", &pid);
-
- if (ret == 1) {
- char cmdpath[PATH_MAX];
- sprintf(cmdpath, "/proc/%d/cmdline", pid);
-
- FILE* file = fopen(cmdpath, "r");
- size_t task_size = PATH_MAX;
- char task[PATH_MAX];
- char* p = task;
- if (getline(&p, &task_size, file) > 0) {
- if (strstr(task, "keystore") != 0) {
- printf("keystore pid %d found, sending kill.\n", pid);
- kill(pid, SIGINT);
- usleep(5000);
- kill(pid, SIGKILL);
- }
- }
- fclose(file);
- }
- }
- closedir(dir);
- }
-}
-
-// The keystore holds a file open on /data so we have to stop / kill it
-// if we want to be able to unmount /data for things like formatting.
-static void stop_keystore() {
- printf("Stopping keystore...\n");
- property_set("ctl.stop", "keystore");
- usleep(5000);
- kill_keystore();
-}
-
-/* These next 2 functions try to get the keystore service 50 times because
- * the keystore is not always ready when TWRP boots */
-sp<IBinder> getKeystoreBinder() {
- sp<IServiceManager> sm = defaultServiceManager();
- return sm->getService(String16("android.security.keystore"));
-}
-
-sp<IBinder> getKeystoreBinderRetry() {
- printf("Starting keystore...\n");
- property_set("ctl.start", "keystore");
- int retry_count = 50;
- sp<IBinder> binder = getKeystoreBinder();
- while (binder == NULL && retry_count) {
- printf("Waiting for keystore service... %i\n", retry_count--);
- sleep(1);
- binder = getKeystoreBinder();
- }
- return binder;
-}
-
-namespace keystore {
-
-#define SYNTHETIC_PASSWORD_VERSION_V1 1
-#define SYNTHETIC_PASSWORD_VERSION_V2 2
-#define SYNTHETIC_PASSWORD_VERSION_V3 3
-#define SYNTHETIC_PASSWORD_PASSWORD_BASED 0
-#define SYNTHETIC_PASSWORD_KEY_PREFIX "USRSKEY_synthetic_password_"
-#define USR_PRIVATE_KEY_PREFIX "USRPKEY_synthetic_password_"
-
-static std::string mKey_Prefix;
-
-/* The keystore alias subid is sometimes the same as the handle, but not always.
- * In the case of handle 0c5303fd2010fe29, the alias subid used c5303fd2010fe29
- * without the leading 0. We could try to parse the data from a previous
- * keystore request, but I think this is an easier solution because there
- * is little to no documentation on the format of data we get back from
- * the keystore in this instance. We also want to copy everything to a temp
- * folder so that any key upgrades that might take place do not actually
- * upgrade the keys on the data partition. We rename all 1000 uid files to 0
- * to pass the keystore permission checks. */
-bool Find_Keystore_Alias_SubID_And_Prep_Files(const userid_t user_id, std::string& keystoreid, const std::string& handle_str) {
- char path_c[PATH_MAX];
- sprintf(path_c, "/data/misc/keystore/user_%d", user_id);
- char user_dir[PATH_MAX];
- sprintf(user_dir, "user_%d", user_id);
- std::string source_path = "/data/misc/keystore/";
- source_path += user_dir;
- std::string handle_sub = handle_str;
- while (handle_sub.substr(0,1) == "0") {
- std::string temp = handle_sub.substr(1);
- handle_sub = temp;
- }
- mKey_Prefix = "";
-
- mkdir("/tmp/misc", 0755);
- mkdir("/tmp/misc/keystore", 0755);
- std::string destination_path = "/tmp/misc/keystore/";
- destination_path += user_dir;
- if (mkdir(destination_path.c_str(), 0755) && errno != EEXIST) {
- printf("failed to mkdir '%s' %s\n", destination_path.c_str(), strerror(errno));
- return false;
- }
- destination_path += "/";
-
- DIR* dir = opendir(source_path.c_str());
- if (!dir) {
- printf("Error opening '%s'\n", source_path.c_str());
- return false;
- }
- source_path += "/";
-
- struct dirent* de = 0;
- size_t prefix_len = strlen(SYNTHETIC_PASSWORD_KEY_PREFIX);
- bool found_subid = false;
- bool has_pkey = false; // PKEY has priority over SKEY
-
- while ((de = readdir(dir)) != 0) {
- if (strcmp(de->d_name, ".") == 0 || strcmp(de->d_name, "..") == 0)
- continue;
- if (!found_subid) {
- size_t len = strlen(de->d_name);
- if (len <= prefix_len)
- continue;
- if (strstr(de->d_name, SYNTHETIC_PASSWORD_KEY_PREFIX) && !has_pkey)
- mKey_Prefix = SYNTHETIC_PASSWORD_KEY_PREFIX;
- else if (strstr(de->d_name, USR_PRIVATE_KEY_PREFIX)) {
- mKey_Prefix = USR_PRIVATE_KEY_PREFIX;
- has_pkey = true;
- } else
- continue;
- if (strstr(de->d_name, handle_sub.c_str())) {
- keystoreid = handle_sub;
- printf("keystoreid matched handle_sub: '%s'\n", keystoreid.c_str());
- found_subid = true;
- } else {
- std::string file = de->d_name;
- std::size_t found = file.find_last_of("_");
- if (found != std::string::npos) {
- keystoreid = file.substr(found + 1);
- printf("possible keystoreid: '%s'\n", keystoreid.c_str());
- //found_subid = true; // we'll keep going in hopes that we find a pkey or a match to the handle_sub
- }
- }
- }
- std::string src = source_path;
- src += de->d_name;
- std::ifstream srcif(src.c_str(), std::ios::binary);
- std::string dst = destination_path;
- dst += de->d_name;
- std::size_t source_uid = dst.find("1000");
- if (source_uid != std::string::npos)
- dst.replace(source_uid, 4, "0");
- std::ofstream dstof(dst.c_str(), std::ios::binary);
- printf("copying '%s' to '%s'\n", src.c_str(), dst.c_str());
- dstof << srcif.rdbuf();
- srcif.close();
- dstof.close();
- }
- closedir(dir);
- if (!found_subid && !mKey_Prefix.empty() && !keystoreid.empty())
- found_subid = true;
- return found_subid;
-}
-
-/* C++ replacement for function of the same name
- * https://android.googlesource.com/platform/frameworks/base/+/android-8.0.0_r23/services/core/java/com/android/server/locksettings/SyntheticPasswordManager.java#867
- * returning an empty string indicates an error */
-std::string unwrapSyntheticPasswordBlob(const std::string& spblob_path, const std::string& handle_str, const userid_t user_id, const void* application_id, const size_t application_id_size, uint32_t auth_token_len) {
- std::string disk_decryption_secret_key = "";
-
- std::string keystore_alias_subid;
- // Can be stored in user 0, so check for both.
- if (!Find_Keystore_Alias_SubID_And_Prep_Files(user_id, keystore_alias_subid, handle_str) &&
- !Find_Keystore_Alias_SubID_And_Prep_Files(0, keystore_alias_subid, handle_str))
- {
- printf("failed to scan keystore alias subid and prep keystore files\n");
- return disk_decryption_secret_key;
- }
-
- // First get the keystore service
- sp<IBinder> binder = getKeystoreBinderRetry();
-#ifdef USE_KEYSTORAGE_4
- sp<IKeystoreService> service = interface_cast<IKeystoreService>(binder);
-#else
- sp<IKeystoreService> service = interface_cast<IKeystoreService>(binder);
-#endif
- if (service == NULL) {
- printf("error: could not connect to keystore service\n");
- return disk_decryption_secret_key;
- }
-
- if (auth_token_len > 0) {
- printf("Starting keystore_auth service...\n");
- property_set("ctl.start", "keystore_auth");
- }
-
- // Read the data from the .spblob file per: https://android.googlesource.com/platform/frameworks/base/+/android-8.0.0_r23/services/core/java/com/android/server/locksettings/SyntheticPasswordManager.java#869
- std::string spblob_file = spblob_path + handle_str + ".spblob";
- std::string spblob_data;
- if (!android::base::ReadFileToString(spblob_file, &spblob_data)) {
- printf("Failed to read '%s'\n", spblob_file.c_str());
- return disk_decryption_secret_key;
- }
- unsigned char* byteptr = (unsigned char*)spblob_data.data();
- if (*byteptr != SYNTHETIC_PASSWORD_VERSION_V2 && *byteptr != SYNTHETIC_PASSWORD_VERSION_V1
- && *byteptr != SYNTHETIC_PASSWORD_VERSION_V3) {
- printf("Unsupported synthetic password version %i\n", *byteptr);
- return disk_decryption_secret_key;
- }
- const unsigned char* synthetic_password_version = byteptr;
- byteptr++;
- if (*byteptr != SYNTHETIC_PASSWORD_PASSWORD_BASED) {
- printf("spblob data is not SYNTHETIC_PASSWORD_PASSWORD_BASED\n");
- return disk_decryption_secret_key;
- }
- byteptr++; // Now we're pointing to the blob data itself
- if (*synthetic_password_version == SYNTHETIC_PASSWORD_VERSION_V1) {
- printf("spblob v1\n");
- /* We're now going to handle decryptSPBlob: https://android.googlesource.com/platform/frameworks/base/+/android-8.0.0_r23/services/core/java/com/android/server/locksettings/SyntheticPasswordCrypto.java#115
- * Called from https://android.googlesource.com/platform/frameworks/base/+/android-8.0.0_r23/services/core/java/com/android/server/locksettings/SyntheticPasswordManager.java#879
- * This small function ends up being quite a headache. The call to get data from the keystore basically is not needed in TWRP at this time.
- * The keystore data seems to be the serialized data from an entire class in Java. Specifically I think it represents:
- * https://android.googlesource.com/platform/frameworks/base/+/android-8.0.0_r23/keystore/java/android/security/keystore/AndroidKeyStoreCipherSpiBase.java
- * or perhaps
- * https://android.googlesource.com/platform/frameworks/base/+/android-8.0.0_r23/keystore/java/android/security/keystore/AndroidKeyStoreAuthenticatedAESCipherSpi.java
- * but the only things we "need" from this keystore are a user ID and the keyAlias which ends up being USRSKEY_synthetic_password_{handle_str}
- * the latter of which we already have. We may need to figure out how to get the user ID if we ever support decrypting mulitple users.
- * There are 2 calls to a Java decrypt funcion that is overloaded. These 2 calls go in completely different directions despite the seemingly
- * similar use of decrypt() and decrypt parameters. To figure out where things were going, I added logging to:
- * https://android.googlesource.com/platform/libcore/+/android-8.0.0_r23/ojluni/src/main/java/javax/crypto/Cipher.java#2575
- * Logger.global.severe("Cipher tryCombinations " + prov.getName() + " - " + prov.getInfo());
- * To make logging work in libcore, import java.util.logging.Logger; and either set a better logging level or modify the framework to log everything
- * regardless of logging level. This will give you some strings that you can grep for and find the actual crypto provider in use. In our case there were
- * 2 different providers in use. The first stage to get the intermediate key used:
- * https://android.googlesource.com/platform/external/conscrypt/+/android-8.0.0_r23/common/src/main/java/org/conscrypt/OpenSSLProvider.java
- * which is a pretty straight-forward OpenSSL implementation of AES/GCM/NoPadding. */
- // First we personalize as seen https://android.googlesource.com/platform/frameworks/base/+/android-8.0.0_r23/services/core/java/com/android/server/locksettings/SyntheticPasswordCrypto.java#102
- void* personalized_application_id = PersonalizedHashBinary(PERSONALISATION_APPLICATION_ID, (const char*)application_id, application_id_size);
- if (!personalized_application_id) {
- printf("malloc personalized_application_id\n");
- return disk_decryption_secret_key;
- }
- //printf("personalized application id: "); output_hex((unsigned char*)personalized_application_id, SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH); printf("\n");
- // Now we'll decrypt using openssl AES/GCM/NoPadding
- OpenSSL_add_all_ciphers();
- int actual_size=0, final_size=0;
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX *d_ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
- const unsigned char* iv = (const unsigned char*)byteptr; // The IV is the first 12 bytes of the spblob
- //printf("iv: "); output_hex((const unsigned char*)iv, 12); printf("\n");
- const unsigned char* cipher_text = (const unsigned char*)byteptr + 12; // The cipher text comes immediately after the IV
- //printf("cipher_text: "); output_hex((const unsigned char*)cipher_text, spblob_data.size() - 2 - 12); printf("\n");
- const unsigned char* key = (const unsigned char*)personalized_application_id; // The key is the now personalized copy of the application ID
- //printf("key: "); output_hex((const unsigned char*)key, 32); printf("\n");
- EVP_DecryptInit(d_ctx, EVP_aes_256_gcm(), key, iv);
- std::vector<unsigned char> intermediate_key;
- intermediate_key.resize(spblob_data.size() - 2 - 12, '\0');
- EVP_DecryptUpdate(d_ctx, &intermediate_key[0], &actual_size, cipher_text, spblob_data.size() - 2 - 12);
- unsigned char tag[AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(d_ctx, EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_TAG, 16, tag);
- EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(d_ctx, &intermediate_key[actual_size], &final_size);
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(d_ctx);
- free(personalized_application_id);
- //printf("spblob_data size: %lu actual_size %i, final_size: %i\n", spblob_data.size(), actual_size, final_size);
- intermediate_key.resize(actual_size + final_size - 16, '\0');// not sure why we have to trim the size by 16 as I don't see where this is done in Java side
- //printf("intermediate key: "); output_hex((const unsigned char*)intermediate_key.data(), intermediate_key.size()); printf("\n");
-
- // When using secdis (aka not weaver) you must supply an auth token to the keystore prior to the begin operation
- if (auth_token_len > 0) {
- /*::keystore::KeyStoreServiceReturnCode auth_result = service->addAuthToken(auth_token, auth_token_len);
- if (!auth_result.isOk()) {
- // The keystore checks the uid of the calling process and will return a permission denied on this operation for user 0
- printf("keystore error adding auth token\n");
- return disk_decryption_secret_key;
- }*/
- // The keystore refuses to allow the root user to supply auth tokens, so we write the auth token to a file earlier and
- // run a separate service that runs user the system user to add the auth token. We wait for the auth token file to be
- // deleted by the keymaster_auth service and check for a /auth_error file in case of errors. We quit after after a while if
- // the /auth_token file never gets deleted.
- int auth_wait_count = 20;
- while (access("/auth_token", F_OK) == 0 && auth_wait_count-- > 0)
- usleep(5000);
- if (auth_wait_count == 0 || access("/auth_error", F_OK) == 0) {
- printf("error during keymaster_auth service\n");
- /* If you are getting this error, make sure that you have the keymaster_auth service defined in your init scripts, preferrably in init.recovery.{ro.hardware}.rc
- * service keystore_auth /system/bin/keystore_auth
- * disabled
- * oneshot
- * user system
- * group root
- * seclabel u:r:recovery:s0
- *
- * And check dmesg for error codes regarding this service if needed. */
- return disk_decryption_secret_key;
- }
- }
-
- int32_t ret;
-
- /* We only need a keyAlias which is USRSKEY_synthetic_password_b6f71045af7bd042 which we find and a uid which is -1 or 1000, I forget which
- * as the key data will be read again by the begin function later via the keystore.
- * The data is in a hidl_vec format which consists of a type and a value. */
- /*::keystore::hidl_vec<uint8_t> data;
- std::string keystoreid = SYNTHETIC_PASSWORD_KEY_PREFIX;
- keystoreid += handle_str;
-
- ret = service->get(String16(keystoreid.c_str()), user_id, &data);
- if (ret < 0) {
- printf("Could not connect to keystore service %i\n", ret);
- return disk_decryption_secret_key;
- } else if (ret != 1 /*android::keystore::ResponseCode::NO_ERROR*//*) {
- printf("keystore error: (%d)\n", /*responses[ret],*//* ret);
- return disk_decryption_secret_key;
- } else {
- printf("keystore returned: "); output_hex(&data[0], data.size()); printf("\n");
- }*/
-
- // Now we'll break up the intermediate key into the IV (first 12 bytes) and the cipher text (the rest of it).
- std::vector<unsigned char> nonce = intermediate_key;
- nonce.resize(12);
- intermediate_key.erase (intermediate_key.begin(),intermediate_key.begin()+12);
- //printf("nonce: "); output_hex((const unsigned char*)nonce.data(), nonce.size()); printf("\n");
- //printf("cipher text: "); output_hex((const unsigned char*)intermediate_key.data(), intermediate_key.size()); printf("\n");
-
- /* Now we will begin the second decrypt call found in
- * https://android.googlesource.com/platform/frameworks/base/+/android-8.0.0_r23/services/core/java/com/android/server/locksettings/SyntheticPasswordCrypto.java#122
- * This time we will use https://android.googlesource.com/platform/frameworks/base/+/android-8.0.0_r23/keystore/java/android/security/keystore/AndroidKeyStoreCipherSpiBase.java
- * and https://android.googlesource.com/platform/frameworks/base/+/android-8.0.0_r23/keystore/java/android/security/keystore/AndroidKeyStoreAuthenticatedAESCipherSpi.java
- * First we set some algorithm parameters as seen in two places:
- * https://android.googlesource.com/platform/frameworks/base/+/android-8.0.0_r23/keystore/java/android/security/keystore/AndroidKeyStoreAuthenticatedAESCipherSpi.java#297
- * https://android.googlesource.com/platform/frameworks/base/+/android-8.0.0_r23/keystore/java/android/security/keystore/AndroidKeyStoreAuthenticatedAESCipherSpi.java#216 */
- size_t maclen = 128;
- ::keystore::AuthorizationSetBuilder begin_params;
- begin_params.Authorization(::keystore::TAG_ALGORITHM, ::keystore::Algorithm::AES);
- begin_params.Authorization(::keystore::TAG_BLOCK_MODE, ::keystore::BlockMode::GCM);
- begin_params.Padding(::keystore::PaddingMode::NONE);
- begin_params.Authorization(::keystore::TAG_NONCE, nonce);
- begin_params.Authorization(::keystore::TAG_MAC_LENGTH, maclen);
- //keymasterArgs.addEnum(KeymasterDefs.KM_TAG_ALGORITHM, KeymasterDefs.KM_ALGORITHM_AES);
- //keymasterArgs.addEnum(KeymasterDefs.KM_TAG_BLOCK_MODE, mKeymasterBlockMode);
- //keymasterArgs.addEnum(KeymasterDefs.KM_TAG_PADDING, mKeymasterPadding);
- //keymasterArgs.addUnsignedInt(KeymasterDefs.KM_TAG_MAC_LENGTH, mTagLengthBits);
- ::keystore::hidl_vec<uint8_t> entropy; // No entropy is needed for decrypt
- entropy.resize(0);
- std::string keystore_alias = mKey_Prefix;
- keystore_alias += keystore_alias_subid;
- String16 keystore_alias16(keystore_alias.c_str());
-#ifdef USE_KEYSTORAGE_4
- android::hardware::keymaster::V4_0::KeyPurpose purpose = android::hardware::keymaster::V4_0::KeyPurpose::DECRYPT;
- security::keymaster::OperationResult begin_result;
- security::keymaster::OperationResult update_result;
- security::keymaster::OperationResult finish_result;
- ::android::security::keymaster::KeymasterArguments empty_params;
- // These parameters are mostly driven by the cipher.init call https://android.googlesource.com/platform/frameworks/base/+/android-8.0.0_r23/services/core/java/com/android/server/locksettings/SyntheticPasswordCrypto.java#63
- service->begin(binder, keystore_alias16, (int32_t)purpose, true, android::security::keymaster::KeymasterArguments(begin_params.hidl_data()), entropy, -1, &begin_result);
-#else
- ::keystore::KeyPurpose purpose = ::keystore::KeyPurpose::DECRYPT;
- OperationResult begin_result;
- OperationResult update_result;
- OperationResult finish_result;
- ::keystore::hidl_vec<::keystore::KeyParameter> empty_params;
- empty_params.resize(0);
- // These parameters are mostly driven by the cipher.init call https://android.googlesource.com/platform/frameworks/base/+/android-8.0.0_r23/services/core/java/com/android/server/locksettings/SyntheticPasswordCrypto.java#63
- service->begin(binder, keystore_alias16, purpose, true, begin_params.hidl_data(), entropy, -1, &begin_result);
-#endif
- ret = begin_result.resultCode;
- if (ret != 1 /*android::keystore::ResponseCode::NO_ERROR*/) {
- printf("keystore begin error: (%d)\n", /*responses[ret],*/ ret);
- return disk_decryption_secret_key;
- } else {
- //printf("keystore begin operation successful\n");
- }
- // The cipher.doFinal call triggers an update to the keystore followed by a finish https://android.googlesource.com/platform/frameworks/base/+/android-8.0.0_r23/services/core/java/com/android/server/locksettings/SyntheticPasswordCrypto.java#64
- // See also https://android.googlesource.com/platform/frameworks/base/+/android-8.0.0_r23/keystore/java/android/security/keystore/KeyStoreCryptoOperationChunkedStreamer.java#208
- service->update(begin_result.token, empty_params, intermediate_key, &update_result);
- ret = update_result.resultCode;
- if (ret != 1 /*android::keystore::ResponseCode::NO_ERROR*/) {
- printf("keystore update error: (%d)\n", /*responses[ret],*/ ret);
- return disk_decryption_secret_key;
- } else {
- //printf("keystore update operation successful\n");
- //printf("keystore update returned: "); output_hex(&update_result.data[0], update_result.data.size()); printf("\n"); // this ends up being the synthetic password
- }
- // We must use the data in update_data.data before we call finish below or the data will be gone
- // The payload data from the keystore update is further personalized at https://android.googlesource.com/platform/frameworks/base/+/android-8.0.0_r23/services/core/java/com/android/server/locksettings/SyntheticPasswordManager.java#153
- // We now have the disk decryption key!
- disk_decryption_secret_key = PersonalizedHash(PERSONALIZATION_FBE_KEY, (const char*)&update_result.data[0], update_result.data.size());
- //printf("disk_decryption_secret_key: '%s'\n", disk_decryption_secret_key.c_str());
- ::keystore::hidl_vec<uint8_t> signature;
- service->finish(begin_result.token, empty_params, signature, entropy, &finish_result);
- ret = finish_result.resultCode;
- if (ret != 1 /*android::keystore::ResponseCode::NO_ERROR*/) {
- printf("keystore finish error: (%d)\n", /*responses[ret],*/ ret);
- return disk_decryption_secret_key;
- } else {
- //printf("keystore finish operation successful\n");
- }
- stop_keystore();
- return disk_decryption_secret_key;
- } else if (*synthetic_password_version == SYNTHETIC_PASSWORD_VERSION_V2
- || *synthetic_password_version == SYNTHETIC_PASSWORD_VERSION_V3) {
- printf("spblob v2 / v3\n");
- /* Version 2 / 3 of the spblob is basically the same as version 1, but the order of getting the intermediate key and disk decryption key have been flip-flopped
- * as seen in https://android.googlesource.com/platform/frameworks/base/+/5025791ac6d1538224e19189397de8d71dcb1a12
- */
- /* First decrypt call found in
- * https://android.googlesource.com/platform/frameworks/base/+/android-8.1.0_r18/services/core/java/com/android/server/locksettings/SyntheticPasswordCrypto.java#135
- * We will use https://android.googlesource.com/platform/frameworks/base/+/android-8.0.0_r23/keystore/java/android/security/keystore/AndroidKeyStoreCipherSpiBase.java
- * and https://android.googlesource.com/platform/frameworks/base/+/android-8.0.0_r23/keystore/java/android/security/keystore/AndroidKeyStoreAuthenticatedAESCipherSpi.java
- * First we set some algorithm parameters as seen in two places:
- * https://android.googlesource.com/platform/frameworks/base/+/android-8.0.0_r23/keystore/java/android/security/keystore/AndroidKeyStoreAuthenticatedAESCipherSpi.java#297
- * https://android.googlesource.com/platform/frameworks/base/+/android-8.0.0_r23/keystore/java/android/security/keystore/AndroidKeyStoreAuthenticatedAESCipherSpi.java#216 */
- // When using secdis (aka not weaver) you must supply an auth token to the keystore prior to the begin operation
- if (auth_token_len > 0) {
- /*::keystore::KeyStoreServiceReturnCode auth_result = service->addAuthToken(auth_token, auth_token_len);
- if (!auth_result.isOk()) {
- // The keystore checks the uid of the calling process and will return a permission denied on this operation for user 0
- printf("keystore error adding auth token\n");
- return disk_decryption_secret_key;
- }*/
- // The keystore refuses to allow the root user to supply auth tokens, so we write the auth token to a file earlier and
- // run a separate service that runs user the system user to add the auth token. We wait for the auth token file to be
- // deleted by the keymaster_auth service and check for a /auth_error file in case of errors. We quit after after a while if
- // the /auth_token file never gets deleted.
- int auth_wait_count = 20;
- while (access("/auth_token", F_OK) == 0 && auth_wait_count-- > 0)
- usleep(5000);
- if (auth_wait_count == 0 || access("/auth_error", F_OK) == 0) {
- printf("error during keymaster_auth service\n");
- /* If you are getting this error, make sure that you have the keymaster_auth service defined in your init scripts, preferrably in init.recovery.{ro.hardware}.rc
- * service keystore_auth /system/bin/keystore_auth
- * disabled
- * oneshot
- * user system
- * group root
- * seclabel u:r:recovery:s0
- *
- * And check dmesg for error codes regarding this service if needed. */
- return disk_decryption_secret_key;
- }
- }
- int32_t ret;
- size_t maclen = 128;
- unsigned char* iv = (unsigned char*)byteptr; // The IV is the first 12 bytes of the spblob
- ::keystore::hidl_vec<uint8_t> iv_hidlvec;
- iv_hidlvec.setToExternal((unsigned char*)byteptr, 12);
- //printf("iv: "); output_hex((const unsigned char*)iv, 12); printf("\n");
- unsigned char* cipher_text = (unsigned char*)byteptr + 12; // The cipher text comes immediately after the IV
- ::keystore::hidl_vec<uint8_t> cipher_text_hidlvec;
- cipher_text_hidlvec.setToExternal(cipher_text, spblob_data.size() - 14 /* 1 each for version and SYNTHETIC_PASSWORD_PASSWORD_BASED and 12 for the iv */);
- ::keystore::AuthorizationSetBuilder begin_params;
- begin_params.Authorization(::keystore::TAG_ALGORITHM, ::keystore::Algorithm::AES);
- begin_params.Authorization(::keystore::TAG_BLOCK_MODE, ::keystore::BlockMode::GCM);
- begin_params.Padding(::keystore::PaddingMode::NONE);
- begin_params.Authorization(::keystore::TAG_NONCE, iv_hidlvec);
- begin_params.Authorization(::keystore::TAG_MAC_LENGTH, maclen);
- ::keystore::hidl_vec<uint8_t> entropy; // No entropy is needed for decrypt
- entropy.resize(0);
- std::string keystore_alias = mKey_Prefix;
- keystore_alias += keystore_alias_subid;
- String16 keystore_alias16(keystore_alias.c_str());
-#ifdef USE_KEYSTORAGE_4
- android::hardware::keymaster::V4_0::KeyPurpose purpose = android::hardware::keymaster::V4_0::KeyPurpose::DECRYPT;
- security::keymaster::OperationResult begin_result;
- security::keymaster::OperationResult update_result;
- security::keymaster::OperationResult finish_result;
- ::android::security::keymaster::KeymasterArguments empty_params;
- // These parameters are mostly driven by the cipher.init call https://android.googlesource.com/platform/frameworks/base/+/android-8.0.0_r23/services/core/java/com/android/server/locksettings/SyntheticPasswordCrypto.java#63
- service->begin(binder, keystore_alias16, (int32_t)purpose, true, android::security::keymaster::KeymasterArguments(begin_params.hidl_data()), entropy, -1, &begin_result);
-#else
- ::keystore::KeyPurpose purpose = ::keystore::KeyPurpose::DECRYPT;
- OperationResult begin_result;
- OperationResult update_result;
- OperationResult finish_result;
- ::keystore::hidl_vec<::keystore::KeyParameter> empty_params;
- empty_params.resize(0);
- // These parameters are mostly driven by the cipher.init call https://android.googlesource.com/platform/frameworks/base/+/android-8.0.0_r23/services/core/java/com/android/server/locksettings/SyntheticPasswordCrypto.java#63
- service->begin(binder, keystore_alias16, purpose, true, begin_params.hidl_data(), entropy, -1, &begin_result);
-#endif
- ret = begin_result.resultCode;
- if (ret != 1 /*android::keystore::ResponseCode::NO_ERROR*/) {
- printf("keystore begin error: (%d)\n", /*responses[ret],*/ ret);
- return disk_decryption_secret_key;
- } /*else {
- printf("keystore begin operation successful\n");
- }*/
- // The cipher.doFinal call triggers an update to the keystore followed by a finish https://android.googlesource.com/platform/frameworks/base/+/android-8.0.0_r23/services/core/java/com/android/server/locksettings/SyntheticPasswordCrypto.java#64
- // See also https://android.googlesource.com/platform/frameworks/base/+/android-8.0.0_r23/keystore/java/android/security/keystore/KeyStoreCryptoOperationChunkedStreamer.java#208
- service->update(begin_result.token, empty_params, cipher_text_hidlvec, &update_result);
- ret = update_result.resultCode;
- if (ret != 1 /*android::keystore::ResponseCode::NO_ERROR*/) {
- printf("keystore update error: (%d)\n", /*responses[ret],*/ ret);
- return disk_decryption_secret_key;
- } /*else {
- printf("keystore update operation successful\n");
- printf("keystore update returned: "); output_hex(&update_result.data[0], update_result.data.size()); printf("\n"); // this ends up being the synthetic password
- }*/
- //printf("keystore resulting data: "); output_hex((unsigned char*)&update_result.data[0], update_result.data.size()); printf("\n");
- // We must copy the data in update_data.data before we call finish below or the data will be gone
- size_t keystore_result_size = update_result.data.size();
- unsigned char* keystore_result = (unsigned char*)malloc(keystore_result_size);
- if (!keystore_result) {
- printf("malloc on keystore_result\n");
- return disk_decryption_secret_key;
- }
- memcpy(keystore_result, &update_result.data[0], update_result.data.size());
- //printf("keystore_result data: "); output_hex(keystore_result, keystore_result_size); printf("\n");
- ::keystore::hidl_vec<uint8_t> signature;
- service->finish(begin_result.token, empty_params, signature, entropy, &finish_result);
- ret = finish_result.resultCode;
- if (ret != 1 /*android::keystore::ResponseCode::NO_ERROR*/) {
- printf("keystore finish error: (%d)\n", /*responses[ret],*/ ret);
- free(keystore_result);
- return disk_decryption_secret_key;
- } /*else {
- printf("keystore finish operation successful\n");
- }*/
- stop_keystore();
-
- /* Now we do the second decrypt call as seen in:
- * https://android.googlesource.com/platform/frameworks/base/+/android-8.1.0_r18/services/core/java/com/android/server/locksettings/SyntheticPasswordCrypto.java#136
- */
- const unsigned char* intermediate_iv = keystore_result;
- //printf("intermediate_iv: "); output_hex((const unsigned char*)intermediate_iv, 12); printf("\n");
- const unsigned char* intermediate_cipher_text = (const unsigned char*)keystore_result + 12; // The cipher text comes immediately after the IV
- int cipher_size = keystore_result_size - 12;
- //printf("intermediate_cipher_text: "); output_hex((const unsigned char*)intermediate_cipher_text, cipher_size); printf("\n");
- // First we personalize as seen https://android.googlesource.com/platform/frameworks/base/+/android-8.0.0_r23/services/core/java/com/android/server/locksettings/SyntheticPasswordCrypto.java#102
- void* personalized_application_id = PersonalizedHashBinary(PERSONALISATION_APPLICATION_ID, (const char*)application_id, application_id_size);
- if (!personalized_application_id) {
- printf("malloc personalized_application_id\n");
- free(keystore_result);
- return disk_decryption_secret_key;
- }
- //printf("personalized application id: "); output_hex((unsigned char*)personalized_application_id, SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH); printf("\n");
- // Now we'll decrypt using openssl AES/GCM/NoPadding
- OpenSSL_add_all_ciphers();
- int actual_size=0, final_size=0;
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX *d_ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
- const unsigned char* key = (const unsigned char*)personalized_application_id; // The key is the now personalized copy of the application ID
- //printf("key: "); output_hex((const unsigned char*)key, 32); printf("\n");
- EVP_DecryptInit(d_ctx, EVP_aes_256_gcm(), key, intermediate_iv);
- unsigned char* secret_key = (unsigned char*)malloc(cipher_size);
- EVP_DecryptUpdate(d_ctx, secret_key, &actual_size, intermediate_cipher_text, cipher_size);
- unsigned char tag[AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(d_ctx, EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_TAG, 16, tag);
- EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(d_ctx, secret_key + actual_size, &final_size);
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(d_ctx);
- free(personalized_application_id);
- free(keystore_result);
- int secret_key_real_size = actual_size - 16;
- //printf("secret key: "); output_hex((const unsigned char*)secret_key, secret_key_real_size); printf("\n");
- // The payload data from the keystore update is further personalized at https://android.googlesource.com/platform/frameworks/base/+/android-8.0.0_r23/services/core/java/com/android/server/locksettings/SyntheticPasswordManager.java#153
- // We now have the disk decryption key!
- if (*synthetic_password_version == SYNTHETIC_PASSWORD_VERSION_V3) {
- // V3 uses SP800 instead of SHA512
- disk_decryption_secret_key = PersonalizedHashSP800(PERSONALIZATION_FBE_KEY, PERSONALISATION_CONTEXT, (const char*)secret_key, secret_key_real_size);
- } else {
- disk_decryption_secret_key = PersonalizedHash(PERSONALIZATION_FBE_KEY, (const char*)secret_key, secret_key_real_size);
- }
- //printf("disk_decryption_secret_key: '%s'\n", disk_decryption_secret_key.c_str());
- free(secret_key);
- return disk_decryption_secret_key;
- }
- return disk_decryption_secret_key;
-}
-
-}}
-
-#define PASSWORD_TOKEN_SIZE 32
-
-/* C++ replacement for
- * https://android.googlesource.com/platform/frameworks/base/+/android-8.0.0_r23/services/core/java/com/android/server/locksettings/SyntheticPasswordManager.java#992
- * called here
- * https://android.googlesource.com/platform/frameworks/base/+/android-8.0.0_r23/services/core/java/com/android/server/locksettings/SyntheticPasswordManager.java#813 */
-bool Get_Secdis(const std::string& spblob_path, const std::string& handle_str, std::string& secdis_data) {
- std::string secdis_file = spblob_path + handle_str + ".secdis";
- if (!android::base::ReadFileToString(secdis_file, &secdis_data)) {
- printf("Failed to read '%s'\n", secdis_file.c_str());
- return false;
- }
- //output_hex(secdis_data.data(), secdis_data.size());printf("\n");
- return true;
-}
-
-// C++ replacement for https://android.googlesource.com/platform/frameworks/base/+/android-8.0.0_r23/services/core/java/com/android/server/locksettings/SyntheticPasswordManager.java#1033
-userid_t fakeUid(const userid_t uid) {
- return 100000 + uid;
-}
-
-bool Is_Weaver(const std::string& spblob_path, const std::string& handle_str) {
- std::string weaver_file = spblob_path + handle_str + ".weaver";
- struct stat st;
- if (stat(weaver_file.c_str(), &st) == 0)
- return true;
- return false;
-}
-
-bool Free_Return(bool retval, void* weaver_key, password_data_struct* pwd) {
- if (weaver_key)
- free(weaver_key);
- if (pwd->salt)
- free(pwd->salt);
- if (pwd->password_handle)
- free(pwd->password_handle);
- return retval;
-}
-
-/* Decrypt_User_Synth_Pass is the TWRP C++ equivalent to spBasedDoVerifyCredential
- * https://android.googlesource.com/platform/frameworks/base/+/android-8.0.0_r23/services/core/java/com/android/server/locksettings/LockSettingsService.java#1998 */
-bool Decrypt_User_Synth_Pass(const userid_t user_id, const std::string& Password) {
- bool retval = false;
- void* weaver_key = NULL;
- password_data_struct pwd;
- pwd.salt = NULL;
- pwd.salt_len = 0;
- pwd.password_handle = NULL;
- pwd.handle_len = 0;
- char application_id[PASSWORD_TOKEN_SIZE + SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH];
-
- uint32_t auth_token_len = 0;
-
- std::string secret; // this will be the disk decryption key that is sent to vold
- std::string token = "!"; // there is no token used for this kind of decrypt, key escrow is handled by weaver
- int flags = FLAG_STORAGE_DE;
- if (user_id == 0)
- flags = FLAG_STORAGE_DE;
- else
- flags = FLAG_STORAGE_CE;
- char spblob_path_char[PATH_MAX];
- sprintf(spblob_path_char, "/data/system_de/%d/spblob/", user_id);
- std::string spblob_path = spblob_path_char;
- long handle = 0;
- std::string handle_str;
- // Get the handle: https://android.googlesource.com/platform/frameworks/base/+/android-8.0.0_r23/services/core/java/com/android/server/locksettings/LockSettingsService.java#2017
- if (!Find_Handle(spblob_path, handle_str)) {
- printf("Error getting handle\n");
- return Free_Return(retval, weaver_key, &pwd);
- }
- printf("Handle is '%s'\n", handle_str.c_str());
- // Now we begin driving unwrapPasswordBasedSyntheticPassword from: https://android.googlesource.com/platform/frameworks/base/+/android-8.0.0_r23/services/core/java/com/android/server/locksettings/SyntheticPasswordManager.java#758
- // First we read the password data which contains scrypt parameters
- if (!Get_Password_Data(spblob_path, handle_str, &pwd)) {
- printf("Failed to Get_Password_Data\n");
- return Free_Return(retval, weaver_key, &pwd);
- }
- //printf("pwd N %i R %i P %i salt ", pwd.scryptN, pwd.scryptR, pwd.scryptP); output_hex((char*)pwd.salt, pwd.salt_len); printf("\n");
- unsigned char password_token[PASSWORD_TOKEN_SIZE];
- //printf("Password: '%s'\n", Password.c_str());
- // The password token is the password scrypted with the parameters from the password data file
- if (!Get_Password_Token(&pwd, Password, &password_token[0])) {
- printf("Failed to Get_Password_Token\n");
- return Free_Return(retval, weaver_key, &pwd);
- }
- //output_hex(&password_token[0], PASSWORD_TOKEN_SIZE);printf("\n");
- if (Is_Weaver(spblob_path, handle_str)) {
- printf("using weaver\n");
- // BEGIN PIXEL 2 WEAVER
- // Get the weaver data from the .weaver file which tells us which slot to use when we ask weaver for the escrowed key
- // https://android.googlesource.com/platform/frameworks/base/+/android-8.0.0_r23/services/core/java/com/android/server/locksettings/SyntheticPasswordManager.java#768
- weaver_data_struct wd;
- if (!Get_Weaver_Data(spblob_path, handle_str, &wd)) {
- printf("Failed to get weaver data\n");
- return Free_Return(retval, weaver_key, &pwd);
- }
- // The weaver key is the the password token prefixed with "weaver-key" padded to 128 with nulls with the password token appended then SHA512
- // https://android.googlesource.com/platform/frameworks/base/+/android-8.0.0_r23/services/core/java/com/android/server/locksettings/SyntheticPasswordManager.java#1059
- weaver_key = PersonalizedHashBinary(PERSONALISATION_WEAVER_KEY, (char*)&password_token[0], PASSWORD_TOKEN_SIZE);
- if (!weaver_key) {
- printf("malloc error getting weaver_key\n");
- return Free_Return(retval, weaver_key, &pwd);
- }
- // Now we start driving weaverVerify: https://android.googlesource.com/platform/frameworks/base/+/android-8.0.0_r23/services/core/java/com/android/server/locksettings/SyntheticPasswordManager.java#343
- // Called from https://android.googlesource.com/platform/frameworks/base/+/android-8.0.0_r23/services/core/java/com/android/server/locksettings/SyntheticPasswordManager.java#776
- android::vold::Weaver weaver;
- if (!weaver) {
- printf("Failed to get weaver service\n");
- return Free_Return(retval, weaver_key, &pwd);
- }
- // Get the key size from weaver service
- uint32_t weaver_key_size = 0;
- if (!weaver.GetKeySize(&weaver_key_size)) {
- printf("Failed to get weaver key size\n");
- return Free_Return(retval, weaver_key, &pwd);
- } else {
- //printf("weaver key size is %u\n", weaver_key_size);
- }
- //printf("weaver key: "); output_hex((unsigned char*)weaver_key, weaver_key_size); printf("\n");
- // Send the slot from the .weaver file, the computed weaver key, and get the escrowed key data
- std::vector<uint8_t> weaver_payload;
- // TODO: we should return more information about the status including time delays before the next retry
- if (!weaver.WeaverVerify(wd.slot, weaver_key, &weaver_payload)) {
- printf("failed to weaver verify\n");
- return Free_Return(retval, weaver_key, &pwd);
- }
- //printf("weaver payload: "); output_hex(&weaver_payload); printf("\n");
- // Done with weaverVerify
- // Now we will compute the application ID
- // https://android.googlesource.com/platform/frameworks/base/+/android-8.0.0_r23/services/core/java/com/android/server/locksettings/SyntheticPasswordManager.java#964
- // Called from https://android.googlesource.com/platform/frameworks/base/+/android-8.0.0_r23/services/core/java/com/android/server/locksettings/SyntheticPasswordManager.java#780
- // The escrowed weaver key data is prefixed with "weaver-pwd" padded to 128 with nulls with the weaver payload appended then SHA512
- void* weaver_secret = PersonalizedHashBinary(PERSONALISATION_WEAVER_PASSWORD, (const char*)weaver_payload.data(), weaver_payload.size());
- //printf("weaver secret: "); output_hex((unsigned char*)weaver_secret, SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH); printf("\n");
- // The application ID is the password token and weaver secret appended to each other
- memcpy((void*)&application_id[0], (void*)&password_token[0], PASSWORD_TOKEN_SIZE);
- memcpy((void*)&application_id[PASSWORD_TOKEN_SIZE], weaver_secret, SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH);
- //printf("application ID: "); output_hex((unsigned char*)application_id, PASSWORD_TOKEN_SIZE + SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH); printf("\n");
- // END PIXEL 2 WEAVER
- } else {
- printf("using secdis\n");
- std::string secdis_data;
- if (!Get_Secdis(spblob_path, handle_str, secdis_data)) {
- printf("Failed to get secdis data\n");
- return Free_Return(retval, weaver_key, &pwd);
- }
- void* secdiscardable = PersonalizedHashBinary(PERSONALISATION_SECDISCARDABLE, (char*)secdis_data.data(), secdis_data.size());
- if (!secdiscardable) {
- printf("malloc error getting secdiscardable\n");
- return Free_Return(retval, weaver_key, &pwd);
- }
- memcpy((void*)&application_id[0], (void*)&password_token[0], PASSWORD_TOKEN_SIZE);
- memcpy((void*)&application_id[PASSWORD_TOKEN_SIZE], secdiscardable, SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH);
-
- int ret = -1;
- bool request_reenroll = false;
- android::sp<android::hardware::gatekeeper::V1_0::IGatekeeper> gk_device;
- gk_device = ::android::hardware::gatekeeper::V1_0::IGatekeeper::getService();
- if (gk_device == nullptr) {
- printf("failed to get gatekeeper service\n");
- return Free_Return(retval, weaver_key, &pwd);
- }
- if (pwd.handle_len <= 0) {
- printf("no password handle supplied\n");
- return Free_Return(retval, weaver_key, &pwd);
- }
- android::hardware::hidl_vec<uint8_t> pwd_handle_hidl;
- pwd_handle_hidl.setToExternal(const_cast<uint8_t *>((const uint8_t *)pwd.password_handle), pwd.handle_len);
- void* gk_pwd_token = PersonalizedHashBinary(PERSONALIZATION_USER_GK_AUTH, (char*)&password_token[0], PASSWORD_TOKEN_SIZE);
- if (!gk_pwd_token) {
- printf("malloc error getting gatekeeper_key\n");
- return Free_Return(retval, weaver_key, &pwd);
- }
- android::hardware::hidl_vec<uint8_t> gk_pwd_token_hidl;
- gk_pwd_token_hidl.setToExternal(const_cast<uint8_t *>((const uint8_t *)gk_pwd_token), SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH);
- android::hardware::Return<void> hwRet =
- gk_device->verify(fakeUid(user_id), 0 /* challange */,
- pwd_handle_hidl,
- gk_pwd_token_hidl,
- [&ret, &request_reenroll, &auth_token_len]
- (const android::hardware::gatekeeper::V1_0::GatekeeperResponse &rsp) {
- ret = static_cast<int>(rsp.code); // propagate errors
- if (rsp.code >= android::hardware::gatekeeper::V1_0::GatekeeperStatusCode::STATUS_OK) {
- auth_token_len = rsp.data.size();
- request_reenroll = (rsp.code == android::hardware::gatekeeper::V1_0::GatekeeperStatusCode::STATUS_REENROLL);
- ret = 0; // all success states are reported as 0
- // The keystore refuses to allow the root user to supply auth tokens, so we write the auth token to a file here and later
- // run a separate service that runs as the system user to add the auth token. We wait for the auth token file to be
- // deleted by the keymaster_auth service and check for a /auth_error file in case of errors. We quit after a while seconds if
- // the /auth_token file never gets deleted.
- unlink("/auth_token");
- FILE* auth_file = fopen("/auth_token","wb");
- if (auth_file != NULL) {
- fwrite(rsp.data.data(), sizeof(uint8_t), rsp.data.size(), auth_file);
- fclose(auth_file);
- } else {
- printf("failed to open /auth_token for writing\n");
- ret = -2;
- }
- } else if (rsp.code == android::hardware::gatekeeper::V1_0::GatekeeperStatusCode::ERROR_RETRY_TIMEOUT && rsp.timeout > 0) {
- ret = rsp.timeout;
- }
- }
- );
- free(gk_pwd_token);
- if (!hwRet.isOk() || ret != 0) {
- printf("gatekeeper verification failed\n");
- return Free_Return(retval, weaver_key, &pwd);
- }
- }
- // Now we will handle https://android.googlesource.com/platform/frameworks/base/+/android-8.0.0_r23/services/core/java/com/android/server/locksettings/SyntheticPasswordManager.java#816
- // Plus we will include the last bit that computes the disk decrypt key found in:
- // https://android.googlesource.com/platform/frameworks/base/+/android-8.0.0_r23/services/core/java/com/android/server/locksettings/SyntheticPasswordManager.java#153
- secret = android::keystore::unwrapSyntheticPasswordBlob(spblob_path, handle_str, user_id, (const void*)&application_id[0], PASSWORD_TOKEN_SIZE + SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH, auth_token_len);
- if (!secret.size()) {
- printf("failed to unwrapSyntheticPasswordBlob\n");
- return Free_Return(retval, weaver_key, &pwd);
- }
- if (!e4crypt_unlock_user_key(user_id, 0, token.c_str(), secret.c_str())) {
- printf("e4crypt_unlock_user_key returned fail\n");
- return Free_Return(retval, weaver_key, &pwd);
- }
-/*#ifdef USE_KEYSTORAGE_4
- if (!e4crypt_prepare_user_storage("", user_id, 0, flags)) {
-#else
- if (!e4crypt_prepare_user_storage(nullptr, user_id, 0, flags)) {
-#endif
- printf("failed to e4crypt_prepare_user_storage\n");
- return Free_Return(retval, weaver_key, &pwd);
- }*/
- printf("User %i Decrypted Successfully!\n", user_id);
- retval = true;
- return Free_Return(retval, weaver_key, &pwd);
-}
-#endif //HAVE_SYNTH_PWD_SUPPORT
-
-int Get_Password_Type(const userid_t user_id, std::string& filename) {
- struct stat st;
- char spblob_path_char[PATH_MAX];
- sprintf(spblob_path_char, "/data/system_de/%d/spblob/", user_id);
- if (stat(spblob_path_char, &st) == 0) {
-#ifdef HAVE_SYNTH_PWD_SUPPORT
- printf("Using synthetic password method\n");
- std::string spblob_path = spblob_path_char;
- std::string handle_str;
- if (!Find_Handle(spblob_path, handle_str)) {
- printf("Error getting handle\n");
- return 0;
- }
- printf("Handle is '%s'\n", handle_str.c_str());
- password_data_struct pwd;
- if (!Get_Password_Data(spblob_path, handle_str, &pwd)) {
- printf("Failed to Get_Password_Data\n");
- return 0;
- }
- if (pwd.password_type == 1) // In Android this means pattern
- return 2; // In TWRP this means pattern
- // In Android <11 type 2 is PIN or password
- // In Android 11 type 3 is PIN and type 4 is password
- else if (pwd.password_type > 1)
- return 1; // In TWRP this means PIN or password
- return 0; // We'll try the default password
-#else
- printf("Synthetic password support not present in TWRP\n");
- return -1;
-#endif
- }
- std::string path;
- if (user_id == 0) {
- path = "/data/system/";
- } else {
- char user_id_str[5];
- sprintf(user_id_str, "%i", user_id);
- path = "/data/system/users/";
- path += user_id_str;
- path += "/";
- }
- filename = path + "gatekeeper.password.key";
- if (stat(filename.c_str(), &st) == 0 && st.st_size > 0)
- return 1;
- filename = path + "gatekeeper.pattern.key";
- if (stat(filename.c_str(), &st) == 0 && st.st_size > 0)
- return 2;
- printf("Unable to locate gatekeeper password file '%s'\n", filename.c_str());
- filename = "";
- return 0;
-}
-
-bool Decrypt_User(const userid_t user_id, const std::string& Password) {
- uint8_t *auth_token;
- uint32_t auth_token_len;
- int ret;
-
- struct stat st;
- if (user_id > 9999) {
- printf("user_id is too big\n");
- return false;
- }
- std::string filename;
- bool Default_Password = (Password == "!");
- if (Get_Password_Type(user_id, filename) == 0 && !Default_Password) {
- printf("Unknown password type\n");
- return false;
- }
- int flags = FLAG_STORAGE_DE;
- if (user_id == 0)
- flags = FLAG_STORAGE_DE;
- else
- flags = FLAG_STORAGE_CE;
- if (Default_Password) {
- if (!e4crypt_unlock_user_key(user_id, 0, "!", "!")) {
- printf("e4crypt_unlock_user_key returned fail\n");
- return false;
- }
-/*#ifdef USE_KEYSTORAGE_4
- if (!e4crypt_prepare_user_storage("", user_id, 0, flags)) {
-#else
- if (!e4crypt_prepare_user_storage(nullptr, user_id, 0, flags)) {
-#endif
- printf("failed to e4crypt_prepare_user_storage\n");
- return false;
- }*/
- printf("User %i Decrypted Successfully!\n", user_id);
- return true;
- }
- if (stat("/data/system_de/0/spblob", &st) == 0) {
-#ifdef HAVE_SYNTH_PWD_SUPPORT
- printf("Using synthetic password method\n");
- return Decrypt_User_Synth_Pass(user_id, Password);
-#else
- printf("Synthetic password support not present in TWRP\n");
- return false;
-#endif
- }
- printf("password filename is '%s'\n", filename.c_str());
- if (stat(filename.c_str(), &st) != 0) {
- printf("error stat'ing key file: %s\n", strerror(errno));
- return false;
- }
- std::string handle;
- if (!android::base::ReadFileToString(filename, &handle)) {
- printf("Failed to read '%s'\n", filename.c_str());
- return false;
- }
- bool should_reenroll;
-#ifdef HAVE_GATEKEEPER1
- bool request_reenroll = false;
- android::sp<android::hardware::gatekeeper::V1_0::IGatekeeper> gk_device;
- gk_device = ::android::hardware::gatekeeper::V1_0::IGatekeeper::getService();
- if (gk_device == nullptr)
- return false;
- android::hardware::hidl_vec<uint8_t> curPwdHandle;
- curPwdHandle.setToExternal(const_cast<uint8_t *>((const uint8_t *)handle.c_str()), st.st_size);
- android::hardware::hidl_vec<uint8_t> enteredPwd;
- enteredPwd.setToExternal(const_cast<uint8_t *>((const uint8_t *)Password.c_str()), Password.size());
-
- android::hardware::Return<void> hwRet =
- gk_device->verify(user_id, 0 /* challange */,
- curPwdHandle,
- enteredPwd,
- [&ret, &request_reenroll, &auth_token, &auth_token_len]
- (const android::hardware::gatekeeper::V1_0::GatekeeperResponse &rsp) {
- ret = static_cast<int>(rsp.code); // propagate errors
- if (rsp.code >= android::hardware::gatekeeper::V1_0::GatekeeperStatusCode::STATUS_OK) {
- auth_token = new uint8_t[rsp.data.size()];
- auth_token_len = rsp.data.size();
- memcpy(auth_token, rsp.data.data(), auth_token_len);
- request_reenroll = (rsp.code == android::hardware::gatekeeper::V1_0::GatekeeperStatusCode::STATUS_REENROLL);
- ret = 0; // all success states are reported as 0
- } else if (rsp.code == android::hardware::gatekeeper::V1_0::GatekeeperStatusCode::ERROR_RETRY_TIMEOUT && rsp.timeout > 0) {
- ret = rsp.timeout;
- }
- }
- );
- if (!hwRet.isOk()) {
- return false;
- }
-#else
- gatekeeper_device_t *gk_device;
- ret = gatekeeper_device_initialize(&gk_device);
- if (ret!=0)
- return false;
- ret = gk_device->verify(gk_device, user_id, 0, (const uint8_t *)handle.c_str(), st.st_size,
- (const uint8_t *)Password.c_str(), (uint32_t)Password.size(), &auth_token, &auth_token_len,
- &should_reenroll);
- if (ret !=0) {
- printf("failed to verify\n");
- return false;
- }
-#endif
- char token_hex[(auth_token_len*2)+1];
- token_hex[(auth_token_len*2)] = 0;
- uint32_t i;
- for (i=0;i<auth_token_len;i++) {
- sprintf(&token_hex[2*i], "%02X", auth_token[i]);
- }
- // The secret is "Android FBE credential hash" plus appended 0x00 to reach 128 bytes then append the user's password then feed that to sha512sum
- std::string secret = HashPassword(Password);
- if (!e4crypt_unlock_user_key(user_id, 0, token_hex, secret.c_str())) {
- printf("e4crypt_unlock_user_key returned fail\n");
- return false;
- }
-/*#ifdef USE_KEYSTORAGE_4
- if (!e4crypt_prepare_user_storage("", user_id, 0, flags)) {
-#else
- if (!e4crypt_prepare_user_storage(nullptr, user_id, 0, flags)) {
-#endif
- printf("failed to e4crypt_prepare_user_storage\n");
- return false;
- }*/
- printf("User %i Decrypted Successfully!\n", user_id);
- return true;
-}
diff --git a/crypto/ext4crypt/Decrypt.h b/crypto/ext4crypt/Decrypt.h
deleted file mode 100644
index 56318e2..0000000
--- a/crypto/ext4crypt/Decrypt.h
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,38 +0,0 @@
-/*
- * Copyright (C) 2015 The Android Open Source Project
- *
- * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
- * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
- * You may obtain a copy of the License at
- *
- * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
- *
- * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
- * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
- * WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
- * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
- * limitations under the License.
- */
-
-#include <stdbool.h>
-#include <sys/cdefs.h>
-
-#include <cutils/multiuser.h>
-
-#include <string>
-
-__BEGIN_DECLS
-
-// NOTE: keep in sync with StorageManager
-static constexpr int FLAG_STORAGE_DE = 1 << 0;
-static constexpr int FLAG_STORAGE_CE = 1 << 1;
-// For 9.0 Ext4CryptPie.cpp
-static constexpr int STORAGE_FLAG_DE = 1 << 0;
-static constexpr int STORAGE_FLAG_CE = 1 << 1;
-
-
-int Get_Password_Type(const userid_t user_id, std::string& filename);
-bool Decrypt_DE();
-bool Decrypt_User(const userid_t user_id, const std::string& Password);
-
-__END_DECLS
diff --git a/crypto/ext4crypt/Ext4Crypt.cpp b/crypto/ext4crypt/Ext4Crypt.cpp
deleted file mode 100644
index 9360b1a..0000000
--- a/crypto/ext4crypt/Ext4Crypt.cpp
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,450 +0,0 @@
-/*
- * Copyright (C) 2015 The Android Open Source Project
- *
- * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
- * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
- * You may obtain a copy of the License at
- *
- * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
- *
- * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
- * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
- * WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
- * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
- * limitations under the License.
- */
-
-#include "Ext4Crypt.h"
-#include "Decrypt.h"
-
-#ifdef USE_KEYSTORAGE_3
-#include "KeyStorage3.h"
-#else
-#include "KeyStorage.h"
-#endif
-#include "Utils.h"
-
-#include <algorithm>
-#include <iomanip>
-#include <map>
-#include <set>
-#include <sstream>
-#include <string>
-
-#include <dirent.h>
-#include <errno.h>
-#include <fcntl.h>
-#include <limits.h>
-#include <openssl/sha.h>
-#include <selinux/android.h>
-#include <stdio.h>
-#include <sys/mount.h>
-#include <sys/stat.h>
-#include <sys/types.h>
-#include <iostream>
-
-#include <private/android_filesystem_config.h>
-
-#ifdef HAVE_SYNTH_PWD_SUPPORT
-#include <ext4_utils/ext4_crypt.h>
-#else
-#include "ext4_crypt.h"
-#endif
-#ifndef HAVE_LIBKEYUTILS
-#include "key_control.h"
-#else
-#include <keyutils.h>
-#endif
-
-#include <hardware/gatekeeper.h>
-#include "HashPassword.h"
-
-#define EMULATED_USES_SELINUX 0
-#define MANAGE_MISC_DIRS 0
-
-#include <cutils/fs.h>
-#include <cutils/properties.h>
-
-#include <android-base/file.h>
-//#include <android-base/logging.h>
-#include <android-base/stringprintf.h>
-
-#define LOG(x) std::cout
-#define PLOG(x) std::cout
-#define DATA_MNT_POINT "/data"
-
-using android::base::StringPrintf;
-using android::vold::kEmptyAuthentication;
-
-// NOTE: keep in sync with StorageManager
-//static constexpr int FLAG_STORAGE_DE = 1 << 0; // moved to Decrypt.h
-//static constexpr int FLAG_STORAGE_CE = 1 << 1;
-
-// Store main DE raw ref / policy
-std::string de_raw_ref;
-// Map user ids to key references
-std::map<userid_t, std::string> s_de_key_raw_refs;
-std::map<userid_t, std::string> s_ce_key_raw_refs;
-
-namespace {
-const std::string device_key_dir = std::string() + DATA_MNT_POINT + e4crypt_unencrypted_folder;
-const std::string device_key_path = device_key_dir + "/key";
-const std::string device_key_temp = device_key_dir + "/temp";
-
-const std::string user_key_dir = std::string() + DATA_MNT_POINT + "/misc/vold/user_keys";
-const std::string user_key_temp = user_key_dir + "/temp";
-
-bool s_global_de_initialized = false;
-
-// Some users are ephemeral, don't try to wipe their keys from disk
-std::set<userid_t> s_ephemeral_users;
-
-// TODO abolish this map. Keys should not be long-lived in user memory, only kernel memory.
-// See b/26948053
-std::map<userid_t, std::string> s_ce_keys;
-
-// ext4enc:TODO get this const from somewhere good
-const int EXT4_KEY_DESCRIPTOR_SIZE = 8;
-
-// ext4enc:TODO Include structure from somewhere sensible
-// MUST be in sync with ext4_crypto.c in kernel
-constexpr int EXT4_ENCRYPTION_MODE_AES_256_XTS = 1;
-constexpr int EXT4_AES_256_XTS_KEY_SIZE = 64;
-constexpr int EXT4_MAX_KEY_SIZE = 64;
-struct ext4_encryption_key {
- uint32_t mode;
- char raw[EXT4_MAX_KEY_SIZE];
- uint32_t size;
-};
-}
-
-static bool e4crypt_is_emulated() {
- return false; //property_get_bool("persist.sys.emulate_fbe", false);
-}
-
-static const char* escape_null(const char* value) {
- return (value == nullptr) ? "null" : value;
-}
-
-// Get raw keyref - used to make keyname and to pass to ioctl
-static std::string generate_key_ref(const char* key, int length) {
- SHA512_CTX c;
-
- SHA512_Init(&c);
- SHA512_Update(&c, key, length);
- unsigned char key_ref1[SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH];
- SHA512_Final(key_ref1, &c);
-
- SHA512_Init(&c);
- SHA512_Update(&c, key_ref1, SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH);
- unsigned char key_ref2[SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH];
- SHA512_Final(key_ref2, &c);
-
- static_assert(EXT4_KEY_DESCRIPTOR_SIZE <= SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH,
- "Hash too short for descriptor");
- return std::string((char*)key_ref2, EXT4_KEY_DESCRIPTOR_SIZE);
-}
-
-static bool fill_key(const std::string& key, ext4_encryption_key* ext4_key) {
- if (key.size() != EXT4_AES_256_XTS_KEY_SIZE) {
- LOG(ERROR) << "Wrong size key " << key.size();
- return false;
- }
- static_assert(EXT4_AES_256_XTS_KEY_SIZE <= sizeof(ext4_key->raw), "Key too long!");
- ext4_key->mode = EXT4_ENCRYPTION_MODE_AES_256_XTS;
- ext4_key->size = key.size();
- memset(ext4_key->raw, 0, sizeof(ext4_key->raw));
- memcpy(ext4_key->raw, key.data(), key.size());
- return true;
-}
-
-static std::string keyname(const std::string& raw_ref) {
- std::ostringstream o;
- o << "ext4:";
- for (auto i : raw_ref) {
- o << std::hex << std::setw(2) << std::setfill('0') << (int)i;
- }
- LOG(INFO) << "keyname is " << o.str() << "\n";
- return o.str();
-}
-
-// Get the keyring we store all keys in
-static bool e4crypt_keyring(key_serial_t* device_keyring) {
- *device_keyring = keyctl_search(KEY_SPEC_SESSION_KEYRING, "keyring", "e4crypt", 0);
- if (*device_keyring == -1) {
- PLOG(ERROR) << "Unable to find device keyring\n";
- return false;
- }
- return true;
-}
-
-// Install password into global keyring
-// Return raw key reference for use in policy
-static bool install_key(const std::string& key, std::string* raw_ref) {
- ext4_encryption_key ext4_key;
- if (!fill_key(key, &ext4_key)) return false;
- *raw_ref = generate_key_ref(ext4_key.raw, ext4_key.size);
- auto ref = keyname(*raw_ref);
- key_serial_t device_keyring;
- if (!e4crypt_keyring(&device_keyring)) return false;
- key_serial_t key_id =
- add_key("logon", ref.c_str(), (void*)&ext4_key, sizeof(ext4_key), device_keyring);
- if (key_id == -1) {
- PLOG(ERROR) << "Failed to insert key into keyring " << device_keyring << "\n";
- return false;
- }
- LOG(DEBUG) << "Added key " << key_id << " (" << ref << ") to keyring " << device_keyring
- << " in process " << getpid() << "\n";
- return true;
-}
-
-static std::string get_de_key_path(userid_t user_id) {
-LOG(INFO) << "get_de_key_path " << user_id << " " << StringPrintf("%s/de/%d", user_key_dir.c_str(), user_id) << "\n";
- return StringPrintf("%s/de/%d", user_key_dir.c_str(), user_id);
-}
-
-static std::string get_ce_key_directory_path(userid_t user_id) {
-LOG(INFO) << "get_ce_key_directory_path " << user_id << ": " << StringPrintf("%s/ce/%d", user_key_dir.c_str(), user_id) << "\n";
- return StringPrintf("%s/ce/%d", user_key_dir.c_str(), user_id);
-}
-
-// Returns the keys newest first
-static std::vector<std::string> get_ce_key_paths(const std::string& directory_path) {
- auto dirp = std::unique_ptr<DIR, int (*)(DIR*)>(opendir(directory_path.c_str()), closedir);
- if (!dirp) {
- PLOG(ERROR) << "Unable to open ce key directory: " + directory_path;
- return std::vector<std::string>();
- }
- std::vector<std::string> result;
- for (;;) {
- errno = 0;
- auto const entry = readdir(dirp.get());
- if (!entry) {
- if (errno) {
- PLOG(ERROR) << "Unable to read ce key directory: " + directory_path;
- return std::vector<std::string>();
- }
- break;
- }
- if (entry->d_type != DT_DIR || entry->d_name[0] != 'c') {
- LOG(DEBUG) << "Skipping non-key " << entry->d_name;
- continue;
- }
- result.emplace_back(directory_path + "/" + entry->d_name);
- LOG(INFO) << "get_ce_key_paths adding: " << directory_path + "/" + entry->d_name << "\n";
- }
- std::sort(result.begin(), result.end());
- std::reverse(result.begin(), result.end());
- return result;
-}
-
-static std::string get_ce_key_current_path(const std::string& directory_path) {
-LOG(INFO) << "get_ce_key_current_path: " << directory_path + "/current\n";
- return directory_path + "/current";
-}
-
-// Discard all keys but the named one; rename it to canonical name.
-// No point in acting on errors in this; ignore them.
-static void fixate_user_ce_key(const std::string& directory_path, const std::string &to_fix,
- const std::vector<std::string>& paths) {
- for (auto const other_path: paths) {
- if (other_path != to_fix) {
- android::vold::destroyKey(other_path);
- }
- }
- auto const current_path = get_ce_key_current_path(directory_path);
- if (to_fix != current_path) {
- LOG(DEBUG) << "Renaming " << to_fix << " to " << current_path;
- if (rename(to_fix.c_str(), current_path.c_str()) != 0) {
- PLOG(WARNING) << "Unable to rename " << to_fix << " to " << current_path;
- }
- }
-}
-
-static bool read_and_fixate_user_ce_key(userid_t user_id,
- const android::vold::KeyAuthentication& auth,
- std::string *ce_key) {
- auto const directory_path = get_ce_key_directory_path(user_id);
- auto const paths = get_ce_key_paths(directory_path);
- for (auto const ce_key_path: paths) {
- LOG(DEBUG) << "Trying user CE key " << ce_key_path;
- if (android::vold::retrieveKey(ce_key_path, auth, ce_key)) {
- LOG(DEBUG) << "Successfully retrieved key";
- fixate_user_ce_key(directory_path, ce_key_path, paths);
- return true;
- }
- }
- LOG(ERROR) << "Failed to find working ce key for user " << user_id;
- return false;
-}
-
-static bool read_and_install_user_ce_key(userid_t user_id,
- const android::vold::KeyAuthentication& auth) {
- if (s_ce_key_raw_refs.count(user_id) != 0) return true;
- std::string ce_key;
- if (!read_and_fixate_user_ce_key(user_id, auth, &ce_key)) return false;
- std::string ce_raw_ref;
- if (!install_key(ce_key, &ce_raw_ref)) return false;
- s_ce_keys[user_id] = ce_key;
- s_ce_key_raw_refs[user_id] = ce_raw_ref;
- LOG(DEBUG) << "Installed ce key for user " << user_id;
- return true;
-}
-
-static bool prepare_dir(const std::string& dir, mode_t mode, uid_t uid, gid_t gid) {
- LOG(DEBUG) << "Preparing: " << dir << "\n";
- return true;
- return access(dir.c_str(), F_OK) == 0; // we don't want recovery creating directories or changing permissions at this point, so we will just return true if the path already exists
- if (fs_prepare_dir(dir.c_str(), mode, uid, gid) != 0) {
- PLOG(ERROR) << "Failed to prepare " << dir;
- return false;
- }
- return true;
-}
-
-static bool path_exists(const std::string& path) {
- return access(path.c_str(), F_OK) == 0;
-}
-
-bool lookup_key_ref(const std::map<userid_t, std::string>& key_map, userid_t user_id,
- std::string* raw_ref) {
- auto refi = key_map.find(user_id);
- if (refi == key_map.end()) {
- LOG(ERROR) << "Cannot find key for " << user_id;
- return false;
- }
- *raw_ref = refi->second;
- return true;
-}
-
-static bool is_numeric(const char* name) {
- for (const char* p = name; *p != '\0'; p++) {
- if (!isdigit(*p)) return false;
- }
- return true;
-}
-
-static bool load_all_de_keys() {
- auto de_dir = user_key_dir + "/de";
- auto dirp = std::unique_ptr<DIR, int (*)(DIR*)>(opendir(de_dir.c_str()), closedir);
- if (!dirp) {
- PLOG(ERROR) << "Unable to read de key directory";
- return false;
- }
- for (;;) {
- errno = 0;
- auto entry = readdir(dirp.get());
- if (!entry) {
- if (errno) {
- PLOG(ERROR) << "Unable to read de key directory";
- return false;
- }
- break;
- }
- if (entry->d_type != DT_DIR || !is_numeric(entry->d_name)) {
- LOG(DEBUG) << "Skipping non-de-key " << entry->d_name;
- continue;
- }
- userid_t user_id = atoi(entry->d_name);
- if (s_de_key_raw_refs.count(user_id) == 0) {
- auto key_path = de_dir + "/" + entry->d_name;
- std::string key;
- if (!android::vold::retrieveKey(key_path, kEmptyAuthentication, &key)) return false;
- std::string raw_ref;
- if (!install_key(key, &raw_ref)) return false;
- s_de_key_raw_refs[user_id] = raw_ref;
- LOG(DEBUG) << "Installed de key for user " << user_id;
-
- std::string user_prop = "twrp.user." + std::to_string(user_id) + ".decrypt";
- property_set(user_prop.c_str(), "0");
- }
- }
- // ext4enc:TODO: go through all DE directories, ensure that all user dirs have the
- // correct policy set on them, and that no rogue ones exist.
- return true;
-}
-
-bool e4crypt_initialize_global_de() {
-
- if (s_global_de_initialized) {
- LOG(INFO) << "Already initialized\n";
- return true;
- }
-
- std::string device_key;
- if (path_exists(device_key_path)) {
- if (!android::vold::retrieveKey(device_key_path,
- kEmptyAuthentication, &device_key)) return false;
- } else {
- LOG(INFO) << "NOT Creating new key\n";
- return false;
- }
-
- std::string device_key_ref;
- if (!install_key(device_key, &device_key_ref)) {
- LOG(ERROR) << "Failed to install device key\n";
- return false;
- }
-
- s_global_de_initialized = true;
- de_raw_ref = device_key_ref;
- return true;
-}
-
-bool e4crypt_init_user0() {
- if (e4crypt_is_native()) {
- if (!prepare_dir(user_key_dir, 0700, AID_ROOT, AID_ROOT)) return false;
- if (!prepare_dir(user_key_dir + "/ce", 0700, AID_ROOT, AID_ROOT)) return false;
- if (!prepare_dir(user_key_dir + "/de", 0700, AID_ROOT, AID_ROOT)) return false;
- if (!path_exists(get_de_key_path(0))) {
- //if (!create_and_install_user_keys(0, false)) return false;
- printf("de key path not found\n");
- return false;
- }
- // TODO: switch to loading only DE_0 here once framework makes
- // explicit calls to install DE keys for secondary users
- if (!load_all_de_keys()) return false;
- }
-
- // If this is a non-FBE device that recently left an emulated mode,
- // restore user data directories to known-good state.
- if (!e4crypt_is_native() && !e4crypt_is_emulated()) {
- e4crypt_unlock_user_key(0, 0, "!", "!");
- }
-
- return true;
-}
-
-static bool parse_hex(const char* hex, std::string* result) {
- if (strcmp("!", hex) == 0) {
- *result = "";
- return true;
- }
- if (android::vold::HexToStr(hex, *result) != 0) {
- LOG(ERROR) << "Invalid FBE hex string"; // Don't log the string for security reasons
- return false;
- }
- return true;
-}
-
-// TODO: rename to 'install' for consistency, and take flags to know which keys to install
-bool e4crypt_unlock_user_key(userid_t user_id, int serial __unused, const char* token_hex,
- const char* secret_hex) {
- if (e4crypt_is_native()) {
- if (s_ce_key_raw_refs.count(user_id) != 0) {
- LOG(WARNING) << "Tried to unlock already-unlocked key for user " << user_id;
- return true;
- }
- std::string token, secret;
- if (!parse_hex(token_hex, &token)) return false;
- if (!parse_hex(secret_hex, &secret)) return false;
- android::vold::KeyAuthentication auth(token, secret);
- if (!read_and_install_user_ce_key(user_id, auth)) {
- LOG(ERROR) << "Couldn't read key for " << user_id;
- return false;
- }
- } else {
- printf("Emulation mode not supported in TWRP\n");
- }
- return true;
-}
diff --git a/crypto/ext4crypt/Ext4Crypt.h b/crypto/ext4crypt/Ext4Crypt.h
deleted file mode 100644
index beb5d8f..0000000
--- a/crypto/ext4crypt/Ext4Crypt.h
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,47 +0,0 @@
-/*
- * Copyright (C) 2015 The Android Open Source Project
- *
- * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
- * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
- * You may obtain a copy of the License at
- *
- * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
- *
- * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
- * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
- * WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
- * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
- * limitations under the License.
- */
-
-#include <stdbool.h>
-#include <sys/cdefs.h>
-
-#include <cutils/multiuser.h>
-
-#include <map>
-#include <string>
-
-__BEGIN_DECLS
-
-// General functions
-bool e4crypt_is_native();
-bool e4crypt_initialize_global_de();
-
-bool e4crypt_init_user0();
-//bool e4crypt_vold_create_user_key(userid_t user_id, int serial, bool ephemeral);
-//bool e4crypt_destroy_user_key(userid_t user_id);
-//bool e4crypt_add_user_key_auth(userid_t user_id, int serial, const char* token,
-// const char* secret);
-//bool e4crypt_fixate_newest_user_key_auth(userid_t user_id);
-
-bool e4crypt_unlock_user_key(userid_t user_id, int serial, const char* token, const char* secret);
-//bool e4crypt_lock_user_key(userid_t user_id);
-
-//bool e4crypt_prepare_user_storage(const char* volume_uuid, userid_t user_id, int serial, int flags);
-//bool e4crypt_destroy_user_storage(const char* volume_uuid, userid_t user_id, int flags);
-
-bool lookup_key_ref(const std::map<userid_t, std::string>& key_map, userid_t user_id,
- std::string* raw_ref);
-
-__END_DECLS
diff --git a/crypto/ext4crypt/Ext4CryptPie.cpp b/crypto/ext4crypt/Ext4CryptPie.cpp
deleted file mode 100644
index 48b4ec9..0000000
--- a/crypto/ext4crypt/Ext4CryptPie.cpp
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,477 +0,0 @@
-/*
- * Copyright (C) 2015 The Android Open Source Project
- *
- * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
- * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
- * You may obtain a copy of the License at
- *
- * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
- *
- * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
- * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
- * WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
- * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
- * limitations under the License.
- */
-
-#include "Ext4CryptPie.h"
-
-#include "Keymaster4.h"
-#include "KeyStorage4.h"
-#include "KeyUtil.h"
-#include "Utils.h"
-#include "Decrypt.h"
-//#include "VoldUtil.h"
-
-#include <algorithm>
-#include <map>
-#include <set>
-#include <sstream>
-#include <string>
-#include <vector>
-
-#include <dirent.h>
-#include <errno.h>
-#include <fcntl.h>
-#include <unistd.h>
-#include <limits.h>
-#include <selinux/android.h>
-#include <sys/mount.h>
-#include <sys/stat.h>
-#include <sys/types.h>
-
-#include <private/android_filesystem_config.h>
-
-//#include "android/os/IVold.h"
-
-//#include "cryptfs.h"
-
-#define EMULATED_USES_SELINUX 0
-#define MANAGE_MISC_DIRS 0
-
-#include <cutils/fs.h>
-#include <cutils/properties.h>
-
-#include <ext4_utils/ext4_crypt.h>
-#include <keyutils.h>
-
-#include <android-base/file.h>
-//#include <android-base/logging.h>
-#include <android-base/properties.h>
-#include <android-base/stringprintf.h>
-
-#include <iostream>
-#define LOG(x) std::cout
-#define PLOG(x) std::cout
-#define DATA_MNT_POINT "/data"
-
-using android::base::StringPrintf;
-using android::base::WriteStringToFile;
-using android::vold::kEmptyAuthentication;
-using android::vold::KeyBuffer;
-using android::vold::Keymaster;
-using android::hardware::keymaster::V4_0::KeyFormat;
-
-// Store main DE raw ref / policy
-std::string de_raw_ref;
-// Map user ids to key references
-std::map<userid_t, std::string> s_de_key_raw_refs;
-std::map<userid_t, std::string> s_ce_key_raw_refs;
-// TODO abolish this map, per b/26948053
-std::map<userid_t, KeyBuffer> s_ce_keys;
-
-namespace {
-
-struct PolicyKeyRef {
- std::string contents_mode;
- std::string filenames_mode;
- std::string key_raw_ref;
-};
-
-const std::string device_key_dir = std::string() + DATA_MNT_POINT + e4crypt_unencrypted_folder;
-const std::string device_key_path = device_key_dir + "/key";
-const std::string device_key_temp = device_key_dir + "/temp";
-
-const std::string user_key_dir = std::string() + DATA_MNT_POINT + "/misc/vold/user_keys";
-const std::string user_key_temp = user_key_dir + "/temp";
-const std::string prepare_subdirs_path = "/system/bin/vold_prepare_subdirs";
-
-const std::string systemwide_volume_key_dir =
- std::string() + DATA_MNT_POINT + "/misc/vold/volume_keys";
-
-bool s_global_de_initialized = false;
-
-// Some users are ephemeral, don't try to wipe their keys from disk
-std::set<userid_t> s_ephemeral_users;
-
-}
-
-static bool e4crypt_is_emulated() {
- return property_get_bool("persist.sys.emulate_fbe", false);
-}
-
-/*static const char* escape_empty(const std::string& value) {
- return value.empty() ? "null" : value.c_str();
-}*/
-
-static std::string get_de_key_path(userid_t user_id) {
- return StringPrintf("%s/de/%d", user_key_dir.c_str(), user_id);
-}
-
-static std::string get_ce_key_directory_path(userid_t user_id) {
- return StringPrintf("%s/ce/%d", user_key_dir.c_str(), user_id);
-}
-
-// Returns the keys newest first
-static std::vector<std::string> get_ce_key_paths(const std::string& directory_path) {
- auto dirp = std::unique_ptr<DIR, int (*)(DIR*)>(opendir(directory_path.c_str()), closedir);
- if (!dirp) {
- PLOG(ERROR) << "Unable to open ce key directory: " + directory_path << std::endl;
- return std::vector<std::string>();
- }
- std::vector<std::string> result;
- for (;;) {
- errno = 0;
- auto const entry = readdir(dirp.get());
- if (!entry) {
- if (errno) {
- PLOG(ERROR) << "Unable to read ce key directory: " + directory_path << std::endl;
- return std::vector<std::string>();
- }
- break;
- }
- if (entry->d_type != DT_DIR || entry->d_name[0] != 'c') {
- LOG(DEBUG) << "Skipping non-key " << entry->d_name << std::endl;
- continue;
- }
- result.emplace_back(directory_path + "/" + entry->d_name);
- }
- std::sort(result.begin(), result.end());
- std::reverse(result.begin(), result.end());
- return result;
-}
-
-static std::string get_ce_key_current_path(const std::string& directory_path) {
- return directory_path + "/current";
-}
-
-// Discard all keys but the named one; rename it to canonical name.
-// No point in acting on errors in this; ignore them.
-static void fixate_user_ce_key(const std::string& directory_path, const std::string &to_fix,
- const std::vector<std::string>& paths) {
- for (auto const other_path: paths) {
- if (other_path != to_fix) {
- android::vold::destroyKey(other_path);
- }
- }
- auto const current_path = get_ce_key_current_path(directory_path);
- if (to_fix != current_path) {
- LOG(DEBUG) << "Renaming " << to_fix << " to " << current_path << std::endl;
- if (rename(to_fix.c_str(), current_path.c_str()) != 0) {
- PLOG(WARNING) << "Unable to rename " << to_fix << " to " << current_path << std::endl;
- }
- }
-}
-
-static bool read_and_fixate_user_ce_key(userid_t user_id,
- const android::vold::KeyAuthentication& auth,
- KeyBuffer *ce_key) {
- auto const directory_path = get_ce_key_directory_path(user_id);
- auto const paths = get_ce_key_paths(directory_path);
- for (auto const ce_key_path: paths) {
- LOG(DEBUG) << "Trying user CE key " << ce_key_path << std::endl;
- if (android::vold::retrieveKey(ce_key_path, auth, ce_key)) {
- LOG(DEBUG) << "Successfully retrieved key" << std::endl;
- fixate_user_ce_key(directory_path, ce_key_path, paths);
- return true;
- }
- }
- LOG(ERROR) << "Failed to find working ce key for user " << user_id << std::endl;
- return false;
-}
-
-static bool is_wrapped_key_supported_common(const std::string& mount_point) {
- LOG(DEBUG) << "Determining wrapped-key support for " << mount_point << std::endl;
- std::string wrapped_key_supported = android::base::GetProperty("fbe.data.wrappedkey", "false");
- LOG(DEBUG) << "fbe.data.wrappedkey = " << wrapped_key_supported << std::endl;
- if (mount_point == DATA_MNT_POINT && wrapped_key_supported == "true") {
- LOG(DEBUG) << "Wrapped key supported on " << mount_point << std::endl;
- return true;
- } else {
- return false;
- }
-}
-
-bool is_wrapped_key_supported() {
- return is_wrapped_key_supported_common(DATA_MNT_POINT);
-}
-
-bool is_wrapped_key_supported_external() {
- return false;
-}
-
-static bool read_and_install_user_ce_key(userid_t user_id,
- const android::vold::KeyAuthentication& auth) {
- if (s_ce_key_raw_refs.count(user_id) != 0) return true;
- KeyBuffer ce_key;
- if (!read_and_fixate_user_ce_key(user_id, auth, &ce_key)) return false;
- std::string ce_raw_ref;
-
- if (is_wrapped_key_supported()) {
- KeyBuffer ephemeral_wrapped_key;
- if (!getEphemeralWrappedKey(KeyFormat::RAW, ce_key, &ephemeral_wrapped_key)) {
- LOG(ERROR) << "Failed to export ce key";
- return false;
- }
-
- ce_key = std::move(ephemeral_wrapped_key);
- }
- if (!android::vold::installKey(ce_key, &ce_raw_ref)) return false;
- s_ce_keys[user_id] = std::move(ce_key);
- s_ce_key_raw_refs[user_id] = ce_raw_ref;
- LOG(DEBUG) << "Installed ce key for user " << user_id << std::endl;
- return true;
-}
-
-static bool prepare_dir(const std::string& dir, mode_t mode, uid_t uid, gid_t gid) {
- LOG(DEBUG) << "Preparing: " << dir << std::endl;
- if (fs_prepare_dir(dir.c_str(), mode, uid, gid) != 0) {
- PLOG(ERROR) << "Failed to prepare " << dir << std::endl;
- return false;
- }
- return true;
-}
-
-// NB this assumes that there is only one thread listening for crypt commands, because
-// it creates keys in a fixed location.
-static bool create_and_install_user_keys(userid_t user_id, bool create_ephemeral) {
- /*KeyBuffer de_key, ce_key;
- if (!android::vold::randomKey(&de_key)) return false;
- if (!android::vold::randomKey(&ce_key)) return false;
- if (create_ephemeral) {
- // If the key should be created as ephemeral, don't store it.
- s_ephemeral_users.insert(user_id);
- } else {
- auto const directory_path = get_ce_key_directory_path(user_id);
- if (!prepare_dir(directory_path, 0700, AID_ROOT, AID_ROOT)) return false;
- auto const paths = get_ce_key_paths(directory_path);
- std::string ce_key_path;
- if (!get_ce_key_new_path(directory_path, paths, &ce_key_path)) return false;
- if (!android::vold::storeKeyAtomically(ce_key_path, user_key_temp,
- kEmptyAuthentication, ce_key)) return false;
- fixate_user_ce_key(directory_path, ce_key_path, paths);
- // Write DE key second; once this is written, all is good.
- if (!android::vold::storeKeyAtomically(get_de_key_path(user_id), user_key_temp,
- kEmptyAuthentication, de_key)) return false;
- }
- std::string de_raw_ref;
- if (!android::vold::installKey(de_key, &de_raw_ref)) return false;
- s_de_key_raw_refs[user_id] = de_raw_ref;
- std::string ce_raw_ref;
- if (!android::vold::installKey(ce_key, &ce_raw_ref)) return false;
- s_ce_keys[user_id] = ce_key;
- s_ce_key_raw_refs[user_id] = ce_raw_ref;
- LOG(DEBUG) << "Created keys for user " << user_id;*/
- LOG(DEBUG) << "TWRP not doing create_and_install_user_keys\n";
- return true;
-}
-
-bool lookup_key_ref(const std::map<userid_t, std::string>& key_map, userid_t user_id,
- std::string* raw_ref) {
- auto refi = key_map.find(user_id);
- if (refi == key_map.end()) {
- LOG(ERROR) << "Cannot find key for " << user_id << std::endl;
- return false;
- }
- *raw_ref = refi->second;
- return true;
-}
-
-static void get_data_file_encryption_modes(PolicyKeyRef* key_ref) {
- /*struct fstab_rec* rec = fs_mgr_get_entry_for_mount_point(fstab_default, DATA_MNT_POINT);
- char const* contents_mode = strdup("ice");
- char const* filenames_mode = strdup("aes-256-heh");
- fs_mgr_get_file_encryption_modes(rec, &contents_mode, &filenames_mode);
- key_ref->contents_mode = contents_mode;
- key_ref->filenames_mode = filenames_mode;*/
- LOG(INFO) << "contents mode '" << android::base::GetProperty("fbe.contents", "aes-256-xts") << "' filenames '" << android::base::GetProperty("fbe.filenames", "aes-256-heh") << "'\n";
- key_ref->contents_mode =
- android::base::GetProperty("fbe.contents", "aes-256-xts");
- key_ref->filenames_mode =
- android::base::GetProperty("fbe.filenames", "aes-256-heh");
-}
-
-static bool is_numeric(const char* name) {
- for (const char* p = name; *p != '\0'; p++) {
- if (!isdigit(*p)) return false;
- }
- return true;
-}
-
-static bool load_all_de_keys() {
- auto de_dir = user_key_dir + "/de";
- auto dirp = std::unique_ptr<DIR, int (*)(DIR*)>(opendir(de_dir.c_str()), closedir);
- if (!dirp) {
- PLOG(ERROR) << "Unable to read de key directory" << std::endl;
- return false;
- }
- for (;;) {
- errno = 0;
- auto entry = readdir(dirp.get());
- if (!entry) {
- if (errno) {
- PLOG(ERROR) << "Unable to read de key directory" << std::endl;
- return false;
- }
- break;
- }
- if (entry->d_type != DT_DIR || !is_numeric(entry->d_name)) {
- LOG(DEBUG) << "Skipping non-de-key " << entry->d_name << std::endl;
- continue;
- }
- userid_t user_id = std::stoi(entry->d_name);
- if (s_de_key_raw_refs.count(user_id) == 0) {
- auto key_path = de_dir + "/" + entry->d_name;
- KeyBuffer key;
- if (!android::vold::retrieveKey(key_path, kEmptyAuthentication, &key)) return false;
- std::string raw_ref;
- if (is_wrapped_key_supported()) {
- KeyBuffer ephemeral_wrapped_key;
- if (!getEphemeralWrappedKey(KeyFormat::RAW, key, &ephemeral_wrapped_key)) {
- LOG(ERROR) << "Failed to export de_key in create_and_install_user_keys";
- return false;
- }
- key = std::move(ephemeral_wrapped_key);
- }
- if (!android::vold::installKey(key, &raw_ref)) return false;
- s_de_key_raw_refs[user_id] = raw_ref;
- LOG(DEBUG) << "Installed de key for user " << user_id << std::endl;
-
- std::string user_prop = "twrp.user." + std::to_string(user_id) + ".decrypt";
- property_set(user_prop.c_str(), "0");
- }
- }
- // ext4enc:TODO: go through all DE directories, ensure that all user dirs have the
- // correct policy set on them, and that no rogue ones exist.
- return true;
-}
-
-bool e4crypt_initialize_global_de() {
- LOG(INFO) << "e4crypt_initialize_global_de" << std::endl;
- bool wrapped_key_supported = false;
-
- if (s_global_de_initialized) {
- LOG(INFO) << "Already initialized" << std::endl;
- return true;
- }
-
- PolicyKeyRef device_ref;
- wrapped_key_supported = is_wrapped_key_supported();
- LOG(INFO) << "calling retrieveAndInstallKey\n";
- if (!android::vold::retrieveAndInstallKey(true, kEmptyAuthentication, device_key_path,
- device_key_temp, &device_ref.key_raw_ref, wrapped_key_supported))
- return false;
- get_data_file_encryption_modes(&device_ref);
-
- std::string modestring = device_ref.contents_mode + ":" + device_ref.filenames_mode;
- std::string mode_filename = std::string("/data") + e4crypt_key_mode;
- if (!android::base::WriteStringToFile(modestring, mode_filename)) {
- PLOG(ERROR) << "Cannot save type" << std::endl;
- return false;
- }
-
- std::string ref_filename = std::string("/data") + e4crypt_key_ref;
- if (!android::base::WriteStringToFile(device_ref.key_raw_ref, ref_filename)) {
- PLOG(ERROR) << "Cannot save key reference to:" << ref_filename << std::endl;
- return false;
- }
- LOG(INFO) << "Wrote system DE key reference to:" << ref_filename << std::endl;
-
- s_global_de_initialized = true;
- de_raw_ref = device_ref.key_raw_ref;
- return true;
-}
-
-bool e4crypt_init_user0() {
- LOG(DEBUG) << "e4crypt_init_user0\n";
- if (e4crypt_is_native()) {
- if (!prepare_dir(user_key_dir, 0700, AID_ROOT, AID_ROOT)) return false;
- if (!prepare_dir(user_key_dir + "/ce", 0700, AID_ROOT, AID_ROOT)) return false;
- if (!prepare_dir(user_key_dir + "/de", 0700, AID_ROOT, AID_ROOT)) return false;
- if (!android::vold::pathExists(get_de_key_path(0))) {
- if (!create_and_install_user_keys(0, false)) return false;
- }
- // TODO: switch to loading only DE_0 here once framework makes
- // explicit calls to install DE keys for secondary users
- if (!load_all_de_keys()) return false;
- }
-
- // If this is a non-FBE device that recently left an emulated mode,
- // restore user data directories to known-good state.
- if (!e4crypt_is_native() && !e4crypt_is_emulated()) {
- e4crypt_unlock_user_key(0, 0, "!", "!");
- }
-
- return true;
-}
-
-static bool emulated_unlock(const std::string& path, mode_t mode) {
- if (chmod(path.c_str(), mode) != 0) {
- PLOG(ERROR) << "Failed to chmod " << path << std::endl;
- // FIXME temporary workaround for b/26713622
- if (e4crypt_is_emulated()) return false;
- }
-#if EMULATED_USES_SELINUX
- if (selinux_android_restorecon(path.c_str(), SELINUX_ANDROID_RESTORECON_FORCE) != 0) {
- PLOG(WARNING) << "Failed to restorecon " << path << std::endl;
- // FIXME temporary workaround for b/26713622
- if (e4crypt_is_emulated()) return false;
- }
-#endif
- return true;
-}
-
-static bool parse_hex(const std::string& hex, std::string* result) {
- if (hex == "!") {
- *result = "";
- return true;
- }
- if (android::vold::HexToStr(hex, *result) != 0) {
- LOG(ERROR) << "Invalid FBE hex string" << std::endl; // Don't log the string for security reasons
- return false;
- }
- return true;
-}
-
-// TODO: rename to 'install' for consistency, and take flags to know which keys to install
-bool e4crypt_unlock_user_key(userid_t user_id, int serial, const std::string& token_hex,
- const std::string& secret_hex) {
- LOG(DEBUG) << "e4crypt_unlock_user_key " << user_id << " serial=" << serial
- << " token_present=" << (token_hex != "!") << std::endl;
- if (e4crypt_is_native()) {
- if (s_ce_key_raw_refs.count(user_id) != 0) {
- LOG(WARNING) << "Tried to unlock already-unlocked key for user " << user_id << std::endl;
- return true;
- }
- std::string token, secret;
- if (!parse_hex(token_hex, &token)) return false;
- if (!parse_hex(secret_hex, &secret)) return false;
- android::vold::KeyAuthentication auth(token, secret);
- if (!read_and_install_user_ce_key(user_id, auth)) {
- LOG(ERROR) << "Couldn't read key for " << user_id << std::endl;
- return false;
- }
- } else {
- // When in emulation mode, we just use chmod. However, we also
- // unlock directories when not in emulation mode, to bring devices
- // back into a known-good state.
- if (!emulated_unlock(android::vold::BuildDataSystemCePath(user_id), 0771) ||
- !emulated_unlock(android::vold::BuildDataMiscCePath(user_id), 01771) ||
- !emulated_unlock(android::vold::BuildDataMediaCePath("", user_id), 0770) ||
- !emulated_unlock(android::vold::BuildDataUserCePath("", user_id), 0771)) {
- LOG(ERROR) << "Failed to unlock user " << user_id << std::endl;
- return false;
- }
- }
- return true;
-}
diff --git a/crypto/ext4crypt/Ext4CryptPie.h b/crypto/ext4crypt/Ext4CryptPie.h
deleted file mode 100644
index 7236bc0..0000000
--- a/crypto/ext4crypt/Ext4CryptPie.h
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,45 +0,0 @@
-/*
- * Copyright (C) 2015 The Android Open Source Project
- *
- * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
- * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
- * You may obtain a copy of the License at
- *
- * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
- *
- * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
- * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
- * WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
- * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
- * limitations under the License.
- */
-
-#include <map>
-#include <string>
-
-#include <cutils/multiuser.h>
-
-bool e4crypt_initialize_global_de();
-
-bool e4crypt_init_user0();
-/*bool e4crypt_vold_create_user_key(userid_t user_id, int serial, bool ephemeral);
-bool e4crypt_destroy_user_key(userid_t user_id);
-bool e4crypt_add_user_key_auth(userid_t user_id, int serial, const std::string& token,
- const std::string& secret);
-bool e4crypt_fixate_newest_user_key_auth(userid_t user_id);*/
-
-bool e4crypt_unlock_user_key(userid_t user_id, int serial, const std::string& token,
- const std::string& secret);
-//bool e4crypt_lock_user_key(userid_t user_id);
-
-/*bool e4crypt_prepare_user_storage(const std::string& volume_uuid, userid_t user_id, int serial,
- int flags);*/
-/*bool e4crypt_destroy_user_storage(const std::string& volume_uuid, userid_t user_id, int flags);
-
-bool e4crypt_destroy_volume_keys(const std::string& volume_uuid);*/
-
-bool is_wrapped_key_supported();
-bool is_wrapped_key_supported_external();
-
-bool lookup_key_ref(const std::map<userid_t, std::string>& key_map, userid_t user_id,
- std::string* raw_ref);
diff --git a/crypto/ext4crypt/HashPassword.cpp b/crypto/ext4crypt/HashPassword.cpp
deleted file mode 100644
index 07ecb1f..0000000
--- a/crypto/ext4crypt/HashPassword.cpp
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,117 +0,0 @@
-/*
- * Copyright (C) 2016 Team Win Recovery Project
- *
- * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
- * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
- * You may obtain a copy of the License at
- *
- * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
- *
- * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
- * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
- * WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
- * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
- * limitations under the License.
- */
-
-/*
- * This computes the "secret" used by Android as one of the parameters
- * to decrypt File Based Encryption. The secret is prefixed with
- * "Android FBE credential hash" padded with 0s to 128 bytes then the
- * user's password is appended to the end of the 128 bytes. This string
- * is then hashed with sha512 and the sha512 value is then converted to
- * hex with upper-case characters.
- */
-
-#include <stdio.h>
-#include <string>
-#include <stdlib.h>
-#include <openssl/sha.h>
-#include <openssl/hmac.h>
-
-#include "HashPassword.h"
-
-#define PASS_PADDING_SIZE 128
-#define SHA512_HEX_SIZE SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH * 2
-#define SHA256_HEX_SIZE SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH * 2
-
-void* PersonalizedHashBinary(const char* prefix, const char* key, const size_t key_size) {
- size_t size = PASS_PADDING_SIZE + key_size;
- unsigned char* buffer = (unsigned char*)calloc(1, size);
- if (!buffer) return NULL; // failed to malloc
- memcpy((void*)buffer, (void*)prefix, strlen(prefix));
- unsigned char* ptr = buffer + PASS_PADDING_SIZE;
- memcpy((void*)ptr, key, key_size);
- unsigned char hash[SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH];
- SHA512_CTX sha512;
- SHA512_Init(&sha512);
- SHA512_Update(&sha512, buffer, size);
- SHA512_Final(hash, &sha512);
- free(buffer);
- void* ret = malloc(SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH);
- if (!ret) return NULL; // failed to malloc
- memcpy(ret, (void*)&hash[0], SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH);
- return ret;
-}
-
-std::string PersonalizedHash(const char* prefix, const char* key, const size_t key_size) {
- size_t size = PASS_PADDING_SIZE + key_size;
- unsigned char* buffer = (unsigned char*)calloc(1, size);
- if (!buffer) return ""; // failed to malloc
- memcpy((void*)buffer, (void*)prefix, strlen(prefix));
- unsigned char* ptr = buffer + PASS_PADDING_SIZE;
- memcpy((void*)ptr, key, key_size);
- unsigned char hash[SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH];
- SHA512_CTX sha512;
- SHA512_Init(&sha512);
- SHA512_Update(&sha512, buffer, size);
- SHA512_Final(hash, &sha512);
- int index = 0;
- char hex_hash[SHA512_HEX_SIZE + 1];
- for(index = 0; index < SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH; index++)
- sprintf(hex_hash + (index * 2), "%02X", hash[index]);
- hex_hash[128] = 0;
- std::string ret = hex_hash;
- free(buffer);
- return ret;
-}
-
-std::string PersonalizedHash(const char* prefix, const std::string& Password) {
- return PersonalizedHash(prefix, Password.c_str(), Password.size());
-}
-
-std::string PersonalizedHashSP800(const char* label, const char* context, const char* key, const size_t key_size) {
- HMAC_CTX ctx;
- HMAC_CTX_init(&ctx);
- HMAC_Init_ex(&ctx, key, key_size, EVP_sha256(), NULL);
- unsigned int counter = 1;
- endianswap(&counter);
- HMAC_Update(&ctx, (const unsigned char*)&counter, 4);
- HMAC_Update(&ctx, (const unsigned char*)label, strlen(label));
- const unsigned char divider = 0;
- HMAC_Update(&ctx, ÷r, 1);
- HMAC_Update(&ctx, (const unsigned char*)context, strlen(context));
- unsigned int contextDisambiguation = strlen(context) * 8;
- endianswap(&contextDisambiguation);
- HMAC_Update(&ctx, (const unsigned char*)&contextDisambiguation, 4);
- unsigned int finalValue = 256;
- endianswap(&finalValue);
- HMAC_Update(&ctx, (const unsigned char*)&finalValue, 4);
-
- unsigned char output[SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH];
- unsigned int out_size = 0;
- HMAC_Final(&ctx, output, &out_size);
-
- int index = 0;
- char hex_hash[SHA256_HEX_SIZE + 1];
- for(index = 0; index < SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH; index++)
- sprintf(hex_hash + (index * 2), "%02x", output[index]);
- hex_hash[SHA256_HEX_SIZE] = 0;
- std::string ret = hex_hash;
- return ret;
-}
-
-std::string HashPassword(const std::string& Password) {
- const char* prefix = FBE_PERSONALIZATION;
- return PersonalizedHash(prefix, Password);
-}
diff --git a/crypto/ext4crypt/HashPassword.h b/crypto/ext4crypt/HashPassword.h
deleted file mode 100644
index 73880b1..0000000
--- a/crypto/ext4crypt/HashPassword.h
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,44 +0,0 @@
-/*
- * Copyright (C) 2016 Team Win Recovery Project
- *
- * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
- * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
- * You may obtain a copy of the License at
- *
- * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
- *
- * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
- * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
- * WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
- * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
- * limitations under the License.
- */
-
-#ifndef __HASH_PASSWORD_H
-#define __HASH_PASSWORD_H
-
-#include <string>
-
-#define FBE_PERSONALIZATION "Android FBE credential hash"
-#define PERSONALISATION_WEAVER_KEY "weaver-key"
-#define PERSONALISATION_WEAVER_PASSWORD "weaver-pwd"
-#define PERSONALISATION_APPLICATION_ID "application-id"
-#define PERSONALIZATION_FBE_KEY "fbe-key"
-#define PERSONALIZATION_USER_GK_AUTH "user-gk-authentication"
-#define PERSONALISATION_SECDISCARDABLE "secdiscardable-transform"
-#define PERSONALISATION_CONTEXT "android-synthetic-password-personalization-context"
-
-void* PersonalizedHashBinary(const char* prefix, const char* key, const size_t key_size);
-
-std::string PersonalizedHash(const char* prefix, const char* key, const size_t key_size);
-std::string PersonalizedHash(const char* prefix, const std::string& Password);
-std::string PersonalizedHashSP800(const char* label, const char* context, const char* key, const size_t key_size);
-std::string HashPassword(const std::string& Password);
-
-template <class T>
-void endianswap(T *objp) {
- unsigned char *memp = reinterpret_cast<unsigned char*>(objp);
- std::reverse(memp, memp + sizeof(T));
-}
-
-#endif
diff --git a/crypto/ext4crypt/KeyBuffer.cpp b/crypto/ext4crypt/KeyBuffer.cpp
deleted file mode 100644
index e7aede5..0000000
--- a/crypto/ext4crypt/KeyBuffer.cpp
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,37 +0,0 @@
-/*
- * Copyright (C) 2017 The Android Open Source Project
- *
- * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
- * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
- * You may obtain a copy of the License at
- *
- * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
- *
- * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
- * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
- * WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
- * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
- * limitations under the License.
- */
-
-#include "KeyBuffer.h"
-
-#include <algorithm>
-#include <cstring>
-
-namespace android {
-namespace vold {
-
-KeyBuffer operator+(KeyBuffer&& lhs, const KeyBuffer& rhs) {
- std::copy(rhs.begin(), rhs.end(), std::back_inserter(lhs));
- return std::move(lhs);
-}
-
-KeyBuffer operator+(KeyBuffer&& lhs, const char* rhs) {
- std::copy(rhs, rhs + strlen(rhs), std::back_inserter(lhs));
- return std::move(lhs);
-}
-
-} // namespace vold
-} // namespace android
-
diff --git a/crypto/ext4crypt/KeyBuffer.h b/crypto/ext4crypt/KeyBuffer.h
deleted file mode 100644
index 2087187..0000000
--- a/crypto/ext4crypt/KeyBuffer.h
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,63 +0,0 @@
-/*
- * Copyright (C) 2017 The Android Open Source Project
- *
- * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
- * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
- * You may obtain a copy of the License at
- *
- * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
- *
- * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
- * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
- * WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
- * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
- * limitations under the License.
- */
-
-#ifndef ANDROID_VOLD_KEYBUFFER_H
-#define ANDROID_VOLD_KEYBUFFER_H
-
-#include <cstring>
-#include <memory>
-#include <vector>
-
-namespace android {
-namespace vold {
-
-/**
- * Variant of memset() that should never be optimized away. Borrowed from keymaster code.
- */
-#ifdef __clang__
-#define OPTNONE __attribute__((optnone))
-#else // not __clang__
-#define OPTNONE __attribute__((optimize("O0")))
-#endif // not __clang__
-inline OPTNONE void* memset_s(void* s, int c, size_t n) {
- if (!s)
- return s;
- return memset(s, c, n);
-}
-#undef OPTNONE
-
-// Allocator that delegates useful work to standard one but zeroes data before deallocating.
-class ZeroingAllocator : public std::allocator<char> {
- public:
- void deallocate(pointer p, size_type n)
- {
- memset_s(p, 0, n);
- std::allocator<char>::deallocate(p, n);
- }
-};
-
-// Char vector that zeroes memory when deallocating.
-using KeyBuffer = std::vector<char, ZeroingAllocator>;
-
-// Convenience methods to concatenate key buffers.
-KeyBuffer operator+(KeyBuffer&& lhs, const KeyBuffer& rhs);
-KeyBuffer operator+(KeyBuffer&& lhs, const char* rhs);
-
-} // namespace vold
-} // namespace android
-
-#endif
-
diff --git a/crypto/ext4crypt/KeyStorage.cpp b/crypto/ext4crypt/KeyStorage.cpp
deleted file mode 100644
index 199520e..0000000
--- a/crypto/ext4crypt/KeyStorage.cpp
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,349 +0,0 @@
-/*
- * Copyright (C) 2016 The Android Open Source Project
- *
- * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
- * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
- * You may obtain a copy of the License at
- *
- * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
- *
- * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
- * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
- * WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
- * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
- * limitations under the License.
- */
-
-#include "KeyStorage.h"
-
-#include "Keymaster.h"
-#include "ScryptParameters.h"
-#include "Utils.h"
-
-#include <vector>
-
-#include <errno.h>
-#include <sys/stat.h>
-#include <sys/types.h>
-#include <sys/wait.h>
-#include <unistd.h>
-#include <iostream>
-
-#include <openssl/sha.h>
-
-#include <android-base/file.h>
-//#include <android-base/logging.h>
-
-#include <cutils/properties.h>
-
-#include <hardware/hw_auth_token.h>
-
-#include <keymaster/authorization_set.h>
-
-extern "C" {
-
-#include "crypto_scrypt.h"
-}
-
-#define ERROR 1
-#define LOG(x) std::cout
-#define PLOG(x) std::cout
-
-namespace android {
-namespace vold {
-
-const KeyAuthentication kEmptyAuthentication{"", ""};
-
-static constexpr size_t AES_KEY_BYTES = 32;
-static constexpr size_t GCM_NONCE_BYTES = 12;
-static constexpr size_t GCM_MAC_BYTES = 16;
-static constexpr size_t SALT_BYTES = 1 << 4;
-static constexpr size_t SECDISCARDABLE_BYTES = 1 << 14;
-static constexpr size_t STRETCHED_BYTES = 1 << 6;
-
-static constexpr uint32_t AUTH_TIMEOUT = 30; // Seconds
-
-static const char* kCurrentVersion = "1";
-static const char* kRmPath = "/system/bin/rm";
-static const char* kSecdiscardPath = "/system/bin/secdiscard";
-static const char* kStretch_none = "none";
-static const char* kStretch_nopassword = "nopassword";
-static const std::string kStretchPrefix_scrypt = "scrypt ";
-static const char* kFn_encrypted_key = "encrypted_key";
-static const char* kFn_keymaster_key_blob = "keymaster_key_blob";
-static const char* kFn_salt = "salt";
-static const char* kFn_secdiscardable = "secdiscardable";
-static const char* kFn_stretching = "stretching";
-static const char* kFn_version = "version";
-
-static bool checkSize(const std::string& kind, size_t actual, size_t expected) {
- if (actual != expected) {
- LOG(ERROR) << "Wrong number of bytes in " << kind << ", expected " << expected << " got "
- << actual;
- return false;
- }
- return true;
-}
-
-static std::string hashSecdiscardable(const std::string& secdiscardable) {
- SHA512_CTX c;
-
- SHA512_Init(&c);
- // Personalise the hashing by introducing a fixed prefix.
- // Hashing applications should use personalization except when there is a
- // specific reason not to; see section 4.11 of https://www.schneier.com/skein1.3.pdf
- std::string secdiscardableHashingPrefix = "Android secdiscardable SHA512";
- secdiscardableHashingPrefix.resize(SHA512_CBLOCK);
- SHA512_Update(&c, secdiscardableHashingPrefix.data(), secdiscardableHashingPrefix.size());
- SHA512_Update(&c, secdiscardable.data(), secdiscardable.size());
- std::string res(SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH, '\0');
- SHA512_Final(reinterpret_cast<uint8_t*>(&res[0]), &c);
- return res;
-}
-
-/*static bool generateKeymasterKey(Keymaster& keymaster, const KeyAuthentication& auth,
- const std::string& appId, std::string* key) {
- auto paramBuilder = keymaster::AuthorizationSetBuilder()
- .AesEncryptionKey(AES_KEY_BYTES * 8)
- .Authorization(keymaster::TAG_BLOCK_MODE, KM_MODE_GCM)
- .Authorization(keymaster::TAG_MIN_MAC_LENGTH, GCM_MAC_BYTES * 8)
- .Authorization(keymaster::TAG_PADDING, KM_PAD_NONE);
- addStringParam(¶mBuilder, keymaster::TAG_APPLICATION_ID, appId);
- if (auth.token.empty()) {
- LOG(DEBUG) << "Creating key that doesn't need auth token";
- paramBuilder.Authorization(keymaster::TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED);
- } else {
- LOG(DEBUG) << "Auth token required for key";
- if (auth.token.size() != sizeof(hw_auth_token_t)) {
- LOG(ERROR) << "Auth token should be " << sizeof(hw_auth_token_t) << " bytes, was "
- << auth.token.size() << " bytes";
- return false;
- }
- const hw_auth_token_t* at = reinterpret_cast<const hw_auth_token_t*>(auth.token.data());
- paramBuilder.Authorization(keymaster::TAG_USER_SECURE_ID, at->user_id);
- paramBuilder.Authorization(keymaster::TAG_USER_AUTH_TYPE, HW_AUTH_PASSWORD);
- paramBuilder.Authorization(keymaster::TAG_AUTH_TIMEOUT, AUTH_TIMEOUT);
- }
- return keymaster.generateKey(paramBuilder.build(), key);
-}*/
-
-static keymaster::AuthorizationSetBuilder beginParams(const KeyAuthentication& auth,
- const std::string& appId) {
- auto paramBuilder = keymaster::AuthorizationSetBuilder()
- .Authorization(keymaster::TAG_BLOCK_MODE, KM_MODE_GCM)
- .Authorization(keymaster::TAG_MAC_LENGTH, GCM_MAC_BYTES * 8)
- .Authorization(keymaster::TAG_PADDING, KM_PAD_NONE);
- addStringParam(¶mBuilder, keymaster::TAG_APPLICATION_ID, appId);
- if (!auth.token.empty()) {
- LOG(DEBUG) << "Supplying auth token to Keymaster";
- addStringParam(¶mBuilder, keymaster::TAG_AUTH_TOKEN, auth.token);
- }
- return paramBuilder;
-}
-
-/*static bool encryptWithKeymasterKey(Keymaster& keymaster, const std::string& key,
- const KeyAuthentication& auth, const std::string& appId,
- const std::string& message, std::string* ciphertext) {
- auto params = beginParams(auth, appId).build();
- keymaster::AuthorizationSet outParams;
- auto opHandle = keymaster.begin(KM_PURPOSE_ENCRYPT, key, params, &outParams);
- if (!opHandle) return false;
- keymaster_blob_t nonceBlob;
- if (!outParams.GetTagValue(keymaster::TAG_NONCE, &nonceBlob)) {
- LOG(ERROR) << "GCM encryption but no nonce generated";
- return false;
- }
- // nonceBlob here is just a pointer into existing data, must not be freed
- std::string nonce(reinterpret_cast<const char*>(nonceBlob.data), nonceBlob.data_length);
- if (!checkSize("nonce", nonce.size(), GCM_NONCE_BYTES)) return false;
- std::string body;
- if (!opHandle.updateCompletely(message, &body)) return false;
-
- std::string mac;
- if (!opHandle.finishWithOutput(&mac)) return false;
- if (!checkSize("mac", mac.size(), GCM_MAC_BYTES)) return false;
- *ciphertext = nonce + body + mac;
- return true;
-}*/
-
-static bool decryptWithKeymasterKey(Keymaster& keymaster, const std::string& key,
- const KeyAuthentication& auth, const std::string& appId,
- const std::string& ciphertext, std::string* message) {
- auto nonce = ciphertext.substr(0, GCM_NONCE_BYTES);
- auto bodyAndMac = ciphertext.substr(GCM_NONCE_BYTES);
- auto params = addStringParam(beginParams(auth, appId), keymaster::TAG_NONCE, nonce).build();
- auto opHandle = keymaster.begin(KM_PURPOSE_DECRYPT, key, params);
- if (!opHandle) return false;
- if (!opHandle.updateCompletely(bodyAndMac, message)) return false;
- if (!opHandle.finish()) return false;
- return true;
-}
-
-static bool readFileToString(const std::string& filename, std::string* result) {
- if (!android::base::ReadFileToString(filename, result)) {
- PLOG(ERROR) << "Failed to read from " << filename;
- return false;
- }
- return true;
-}
-
-/*static bool writeStringToFile(const std::string& payload, const std::string& filename) {
- if (!android::base::WriteStringToFile(payload, filename)) {
- PLOG(ERROR) << "Failed to write to " << filename;
- return false;
- }
- return true;
-}*/
-
-static std::string getStretching() {
- char paramstr[PROPERTY_VALUE_MAX];
-
- property_get(SCRYPT_PROP, paramstr, SCRYPT_DEFAULTS);
- return std::string() + kStretchPrefix_scrypt + paramstr;
-}
-
-static bool stretchingNeedsSalt(const std::string& stretching) {
- return stretching != kStretch_nopassword && stretching != kStretch_none;
-}
-
-static bool stretchSecret(const std::string& stretching, const std::string& secret,
- const std::string& salt, std::string* stretched) {
- if (stretching == kStretch_nopassword) {
- if (!secret.empty()) {
- LOG(WARNING) << "Password present but stretching is nopassword";
- // Continue anyway
- }
- stretched->clear();
- } else if (stretching == kStretch_none) {
- *stretched = secret;
- } else if (std::equal(kStretchPrefix_scrypt.begin(), kStretchPrefix_scrypt.end(),
- stretching.begin())) {
- int Nf, rf, pf;
- if (!parse_scrypt_parameters(stretching.substr(kStretchPrefix_scrypt.size()).c_str(), &Nf,
- &rf, &pf)) {
- LOG(ERROR) << "Unable to parse scrypt params in stretching: " << stretching;
- return false;
- }
- stretched->assign(STRETCHED_BYTES, '\0');
- if (crypto_scrypt(reinterpret_cast<const uint8_t*>(secret.data()), secret.size(),
- reinterpret_cast<const uint8_t*>(salt.data()), salt.size(),
- 1 << Nf, 1 << rf, 1 << pf,
- reinterpret_cast<uint8_t*>(&(*stretched)[0]), stretched->size()) != 0) {
- LOG(ERROR) << "scrypt failed with params: " << stretching;
- return false;
- }
- } else {
- LOG(ERROR) << "Unknown stretching type: " << stretching;
- return false;
- }
- return true;
-}
-
-static bool generateAppId(const KeyAuthentication& auth, const std::string& stretching,
- const std::string& salt, const std::string& secdiscardable,
- std::string* appId) {
- std::string stretched;
- if (!stretchSecret(stretching, auth.secret, salt, &stretched)) return false;
- *appId = hashSecdiscardable(secdiscardable) + stretched;
- return true;
-}
-
-/*bool storeKey(const std::string& dir, const KeyAuthentication& auth, const std::string& key) {
- if (TEMP_FAILURE_RETRY(mkdir(dir.c_str(), 0700)) == -1) {
- PLOG(ERROR) << "key mkdir " << dir;
- return false;
- }
- if (!writeStringToFile(kCurrentVersion, dir + "/" + kFn_version)) return false;
- std::string secdiscardable;
- if (ReadRandomBytes(SECDISCARDABLE_BYTES, secdiscardable) != OK) {
- // TODO status_t plays badly with PLOG, fix it.
- LOG(ERROR) << "Random read failed";
- return false;
- }
- if (!writeStringToFile(secdiscardable, dir + "/" + kFn_secdiscardable)) return false;
- std::string stretching = auth.secret.empty() ? kStretch_nopassword : getStretching();
- if (!writeStringToFile(stretching, dir + "/" + kFn_stretching)) return false;
- std::string salt;
- if (stretchingNeedsSalt(stretching)) {
- if (ReadRandomBytes(SALT_BYTES, salt) != OK) {
- LOG(ERROR) << "Random read failed";
- return false;
- }
- if (!writeStringToFile(salt, dir + "/" + kFn_salt)) return false;
- }
- std::string appId;
- if (!generateAppId(auth, stretching, salt, secdiscardable, &appId)) return false;
- Keymaster keymaster;
- if (!keymaster) return false;
- std::string kmKey;
- if (!generateKeymasterKey(keymaster, auth, appId, &kmKey)) return false;
- if (!writeStringToFile(kmKey, dir + "/" + kFn_keymaster_key_blob)) return false;
- std::string encryptedKey;
- if (!encryptWithKeymasterKey(keymaster, kmKey, auth, appId, key, &encryptedKey)) return false;
- if (!writeStringToFile(encryptedKey, dir + "/" + kFn_encrypted_key)) return false;
- return true;
-}*/
-
-bool retrieveKey(const std::string& dir, const KeyAuthentication& auth, std::string* key) {
- std::string version;
- if (!readFileToString(dir + "/" + kFn_version, &version)) return false;
- if (version != kCurrentVersion) {
- LOG(ERROR) << "Version mismatch, expected " << kCurrentVersion << " got " << version;
- return false;
- }
- std::string secdiscardable;
- if (!readFileToString(dir + "/" + kFn_secdiscardable, &secdiscardable)) return false;
- std::string stretching;
- if (!readFileToString(dir + "/" + kFn_stretching, &stretching)) return false;
- std::string salt;
- if (stretchingNeedsSalt(stretching)) {
- if (!readFileToString(dir + "/" + kFn_salt, &salt)) return false;
- }
- std::string appId;
- if (!generateAppId(auth, stretching, salt, secdiscardable, &appId)) return false;
- std::string kmKey;
- if (!readFileToString(dir + "/" + kFn_keymaster_key_blob, &kmKey)) return false;
- std::string encryptedMessage;
- if (!readFileToString(dir + "/" + kFn_encrypted_key, &encryptedMessage)) return false;
- Keymaster keymaster;
- if (!keymaster) return false;
- return decryptWithKeymasterKey(keymaster, kmKey, auth, appId, encryptedMessage, key);
-}
-
-static bool deleteKey(const std::string& dir) {
- std::string kmKey;
- if (!readFileToString(dir + "/" + kFn_keymaster_key_blob, &kmKey)) return false;
- Keymaster keymaster;
- if (!keymaster) return false;
- if (!keymaster.deleteKey(kmKey)) return false;
- return true;
-}
-
-static bool secdiscardSecdiscardable(const std::string& dir) {
- if (ForkExecvp(
- std::vector<std::string>{kSecdiscardPath, "--", dir + "/" + kFn_secdiscardable}) != 0) {
- LOG(ERROR) << "secdiscard failed";
- return false;
- }
- return true;
-}
-
-static bool recursiveDeleteKey(const std::string& dir) {
- if (ForkExecvp(std::vector<std::string>{kRmPath, "-rf", dir}) != 0) {
- LOG(ERROR) << "recursive delete failed";
- return false;
- }
- return true;
-}
-
-bool destroyKey(const std::string& dir) {
- bool success = true;
- // Try each thing, even if previous things failed.
- success &= deleteKey(dir);
- success &= secdiscardSecdiscardable(dir);
- success &= recursiveDeleteKey(dir);
- return success;
-}
-
-} // namespace vold
-} // namespace android
diff --git a/crypto/ext4crypt/KeyStorage.h b/crypto/ext4crypt/KeyStorage.h
deleted file mode 100644
index 63d38da..0000000
--- a/crypto/ext4crypt/KeyStorage.h
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,53 +0,0 @@
-/*
- * Copyright (C) 2016 The Android Open Source Project
- *
- * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
- * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
- * You may obtain a copy of the License at
- *
- * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
- *
- * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
- * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
- * WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
- * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
- * limitations under the License.
- */
-
-#ifndef ANDROID_VOLD_KEYSTORAGE_H
-#define ANDROID_VOLD_KEYSTORAGE_H
-
-#include <string>
-
-namespace android {
-namespace vold {
-
-// Represents the information needed to decrypt a disk encryption key.
-// If "token" is nonempty, it is passed in as a required Gatekeeper auth token.
-// If "secret" is nonempty, it is appended to the application-specific
-// binary needed to unlock.
-class KeyAuthentication {
- public:
- KeyAuthentication(std::string t, std::string s) : token{t}, secret{s} {};
- const std::string token;
- const std::string secret;
-};
-
-extern const KeyAuthentication kEmptyAuthentication;
-
-// Create a directory at the named path, and store "key" in it,
-// in such a way that it can only be retrieved via Keymaster and
-// can be securely deleted.
-// It's safe to move/rename the directory after creation.
-//bool storeKey(const std::string& dir, const KeyAuthentication& auth, const std::string& key);
-
-// Retrieve the key from the named directory.
-bool retrieveKey(const std::string& dir, const KeyAuthentication& auth, std::string* key);
-
-// Securely destroy the key stored in the named directory and delete the directory.
-bool destroyKey(const std::string& dir);
-
-} // namespace vold
-} // namespace android
-
-#endif
diff --git a/crypto/ext4crypt/KeyStorage3.cpp b/crypto/ext4crypt/KeyStorage3.cpp
deleted file mode 100644
index a07212d..0000000
--- a/crypto/ext4crypt/KeyStorage3.cpp
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,526 +0,0 @@
-/*
- * Copyright (C) 2016 The Android Open Source Project
- *
- * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
- * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
- * You may obtain a copy of the License at
- *
- * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
- *
- * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
- * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
- * WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
- * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
- * limitations under the License.
- */
-
-#include "KeyStorage3.h"
-
-#include "Keymaster3.h"
-#include "ScryptParameters.h"
-#include "Utils.h"
-
-#include <vector>
-
-#include <errno.h>
-#include <stdio.h>
-#include <sys/stat.h>
-#include <sys/types.h>
-#include <sys/wait.h>
-#include <unistd.h>
-
-#include <openssl/err.h>
-#include <openssl/evp.h>
-#include <openssl/sha.h>
-
-#include <android-base/file.h>
-//#include <android-base/logging.h>
-
-#include <cutils/properties.h>
-
-#include <hardware/hw_auth_token.h>
-
-#include <keystore/authorization_set.h>
-#include <keystore/keystore_hidl_support.h>
-
-extern "C" {
-
-#include "crypto_scrypt.h"
-}
-
-#include <iostream>
-#define ERROR 1
-#define LOG(x) std::cout
-#define PLOG(x) std::cout
-
-namespace android {
-namespace vold {
-using namespace keystore;
-
-const KeyAuthentication kEmptyAuthentication{"", ""};
-
-static constexpr size_t AES_KEY_BYTES = 32;
-static constexpr size_t GCM_NONCE_BYTES = 12;
-static constexpr size_t GCM_MAC_BYTES = 16;
-static constexpr size_t SALT_BYTES = 1 << 4;
-static constexpr size_t SECDISCARDABLE_BYTES = 1 << 14;
-static constexpr size_t STRETCHED_BYTES = 1 << 6;
-
-static constexpr uint32_t AUTH_TIMEOUT = 30; // Seconds
-
-static const char* kCurrentVersion = "1";
-static const char* kRmPath = "/system/bin/rm";
-static const char* kSecdiscardPath = "/system/bin/secdiscard";
-static const char* kStretch_none = "none";
-static const char* kStretch_nopassword = "nopassword";
-static const std::string kStretchPrefix_scrypt = "scrypt ";
-static const char* kHashPrefix_secdiscardable = "Android secdiscardable SHA512";
-static const char* kHashPrefix_keygen = "Android key wrapping key generation SHA512";
-static const char* kFn_encrypted_key = "encrypted_key";
-static const char* kFn_keymaster_key_blob = "keymaster_key_blob";
-static const char* kFn_keymaster_key_blob_upgraded = "keymaster_key_blob_upgraded";
-static const char* kFn_salt = "salt";
-static const char* kFn_secdiscardable = "secdiscardable";
-static const char* kFn_stretching = "stretching";
-static const char* kFn_version = "version";
-
-static bool checkSize(const std::string& kind, size_t actual, size_t expected) {
- if (actual != expected) {
- LOG(ERROR) << "Wrong number of bytes in " << kind << ", expected " << expected << " got "
- << actual;
- return false;
- }
- return true;
-}
-
-static std::string hashWithPrefix(char const* prefix, const std::string& tohash) {
- SHA512_CTX c;
-
- SHA512_Init(&c);
- // Personalise the hashing by introducing a fixed prefix.
- // Hashing applications should use personalization except when there is a
- // specific reason not to; see section 4.11 of https://www.schneier.com/skein1.3.pdf
- std::string hashingPrefix = prefix;
- hashingPrefix.resize(SHA512_CBLOCK);
- SHA512_Update(&c, hashingPrefix.data(), hashingPrefix.size());
- SHA512_Update(&c, tohash.data(), tohash.size());
- std::string res(SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH, '\0');
- SHA512_Final(reinterpret_cast<uint8_t*>(&res[0]), &c);
- return res;
-}
-
-/*static bool generateKeymasterKey(Keymaster& keymaster, const KeyAuthentication& auth,
- const std::string& appId, std::string* key) {
- auto paramBuilder = AuthorizationSetBuilder()
- .AesEncryptionKey(AES_KEY_BYTES * 8)
- .Authorization(TAG_BLOCK_MODE, BlockMode::GCM)
- .Authorization(TAG_MIN_MAC_LENGTH, GCM_MAC_BYTES * 8)
- .Authorization(TAG_PADDING, PaddingMode::NONE)
- .Authorization(TAG_APPLICATION_ID, blob2hidlVec(appId));
- if (auth.token.empty()) {
- LOG(DEBUG) << "Creating key that doesn't need auth token";
- paramBuilder.Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED);
- } else {
- LOG(DEBUG) << "Auth token required for key";
- if (auth.token.size() != sizeof(hw_auth_token_t)) {
- LOG(ERROR) << "Auth token should be " << sizeof(hw_auth_token_t) << " bytes, was "
- << auth.token.size() << " bytes";
- return false;
- }
- const hw_auth_token_t* at = reinterpret_cast<const hw_auth_token_t*>(auth.token.data());
- paramBuilder.Authorization(TAG_USER_SECURE_ID, at->user_id);
- paramBuilder.Authorization(TAG_USER_AUTH_TYPE, HardwareAuthenticatorType::PASSWORD);
- paramBuilder.Authorization(TAG_AUTH_TIMEOUT, AUTH_TIMEOUT);
- }
- return keymaster.generateKey(paramBuilder, key);
-}*/
-
-static AuthorizationSet beginParams(const KeyAuthentication& auth,
- const std::string& appId) {
- auto paramBuilder = AuthorizationSetBuilder()
- .Authorization(TAG_BLOCK_MODE, BlockMode::GCM)
- .Authorization(TAG_MAC_LENGTH, GCM_MAC_BYTES * 8)
- .Authorization(TAG_PADDING, PaddingMode::NONE)
- .Authorization(TAG_APPLICATION_ID, blob2hidlVec(appId));
- if (!auth.token.empty()) {
- LOG(DEBUG) << "Supplying auth token to Keymaster";
- paramBuilder.Authorization(TAG_AUTH_TOKEN, blob2hidlVec(auth.token));
- }
- return paramBuilder;
-}
-
-static bool readFileToString(const std::string& filename, std::string* result) {
- if (!android::base::ReadFileToString(filename, result)) {
- PLOG(ERROR) << "Failed to read from " << filename;
- return false;
- }
- return true;
-}
-
-static bool writeStringToFile(const std::string& payload, const std::string& filename) {
- if (!android::base::WriteStringToFile(payload, filename)) {
- PLOG(ERROR) << "Failed to write to " << filename;
- return false;
- }
- return true;
-}
-
-static KeymasterOperation begin(Keymaster& keymaster, const std::string& dir,
- KeyPurpose purpose,
- const AuthorizationSet &keyParams,
- const AuthorizationSet &opParams,
- AuthorizationSet* outParams) {
- auto kmKeyPath = dir + "/" + kFn_keymaster_key_blob;
- std::string kmKey;
- if (!readFileToString(kmKeyPath, &kmKey)) return KeymasterOperation();
- AuthorizationSet inParams(keyParams);
- inParams.append(opParams.begin(), opParams.end());
- for (;;) {
- auto opHandle = keymaster.begin(purpose, kmKey, inParams, outParams);
- if (opHandle) {
- return opHandle;
- }
- if (opHandle.errorCode() != ErrorCode::KEY_REQUIRES_UPGRADE) return opHandle;
- LOG(DEBUG) << "Upgrading key: " << dir;
- std::string newKey;
- if (!keymaster.upgradeKey(kmKey, keyParams, &newKey)) return KeymasterOperation();
- // Upgrade the key in memory but do not replace the key in storage
- /*auto newKeyPath = dir + "/" + kFn_keymaster_key_blob_upgraded;
- if (!writeStringToFile(newKey, newKeyPath)) return KeymasterOperation();
- if (rename(newKeyPath.c_str(), kmKeyPath.c_str()) != 0) {
- PLOG(ERROR) << "Unable to move upgraded key to location: " << kmKeyPath;
- return KeymasterOperation();
- }
- if (!keymaster.deleteKey(kmKey)) {
- LOG(ERROR) << "Key deletion failed during upgrade, continuing anyway: " << dir;
- }*/
- kmKey = newKey;
- LOG(INFO) << "Key upgraded: " << dir;
- }
-}
-
-/*static bool encryptWithKeymasterKey(Keymaster& keymaster, const std::string& dir,
- const AuthorizationSet &keyParams,
- const std::string& message, std::string* ciphertext) {
- AuthorizationSet opParams;
- AuthorizationSet outParams;
- auto opHandle = begin(keymaster, dir, KeyPurpose::ENCRYPT, keyParams, opParams, &outParams);
- if (!opHandle) return false;
- auto nonceBlob = outParams.GetTagValue(TAG_NONCE);
- if (!nonceBlob.isOk()) {
- LOG(ERROR) << "GCM encryption but no nonce generated";
- return false;
- }
- // nonceBlob here is just a pointer into existing data, must not be freed
- std::string nonce(reinterpret_cast<const char*>(&nonceBlob.value()[0]), nonceBlob.value().size());
- if (!checkSize("nonce", nonce.size(), GCM_NONCE_BYTES)) return false;
- std::string body;
- if (!opHandle.updateCompletely(message, &body)) return false;
-
- std::string mac;
- if (!opHandle.finish(&mac)) return false;
- if (!checkSize("mac", mac.size(), GCM_MAC_BYTES)) return false;
- *ciphertext = nonce + body + mac;
- return true;
-}*/
-
-static bool decryptWithKeymasterKey(Keymaster& keymaster, const std::string& dir,
- const AuthorizationSet &keyParams,
- const std::string& ciphertext, std::string* message) {
- auto nonce = ciphertext.substr(0, GCM_NONCE_BYTES);
- auto bodyAndMac = ciphertext.substr(GCM_NONCE_BYTES);
- auto opParams = AuthorizationSetBuilder()
- .Authorization(TAG_NONCE, blob2hidlVec(nonce));
- auto opHandle = begin(keymaster, dir, KeyPurpose::DECRYPT, keyParams, opParams, nullptr);
- if (!opHandle) return false;
- if (!opHandle.updateCompletely(bodyAndMac, message)) return false;
- if (!opHandle.finish(nullptr)) return false;
- return true;
-}
-
-static std::string getStretching(const KeyAuthentication& auth) {
- if (!auth.usesKeymaster()) {
- return kStretch_none;
- } else if (auth.secret.empty()) {
- return kStretch_nopassword;
- } else {
- char paramstr[PROPERTY_VALUE_MAX];
-
- property_get(SCRYPT_PROP, paramstr, SCRYPT_DEFAULTS);
- return std::string() + kStretchPrefix_scrypt + paramstr;
- }
-}
-
-static bool stretchingNeedsSalt(const std::string& stretching) {
- return stretching != kStretch_nopassword && stretching != kStretch_none;
-}
-
-static bool stretchSecret(const std::string& stretching, const std::string& secret,
- const std::string& salt, std::string* stretched) {
- if (stretching == kStretch_nopassword) {
- if (!secret.empty()) {
- LOG(WARNING) << "Password present but stretching is nopassword";
- // Continue anyway
- }
- stretched->clear();
- } else if (stretching == kStretch_none) {
- *stretched = secret;
- } else if (std::equal(kStretchPrefix_scrypt.begin(), kStretchPrefix_scrypt.end(),
- stretching.begin())) {
- int Nf, rf, pf;
- if (!parse_scrypt_parameters(stretching.substr(kStretchPrefix_scrypt.size()).c_str(), &Nf,
- &rf, &pf)) {
- LOG(ERROR) << "Unable to parse scrypt params in stretching: " << stretching;
- return false;
- }
- stretched->assign(STRETCHED_BYTES, '\0');
- if (crypto_scrypt(reinterpret_cast<const uint8_t*>(secret.data()), secret.size(),
- reinterpret_cast<const uint8_t*>(salt.data()), salt.size(),
- 1 << Nf, 1 << rf, 1 << pf,
- reinterpret_cast<uint8_t*>(&(*stretched)[0]), stretched->size()) != 0) {
- LOG(ERROR) << "scrypt failed with params: " << stretching;
- return false;
- }
- } else {
- LOG(ERROR) << "Unknown stretching type: " << stretching;
- return false;
- }
- return true;
-}
-
-static bool generateAppId(const KeyAuthentication& auth, const std::string& stretching,
- const std::string& salt, const std::string& secdiscardable,
- std::string* appId) {
- std::string stretched;
- if (!stretchSecret(stretching, auth.secret, salt, &stretched)) return false;
- *appId = hashWithPrefix(kHashPrefix_secdiscardable, secdiscardable) + stretched;
- return true;
-}
-
-static bool readRandomBytesOrLog(size_t count, std::string* out) {
- auto status = ReadRandomBytes(count, *out);
- if (status != OK) {
- LOG(ERROR) << "Random read failed with status: " << status;
- return false;
- }
- return true;
-}
-
-static void logOpensslError() {
- LOG(ERROR) << "Openssl error: " << ERR_get_error();
-}
-
-static bool encryptWithoutKeymaster(const std::string& preKey,
- const std::string& plaintext, std::string* ciphertext) {
- auto key = hashWithPrefix(kHashPrefix_keygen, preKey);
- key.resize(AES_KEY_BYTES);
- if (!readRandomBytesOrLog(GCM_NONCE_BYTES, ciphertext)) return false;
- auto ctx = std::unique_ptr<EVP_CIPHER_CTX, decltype(&::EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free)>(
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new(), EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free);
- if (!ctx) {
- logOpensslError();
- return false;
- }
- if (1 != EVP_EncryptInit_ex(ctx.get(), EVP_aes_256_gcm(), NULL,
- reinterpret_cast<const uint8_t*>(key.data()),
- reinterpret_cast<const uint8_t*>(ciphertext->data()))) {
- logOpensslError();
- return false;
- }
- ciphertext->resize(GCM_NONCE_BYTES + plaintext.size() + GCM_MAC_BYTES);
- int outlen;
- if (1 != EVP_EncryptUpdate(ctx.get(),
- reinterpret_cast<uint8_t*>(&(*ciphertext)[0] + GCM_NONCE_BYTES), &outlen,
- reinterpret_cast<const uint8_t*>(plaintext.data()), plaintext.size())) {
- logOpensslError();
- return false;
- }
- if (outlen != static_cast<int>(plaintext.size())) {
- LOG(ERROR) << "GCM ciphertext length should be " << plaintext.size() << " was " << outlen;
- return false;
- }
- if (1 != EVP_EncryptFinal_ex(ctx.get(),
- reinterpret_cast<uint8_t*>(&(*ciphertext)[0] + GCM_NONCE_BYTES + plaintext.size()), &outlen)) {
- logOpensslError();
- return false;
- }
- if (outlen != 0) {
- LOG(ERROR) << "GCM EncryptFinal should be 0, was " << outlen;
- return false;
- }
- if (1 != EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ctx.get(), EVP_CTRL_GCM_GET_TAG, GCM_MAC_BYTES,
- reinterpret_cast<uint8_t*>(&(*ciphertext)[0] + GCM_NONCE_BYTES + plaintext.size()))) {
- logOpensslError();
- return false;
- }
- return true;
-}
-
-static bool decryptWithoutKeymaster(const std::string& preKey,
- const std::string& ciphertext, std::string* plaintext) {
- if (ciphertext.size() < GCM_NONCE_BYTES + GCM_MAC_BYTES) {
- LOG(ERROR) << "GCM ciphertext too small: " << ciphertext.size();
- return false;
- }
- auto key = hashWithPrefix(kHashPrefix_keygen, preKey);
- key.resize(AES_KEY_BYTES);
- auto ctx = std::unique_ptr<EVP_CIPHER_CTX, decltype(&::EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free)>(
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new(), EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free);
- if (!ctx) {
- logOpensslError();
- return false;
- }
- if (1 != EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ctx.get(), EVP_aes_256_gcm(), NULL,
- reinterpret_cast<const uint8_t*>(key.data()),
- reinterpret_cast<const uint8_t*>(ciphertext.data()))) {
- logOpensslError();
- return false;
- }
- plaintext->resize(ciphertext.size() - GCM_NONCE_BYTES - GCM_MAC_BYTES);
- int outlen;
- if (1 != EVP_DecryptUpdate(ctx.get(),
- reinterpret_cast<uint8_t*>(&(*plaintext)[0]), &outlen,
- reinterpret_cast<const uint8_t*>(ciphertext.data() + GCM_NONCE_BYTES), plaintext->size())) {
- logOpensslError();
- return false;
- }
- if (outlen != static_cast<int>(plaintext->size())) {
- LOG(ERROR) << "GCM plaintext length should be " << plaintext->size() << " was " << outlen;
- return false;
- }
- if (1 != EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ctx.get(), EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_TAG, GCM_MAC_BYTES,
- const_cast<void *>(
- reinterpret_cast<const void*>(ciphertext.data() + GCM_NONCE_BYTES + plaintext->size())))) {
- logOpensslError();
- return false;
- }
- if (1 != EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(ctx.get(),
- reinterpret_cast<uint8_t*>(&(*plaintext)[0] + plaintext->size()), &outlen)) {
- logOpensslError();
- return false;
- }
- if (outlen != 0) {
- LOG(ERROR) << "GCM EncryptFinal should be 0, was " << outlen;
- return false;
- }
- return true;
-}
-
-/*bool storeKey(const std::string& dir, const KeyAuthentication& auth, const std::string& key) {
- if (TEMP_FAILURE_RETRY(mkdir(dir.c_str(), 0700)) == -1) {
- PLOG(ERROR) << "key mkdir " << dir;
- return false;
- }
- if (!writeStringToFile(kCurrentVersion, dir + "/" + kFn_version)) return false;
- std::string secdiscardable;
- if (!readRandomBytesOrLog(SECDISCARDABLE_BYTES, &secdiscardable)) return false;
- if (!writeStringToFile(secdiscardable, dir + "/" + kFn_secdiscardable)) return false;
- std::string stretching = getStretching(auth);
- if (!writeStringToFile(stretching, dir + "/" + kFn_stretching)) return false;
- std::string salt;
- if (stretchingNeedsSalt(stretching)) {
- if (ReadRandomBytes(SALT_BYTES, salt) != OK) {
- LOG(ERROR) << "Random read failed";
- return false;
- }
- if (!writeStringToFile(salt, dir + "/" + kFn_salt)) return false;
- }
- std::string appId;
- if (!generateAppId(auth, stretching, salt, secdiscardable, &appId)) return false;
- std::string encryptedKey;
- if (auth.usesKeymaster()) {
- Keymaster keymaster;
- if (!keymaster) return false;
- std::string kmKey;
- if (!generateKeymasterKey(keymaster, auth, appId, &kmKey)) return false;
- if (!writeStringToFile(kmKey, dir + "/" + kFn_keymaster_key_blob)) return false;
- auto keyParams = beginParams(auth, appId);
- if (!encryptWithKeymasterKey(keymaster, dir, keyParams, key, &encryptedKey)) return false;
- } else {
- if (!encryptWithoutKeymaster(appId, key, &encryptedKey)) return false;
- }
- if (!writeStringToFile(encryptedKey, dir + "/" + kFn_encrypted_key)) return false;
- return true;
-}*/
-
-bool retrieveKey(const std::string& dir, const KeyAuthentication& auth, std::string* key) {
- std::string version;
- if (!readFileToString(dir + "/" + kFn_version, &version)) return false;
- if (version != kCurrentVersion) {
- LOG(ERROR) << "Version mismatch, expected " << kCurrentVersion << " got " << version;
- return false;
- }
- std::string secdiscardable;
- if (!readFileToString(dir + "/" + kFn_secdiscardable, &secdiscardable)) return false;
- std::string stretching;
- if (!readFileToString(dir + "/" + kFn_stretching, &stretching)) return false;
- std::string salt;
- if (stretchingNeedsSalt(stretching)) {
- if (!readFileToString(dir + "/" + kFn_salt, &salt)) return false;
- }
- std::string appId;
- if (!generateAppId(auth, stretching, salt, secdiscardable, &appId)) return false;
- std::string encryptedMessage;
- if (!readFileToString(dir + "/" + kFn_encrypted_key, &encryptedMessage)) return false;
- if (auth.usesKeymaster()) {
- Keymaster keymaster;
- if (!keymaster) return false;
- auto keyParams = beginParams(auth, appId);
- if (!decryptWithKeymasterKey(keymaster, dir, keyParams, encryptedMessage, key)) return false;
- } else {
- if (!decryptWithoutKeymaster(appId, encryptedMessage, key)) return false;
- }
- return true;
-}
-
-static bool deleteKey(const std::string& dir) {
- std::string kmKey;
- if (!readFileToString(dir + "/" + kFn_keymaster_key_blob, &kmKey)) return false;
- Keymaster keymaster;
- if (!keymaster) return false;
- if (!keymaster.deleteKey(kmKey)) return false;
- return true;
-}
-
-static bool runSecdiscard(const std::string& dir) {
- if (ForkExecvp(
- std::vector<std::string>{kSecdiscardPath, "--",
- dir + "/" + kFn_encrypted_key,
- dir + "/" + kFn_keymaster_key_blob,
- dir + "/" + kFn_secdiscardable,
- }) != 0) {
- LOG(ERROR) << "secdiscard failed";
- return false;
- }
- return true;
-}
-
-bool runSecdiscardSingle(const std::string& file) {
- if (ForkExecvp(
- std::vector<std::string>{kSecdiscardPath, "--",
- file}) != 0) {
- LOG(ERROR) << "secdiscard failed";
- return false;
- }
- return true;
-}
-
-static bool recursiveDeleteKey(const std::string& dir) {
- if (ForkExecvp(std::vector<std::string>{kRmPath, "-rf", dir}) != 0) {
- LOG(ERROR) << "recursive delete failed";
- return false;
- }
- return true;
-}
-
-bool destroyKey(const std::string& dir) {
- bool success = true;
- // Try each thing, even if previous things failed.
- success &= deleteKey(dir);
- success &= runSecdiscard(dir);
- success &= recursiveDeleteKey(dir);
- return success;
-}
-
-} // namespace vold
-} // namespace android
diff --git a/crypto/ext4crypt/KeyStorage3.h b/crypto/ext4crypt/KeyStorage3.h
deleted file mode 100644
index bce6a99..0000000
--- a/crypto/ext4crypt/KeyStorage3.h
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,58 +0,0 @@
-/*
- * Copyright (C) 2016 The Android Open Source Project
- *
- * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
- * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
- * You may obtain a copy of the License at
- *
- * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
- *
- * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
- * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
- * WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
- * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
- * limitations under the License.
- */
-
-#ifndef ANDROID_VOLD_KEYSTORAGE_H
-#define ANDROID_VOLD_KEYSTORAGE_H
-
-#include <string>
-
-namespace android {
-namespace vold {
-
-// Represents the information needed to decrypt a disk encryption key.
-// If "token" is nonempty, it is passed in as a required Gatekeeper auth token.
-// If "token" and "secret" are nonempty, "secret" is appended to the application-specific
-// binary needed to unlock.
-// If only "secret" is nonempty, it is used to decrypt in a non-Keymaster process.
-class KeyAuthentication {
- public:
- KeyAuthentication(std::string t, std::string s) : token{t}, secret{s} {};
-
- bool usesKeymaster() const { return !token.empty() || secret.empty(); };
-
- const std::string token;
- const std::string secret;
-};
-
-extern const KeyAuthentication kEmptyAuthentication;
-
-// Create a directory at the named path, and store "key" in it,
-// in such a way that it can only be retrieved via Keymaster and
-// can be securely deleted.
-// It's safe to move/rename the directory after creation.
-bool storeKey(const std::string& dir, const KeyAuthentication& auth, const std::string& key);
-
-// Retrieve the key from the named directory.
-bool retrieveKey(const std::string& dir, const KeyAuthentication& auth, std::string* key);
-
-// Securely destroy the key stored in the named directory and delete the directory.
-bool destroyKey(const std::string& dir);
-
-bool runSecdiscardSingle(const std::string& file);
-} // namespace vold
-} // namespace android
-
-#endif
diff --git a/crypto/ext4crypt/KeyStorage4.cpp b/crypto/ext4crypt/KeyStorage4.cpp
deleted file mode 100644
index b086791..0000000
--- a/crypto/ext4crypt/KeyStorage4.cpp
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,656 +0,0 @@
-/*
- * Copyright (C) 2016 The Android Open Source Project
- *
- * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
- * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
- * You may obtain a copy of the License at
- *
- * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
- *
- * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
- * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
- * WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
- * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
- * limitations under the License.
- */
-
-#include "KeyStorage4.h"
-
-#include "Keymaster4.h"
-#include "ScryptParameters.h"
-#include "Utils.h"
-
-#include <vector>
-
-#include <errno.h>
-#include <stdio.h>
-#include <sys/stat.h>
-#include <sys/types.h>
-#include <sys/wait.h>
-#include <unistd.h>
-
-#include <openssl/err.h>
-#include <openssl/evp.h>
-#include <openssl/sha.h>
-
-#include <android-base/file.h>
-//#include <android-base/logging.h>
-#include <android-base/unique_fd.h>
-
-#include <cutils/properties.h>
-
-#include <hardware/hw_auth_token.h>
-#include <keymasterV4_0/authorization_set.h>
-#include <keymasterV4_0/keymaster_utils.h>
-
-#include <iostream>
-#define ERROR 1
-#define LOG(x) std::cout
-#define PLOG(x) std::cout
-
-extern "C" {
-
-#include "crypto_scrypt.h"
-}
-
-namespace android {
-namespace vold {
-
-const KeyAuthentication kEmptyAuthentication{"", ""};
-
-static constexpr size_t AES_KEY_BYTES = 32;
-static constexpr size_t GCM_NONCE_BYTES = 12;
-static constexpr size_t GCM_MAC_BYTES = 16;
-static constexpr size_t SALT_BYTES = 1 << 4;
-static constexpr size_t SECDISCARDABLE_BYTES = 1 << 14;
-static constexpr size_t STRETCHED_BYTES = 1 << 6;
-
-static constexpr uint32_t AUTH_TIMEOUT = 30; // Seconds
-constexpr int EXT4_AES_256_XTS_KEY_SIZE = 64;
-
-static const char* kCurrentVersion = "1";
-static const char* kRmPath = "/system/bin/rm";
-static const char* kSecdiscardPath = "/system/bin/secdiscard";
-static const char* kStretch_none = "none";
-static const char* kStretch_nopassword = "nopassword";
-static const std::string kStretchPrefix_scrypt = "scrypt ";
-static const char* kHashPrefix_secdiscardable = "Android secdiscardable SHA512";
-static const char* kHashPrefix_keygen = "Android key wrapping key generation SHA512";
-static const char* kFn_encrypted_key = "encrypted_key";
-static const char* kFn_keymaster_key_blob = "keymaster_key_blob";
-static const char* kFn_keymaster_key_blob_upgraded = "keymaster_key_blob_upgraded";
-static const char* kFn_salt = "salt";
-static const char* kFn_secdiscardable = "secdiscardable";
-static const char* kFn_stretching = "stretching";
-static const char* kFn_version = "version";
-
-static bool checkSize(const std::string& kind, size_t actual, size_t expected) {
- if (actual != expected) {
- LOG(ERROR) << "Wrong number of bytes in " << kind << ", expected " << expected << " got "
- << actual << std::endl;
- return false;
- }
- return true;
-}
-
-static void hashWithPrefix(char const* prefix, const std::string& tohash, std::string* res) {
- SHA512_CTX c;
-
- SHA512_Init(&c);
- // Personalise the hashing by introducing a fixed prefix.
- // Hashing applications should use personalization except when there is a
- // specific reason not to; see section 4.11 of https://www.schneier.com/skein1.3.pdf
- std::string hashingPrefix = prefix;
- hashingPrefix.resize(SHA512_CBLOCK);
- SHA512_Update(&c, hashingPrefix.data(), hashingPrefix.size());
- SHA512_Update(&c, tohash.data(), tohash.size());
- res->assign(SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH, '\0');
- SHA512_Final(reinterpret_cast<uint8_t*>(&(*res)[0]), &c);
-}
-
-static bool generateKeymasterKey(Keymaster& keymaster, const KeyAuthentication& auth,
- const std::string& appId, std::string* key) {
- auto paramBuilder = km::AuthorizationSetBuilder()
- .AesEncryptionKey(AES_KEY_BYTES * 8)
- .GcmModeMinMacLen(GCM_MAC_BYTES * 8)
- .Authorization(km::TAG_APPLICATION_ID, km::support::blob2hidlVec(appId));
- if (auth.token.empty()) {
- LOG(DEBUG) << "Creating key that doesn't need auth token" << std::endl;
- paramBuilder.Authorization(km::TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED);
- } else {
- LOG(DEBUG) << "Auth token required for key" << std::endl;
- if (auth.token.size() != sizeof(hw_auth_token_t)) {
- LOG(ERROR) << "Auth token should be " << sizeof(hw_auth_token_t) << " bytes, was "
- << auth.token.size() << " bytes" << std::endl;
- return false;
- }
- const hw_auth_token_t* at = reinterpret_cast<const hw_auth_token_t*>(auth.token.data());
- paramBuilder.Authorization(km::TAG_USER_SECURE_ID, at->user_id);
- paramBuilder.Authorization(km::TAG_USER_AUTH_TYPE, km::HardwareAuthenticatorType::PASSWORD);
- paramBuilder.Authorization(km::TAG_AUTH_TIMEOUT, AUTH_TIMEOUT);
- }
- return keymaster.generateKey(paramBuilder, key);
-}
-
-bool generateWrappedKey(userid_t user_id, KeyType key_type,
- KeyBuffer* key) {
- Keymaster keymaster;
- if (!keymaster) return false;
- *key = KeyBuffer(EXT4_AES_256_XTS_KEY_SIZE);
- std::string key_temp;
- auto paramBuilder = km::AuthorizationSetBuilder()
- .AesEncryptionKey(AES_KEY_BYTES * 8)
- .GcmModeMinMacLen(GCM_MAC_BYTES * 8)
- .Authorization(km::TAG_USER_ID, user_id);
- km::KeyParameter param1;
- param1.tag = (km::Tag) (android::hardware::keymaster::V4_0::KM_TAG_FBE_ICE);
- param1.f.boolValue = true;
- paramBuilder.push_back(param1);
- km::KeyParameter param2;
- if ((key_type == KeyType::DE_USER) || (key_type == KeyType::DE_SYS)) {
- param2.tag = (km::Tag) (android::hardware::keymaster::V4_0::KM_TAG_KEY_TYPE);
- param2.f.integer = 0;
- } else if (key_type == KeyType::CE_USER) {
- param2.tag = (km::Tag) (android::hardware::keymaster::V4_0::KM_TAG_KEY_TYPE);
- param2.f.integer = 1;
- }
- paramBuilder.push_back(param2);
- if (!keymaster.generateKey(paramBuilder, &key_temp)) return false;
- *key = KeyBuffer(key_temp.size());
- memcpy(reinterpret_cast<void*>(key->data()), key_temp.c_str(), key->size());
- return true;
-}
-
-bool getEphemeralWrappedKey(km::KeyFormat format, KeyBuffer& kmKey, KeyBuffer* key) {
- std::string key_temp;
- Keymaster keymaster;
- if (!keymaster) return false;
-
- //Export once, if upgrade needed, upgrade and export again
- bool export_again = true;
- while (export_again) {
- export_again = false;
- auto ret = keymaster.exportKey(format, kmKey, "!", "!", &key_temp);
- if (ret == km::ErrorCode::OK) {
- *key = KeyBuffer(key_temp.size());
- memcpy(reinterpret_cast<void*>(key->data()), key_temp.c_str(), key->size());
- return true;
- }
- if (ret != km::ErrorCode::KEY_REQUIRES_UPGRADE) return false;
- LOG(DEBUG) << "Upgrading key" << std::endl;
- std::string kmKeyStr(reinterpret_cast<const char*>(kmKey.data()), kmKey.size());
- std::string newKey;
- if (!keymaster.upgradeKey(kmKeyStr, km::AuthorizationSet(), &newKey)) return false;
- memcpy(reinterpret_cast<void*>(kmKey.data()), newKey.c_str(), kmKey.size());
- LOG(INFO) << "Key upgraded" << std::endl;
- export_again = true;
- }
- //Should never come here
- return false;
-}
-
-static std::pair<km::AuthorizationSet, km::HardwareAuthToken> beginParams(
- const KeyAuthentication& auth, const std::string& appId) {
- auto paramBuilder = km::AuthorizationSetBuilder()
- .GcmModeMacLen(GCM_MAC_BYTES * 8)
- .Authorization(km::TAG_APPLICATION_ID, km::support::blob2hidlVec(appId));
- km::HardwareAuthToken authToken;
- if (!auth.token.empty()) {
- LOG(DEBUG) << "Supplying auth token to Keymaster" << std::endl;
- authToken = km::support::hidlVec2AuthToken(km::support::blob2hidlVec(auth.token));
- }
- return {paramBuilder, authToken};
-}
-
-static bool readFileToString(const std::string& filename, std::string* result) {
- if (!android::base::ReadFileToString(filename, result)) {
- PLOG(ERROR) << "Failed to read from " << filename << std::endl;
- return false;
- }
- return true;
-}
-
-static bool writeStringToFile(const std::string& payload, const std::string& filename) {
- PLOG(ERROR) << __FUNCTION__ << " called for " << filename << " and being skipped\n";
- return true;
- android::base::unique_fd fd(TEMP_FAILURE_RETRY(
- open(filename.c_str(), O_WRONLY | O_CREAT | O_NOFOLLOW | O_TRUNC | O_CLOEXEC, 0666)));
- if (fd == -1) {
- PLOG(ERROR) << "Failed to open " << filename;
- return false;
- }
- if (!android::base::WriteStringToFd(payload, fd)) {
- PLOG(ERROR) << "Failed to write to " << filename;
- unlink(filename.c_str());
- return false;
- }
- // fsync as close won't guarantee flush data
- // see close(2), fsync(2) and b/68901441
- if (fsync(fd) == -1) {
- if (errno == EROFS || errno == EINVAL) {
- PLOG(WARNING) << "Skip fsync " << filename
- << " on a file system does not support synchronization";
- } else {
- PLOG(ERROR) << "Failed to fsync " << filename;
- unlink(filename.c_str());
- return false;
- }
- }
- return true;
-}
-
-static bool readRandomBytesOrLog(size_t count, std::string* out) {
- auto status = ReadRandomBytes(count, *out);
- if (status != OK) {
- LOG(ERROR) << "Random read failed with status: " << status << std::endl;
- return false;
- }
- return true;
-}
-
-bool createSecdiscardable(const std::string& filename, std::string* hash) {
- std::string secdiscardable;
- if (!readRandomBytesOrLog(SECDISCARDABLE_BYTES, &secdiscardable)) return false;
- if (!writeStringToFile(secdiscardable, filename)) return false;
- hashWithPrefix(kHashPrefix_secdiscardable, secdiscardable, hash);
- return true;
-}
-
-bool readSecdiscardable(const std::string& filename, std::string* hash) {
- std::string secdiscardable;
- if (!readFileToString(filename, &secdiscardable)) return false;
- hashWithPrefix(kHashPrefix_secdiscardable, secdiscardable, hash);
- return true;
-}
-
-static KeymasterOperation begin(Keymaster& keymaster, const std::string& dir,
- km::KeyPurpose purpose, const km::AuthorizationSet& keyParams,
- const km::AuthorizationSet& opParams,
- const km::HardwareAuthToken& authToken,
- km::AuthorizationSet* outParams) {
- auto kmKeyPath = dir + "/" + kFn_keymaster_key_blob;
- std::string kmKey;
- if (!readFileToString(kmKeyPath, &kmKey)) return KeymasterOperation();
- km::AuthorizationSet inParams(keyParams);
- inParams.append(opParams.begin(), opParams.end());
- for (;;) {
- auto opHandle = keymaster.begin(purpose, kmKey, inParams, authToken, outParams);
- if (opHandle) {
- return opHandle;
- }
- if (opHandle.errorCode() != km::ErrorCode::KEY_REQUIRES_UPGRADE) return opHandle;
- LOG(DEBUG) << "Upgrading key in memory only: " << dir << std::endl;
- std::string newKey;
- if (!keymaster.upgradeKey(kmKey, keyParams, &newKey)) return KeymasterOperation();
- /*auto newKeyPath = dir + "/" + kFn_keymaster_key_blob_upgraded;
- if (!writeStringToFile(newKey, newKeyPath)) return KeymasterOperation();
- if (rename(newKeyPath.c_str(), kmKeyPath.c_str()) != 0) {
- PLOG(ERROR) << "Unable to move upgraded key to location: " << kmKeyPath;
- return KeymasterOperation();
- }
- if (!keymaster.deleteKey(kmKey)) {
- LOG(ERROR) << "Key deletion failed during upgrade, continuing anyway: " << dir;
- }*/
- kmKey = newKey;
- LOG(INFO) << "Key upgraded in memory but not updated in folder: " << dir << std::endl;
- }
-}
-
-static bool encryptWithKeymasterKey(Keymaster& keymaster, const std::string& dir,
- const km::AuthorizationSet& keyParams,
- const km::HardwareAuthToken& authToken,
- const KeyBuffer& message, std::string* ciphertext) {
- km::AuthorizationSet opParams;
- km::AuthorizationSet outParams;
- auto opHandle =
- begin(keymaster, dir, km::KeyPurpose::ENCRYPT, keyParams, opParams, authToken, &outParams);
- if (!opHandle) return false;
- auto nonceBlob = outParams.GetTagValue(km::TAG_NONCE);
- if (!nonceBlob.isOk()) {
- LOG(ERROR) << "GCM encryption but no nonce generated" << std::endl;
- return false;
- }
- // nonceBlob here is just a pointer into existing data, must not be freed
- std::string nonce(reinterpret_cast<const char*>(&nonceBlob.value()[0]),
- nonceBlob.value().size());
- if (!checkSize("nonce", nonce.size(), GCM_NONCE_BYTES)) return false;
- std::string body;
- if (!opHandle.updateCompletely(message, &body)) return false;
-
- std::string mac;
- if (!opHandle.finish(&mac)) return false;
- if (!checkSize("mac", mac.size(), GCM_MAC_BYTES)) return false;
- *ciphertext = nonce + body + mac;
- return true;
-}
-
-static bool decryptWithKeymasterKey(Keymaster& keymaster, const std::string& dir,
- const km::AuthorizationSet& keyParams,
- const km::HardwareAuthToken& authToken,
- const std::string& ciphertext, KeyBuffer* message) {
- auto nonce = ciphertext.substr(0, GCM_NONCE_BYTES);
- auto bodyAndMac = ciphertext.substr(GCM_NONCE_BYTES);
- auto opParams = km::AuthorizationSetBuilder().Authorization(km::TAG_NONCE,
- km::support::blob2hidlVec(nonce));
- auto opHandle =
- begin(keymaster, dir, km::KeyPurpose::DECRYPT, keyParams, opParams, authToken, nullptr);
- if (!opHandle) return false;
- if (!opHandle.updateCompletely(bodyAndMac, message)) return false;
- if (!opHandle.finish(nullptr)) return false;
- return true;
-}
-
-static std::string getStretching(const KeyAuthentication& auth) {
- if (!auth.usesKeymaster()) {
- return kStretch_none;
- } else if (auth.secret.empty()) {
- return kStretch_nopassword;
- } else {
- char paramstr[PROPERTY_VALUE_MAX];
-
- property_get(SCRYPT_PROP, paramstr, SCRYPT_DEFAULTS);
- return std::string() + kStretchPrefix_scrypt + paramstr;
- }
-}
-
-static bool stretchingNeedsSalt(const std::string& stretching) {
- return stretching != kStretch_nopassword && stretching != kStretch_none;
-}
-
-static bool stretchSecret(const std::string& stretching, const std::string& secret,
- const std::string& salt, std::string* stretched) {
- if (stretching == kStretch_nopassword) {
- if (!secret.empty()) {
- LOG(WARNING) << "Password present but stretching is nopassword" << std::endl;
- // Continue anyway
- }
- stretched->clear();
- } else if (stretching == kStretch_none) {
- *stretched = secret;
- } else if (std::equal(kStretchPrefix_scrypt.begin(), kStretchPrefix_scrypt.end(),
- stretching.begin())) {
- int Nf, rf, pf;
- if (!parse_scrypt_parameters(stretching.substr(kStretchPrefix_scrypt.size()).c_str(), &Nf,
- &rf, &pf)) {
- LOG(ERROR) << "Unable to parse scrypt params in stretching: " << stretching << std::endl;
- return false;
- }
- stretched->assign(STRETCHED_BYTES, '\0');
- if (crypto_scrypt(reinterpret_cast<const uint8_t*>(secret.data()), secret.size(),
- reinterpret_cast<const uint8_t*>(salt.data()), salt.size(), 1 << Nf,
- 1 << rf, 1 << pf, reinterpret_cast<uint8_t*>(&(*stretched)[0]),
- stretched->size()) != 0) {
- LOG(ERROR) << "scrypt failed with params: " << stretching << std::endl;
- return false;
- }
- } else {
- LOG(ERROR) << "Unknown stretching type: " << stretching << std::endl;
- return false;
- }
- return true;
-}
-
-static bool generateAppId(const KeyAuthentication& auth, const std::string& stretching,
- const std::string& salt, const std::string& secdiscardable_hash,
- std::string* appId) {
- std::string stretched;
- if (!stretchSecret(stretching, auth.secret, salt, &stretched)) return false;
- *appId = secdiscardable_hash + stretched;
- return true;
-}
-
-static void logOpensslError() {
- LOG(ERROR) << "Openssl error: " << ERR_get_error() << std::endl;
-}
-
-static bool encryptWithoutKeymaster(const std::string& preKey, const KeyBuffer& plaintext,
- std::string* ciphertext) {
- std::string key;
- hashWithPrefix(kHashPrefix_keygen, preKey, &key);
- key.resize(AES_KEY_BYTES);
- if (!readRandomBytesOrLog(GCM_NONCE_BYTES, ciphertext)) return false;
- auto ctx = std::unique_ptr<EVP_CIPHER_CTX, decltype(&::EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free)>(
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new(), EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free);
- if (!ctx) {
- logOpensslError();
- return false;
- }
- if (1 != EVP_EncryptInit_ex(ctx.get(), EVP_aes_256_gcm(), NULL,
- reinterpret_cast<const uint8_t*>(key.data()),
- reinterpret_cast<const uint8_t*>(ciphertext->data()))) {
- logOpensslError();
- return false;
- }
- ciphertext->resize(GCM_NONCE_BYTES + plaintext.size() + GCM_MAC_BYTES);
- int outlen;
- if (1 != EVP_EncryptUpdate(
- ctx.get(), reinterpret_cast<uint8_t*>(&(*ciphertext)[0] + GCM_NONCE_BYTES),
- &outlen, reinterpret_cast<const uint8_t*>(plaintext.data()), plaintext.size())) {
- logOpensslError();
- return false;
- }
- if (outlen != static_cast<int>(plaintext.size())) {
- LOG(ERROR) << "GCM ciphertext length should be " << plaintext.size() << " was " << outlen << std::endl;
- return false;
- }
- if (1 != EVP_EncryptFinal_ex(
- ctx.get(),
- reinterpret_cast<uint8_t*>(&(*ciphertext)[0] + GCM_NONCE_BYTES + plaintext.size()),
- &outlen)) {
- logOpensslError();
- return false;
- }
- if (outlen != 0) {
- LOG(ERROR) << "GCM EncryptFinal should be 0, was " << outlen << std::endl;
- return false;
- }
- if (1 != EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ctx.get(), EVP_CTRL_GCM_GET_TAG, GCM_MAC_BYTES,
- reinterpret_cast<uint8_t*>(&(*ciphertext)[0] + GCM_NONCE_BYTES +
- plaintext.size()))) {
- logOpensslError();
- return false;
- }
- return true;
-}
-
-static bool decryptWithoutKeymaster(const std::string& preKey, const std::string& ciphertext,
- KeyBuffer* plaintext) {
- if (ciphertext.size() < GCM_NONCE_BYTES + GCM_MAC_BYTES) {
- LOG(ERROR) << "GCM ciphertext too small: " << ciphertext.size() << std::endl;
- return false;
- }
- std::string key;
- hashWithPrefix(kHashPrefix_keygen, preKey, &key);
- key.resize(AES_KEY_BYTES);
- auto ctx = std::unique_ptr<EVP_CIPHER_CTX, decltype(&::EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free)>(
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new(), EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free);
- if (!ctx) {
- logOpensslError();
- return false;
- }
- if (1 != EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ctx.get(), EVP_aes_256_gcm(), NULL,
- reinterpret_cast<const uint8_t*>(key.data()),
- reinterpret_cast<const uint8_t*>(ciphertext.data()))) {
- logOpensslError();
- return false;
- }
- *plaintext = KeyBuffer(ciphertext.size() - GCM_NONCE_BYTES - GCM_MAC_BYTES);
- int outlen;
- if (1 != EVP_DecryptUpdate(ctx.get(), reinterpret_cast<uint8_t*>(&(*plaintext)[0]), &outlen,
- reinterpret_cast<const uint8_t*>(ciphertext.data() + GCM_NONCE_BYTES),
- plaintext->size())) {
- logOpensslError();
- return false;
- }
- if (outlen != static_cast<int>(plaintext->size())) {
- LOG(ERROR) << "GCM plaintext length should be " << plaintext->size() << " was " << outlen << std::endl;
- return false;
- }
- if (1 != EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ctx.get(), EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_TAG, GCM_MAC_BYTES,
- const_cast<void*>(reinterpret_cast<const void*>(
- ciphertext.data() + GCM_NONCE_BYTES + plaintext->size())))) {
- logOpensslError();
- return false;
- }
- if (1 != EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(ctx.get(),
- reinterpret_cast<uint8_t*>(&(*plaintext)[0] + plaintext->size()),
- &outlen)) {
- logOpensslError();
- return false;
- }
- if (outlen != 0) {
- LOG(ERROR) << "GCM EncryptFinal should be 0, was " << outlen << std::endl;
- return false;
- }
- return true;
-}
-
-bool pathExists(const std::string& path) {
- return access(path.c_str(), F_OK) == 0;
-}
-
-bool storeKey(const std::string& dir, const KeyAuthentication& auth, const KeyBuffer& key) {
- if (TEMP_FAILURE_RETRY(mkdir(dir.c_str(), 0700)) == -1) {
- PLOG(ERROR) << "key mkdir " << dir << std::endl;
- return false;
- }
- if (!writeStringToFile(kCurrentVersion, dir + "/" + kFn_version)) return false;
- std::string secdiscardable_hash;
- if (!createSecdiscardable(dir + "/" + kFn_secdiscardable, &secdiscardable_hash)) return false;
- std::string stretching = getStretching(auth);
- if (!writeStringToFile(stretching, dir + "/" + kFn_stretching)) return false;
- std::string salt;
- if (stretchingNeedsSalt(stretching)) {
- if (ReadRandomBytes(SALT_BYTES, salt) != OK) {
- LOG(ERROR) << "Random read failed" << std::endl;
- return false;
- }
- if (!writeStringToFile(salt, dir + "/" + kFn_salt)) return false;
- }
- std::string appId;
- if (!generateAppId(auth, stretching, salt, secdiscardable_hash, &appId)) return false;
- std::string encryptedKey;
- if (auth.usesKeymaster()) {
- Keymaster keymaster;
- if (!keymaster) return false;
- std::string kmKey;
- if (!generateKeymasterKey(keymaster, auth, appId, &kmKey)) return false;
- if (!writeStringToFile(kmKey, dir + "/" + kFn_keymaster_key_blob)) return false;
- km::AuthorizationSet keyParams;
- km::HardwareAuthToken authToken;
- std::tie(keyParams, authToken) = beginParams(auth, appId);
- if (!encryptWithKeymasterKey(keymaster, dir, keyParams, authToken, key, &encryptedKey))
- return false;
- } else {
- if (!encryptWithoutKeymaster(appId, key, &encryptedKey)) return false;
- }
- if (!writeStringToFile(encryptedKey, dir + "/" + kFn_encrypted_key)) return false;
- return true;
-}
-
-bool storeKeyAtomically(const std::string& key_path, const std::string& tmp_path,
- const KeyAuthentication& auth, const KeyBuffer& key) {
- if (pathExists(key_path)) {
- LOG(ERROR) << "Already exists, cannot create key at: " << key_path << std::endl;
- return false;
- }
- if (pathExists(tmp_path)) {
- LOG(DEBUG) << "Already exists, destroying: " << tmp_path << std::endl;
- destroyKey(tmp_path); // May be partially created so ignore errors
- }
- if (!storeKey(tmp_path, auth, key)) return false;
- if (rename(tmp_path.c_str(), key_path.c_str()) != 0) {
- PLOG(ERROR) << "Unable to move new key to location: " << key_path << std::endl;
- return false;
- }
- LOG(DEBUG) << "Created key: " << key_path << std::endl;
- return true;
-}
-
-bool retrieveKey(const std::string& dir, const KeyAuthentication& auth, KeyBuffer* key) {
- std::string version;
- if (!readFileToString(dir + "/" + kFn_version, &version)) return false;
- if (version != kCurrentVersion) {
- LOG(ERROR) << "Version mismatch, expected " << kCurrentVersion << " got " << version << std::endl;
- return false;
- }
- std::string secdiscardable_hash;
- if (!readSecdiscardable(dir + "/" + kFn_secdiscardable, &secdiscardable_hash)) return false;
- std::string stretching;
- if (!readFileToString(dir + "/" + kFn_stretching, &stretching)) return false;
- std::string salt;
- if (stretchingNeedsSalt(stretching)) {
- if (!readFileToString(dir + "/" + kFn_salt, &salt)) return false;
- }
- std::string appId;
- if (!generateAppId(auth, stretching, salt, secdiscardable_hash, &appId)) return false;
- std::string encryptedMessage;
- if (!readFileToString(dir + "/" + kFn_encrypted_key, &encryptedMessage)) return false;
- if (auth.usesKeymaster()) {
- Keymaster keymaster;
- if (!keymaster) return false;
- km::AuthorizationSet keyParams;
- km::HardwareAuthToken authToken;
- std::tie(keyParams, authToken) = beginParams(auth, appId);
- if (!decryptWithKeymasterKey(keymaster, dir, keyParams, authToken, encryptedMessage, key))
- return false;
- } else {
- if (!decryptWithoutKeymaster(appId, encryptedMessage, key)) return false;
- }
- return true;
-}
-
-static bool deleteKey(const std::string& dir) {
- LOG(DEBUG) << "not deleting key in " << __FILE__ << std::endl;
- return true;
- std::string kmKey;
- if (!readFileToString(dir + "/" + kFn_keymaster_key_blob, &kmKey)) return false;
- Keymaster keymaster;
- if (!keymaster) return false;
- if (!keymaster.deleteKey(kmKey)) return false;
- return true;
-}
-
-bool runSecdiscardSingle(const std::string& file) {
- if (ForkExecvp(std::vector<std::string>{kSecdiscardPath, "--", file}) != 0) {
- LOG(ERROR) << "secdiscard failed" << std::endl;
- return false;
- }
- return true;
-}
-
-static bool recursiveDeleteKey(const std::string& dir) {
- LOG(DEBUG) << "not recursively deleting key in " << __FILE__ << std::endl;
- return true;
- if (ForkExecvp(std::vector<std::string>{kRmPath, "-rf", dir}) != 0) {
- LOG(ERROR) << "recursive delete failed" << std::endl;
- return false;
- }
- return true;
-}
-
-bool destroyKey(const std::string& dir) {
- LOG(DEBUG) << "not destroying key in " << __FILE__ << std::endl;
- return true;
- bool success = true;
- // Try each thing, even if previous things failed.
- bool uses_km = pathExists(dir + "/" + kFn_keymaster_key_blob);
- if (uses_km) {
- success &= deleteKey(dir);
- }
- auto secdiscard_cmd = std::vector<std::string>{
- kSecdiscardPath, "--", dir + "/" + kFn_encrypted_key, dir + "/" + kFn_secdiscardable,
- };
- if (uses_km) {
- secdiscard_cmd.emplace_back(dir + "/" + kFn_keymaster_key_blob);
- }
- if (ForkExecvp(secdiscard_cmd) != 0) {
- LOG(ERROR) << "secdiscard failed" << std::endl;
- success = false;
- }
- success &= recursiveDeleteKey(dir);
- return success;
-}
-
-} // namespace vold
-} // namespace android
diff --git a/crypto/ext4crypt/KeyStorage4.h b/crypto/ext4crypt/KeyStorage4.h
deleted file mode 100644
index f74865f..0000000
--- a/crypto/ext4crypt/KeyStorage4.h
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,86 +0,0 @@
-/*
- * Copyright (C) 2016 The Android Open Source Project
- *
- * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
- * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
- * You may obtain a copy of the License at
- *
- * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
- *
- * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
- * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
- * WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
- * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
- * limitations under the License.
- */
-
-#ifndef ANDROID_TWRP_KEYSTORAGE_H
-#define ANDROID_TWRP_KEYSTORAGE_H
-
-#include "Keymaster4.h"
-#include "KeyBuffer.h"
-#include <ext4_utils/ext4_crypt.h>
-
-#include <string>
-
-namespace android {
-namespace vold {
-
-namespace km = ::android::hardware::keymaster::V4_0;
-
-// Represents the information needed to decrypt a disk encryption key.
-// If "token" is nonempty, it is passed in as a required Gatekeeper auth token.
-// If "token" and "secret" are nonempty, "secret" is appended to the application-specific
-// binary needed to unlock.
-// If only "secret" is nonempty, it is used to decrypt in a non-Keymaster process.
-class KeyAuthentication {
- public:
- KeyAuthentication(std::string t, std::string s) : token{t}, secret{s} {};
-
- bool usesKeymaster() const { return !token.empty() || secret.empty(); };
-
- const std::string token;
- const std::string secret;
-};
-
-enum class KeyType {
- DE_SYS,
- DE_USER,
- CE_USER
-};
-
-extern const KeyAuthentication kEmptyAuthentication;
-
-// Checks if path "path" exists.
-bool pathExists(const std::string& path);
-
-bool createSecdiscardable(const std::string& path, std::string* hash);
-bool readSecdiscardable(const std::string& path, std::string* hash);
-
-// Create a directory at the named path, and store "key" in it,
-// in such a way that it can only be retrieved via Keymaster and
-// can be securely deleted.
-// It's safe to move/rename the directory after creation.
-bool storeKey(const std::string& dir, const KeyAuthentication& auth, const KeyBuffer& key);
-
-// Create a directory at the named path, and store "key" in it as storeKey
-// This version creates the key in "tmp_path" then atomically renames "tmp_path"
-// to "key_path" thereby ensuring that the key is either stored entirely or
-// not at all.
-bool storeKeyAtomically(const std::string& key_path, const std::string& tmp_path,
- const KeyAuthentication& auth, const KeyBuffer& key);
-
-// Retrieve the key from the named directory.
-bool retrieveKey(const std::string& dir, const KeyAuthentication& auth, KeyBuffer* key);
-
-// Securely destroy the key stored in the named directory and delete the directory.
-bool destroyKey(const std::string& dir);
-
-bool runSecdiscardSingle(const std::string& file);
-
-bool generateWrappedKey(userid_t user_id, KeyType key_type, KeyBuffer* key);
-bool getEphemeralWrappedKey(km::KeyFormat format, KeyBuffer& kmKey, KeyBuffer* key);
-} // namespace vold
-} // namespace android
-
-#endif
diff --git a/crypto/ext4crypt/KeyUtil.cpp b/crypto/ext4crypt/KeyUtil.cpp
deleted file mode 100644
index 3dc0500..0000000
--- a/crypto/ext4crypt/KeyUtil.cpp
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,241 +0,0 @@
-/*
- * Copyright (C) 2016 The Android Open Source Project
- *
- * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
- * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
- * You may obtain a copy of the License at
- *
- * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
- *
- * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
- * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
- * WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
- * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
- * limitations under the License.
- */
-
-#include "KeyUtil.h"
-
-#include <iomanip>
-#include <sstream>
-#include <string>
-
-#include <openssl/sha.h>
-
-#include <android-base/file.h>
-//#include <android-base/logging.h>
-#include <keyutils.h>
-
-#include "KeyStorage4.h"
-#include "Ext4CryptPie.h"
-#include "Utils.h"
-
-#include <iostream>
-#define LOG(x) std::cout
-#define PLOG(x) std::cout
-#include <sys/types.h>
-#include <unistd.h>
-
-#define MAX_USER_ID 0xFFFFFFFF
-
-using android::hardware::keymaster::V4_0::KeyFormat;
-using android::vold::KeyType;
-
-namespace android {
-namespace vold {
-
-// ext4enc:TODO get this const from somewhere good
-const int EXT4_KEY_DESCRIPTOR_SIZE = 8;
-
-// ext4enc:TODO Include structure from somewhere sensible
-// MUST be in sync with ext4_crypto.c in kernel
-constexpr int EXT4_ENCRYPTION_MODE_AES_256_XTS = 1;
-constexpr int EXT4_AES_256_XTS_KEY_SIZE = 64;
-constexpr int EXT4_MAX_KEY_SIZE = 64;
-struct ext4_encryption_key {
- uint32_t mode;
- char raw[EXT4_MAX_KEY_SIZE];
- uint32_t size;
-};
-
-bool randomKey(KeyBuffer* key) {
- *key = KeyBuffer(EXT4_AES_256_XTS_KEY_SIZE);
- if (ReadRandomBytes(key->size(), key->data()) != 0) {
- // TODO status_t plays badly with PLOG, fix it.
- LOG(ERROR) << "Random read failed" << std::endl;
- return false;
- }
- return true;
-}
-
-// Get raw keyref - used to make keyname and to pass to ioctl
-static std::string generateKeyRef(const char* key, int length) {
- SHA512_CTX c;
-
- SHA512_Init(&c);
- SHA512_Update(&c, key, length);
- unsigned char key_ref1[SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH];
- SHA512_Final(key_ref1, &c);
-
- SHA512_Init(&c);
- SHA512_Update(&c, key_ref1, SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH);
- unsigned char key_ref2[SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH];
- SHA512_Final(key_ref2, &c);
-
- static_assert(EXT4_KEY_DESCRIPTOR_SIZE <= SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH,
- "Hash too short for descriptor");
- return std::string((char*)key_ref2, EXT4_KEY_DESCRIPTOR_SIZE);
-}
-
-static bool fillKey(const KeyBuffer& key, ext4_encryption_key* ext4_key) {
- if (key.size() != EXT4_AES_256_XTS_KEY_SIZE) {
- LOG(ERROR) << "Wrong size key " << key.size();
- return false;
- }
- static_assert(EXT4_AES_256_XTS_KEY_SIZE <= sizeof(ext4_key->raw), "Key too long!");
- ext4_key->mode = EXT4_ENCRYPTION_MODE_AES_256_XTS;
- ext4_key->size = key.size();
- memset(ext4_key->raw, 0, sizeof(ext4_key->raw));
- memcpy(ext4_key->raw, key.data(), key.size());
- return true;
-}
-
-static char const* const NAME_PREFIXES[] = {
- "ext4",
- "f2fs",
- "fscrypt",
- nullptr
-};
-
-static std::string keyname(const std::string& prefix, const std::string& raw_ref) {
- std::ostringstream o;
- o << prefix << ":";
- for (unsigned char i : raw_ref) {
- o << std::hex << std::setw(2) << std::setfill('0') << (int)i;
- }
- return o.str();
-}
-
-// Get the keyring we store all keys in
-static bool e4cryptKeyring(key_serial_t* device_keyring) {
- *device_keyring = keyctl_search(KEY_SPEC_SESSION_KEYRING, "keyring", "e4crypt", 0);
- if (*device_keyring == -1) {
- PLOG(ERROR) << "Unable to find device keyring" << std::endl;
- return false;
- }
- return true;
-}
-
-// Install password into global keyring
-// Return raw key reference for use in policy
-bool installKey(const KeyBuffer& key, std::string* raw_ref) {
- // Place ext4_encryption_key into automatically zeroing buffer.
- KeyBuffer ext4KeyBuffer(sizeof(ext4_encryption_key));
- ext4_encryption_key &ext4_key = *reinterpret_cast<ext4_encryption_key*>(ext4KeyBuffer.data());
-
- if (!fillKey(key, &ext4_key)) return false;
- if (is_wrapped_key_supported()) {
- /* When wrapped key is supported, only the first 32 bytes are
- the same per boot. The second 32 bytes can change as the ephemeral
- key is different. */
- *raw_ref = generateKeyRef(ext4_key.raw, (ext4_key.size)/2);
- } else {
- *raw_ref = generateKeyRef(ext4_key.raw, ext4_key.size);
- }
- key_serial_t device_keyring;
- if (!e4cryptKeyring(&device_keyring)) return false;
- for (char const* const* name_prefix = NAME_PREFIXES; *name_prefix != nullptr; name_prefix++) {
- auto ref = keyname(*name_prefix, *raw_ref);
- key_serial_t key_id =
- add_key("logon", ref.c_str(), (void*)&ext4_key, sizeof(ext4_key), device_keyring);
- if (key_id == -1) {
- PLOG(ERROR) << "Failed to insert key into keyring " << device_keyring << std::endl;
- return false;
- }
- LOG(DEBUG) << "Added key " << key_id << " (" << ref << ") to keyring " << device_keyring
- << " in process " << getpid() << std::endl;
- }
- return true;
-}
-
-bool evictKey(const std::string& raw_ref) {
- LOG(ERROR) << "not actually evicting key\n";
- return true;
- key_serial_t device_keyring;
- if (!e4cryptKeyring(&device_keyring)) return false;
- bool success = true;
- for (char const* const* name_prefix = NAME_PREFIXES; *name_prefix != nullptr; name_prefix++) {
- auto ref = keyname(*name_prefix, raw_ref);
- auto key_serial = keyctl_search(device_keyring, "logon", ref.c_str(), 0);
-
- // Unlink the key from the keyring. Prefer unlinking to revoking or
- // invalidating, since unlinking is actually no less secure currently, and
- // it avoids bugs in certain kernel versions where the keyring key is
- // referenced from places it shouldn't be.
- if (keyctl_unlink(key_serial, device_keyring) != 0) {
- PLOG(ERROR) << "Failed to unlink key with serial " << key_serial << " ref " << ref;
- success = false;
- } else {
- LOG(DEBUG) << "Unlinked key with serial " << key_serial << " ref " << ref;
- }
- }
- return success;
-}
-
-bool retrieveAndInstallKey(bool create_if_absent, const KeyAuthentication& key_authentication,
- const std::string& key_path, const std::string& tmp_path,
- std::string* key_ref, bool wrapped_key_supported) {
- KeyBuffer key;
- if (pathExists(key_path)) {
- LOG(DEBUG) << "Key exists, using: " << key_path << std::endl;
- if (!retrieveKey(key_path, key_authentication, &key)) return false;
- } else {
- if (!create_if_absent) {
- LOG(ERROR) << "No key found in " << key_path << std::endl;
- return false;
- }
- LOG(INFO) << "Creating new key in " << key_path << std::endl;
- if (wrapped_key_supported) {
- if(!generateWrappedKey(MAX_USER_ID, KeyType::DE_SYS, &key)) return false;
- } else {
- if (!randomKey(&key)) return false;
- }
- if (!storeKeyAtomically(key_path, tmp_path, key_authentication, key)) return false;
- }
-
- if (wrapped_key_supported) {
- KeyBuffer ephemeral_wrapped_key;
- if (!getEphemeralWrappedKey(KeyFormat::RAW, key, &ephemeral_wrapped_key)) {
- LOG(ERROR) << "Failed to export key in retrieveAndInstallKey";
- return false;
- }
- key = std::move(ephemeral_wrapped_key);
- }
-
- if (!installKey(key, key_ref)) {
- LOG(ERROR) << "Failed to install key in " << key_path << std::endl;
- return false;
- }
- return true;
-}
-
-bool retrieveKey(bool create_if_absent, const std::string& key_path,
- const std::string& tmp_path, KeyBuffer* key) {
- if (pathExists(key_path)) {
- LOG(DEBUG) << "Key exists, using: " << key_path << std::endl;
- if (!retrieveKey(key_path, kEmptyAuthentication, key)) return false;
- } else {
- if (!create_if_absent) {
- LOG(ERROR) << "No key found in " << key_path << std::endl;
- return false;
- }
- LOG(INFO) << "Creating new key in " << key_path << std::endl;
- if (!randomKey(key)) return false;
- if (!storeKeyAtomically(key_path, tmp_path,
- kEmptyAuthentication, *key)) return false;
- }
- return true;
-}
-
-} // namespace vold
-} // namespace android
diff --git a/crypto/ext4crypt/KeyUtil.h b/crypto/ext4crypt/KeyUtil.h
deleted file mode 100644
index 46a3124..0000000
--- a/crypto/ext4crypt/KeyUtil.h
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,42 +0,0 @@
-/*
- * Copyright (C) 2016 The Android Open Source Project
- *
- * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
- * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
- * You may obtain a copy of the License at
- *
- * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
- *
- * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
- * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
- * WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
- * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
- * limitations under the License.
- */
-
-#ifndef ANDROID_VOLD_KEYUTIL_H
-#define ANDROID_VOLD_KEYUTIL_H
-
-#include "KeyBuffer.h"
-#include "KeyStorage4.h"
-#include "Keymaster4.h"
-
-#include <string>
-#include <memory>
-
-namespace android {
-namespace vold {
-
-bool randomKey(KeyBuffer* key);
-bool installKey(const KeyBuffer& key, std::string* raw_ref);
-bool evictKey(const std::string& raw_ref);
-bool retrieveAndInstallKey(bool create_if_absent, const KeyAuthentication& key_authentication,
- const std::string& key_path, const std::string& tmp_path,
- std::string* key_ref, bool wrapped_key_supported);
-bool retrieveKey(bool create_if_absent, const std::string& key_path,
- const std::string& tmp_path, KeyBuffer* key);
-
-} // namespace vold
-} // namespace android
-
-#endif
diff --git a/crypto/ext4crypt/Keymaster.cpp b/crypto/ext4crypt/Keymaster.cpp
deleted file mode 100644
index 3c21aa2..0000000
--- a/crypto/ext4crypt/Keymaster.cpp
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,254 +0,0 @@
-/*
- * Copyright (C) 2016 The Android Open Source Project
- *
- * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
- * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
- * You may obtain a copy of the License at
- *
- * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
- *
- * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
- * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
- * WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
- * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
- * limitations under the License.
- */
-
-#include "Keymaster.h"
-
-//#include <android-base/logging.h>
-#include <hardware/hardware.h>
-#include <hardware/keymaster1.h>
-#include <hardware/keymaster2.h>
-
-#include <iostream>
-#define ERROR 1
-#define LOG(x) std::cout
-
-namespace android {
-namespace vold {
-
-class IKeymasterDevice {
- public:
- IKeymasterDevice() {}
- virtual ~IKeymasterDevice() {}
- /*virtual keymaster_error_t generate_key(const keymaster_key_param_set_t* params,
- keymaster_key_blob_t* key_blob) const = 0;*/
- virtual keymaster_error_t delete_key(const keymaster_key_blob_t* key) const = 0;
- virtual keymaster_error_t begin(keymaster_purpose_t purpose, const keymaster_key_blob_t* key,
- const keymaster_key_param_set_t* in_params,
- keymaster_key_param_set_t* out_params,
- keymaster_operation_handle_t* operation_handle) const = 0;
- virtual keymaster_error_t update(keymaster_operation_handle_t operation_handle,
- const keymaster_key_param_set_t* in_params,
- const keymaster_blob_t* input, size_t* input_consumed,
- keymaster_key_param_set_t* out_params,
- keymaster_blob_t* output) const = 0;
- virtual keymaster_error_t finish(keymaster_operation_handle_t operation_handle,
- const keymaster_key_param_set_t* in_params,
- const keymaster_blob_t* signature,
- keymaster_key_param_set_t* out_params,
- keymaster_blob_t* output) const = 0;
- virtual keymaster_error_t abort(keymaster_operation_handle_t operation_handle) const = 0;
-
- protected:
- DISALLOW_COPY_AND_ASSIGN(IKeymasterDevice);
-};
-
-template <typename T> class KeymasterDevice : public IKeymasterDevice {
- public:
- KeymasterDevice(T* d) : mDevice{d} {}
- /*keymaster_error_t generate_key(const keymaster_key_param_set_t* params,
- keymaster_key_blob_t* key_blob) const override final {
- return mDevice->generate_key(mDevice, params, key_blob, nullptr);
- }*/
- keymaster_error_t delete_key(const keymaster_key_blob_t* key) const override final {
- if (mDevice->delete_key == nullptr) return KM_ERROR_OK;
- return mDevice->delete_key(mDevice, key);
- }
- keymaster_error_t begin(keymaster_purpose_t purpose, const keymaster_key_blob_t* key,
- const keymaster_key_param_set_t* in_params,
- keymaster_key_param_set_t* out_params,
- keymaster_operation_handle_t* operation_handle) const override final {
- return mDevice->begin(mDevice, purpose, key, in_params, out_params, operation_handle);
- }
- keymaster_error_t update(keymaster_operation_handle_t operation_handle,
- const keymaster_key_param_set_t* in_params,
- const keymaster_blob_t* input, size_t* input_consumed,
- keymaster_key_param_set_t* out_params,
- keymaster_blob_t* output) const override final {
- return mDevice->update(mDevice, operation_handle, in_params, input, input_consumed,
- out_params, output);
- }
- keymaster_error_t abort(keymaster_operation_handle_t operation_handle) const override final {
- return mDevice->abort(mDevice, operation_handle);
- }
-
- protected:
- T* const mDevice;
-};
-
-class Keymaster1Device : public KeymasterDevice<keymaster1_device_t> {
- public:
- Keymaster1Device(keymaster1_device_t* d) : KeymasterDevice<keymaster1_device_t>{d} {}
- ~Keymaster1Device() override final { keymaster1_close(mDevice); }
- keymaster_error_t finish(keymaster_operation_handle_t operation_handle,
- const keymaster_key_param_set_t* in_params,
- const keymaster_blob_t* signature,
- keymaster_key_param_set_t* out_params,
- keymaster_blob_t* output) const override final {
- return mDevice->finish(mDevice, operation_handle, in_params, signature, out_params, output);
- }
-};
-
-class Keymaster2Device : public KeymasterDevice<keymaster2_device_t> {
- public:
- Keymaster2Device(keymaster2_device_t* d) : KeymasterDevice<keymaster2_device_t>{d} {}
- ~Keymaster2Device() override final { keymaster2_close(mDevice); }
- keymaster_error_t finish(keymaster_operation_handle_t operation_handle,
- const keymaster_key_param_set_t* in_params,
- const keymaster_blob_t* signature,
- keymaster_key_param_set_t* out_params,
- keymaster_blob_t* output) const override final {
- return mDevice->finish(mDevice, operation_handle, in_params, nullptr, signature, out_params,
- output);
- }
-};
-
-KeymasterOperation::~KeymasterOperation() {
- if (mDevice) mDevice->abort(mOpHandle);
-}
-
-bool KeymasterOperation::updateCompletely(const std::string& input, std::string* output) {
- output->clear();
- auto it = input.begin();
- while (it != input.end()) {
- size_t toRead = static_cast<size_t>(input.end() - it);
- keymaster_blob_t inputBlob{reinterpret_cast<const uint8_t*>(&*it), toRead};
- keymaster_blob_t outputBlob;
- size_t inputConsumed;
- auto error =
- mDevice->update(mOpHandle, nullptr, &inputBlob, &inputConsumed, nullptr, &outputBlob);
- if (error != KM_ERROR_OK) {
- LOG(ERROR) << "update failed, code " << error;
- mDevice = nullptr;
- return false;
- }
- output->append(reinterpret_cast<const char*>(outputBlob.data), outputBlob.data_length);
- free(const_cast<uint8_t*>(outputBlob.data));
- if (inputConsumed > toRead) {
- LOG(ERROR) << "update reported too much input consumed";
- mDevice = nullptr;
- return false;
- }
- it += inputConsumed;
- }
- return true;
-}
-
-bool KeymasterOperation::finish() {
- auto error = mDevice->finish(mOpHandle, nullptr, nullptr, nullptr, nullptr);
- mDevice = nullptr;
- if (error != KM_ERROR_OK) {
- LOG(ERROR) << "finish failed, code " << error;
- return false;
- }
- return true;
-}
-
-bool KeymasterOperation::finishWithOutput(std::string* output) {
- keymaster_blob_t outputBlob;
- auto error = mDevice->finish(mOpHandle, nullptr, nullptr, nullptr, &outputBlob);
- mDevice = nullptr;
- if (error != KM_ERROR_OK) {
- LOG(ERROR) << "finish failed, code " << error;
- return false;
- }
- output->assign(reinterpret_cast<const char*>(outputBlob.data), outputBlob.data_length);
- free(const_cast<uint8_t*>(outputBlob.data));
- return true;
-}
-
-Keymaster::Keymaster() {
- mDevice = nullptr;
- const hw_module_t* module;
- int ret = hw_get_module_by_class(KEYSTORE_HARDWARE_MODULE_ID, NULL, &module);
- if (ret != 0) {
- LOG(ERROR) << "hw_get_module_by_class returned " << ret;
- return;
- }
- if (module->module_api_version == KEYMASTER_MODULE_API_VERSION_1_0) {
- keymaster1_device_t* device;
- ret = keymaster1_open(module, &device);
- if (ret != 0) {
- LOG(ERROR) << "keymaster1_open returned " << ret;
- return;
- }
- mDevice = std::make_shared<Keymaster1Device>(device);
- } else if (module->module_api_version == KEYMASTER_MODULE_API_VERSION_2_0) {
- keymaster2_device_t* device;
- ret = keymaster2_open(module, &device);
- if (ret != 0) {
- LOG(ERROR) << "keymaster2_open returned " << ret;
- return;
- }
- mDevice = std::make_shared<Keymaster2Device>(device);
- } else {
- LOG(ERROR) << "module_api_version is " << module->module_api_version;
- return;
- }
-}
-
-/*bool Keymaster::generateKey(const keymaster::AuthorizationSet& inParams, std::string* key) {
- keymaster_key_blob_t keyBlob;
- auto error = mDevice->generate_key(&inParams, &keyBlob);
- if (error != KM_ERROR_OK) {
- LOG(ERROR) << "generate_key failed, code " << error;
- return false;
- }
- key->assign(reinterpret_cast<const char*>(keyBlob.key_material), keyBlob.key_material_size);
- free(const_cast<uint8_t*>(keyBlob.key_material));
- return true;
-}*/
-
-bool Keymaster::deleteKey(const std::string& key) {
- keymaster_key_blob_t keyBlob{reinterpret_cast<const uint8_t*>(key.data()), key.size()};
- auto error = mDevice->delete_key(&keyBlob);
- if (error != KM_ERROR_OK) {
- LOG(ERROR) << "delete_key failed, code " << error;
- return false;
- }
- return true;
-}
-
-KeymasterOperation Keymaster::begin(keymaster_purpose_t purpose, const std::string& key,
- const keymaster::AuthorizationSet& inParams,
- keymaster::AuthorizationSet* outParams) {
- keymaster_key_blob_t keyBlob{reinterpret_cast<const uint8_t*>(key.data()), key.size()};
- keymaster_operation_handle_t mOpHandle;
- keymaster_key_param_set_t outParams_set;
- auto error = mDevice->begin(purpose, &keyBlob, &inParams, &outParams_set, &mOpHandle);
- if (error != KM_ERROR_OK) {
- LOG(ERROR) << "begin failed, code " << error;
- return KeymasterOperation(nullptr, mOpHandle);
- }
- outParams->Clear();
- outParams->push_back(outParams_set);
- keymaster_free_param_set(&outParams_set);
- return KeymasterOperation(mDevice, mOpHandle);
-}
-
-KeymasterOperation Keymaster::begin(keymaster_purpose_t purpose, const std::string& key,
- const keymaster::AuthorizationSet& inParams) {
- keymaster_key_blob_t keyBlob{reinterpret_cast<const uint8_t*>(key.data()), key.size()};
- keymaster_operation_handle_t mOpHandle;
- auto error = mDevice->begin(purpose, &keyBlob, &inParams, nullptr, &mOpHandle);
- if (error != KM_ERROR_OK) {
- LOG(ERROR) << "begin failed, code " << error;
- return KeymasterOperation(nullptr, mOpHandle);
- }
- return KeymasterOperation(mDevice, mOpHandle);
-}
-
-} // namespace vold
-} // namespace android
diff --git a/crypto/ext4crypt/Keymaster.h b/crypto/ext4crypt/Keymaster.h
deleted file mode 100644
index bd3f219..0000000
--- a/crypto/ext4crypt/Keymaster.h
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,111 +0,0 @@
-/*
- * Copyright (C) 2016 The Android Open Source Project
- *
- * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
- * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
- * You may obtain a copy of the License at
- *
- * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
- *
- * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
- * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
- * WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
- * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
- * limitations under the License.
- */
-
-#ifndef ANDROID_VOLD_KEYMASTER_H
-#define ANDROID_VOLD_KEYMASTER_H
-
-#include <memory>
-#include <string>
-#include <utility>
-
-#include <keymaster/authorization_set.h>
-#include "Utils.h"
-
-namespace android {
-namespace vold {
-
-using namespace keymaster;
-
-// C++ wrappers to the Keymaster C interface.
-// This is tailored to the needs of KeyStorage, but could be extended to be
-// a more general interface.
-
-// Class that wraps a keymaster1_device_t or keymaster2_device_t and provides methods
-// they have in common. Also closes the device on destruction.
-class IKeymasterDevice;
-
-// Wrapper for a keymaster_operation_handle_t representing an
-// ongoing Keymaster operation. Aborts the operation
-// in the destructor if it is unfinished. Methods log failures
-// to LOG(ERROR).
-class KeymasterOperation {
- public:
- ~KeymasterOperation();
- // Is this instance valid? This is false if creation fails, and becomes
- // false on finish or if an update fails.
- explicit operator bool() { return mDevice != nullptr; }
- // Call "update" repeatedly until all of the input is consumed, and
- // concatenate the output. Return true on success.
- bool updateCompletely(const std::string& input, std::string* output);
- // Finish; pass nullptr for the "output" param.
- bool finish();
- // Finish and write the output to this string.
- bool finishWithOutput(std::string* output);
- // Move constructor
- KeymasterOperation(KeymasterOperation&& rhs) {
- mOpHandle = std::move(rhs.mOpHandle);
- mDevice = std::move(rhs.mDevice);
- }
-
- private:
- KeymasterOperation(std::shared_ptr<IKeymasterDevice> d, keymaster_operation_handle_t h)
- : mDevice{d}, mOpHandle{h} {}
- std::shared_ptr<IKeymasterDevice> mDevice;
- keymaster_operation_handle_t mOpHandle;
- DISALLOW_COPY_AND_ASSIGN(KeymasterOperation);
- friend class Keymaster;
-};
-
-// Wrapper for a Keymaster device for methods that start a KeymasterOperation or are not
-// part of one.
-class Keymaster {
- public:
- Keymaster();
- // false if we failed to open the keymaster device.
- explicit operator bool() { return mDevice != nullptr; }
- // Generate a key in the keymaster from the given params.
- //bool generateKey(const AuthorizationSet& inParams, std::string* key);
- // If the keymaster supports it, permanently delete a key.
- bool deleteKey(const std::string& key);
- // Begin a new cryptographic operation, collecting output parameters.
- KeymasterOperation begin(keymaster_purpose_t purpose, const std::string& key,
- const AuthorizationSet& inParams, AuthorizationSet* outParams);
- // Begin a new cryptographic operation; don't collect output parameters.
- KeymasterOperation begin(keymaster_purpose_t purpose, const std::string& key,
- const AuthorizationSet& inParams);
-
- private:
- std::shared_ptr<IKeymasterDevice> mDevice;
- DISALLOW_COPY_AND_ASSIGN(Keymaster);
-};
-
-template <keymaster_tag_t Tag>
-inline AuthorizationSetBuilder& addStringParam(AuthorizationSetBuilder&& params,
- TypedTag<KM_BYTES, Tag> tag,
- const std::string& val) {
- return params.Authorization(tag, val.data(), val.size());
-}
-
-template <keymaster_tag_t Tag>
-inline void addStringParam(AuthorizationSetBuilder* params, TypedTag<KM_BYTES, Tag> tag,
- const std::string& val) {
- params->Authorization(tag, val.data(), val.size());
-}
-
-} // namespace vold
-} // namespace android
-
-#endif
diff --git a/crypto/ext4crypt/Keymaster3.cpp b/crypto/ext4crypt/Keymaster3.cpp
deleted file mode 100644
index 7862044..0000000
--- a/crypto/ext4crypt/Keymaster3.cpp
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,348 +0,0 @@
-/*
- * Copyright (C) 2016 The Android Open Source Project
- *
- * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
- * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
- * You may obtain a copy of the License at
- *
- * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
- *
- * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
- * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
- * WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
- * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
- * limitations under the License.
- */
-
-#include "Keymaster3.h"
-
-//#include <android-base/logging.h>
-#include <keystore/keymaster_tags.h>
-#include <keystore/authorization_set.h>
-#include <keystore/keystore_hidl_support.h>
-
-#include <iostream>
-#define ERROR 1
-#define LOG(x) std::cout
-
-using namespace ::keystore;
-using android::hardware::hidl_string;
-
-namespace android {
-namespace vold {
-
-KeymasterOperation::~KeymasterOperation() {
- if (mDevice.get()) mDevice->abort(mOpHandle);
-}
-
-bool KeymasterOperation::updateCompletely(const std::string& input, std::string* output) {
- if (output)
- output->clear();
- auto it = input.begin();
- uint32_t inputConsumed;
-
- ErrorCode km_error;
- auto hidlCB = [&] (ErrorCode ret, uint32_t _inputConsumed,
- const hidl_vec<KeyParameter>& /*ignored*/, const hidl_vec<uint8_t>& _output) {
- km_error = ret;
- if (km_error != ErrorCode::OK) return;
- inputConsumed = _inputConsumed;
- if (output)
- output->append(reinterpret_cast<const char*>(&_output[0]), _output.size());
- };
-
- while (it != input.end()) {
- size_t toRead = static_cast<size_t>(input.end() - it);
- auto inputBlob = blob2hidlVec(reinterpret_cast<const uint8_t*>(&*it), toRead);
- auto error = mDevice->update(mOpHandle, hidl_vec<KeyParameter>(), inputBlob, hidlCB);
- if (!error.isOk()) {
- LOG(ERROR) << "update failed: " << error.description();
- mDevice = nullptr;
- return false;
- }
- if (km_error != ErrorCode::OK) {
- LOG(ERROR) << "update failed, code " << int32_t(km_error);
- mDevice = nullptr;
- return false;
- }
- if (inputConsumed > toRead) {
- LOG(ERROR) << "update reported too much input consumed";
- mDevice = nullptr;
- return false;
- }
- it += inputConsumed;
- }
- return true;
-}
-
-bool KeymasterOperation::finish(std::string* output) {
- ErrorCode km_error;
- auto hidlCb = [&] (ErrorCode ret, const hidl_vec<KeyParameter>& /*ignored*/,
- const hidl_vec<uint8_t>& _output) {
- km_error = ret;
- if (km_error != ErrorCode::OK) return;
- if (output)
- output->assign(reinterpret_cast<const char*>(&_output[0]), _output.size());
- };
- auto error = mDevice->finish(mOpHandle, hidl_vec<KeyParameter>(), hidl_vec<uint8_t>(),
- hidl_vec<uint8_t>(), hidlCb);
- mDevice = nullptr;
- if (!error.isOk()) {
- LOG(ERROR) << "finish failed: " << error.description();
- return false;
- }
- if (km_error != ErrorCode::OK) {
- LOG(ERROR) << "finish failed, code " << int32_t(km_error);
- return false;
- }
- return true;
-}
-
-Keymaster::Keymaster() {
- mDevice = ::android::hardware::keymaster::V3_0::IKeymasterDevice::getService();
-}
-
-/*bool Keymaster::generateKey(const AuthorizationSet& inParams, std::string* key) {
- ErrorCode km_error;
- auto hidlCb = [&] (ErrorCode ret, const hidl_vec<uint8_t>& keyBlob,
- const KeyCharacteristics& /*ignored* /) {
- km_error = ret;
- if (km_error != ErrorCode::OK) return;
- if (key)
- key->assign(reinterpret_cast<const char*>(&keyBlob[0]), keyBlob.size());
- };
-
- auto error = mDevice->generateKey(inParams.hidl_data(), hidlCb);
- if (!error.isOk()) {
- LOG(ERROR) << "generate_key failed: " << error.description();
- return false;
- }
- if (km_error != ErrorCode::OK) {
- LOG(ERROR) << "generate_key failed, code " << int32_t(km_error);
- return false;
- }
- return true;
-}*/
-
-bool Keymaster::deleteKey(const std::string& key) {
- LOG(ERROR) << "NOT deleting key in TWRP";
- return false;
- /*auto keyBlob = blob2hidlVec(key);
- auto error = mDevice->deleteKey(keyBlob);
- if (!error.isOk()) {
- LOG(ERROR) << "delete_key failed: " << error.description();
- return false;
- }
- if (ErrorCode(error) != ErrorCode::OK) {
- LOG(ERROR) << "delete_key failed, code " << uint32_t(ErrorCode(error));
- return false;
- }
- return true;*/
-}
-
-bool Keymaster::upgradeKey(const std::string& oldKey, const AuthorizationSet& inParams,
- std::string* newKey) {
- auto oldKeyBlob = blob2hidlVec(oldKey);
- ErrorCode km_error;
- auto hidlCb = [&] (ErrorCode ret, const hidl_vec<uint8_t>& upgradedKeyBlob) {
- km_error = ret;
- if (km_error != ErrorCode::OK) return;
- if (newKey)
- newKey->assign(reinterpret_cast<const char*>(&upgradedKeyBlob[0]),
- upgradedKeyBlob.size());
- };
- auto error = mDevice->upgradeKey(oldKeyBlob, inParams.hidl_data(), hidlCb);
- if (!error.isOk()) {
- LOG(ERROR) << "upgrade_key failed: " << error.description();
- return false;
- }
- if (km_error != ErrorCode::OK) {
- LOG(ERROR) << "upgrade_key failed, code " << int32_t(km_error);
- return false;
- }
- return true;
-}
-
-KeymasterOperation Keymaster::begin(KeyPurpose purpose, const std::string& key,
- const AuthorizationSet& inParams,
- AuthorizationSet* outParams) {
- auto keyBlob = blob2hidlVec(key);
- uint64_t mOpHandle;
- ErrorCode km_error;
-
- auto hidlCb = [&] (ErrorCode ret, const hidl_vec<KeyParameter>& _outParams,
- uint64_t operationHandle) {
- km_error = ret;
- if (km_error != ErrorCode::OK) return;
- if (outParams)
- *outParams = _outParams;
- mOpHandle = operationHandle;
- };
-
- auto error = mDevice->begin(purpose, keyBlob, inParams.hidl_data(), hidlCb);
- if (!error.isOk()) {
- LOG(ERROR) << "begin failed: " << error.description();
- return KeymasterOperation(ErrorCode::UNKNOWN_ERROR);
- }
- if (km_error != ErrorCode::OK) {
- LOG(ERROR) << "begin failed, code " << int32_t(km_error);
- return KeymasterOperation(km_error);
- }
- return KeymasterOperation(mDevice, mOpHandle);
-}
-bool Keymaster::isSecure() {
- bool _isSecure = false;
- auto rc = mDevice->getHardwareFeatures(
- [&] (bool isSecure, bool, bool, bool, bool, const hidl_string&, const hidl_string&) {
- _isSecure = isSecure; });
- return rc.isOk() && _isSecure;
-}
-
-} // namespace vold
-} // namespace android
-
-using namespace ::android::vold;
-
-/*
-int keymaster_compatibility_cryptfs_scrypt() {
- Keymaster dev;
- if (!dev) {
- LOG(ERROR) << "Failed to initiate keymaster session";
- return -1;
- }
- return dev.isSecure();
-}
-*/
-
-/*int keymaster_create_key_for_cryptfs_scrypt(uint32_t rsa_key_size,
- uint64_t rsa_exponent,
- uint32_t ratelimit,
- uint8_t* key_buffer,
- uint32_t key_buffer_size,
- uint32_t* key_out_size)
-{
- Keymaster dev;
- std::string key;
- if (!dev) {
- LOG(ERROR) << "Failed to initiate keymaster session";
- return -1;
- }
- if (!key_buffer || !key_out_size) {
- LOG(ERROR) << __FILE__ << ":" << __LINE__ << ":Invalid argument";
- return -1;
- }
- if (key_out_size) {
- *key_out_size = 0;
- }
-
- auto paramBuilder = AuthorizationSetBuilder()
- .Authorization(TAG_ALGORITHM, Algorithm::RSA)
- .Authorization(TAG_KEY_SIZE, rsa_key_size)
- .Authorization(TAG_RSA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT, rsa_exponent)
- .Authorization(TAG_PURPOSE, KeyPurpose::SIGN)
- .Authorization(TAG_PADDING, PaddingMode::NONE)
- .Authorization(TAG_DIGEST, Digest::NONE)
- .Authorization(TAG_BLOB_USAGE_REQUIREMENTS,
- KeyBlobUsageRequirements::STANDALONE)
- .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
- .Authorization(TAG_MIN_SECONDS_BETWEEN_OPS, ratelimit);
-
- if (!dev.generateKey(paramBuilder, &key)) {
- return -1;
- }
-
- if (key_out_size) {
- *key_out_size = key.size();
- }
-
- if (key_buffer_size < key.size()) {
- return -1;
- }
-
- std::copy(key.data(), key.data() + key.size(), key_buffer);
- return 0;
-}*/
-
-int keymaster_sign_object_for_cryptfs_scrypt(const uint8_t* key_blob,
- size_t key_blob_size,
- uint32_t ratelimit,
- const uint8_t* object,
- const size_t object_size,
- uint8_t** signature_buffer,
- size_t* signature_buffer_size,
- uint8_t* key_buffer,
- uint32_t key_buffer_size,
- uint32_t* key_out_size)
-{
- Keymaster dev;
- if (!dev) {
- LOG(ERROR) << "Failed to initiate keymaster session";
- return -1;
- }
- if (!key_blob || !object || !signature_buffer || !signature_buffer_size) {
- LOG(ERROR) << __FILE__ << ":" << __LINE__ << ":Invalid argument";
- return -1;
- }
-
- AuthorizationSet outParams;
- std::string key(reinterpret_cast<const char*>(key_blob), key_blob_size);
- std::string input(reinterpret_cast<const char*>(object), object_size);
- std::string output;
- KeymasterOperation op;
-
- auto paramBuilder = AuthorizationSetBuilder()
- .Authorization(TAG_PADDING, PaddingMode::NONE)
- .Authorization(TAG_DIGEST, Digest::NONE);
-
- while (true) {
- op = dev.begin(KeyPurpose::SIGN, key, paramBuilder, &outParams);
- if (op.errorCode() == ErrorCode::KEY_RATE_LIMIT_EXCEEDED) {
- sleep(ratelimit);
- continue;
- } else if (op.errorCode() == ErrorCode::KEY_REQUIRES_UPGRADE) {
- std::string newKey;
- bool ret = dev.upgradeKey(key, paramBuilder, &newKey);
- if(ret == false) {
- LOG(ERROR) << "Error upgradeKey: ";
- return -1;
- }
-
- if (key_out_size) {
- *key_out_size = newKey.size();
- }
-
- if (key_buffer_size < newKey.size()) {
- LOG(ERROR) << "key buffer size is too small";
- return -1;
- }
-
- std::copy(newKey.data(), newKey.data() + newKey.size(), key_buffer);
- key = newKey;
- } else break;
- }
-
- if (op.errorCode() != ErrorCode::OK) {
- LOG(ERROR) << "Error starting keymaster signature transaction: " << int32_t(op.errorCode());
- return -1;
- }
-
- if (!op.updateCompletely(input, &output)) {
- LOG(ERROR) << "Error sending data to keymaster signature transaction: "
- << uint32_t(op.errorCode());
- return -1;
- }
-
- if (!op.finish(&output)) {
- LOG(ERROR) << "Error finalizing keymaster signature transaction: " << int32_t(op.errorCode());
- return -1;
- }
-
- *signature_buffer = reinterpret_cast<uint8_t*>(malloc(output.size()));
- if (*signature_buffer == nullptr) {
- LOG(ERROR) << "Error allocation buffer for keymaster signature";
- return -1;
- }
- *signature_buffer_size = output.size();
- std::copy(output.data(), output.data() + output.size(), *signature_buffer);
- return 0;
-}
diff --git a/crypto/ext4crypt/Keymaster3.h b/crypto/ext4crypt/Keymaster3.h
deleted file mode 100644
index cb5b644..0000000
--- a/crypto/ext4crypt/Keymaster3.h
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,151 +0,0 @@
-/*
- * Copyright (C) 2016 The Android Open Source Project
- *
- * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
- * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
- * You may obtain a copy of the License at
- *
- * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
- *
- * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
- * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
- * WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
- * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
- * limitations under the License.
- */
-
-#ifndef ANDROID_VOLD_KEYMASTER_H
-#define ANDROID_VOLD_KEYMASTER_H
-
-#ifdef __cplusplus
-
-#include <memory>
-#include <string>
-#include <utility>
-
-#include <android/hardware/keymaster/3.0/IKeymasterDevice.h>
-#include <keystore/authorization_set.h>
-#include "Utils.h"
-
-namespace android {
-namespace vold {
-using ::android::hardware::keymaster::V3_0::IKeymasterDevice;
-using ::keystore::ErrorCode;
-using ::keystore::KeyPurpose;
-using ::keystore::AuthorizationSet;
-
-// C++ wrappers to the Keymaster hidl interface.
-// This is tailored to the needs of KeyStorage, but could be extended to be
-// a more general interface.
-
-// Wrapper for a Keymaster operation handle representing an
-// ongoing Keymaster operation. Aborts the operation
-// in the destructor if it is unfinished. Methods log failures
-// to LOG(ERROR).
-class KeymasterOperation {
- public:
- ~KeymasterOperation();
- // Is this instance valid? This is false if creation fails, and becomes
- // false on finish or if an update fails.
- explicit operator bool() { return mError == ErrorCode::OK; }
- ErrorCode errorCode() { return mError; }
- // Call "update" repeatedly until all of the input is consumed, and
- // concatenate the output. Return true on success.
- bool updateCompletely(const std::string& input, std::string* output);
- // Finish and write the output to this string, unless pointer is null.
- bool finish(std::string* output);
- // Move constructor
- KeymasterOperation(KeymasterOperation&& rhs) {
- mDevice = std::move(rhs.mDevice);
- mOpHandle = std::move(rhs.mOpHandle);
- mError = std::move(rhs.mError);
- }
- // Construct an object in an error state for error returns
- KeymasterOperation()
- : mDevice{nullptr}, mOpHandle{0},
- mError {ErrorCode::UNKNOWN_ERROR} {}
- // Move Assignment
- KeymasterOperation& operator= (KeymasterOperation&& rhs) {
- mDevice = std::move(rhs.mDevice);
- mOpHandle = std::move(rhs.mOpHandle);
- mError = std::move(rhs.mError);
- rhs.mError = ErrorCode::UNKNOWN_ERROR;
- rhs.mOpHandle = 0;
- return *this;
- }
-
- private:
- KeymasterOperation(const sp<IKeymasterDevice>& d, uint64_t h)
- : mDevice{d}, mOpHandle{h}, mError {ErrorCode::OK} {}
- KeymasterOperation(ErrorCode error)
- : mDevice{nullptr}, mOpHandle{0},
- mError {error} {}
- sp<IKeymasterDevice> mDevice;
- uint64_t mOpHandle;
- ErrorCode mError;
- DISALLOW_COPY_AND_ASSIGN(KeymasterOperation);
- friend class Keymaster;
-};
-
-// Wrapper for a Keymaster device for methods that start a KeymasterOperation or are not
-// part of one.
-class Keymaster {
- public:
- Keymaster();
- // false if we failed to open the keymaster device.
- explicit operator bool() { return mDevice.get() != nullptr; }
- // Generate a key in the keymaster from the given params.
- //bool generateKey(const AuthorizationSet& inParams, std::string* key);
- // If the keymaster supports it, permanently delete a key.
- bool deleteKey(const std::string& key);
- // Replace stored key blob in response to KM_ERROR_KEY_REQUIRES_UPGRADE.
- bool upgradeKey(const std::string& oldKey, const AuthorizationSet& inParams,
- std::string* newKey);
- // Begin a new cryptographic operation, collecting output parameters if pointer is non-null
- KeymasterOperation begin(KeyPurpose purpose, const std::string& key,
- const AuthorizationSet& inParams, AuthorizationSet* outParams);
- bool isSecure();
-
- private:
- sp<hardware::keymaster::V3_0::IKeymasterDevice> mDevice;
- DISALLOW_COPY_AND_ASSIGN(Keymaster);
-};
-
-} // namespace vold
-} // namespace android
-
-#endif // __cplusplus
-
-
-/*
- * The following functions provide C bindings to keymaster services
- * needed by cryptfs scrypt. The compatibility check checks whether
- * the keymaster implementation is considered secure, i.e., TEE backed.
- * The create_key function generates an RSA key for signing.
- * The sign_object function signes an object with the given keymaster
- * key.
- */
-__BEGIN_DECLS
-
-//int keymaster_compatibility_cryptfs_scrypt();
-/*int keymaster_create_key_for_cryptfs_scrypt(uint32_t rsa_key_size,
- uint64_t rsa_exponent,
- uint32_t ratelimit,
- uint8_t* key_buffer,
- uint32_t key_buffer_size,
- uint32_t* key_out_size);*/
-
-int keymaster_sign_object_for_cryptfs_scrypt(const uint8_t* key_blob,
- size_t key_blob_size,
- uint32_t ratelimit,
- const uint8_t* object,
- const size_t object_size,
- uint8_t** signature_buffer,
- size_t* signature_buffer_size,
- uint8_t* key_buffer,
- uint32_t key_buffer_size,
- uint32_t* key_out_size);
-
-__END_DECLS
-
-#endif
diff --git a/crypto/ext4crypt/Keymaster4.cpp b/crypto/ext4crypt/Keymaster4.cpp
deleted file mode 100644
index 6507bb1..0000000
--- a/crypto/ext4crypt/Keymaster4.cpp
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,382 +0,0 @@
-/*
- * Copyright (C) 2016 The Android Open Source Project
- *
- * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
- * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
- * You may obtain a copy of the License at
- *
- * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
- *
- * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
- * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
- * WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
- * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
- * limitations under the License.
- */
-
-#include "Keymaster4.h"
-
-//#include <android-base/logging.h>
-#include <keymasterV4_0/authorization_set.h>
-#include <keymasterV4_0/keymaster_utils.h>
-
-#include <iostream>
-#define LOG(x) std::cout
-#define PLOG(x) std::cout
-
-namespace android {
-namespace vold {
-
-using ::android::hardware::hidl_string;
-using ::android::hardware::hidl_vec;
-using ::android::hardware::keymaster::V4_0::SecurityLevel;
-
-KeymasterOperation::~KeymasterOperation() {
- if (mDevice) mDevice->abort(mOpHandle);
-}
-
-bool KeymasterOperation::updateCompletely(const char* input, size_t inputLen,
- const std::function<void(const char*, size_t)> consumer) {
- uint32_t inputConsumed = 0;
-
- km::ErrorCode km_error;
- auto hidlCB = [&](km::ErrorCode ret, uint32_t inputConsumedDelta,
- const hidl_vec<km::KeyParameter>& /*ignored*/,
- const hidl_vec<uint8_t>& _output) {
- km_error = ret;
- if (km_error != km::ErrorCode::OK) return;
- inputConsumed += inputConsumedDelta;
- consumer(reinterpret_cast<const char*>(&_output[0]), _output.size());
- };
-
- while (inputConsumed != inputLen) {
- size_t toRead = static_cast<size_t>(inputLen - inputConsumed);
- auto inputBlob = km::support::blob2hidlVec(
- reinterpret_cast<const uint8_t*>(&input[inputConsumed]), toRead);
- auto error = mDevice->update(mOpHandle, hidl_vec<km::KeyParameter>(), inputBlob,
- km::HardwareAuthToken(), km::VerificationToken(), hidlCB);
- if (!error.isOk()) {
- LOG(ERROR) << "update failed: " << error.description() << std::endl;
- mDevice = nullptr;
- return false;
- }
- if (km_error != km::ErrorCode::OK) {
- LOG(ERROR) << "update failed, code " << int32_t(km_error) << std::endl;
- mDevice = nullptr;
- return false;
- }
- if (inputConsumed > inputLen) {
- LOG(ERROR) << "update reported too much input consumed" << std::endl;
- mDevice = nullptr;
- return false;
- }
- }
- return true;
-}
-
-bool KeymasterOperation::finish(std::string* output) {
- km::ErrorCode km_error;
- auto hidlCb = [&](km::ErrorCode ret, const hidl_vec<km::KeyParameter>& /*ignored*/,
- const hidl_vec<uint8_t>& _output) {
- km_error = ret;
- if (km_error != km::ErrorCode::OK) return;
- if (output) output->assign(reinterpret_cast<const char*>(&_output[0]), _output.size());
- };
- auto error = mDevice->finish(mOpHandle, hidl_vec<km::KeyParameter>(), hidl_vec<uint8_t>(),
- hidl_vec<uint8_t>(), km::HardwareAuthToken(),
- km::VerificationToken(), hidlCb);
- mDevice = nullptr;
- if (!error.isOk()) {
- LOG(ERROR) << "finish failed: " << error.description() << std::endl;
- return false;
- }
- if (km_error != km::ErrorCode::OK) {
- LOG(ERROR) << "finish failed, code " << int32_t(km_error) << std::endl;
- return false;
- }
- return true;
-}
-
-/* static */ bool Keymaster::hmacKeyGenerated = false;
-
-Keymaster::Keymaster() {
- auto devices = KmDevice::enumerateAvailableDevices();
- if (!hmacKeyGenerated) {
- KmDevice::performHmacKeyAgreement(devices);
- hmacKeyGenerated = true;
- }
- for (auto& dev : devices) {
- // Do not use StrongBox for device encryption / credential encryption. If a security chip
- // is present it will have Weaver, which already strengthens CE. We get no additional
- // benefit from using StrongBox here, so skip it.
- if (dev->halVersion().securityLevel != SecurityLevel::STRONGBOX) {
- mDevice = std::move(dev);
- break;
- }
- }
- if (!mDevice) return;
- auto& version = mDevice->halVersion();
- LOG(INFO) << "Using " << version.keymasterName << " from " << version.authorName
- << " for encryption. Security level: " << toString(version.securityLevel)
- << ", HAL: " << mDevice->descriptor() << "/" << mDevice->instanceName() << std::endl;
-}
-
-bool Keymaster::generateKey(const km::AuthorizationSet& inParams, std::string* key) {
- km::ErrorCode km_error;
- auto hidlCb = [&](km::ErrorCode ret, const hidl_vec<uint8_t>& keyBlob,
- const km::KeyCharacteristics& /*ignored*/) {
- km_error = ret;
- if (km_error != km::ErrorCode::OK) return;
- if (key) key->assign(reinterpret_cast<const char*>(&keyBlob[0]), keyBlob.size());
- };
-
- auto error = mDevice->generateKey(inParams.hidl_data(), hidlCb);
- if (!error.isOk()) {
- LOG(ERROR) << "generate_key failed: " << error.description() << std::endl;
- return false;
- }
- if (km_error != km::ErrorCode::OK) {
- LOG(ERROR) << "generate_key failed, code " << int32_t(km_error) << std::endl;
- return false;
- }
- return true;
-}
-
-km::ErrorCode Keymaster::exportKey(km::KeyFormat format, KeyBuffer& kmKey, const std::string& clientId,
- const std::string& appData, std::string* key) {
- auto kmKeyBlob = km::support::blob2hidlVec(std::string(kmKey.data(), kmKey.size()));
- auto emptyAssign = NULL;
- auto kmClientId = (clientId == "!") ? emptyAssign: km::support::blob2hidlVec(clientId);
- auto kmAppData = (appData == "!") ? emptyAssign: km::support::blob2hidlVec(appData);
- km::ErrorCode km_error;
- auto hidlCb = [&](km::ErrorCode ret, const hidl_vec<uint8_t>& exportedKeyBlob) {
- km_error = ret;
- if (km_error != km::ErrorCode::OK) return;
- if(key)
- key->assign(reinterpret_cast<const char*>(&exportedKeyBlob[0]),
- exportedKeyBlob.size());
- };
- auto error = mDevice->exportKey(format, kmKeyBlob, kmClientId, kmAppData, hidlCb);
- if (!error.isOk()) {
- LOG(ERROR) << "export_key failed: " << error.description();
- return km::ErrorCode::UNKNOWN_ERROR;
- }
- if (km_error != km::ErrorCode::OK) {
- LOG(ERROR) << "export_key failed, code " << int32_t(km_error);
- return km_error;
- }
- return km::ErrorCode::OK;
-}
-
-bool Keymaster::deleteKey(const std::string& key) {
- LOG(ERROR) << "not actually deleting key\n";
- return true;
- auto keyBlob = km::support::blob2hidlVec(key);
- auto error = mDevice->deleteKey(keyBlob);
- if (!error.isOk()) {
- LOG(ERROR) << "delete_key failed: " << error.description();
- return false;
- }
- if (error != km::ErrorCode::OK) {
- LOG(ERROR) << "delete_key failed, code " << int32_t(km::ErrorCode(error));
- return false;
- }
- return true;
-}
-
-bool Keymaster::upgradeKey(const std::string& oldKey, const km::AuthorizationSet& inParams,
- std::string* newKey) {
- auto oldKeyBlob = km::support::blob2hidlVec(oldKey);
- km::ErrorCode km_error;
- auto hidlCb = [&](km::ErrorCode ret, const hidl_vec<uint8_t>& upgradedKeyBlob) {
- km_error = ret;
- if (km_error != km::ErrorCode::OK) return;
- if (newKey)
- newKey->assign(reinterpret_cast<const char*>(&upgradedKeyBlob[0]),
- upgradedKeyBlob.size());
- };
- auto error = mDevice->upgradeKey(oldKeyBlob, inParams.hidl_data(), hidlCb);
- if (!error.isOk()) {
- LOG(ERROR) << "upgrade_key failed: " << error.description() << std::endl;
- return false;
- }
- if (km_error != km::ErrorCode::OK) {
- LOG(ERROR) << "upgrade_key failed, code " << int32_t(km_error) << std::endl;
- return false;
- }
- return true;
-}
-
-KeymasterOperation Keymaster::begin(km::KeyPurpose purpose, const std::string& key,
- const km::AuthorizationSet& inParams,
- const km::HardwareAuthToken& authToken,
- km::AuthorizationSet* outParams) {
- auto keyBlob = km::support::blob2hidlVec(key);
- uint64_t mOpHandle;
- km::ErrorCode km_error;
-
- auto hidlCb = [&](km::ErrorCode ret, const hidl_vec<km::KeyParameter>& _outParams,
- uint64_t operationHandle) {
- km_error = ret;
- if (km_error != km::ErrorCode::OK) return;
- if (outParams) *outParams = _outParams;
- mOpHandle = operationHandle;
- };
-
- auto error = mDevice->begin(purpose, keyBlob, inParams.hidl_data(), authToken, hidlCb);
- if (!error.isOk()) {
- LOG(ERROR) << "begin failed: " << error.description() << std::endl;
- return KeymasterOperation(km::ErrorCode::UNKNOWN_ERROR);
- }
- if (km_error != km::ErrorCode::OK) {
- LOG(ERROR) << "begin failed, code " << int32_t(km_error) << std::endl;
- return KeymasterOperation(km_error);
- }
- return KeymasterOperation(mDevice.get(), mOpHandle);
-}
-
-bool Keymaster::isSecure() {
- return mDevice->halVersion().securityLevel != km::SecurityLevel::SOFTWARE;
-}
-
-} // namespace vold
-} // namespace android
-
-using namespace ::android::vold;
-
-/*
-int keymaster_compatibility_cryptfs_scrypt() {
- Keymaster dev;
- if (!dev) {
- LOG(ERROR) << "Failed to initiate keymaster session" << std::endl;
- return -1;
- }
- return dev.isSecure();
-}
-*/
-
-static bool write_string_to_buf(const std::string& towrite, uint8_t* buffer, uint32_t buffer_size,
- uint32_t* out_size) {
- if (!buffer || !out_size) {
- LOG(ERROR) << "Missing target pointers" << std::endl;
- return false;
- }
- *out_size = towrite.size();
- if (buffer_size < towrite.size()) {
- LOG(ERROR) << "Buffer too small " << buffer_size << " < " << towrite.size() << std::endl;
- return false;
- }
- memset(buffer, '\0', buffer_size);
- std::copy(towrite.begin(), towrite.end(), buffer);
- return true;
-}
-
-static km::AuthorizationSet keyParams(uint32_t rsa_key_size, uint64_t rsa_exponent,
- uint32_t ratelimit) {
- return km::AuthorizationSetBuilder()
- .RsaSigningKey(rsa_key_size, rsa_exponent)
- .NoDigestOrPadding()
- .Authorization(km::TAG_BLOB_USAGE_REQUIREMENTS, km::KeyBlobUsageRequirements::STANDALONE)
- .Authorization(km::TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
- .Authorization(km::TAG_MIN_SECONDS_BETWEEN_OPS, ratelimit);
-}
-
-/*
-int keymaster_create_key_for_cryptfs_scrypt(uint32_t rsa_key_size, uint64_t rsa_exponent,
- uint32_t ratelimit, uint8_t* key_buffer,
- uint32_t key_buffer_size, uint32_t* key_out_size) {
- if (key_out_size) {
- *key_out_size = 0;
- }
- Keymaster dev;
- if (!dev) {
- LOG(ERROR) << "Failed to initiate keymaster session" << std::endl;
- return -1;
- }
- std::string key;
- if (!dev.generateKey(keyParams(rsa_key_size, rsa_exponent, ratelimit), &key)) return -1;
- if (!write_string_to_buf(key, key_buffer, key_buffer_size, key_out_size)) return -1;
- return 0;
-}
-*/
-
-int keymaster_upgrade_key_for_cryptfs_scrypt(uint32_t rsa_key_size, uint64_t rsa_exponent,
- uint32_t ratelimit, const uint8_t* key_blob,
- size_t key_blob_size, uint8_t* key_buffer,
- uint32_t key_buffer_size, uint32_t* key_out_size) {
- if (key_out_size) {
- *key_out_size = 0;
- }
- Keymaster dev;
- if (!dev) {
- LOG(ERROR) << "Failed to initiate keymaster session" << std::endl;
- return -1;
- }
- std::string old_key(reinterpret_cast<const char*>(key_blob), key_blob_size);
- std::string new_key;
- if (!dev.upgradeKey(old_key, keyParams(rsa_key_size, rsa_exponent, ratelimit), &new_key))
- return -1;
- if (!write_string_to_buf(new_key, key_buffer, key_buffer_size, key_out_size)) return -1;
- return 0;
-}
-
-KeymasterSignResult keymaster_sign_object_for_cryptfs_scrypt(
- const uint8_t* key_blob, size_t key_blob_size, uint32_t ratelimit, const uint8_t* object,
- const size_t object_size, uint8_t** signature_buffer, size_t* signature_buffer_size) {
- Keymaster dev;
- if (!dev) {
- LOG(ERROR) << "Failed to initiate keymaster session" << std::endl;
- return KeymasterSignResult::error;
- }
- if (!key_blob || !object || !signature_buffer || !signature_buffer_size) {
- LOG(ERROR) << __FILE__ << ":" << __LINE__ << ":Invalid argument" << std::endl;
- return KeymasterSignResult::error;
- }
-
- km::AuthorizationSet outParams;
- std::string key(reinterpret_cast<const char*>(key_blob), key_blob_size);
- std::string input(reinterpret_cast<const char*>(object), object_size);
- std::string output;
- KeymasterOperation op;
-
- auto paramBuilder = km::AuthorizationSetBuilder().NoDigestOrPadding();
- while (true) {
- op = dev.begin(km::KeyPurpose::SIGN, key, paramBuilder, km::HardwareAuthToken(), &outParams);
- if (op.errorCode() == km::ErrorCode::KEY_RATE_LIMIT_EXCEEDED) {
- sleep(ratelimit);
- continue;
- } else
- break;
- }
-
- if (op.errorCode() == km::ErrorCode::KEY_REQUIRES_UPGRADE) {
- LOG(ERROR) << "Keymaster key requires upgrade" << std::endl;
- return KeymasterSignResult::upgrade;
- }
-
- if (op.errorCode() != km::ErrorCode::OK) {
- LOG(ERROR) << "Error starting keymaster signature transaction: " << int32_t(op.errorCode()) << std::endl;
- return KeymasterSignResult::error;
- }
-
- if (!op.updateCompletely(input, &output)) {
- LOG(ERROR) << "Error sending data to keymaster signature transaction: "
- << uint32_t(op.errorCode()) << std::endl;
- return KeymasterSignResult::error;
- }
-
- if (!op.finish(&output)) {
- LOG(ERROR) << "Error finalizing keymaster signature transaction: "
- << int32_t(op.errorCode()) << std::endl;
- return KeymasterSignResult::error;
- }
-
- *signature_buffer = reinterpret_cast<uint8_t*>(malloc(output.size()));
- if (*signature_buffer == nullptr) {
- LOG(ERROR) << "Error allocation buffer for keymaster signature" << std::endl;
- return KeymasterSignResult::error;
- }
- *signature_buffer_size = output.size();
- std::copy(output.data(), output.data() + output.size(), *signature_buffer);
- return KeymasterSignResult::ok;
-}
diff --git a/crypto/ext4crypt/Keymaster4.h b/crypto/ext4crypt/Keymaster4.h
deleted file mode 100644
index 704cc2c..0000000
--- a/crypto/ext4crypt/Keymaster4.h
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,162 +0,0 @@
-/*
- * Copyright (C) 2016 The Android Open Source Project
- *
- * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
- * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
- * You may obtain a copy of the License at
- *
- * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
- *
- * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
- * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
- * WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
- * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
- * limitations under the License.
- */
-
-#ifndef ANDROID_TWRP_KEYMASTER_H
-#define ANDROID_TWRP_KEYMASTER_H
-
-#include "KeyBuffer.h"
-
-#include <memory>
-#include <string>
-#include <utility>
-
-#include <android-base/macros.h>
-#include <keymasterV4_0/Keymaster.h>
-#include <keymasterV4_0/authorization_set.h>
-
-namespace android {
-namespace vold {
-
-namespace km = ::android::hardware::keymaster::V4_0;
-using KmDevice = km::support::Keymaster;
-
-// C++ wrappers to the Keymaster hidl interface.
-// This is tailored to the needs of KeyStorage, but could be extended to be
-// a more general interface.
-
-// Wrapper for a Keymaster operation handle representing an
-// ongoing Keymaster operation. Aborts the operation
-// in the destructor if it is unfinished. Methods log failures
-// to LOG(ERROR).
-class KeymasterOperation {
- public:
- ~KeymasterOperation();
- // Is this instance valid? This is false if creation fails, and becomes
- // false on finish or if an update fails.
- explicit operator bool() { return mError == km::ErrorCode::OK; }
- km::ErrorCode errorCode() { return mError; }
- // Call "update" repeatedly until all of the input is consumed, and
- // concatenate the output. Return true on success.
- template <class TI, class TO>
- bool updateCompletely(TI& input, TO* output) {
- if (output) output->clear();
- return updateCompletely(input.data(), input.size(), [&](const char* b, size_t n) {
- if (output) std::copy(b, b + n, std::back_inserter(*output));
- });
- }
-
- // Finish and write the output to this string, unless pointer is null.
- bool finish(std::string* output);
- // Move constructor
- KeymasterOperation(KeymasterOperation&& rhs) { *this = std::move(rhs); }
- // Construct an object in an error state for error returns
- KeymasterOperation() : mDevice{nullptr}, mOpHandle{0}, mError{km::ErrorCode::UNKNOWN_ERROR} {}
- // Move Assignment
- KeymasterOperation& operator=(KeymasterOperation&& rhs) {
- mDevice = rhs.mDevice;
- rhs.mDevice = nullptr;
-
- mOpHandle = rhs.mOpHandle;
- rhs.mOpHandle = 0;
-
- mError = rhs.mError;
- rhs.mError = km::ErrorCode::UNKNOWN_ERROR;
-
- return *this;
- }
-
- private:
- KeymasterOperation(KmDevice* d, uint64_t h)
- : mDevice{d}, mOpHandle{h}, mError{km::ErrorCode::OK} {}
- KeymasterOperation(km::ErrorCode error) : mDevice{nullptr}, mOpHandle{0}, mError{error} {}
-
- bool updateCompletely(const char* input, size_t inputLen,
- const std::function<void(const char*, size_t)> consumer);
-
- KmDevice* mDevice;
- uint64_t mOpHandle;
- km::ErrorCode mError;
- DISALLOW_COPY_AND_ASSIGN(KeymasterOperation);
- friend class Keymaster;
-};
-
-// Wrapper for a Keymaster device for methods that start a KeymasterOperation or are not
-// part of one.
-class Keymaster {
- public:
- Keymaster();
- // false if we failed to open the keymaster device.
- explicit operator bool() { return mDevice.get() != nullptr; }
- // Generate a key in the keymaster from the given params.
- bool generateKey(const km::AuthorizationSet& inParams, std::string* key);
- // Export a key from keymaster.
- km::ErrorCode exportKey(km::KeyFormat format, KeyBuffer& kmKey, const std::string& clientId,
- const std::string& appData, std::string* key);
- // If the keymaster supports it, permanently delete a key.
- bool deleteKey(const std::string& key);
- // Replace stored key blob in response to KM_ERROR_KEY_REQUIRES_UPGRADE.
- bool upgradeKey(const std::string& oldKey, const km::AuthorizationSet& inParams,
- std::string* newKey);
- // Begin a new cryptographic operation, collecting output parameters if pointer is non-null
- KeymasterOperation begin(km::KeyPurpose purpose, const std::string& key,
- const km::AuthorizationSet& inParams,
- const km::HardwareAuthToken& authToken,
- km::AuthorizationSet* outParams);
- bool isSecure();
-
- private:
- std::unique_ptr<KmDevice> mDevice;
- DISALLOW_COPY_AND_ASSIGN(Keymaster);
- static bool hmacKeyGenerated;
-};
-
-} // namespace vold
-} // namespace android
-
-// FIXME no longer needed now cryptfs is in C++.
-
-/*
- * The following functions provide C bindings to keymaster services
- * needed by cryptfs scrypt. The compatibility check checks whether
- * the keymaster implementation is considered secure, i.e., TEE backed.
- * The create_key function generates an RSA key for signing.
- * The sign_object function signes an object with the given keymaster
- * key.
- */
-
-/* Return values for keymaster_sign_object_for_cryptfs_scrypt */
-
-enum class KeymasterSignResult {
- ok = 0,
- error = -1,
- upgrade = -2,
-};
-
-//int keymaster_compatibility_cryptfs_scrypt();
-/*int keymaster_create_key_for_cryptfs_scrypt(uint32_t rsa_key_size, uint64_t rsa_exponent,
- uint32_t ratelimit, uint8_t* key_buffer,
- uint32_t key_buffer_size, uint32_t* key_out_size);*/
-
-int keymaster_upgrade_key_for_cryptfs_scrypt(uint32_t rsa_key_size, uint64_t rsa_exponent,
- uint32_t ratelimit, const uint8_t* key_blob,
- size_t key_blob_size, uint8_t* key_buffer,
- uint32_t key_buffer_size, uint32_t* key_out_size);
-
-KeymasterSignResult keymaster_sign_object_for_cryptfs_scrypt(
- const uint8_t* key_blob, size_t key_blob_size, uint32_t ratelimit, const uint8_t* object,
- const size_t object_size, uint8_t** signature_buffer, size_t* signature_buffer_size);
-
-#endif
diff --git a/crypto/ext4crypt/MetadataCrypt.cpp b/crypto/ext4crypt/MetadataCrypt.cpp
deleted file mode 100644
index b195fa0..0000000
--- a/crypto/ext4crypt/MetadataCrypt.cpp
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,271 +0,0 @@
-/*
- * Copyright (C) 2016 The Android Open Source Project
- *
- * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
- * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
- * You may obtain a copy of the License at
- *
- * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
- *
- * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
- * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
- * WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
- * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
- * limitations under the License.
- */
-
-#include "KeyBuffer.h"
-#include "MetadataCrypt.h"
-
-#include <string>
-#include <thread>
-#include <vector>
-#include <algorithm>
-
-#include <fcntl.h>
-#include <sys/ioctl.h>
-#include <sys/param.h>
-#include <sys/stat.h>
-#include <sys/types.h>
-
-#include <linux/dm-ioctl.h>
-
-//#include <android-base/logging.h>
-#include <android-base/properties.h>
-#include <android-base/unique_fd.h>
-#include <cutils/fs.h>
-//#include <fs_mgr.h>
-
-//#include "EncryptInplace.h"
-#include "KeyStorage4.h"
-#include "KeyUtil.h"
-//#include "secontext.h"
-#include "Utils.h"
-//#include "VoldUtil.h"
-
-#include <iostream>
-#define LOG(x) std::cout
-#define PLOG(x) std::cout
-#include <linux/fs.h>
-
-#define DM_CRYPT_BUF_SIZE 4096
-#define TABLE_LOAD_RETRIES 10
-#define DEFAULT_KEY_TARGET_TYPE "default-key"
-
-using android::vold::KeyBuffer;
-
-static const std::string kDmNameUserdata = "userdata";
-
-void get_blkdev_size(int fd, unsigned long* nr_sec) {
- if ((ioctl(fd, BLKGETSIZE, nr_sec)) == -1) {
- *nr_sec = 0;
- }
-}
-
-static const char* kLookup = "0123456789abcdef";
-
-android::status_t StrToHex(const KeyBuffer& str, KeyBuffer& hex) {
- hex.clear();
- for (size_t i = 0; i < str.size(); i++) {
- hex.push_back(kLookup[(str.data()[i] & 0xF0) >> 4]);
- hex.push_back(kLookup[str.data()[i] & 0x0F]);
- }
- return android::OK;
-}
-
-/*static bool mount_via_fs_mgr(const char* mount_point, const char* blk_device) {
- // fs_mgr_do_mount runs fsck. Use setexeccon to run trusted
- // partitions in the fsck domain.
- if (setexeccon(secontextFsck())) {
- PLOG(ERROR) << "Failed to setexeccon";
- return false;
- }
- auto mount_rc = fs_mgr_do_mount(fstab_default, const_cast<char*>(mount_point),
- const_cast<char*>(blk_device), nullptr);
- if (setexeccon(nullptr)) {
- PLOG(ERROR) << "Failed to clear setexeccon";
- return false;
- }
- if (mount_rc != 0) {
- LOG(ERROR) << "fs_mgr_do_mount failed with rc " << mount_rc;
- return false;
- }
- LOG(DEBUG) << "Mounted " << mount_point;
- return true;
-}*/
-
-static bool read_key(const std::string& key_dir, bool create_if_absent, KeyBuffer* key) {
- /*if (!data_rec->key_dir) {
- LOG(ERROR) << "Failed to get key_dir";
- return false;
- }
- std::string key_dir = data_rec->key_dir;*/
- auto dir = key_dir + "/key";
- LOG(DEBUG) << "key_dir/key: " << dir << "\n";
- /*if (fs_mkdirs(dir.c_str(), 0700)) {
- PLOG(ERROR) << "Creating directories: " << dir;
- return false;
- }*/
- auto temp = key_dir + "/tmp";
- if (!android::vold::retrieveKey(create_if_absent, dir, temp, key)) return false;
- return true;
-}
-
-static KeyBuffer default_key_params(const std::string& real_blkdev, const KeyBuffer& key) {
- KeyBuffer hex_key;
- if (/*android::vold::*/StrToHex(key, hex_key) != android::OK) {
- LOG(ERROR) << "Failed to turn key to hex\n";
- return KeyBuffer();
- }
- auto res = KeyBuffer() + "AES-256-XTS " + hex_key + " " + real_blkdev.c_str() + " 0";
- return res;
-}
-
-static bool get_number_of_sectors(const std::string& real_blkdev, uint64_t *nr_sec) {
- android::base::unique_fd dev_fd(TEMP_FAILURE_RETRY(open(
- real_blkdev.c_str(), O_RDONLY | O_CLOEXEC, 0)));
- if (dev_fd == -1) {
- PLOG(ERROR) << "Unable to open " << real_blkdev << " to measure size\n";
- return false;
- }
- unsigned long res;
- // TODO: should use BLKGETSIZE64
- get_blkdev_size(dev_fd.get(), &res);
- if (res == 0) {
- PLOG(ERROR) << "Unable to measure size of " << real_blkdev << "\n";
- return false;
- }
- *nr_sec = res;
- return true;
-}
-
-static struct dm_ioctl* dm_ioctl_init(char *buffer, size_t buffer_size,
- const std::string& dm_name) {
- if (buffer_size < sizeof(dm_ioctl)) {
- LOG(ERROR) << "dm_ioctl buffer too small\n";
- return nullptr;
- }
-
- memset(buffer, 0, buffer_size);
- struct dm_ioctl* io = (struct dm_ioctl*) buffer;
- io->data_size = buffer_size;
- io->data_start = sizeof(struct dm_ioctl);
- io->version[0] = 4;
- io->version[1] = 0;
- io->version[2] = 0;
- io->flags = 0;
- dm_name.copy(io->name, sizeof(io->name));
- return io;
-}
-
-static bool create_crypto_blk_dev(const std::string& dm_name, uint64_t nr_sec,
- const std::string& target_type, const KeyBuffer& crypt_params,
- std::string* crypto_blkdev) {
- PLOG(INFO) << "starting create_crypto_blk_dev\n";
- android::base::unique_fd dm_fd(TEMP_FAILURE_RETRY(open(
- "/dev/device-mapper", O_RDWR | O_CLOEXEC, 0)));
- if (dm_fd == -1) {
- PLOG(ERROR) << "Cannot open device-mapper\n";
- return false;
- }
- alignas(struct dm_ioctl) char buffer[DM_CRYPT_BUF_SIZE];
- auto io = dm_ioctl_init(buffer, sizeof(buffer), dm_name);
- if (!io || ioctl(dm_fd.get(), DM_DEV_CREATE, io) != 0) {
- PLOG(ERROR) << "Cannot create dm-crypt device " << dm_name << "\n";
- return false;
- }
-
- // Get the device status, in particular, the name of its device file
- io = dm_ioctl_init(buffer, sizeof(buffer), dm_name);
- if (ioctl(dm_fd.get(), DM_DEV_STATUS, io) != 0) {
- PLOG(ERROR) << "Cannot retrieve dm-crypt device status " << dm_name << "\n";
- return false;
- }
- *crypto_blkdev = std::string() + "/dev/block/dm-" + std::to_string(
- (io->dev & 0xff) | ((io->dev >> 12) & 0xfff00));
-
- io = dm_ioctl_init(buffer, sizeof(buffer), dm_name);
- size_t paramix = io->data_start + sizeof(struct dm_target_spec);
- size_t nullix = paramix + crypt_params.size();
- size_t endix = (nullix + 1 + 7) & 8; // Add room for \0 and align to 8 byte boundary
-
- if (endix > sizeof(buffer)) {
- LOG(ERROR) << "crypt_params too big for DM_CRYPT_BUF_SIZE\n";
- return false;
- }
-
- io->target_count = 1;
- auto tgt = (struct dm_target_spec *) (buffer + io->data_start);
- tgt->status = 0;
- tgt->sector_start = 0;
- tgt->length = nr_sec;
- target_type.copy(tgt->target_type, sizeof(tgt->target_type));
- memcpy(buffer + paramix, crypt_params.data(),
- std::min(crypt_params.size(), sizeof(buffer) - paramix));
- buffer[nullix] = '\0';
- tgt->next = endix;
-
- for (int i = 0; ; i++) {
- if (ioctl(dm_fd.get(), DM_TABLE_LOAD, io) == 0) {
- break;
- }
- if (i+1 >= TABLE_LOAD_RETRIES) {
- PLOG(ERROR) << "DM_TABLE_LOAD ioctl failed\n";
- return false;
- }
- PLOG(INFO) << "DM_TABLE_LOAD ioctl failed, retrying\n";
- usleep(500000);
- }
-
- // Resume this device to activate it
- io = dm_ioctl_init(buffer, sizeof(buffer), dm_name);
- if (ioctl(dm_fd.get(), DM_DEV_SUSPEND, io)) {
- PLOG(ERROR) << "Cannot resume dm-crypt device " << dm_name << "\n";
- return false;
- }
- return true;
-}
-
-bool e4crypt_mount_metadata_encrypted(const std::string& mount_point, bool needs_encrypt, const std::string& key_dir, const std::string& blk_device, std::string* crypto_blkdev) {
- LOG(DEBUG) << "e4crypt_mount_metadata_encrypted: " << mount_point << " " << needs_encrypt << "\n";
- /*auto encrypted_state = android::base::GetProperty("ro.crypto.state", "");
- if (encrypted_state != "") {
- LOG(DEBUG) << "e4crypt_enable_crypto got unexpected starting state: " << encrypted_state;
- return false;
- }
- auto data_rec = fs_mgr_get_entry_for_mount_point(fstab_default, mount_point);
- if (!data_rec) {
- LOG(ERROR) << "Failed to get data_rec";
- return false;
- }*/
- KeyBuffer key;
- if (!read_key(key_dir, needs_encrypt, &key)) return false;
- uint64_t nr_sec;
- if (!get_number_of_sectors(blk_device, &nr_sec)) return false;
- //std::string crypto_blkdev;
- if (!create_crypto_blk_dev(kDmNameUserdata, nr_sec, DEFAULT_KEY_TARGET_TYPE,
- default_key_params(blk_device, key), /*&*/crypto_blkdev))
- return false;
- // FIXME handle the corrupt case
- /*if (needs_encrypt) {
- LOG(INFO) << "Beginning inplace encryption, nr_sec: " << nr_sec;
- off64_t size_already_done = 0;
- auto rc =
- cryptfs_enable_inplace(const_cast<char*>(crypto_blkdev.c_str()), data_rec->blk_device,
- nr_sec, &size_already_done, nr_sec, 0, false);
- if (rc != 0) {
- LOG(ERROR) << "Inplace crypto failed with code: " << rc;
- return false;
- }
- if (static_cast<uint64_t>(size_already_done) != nr_sec) {
- LOG(ERROR) << "Inplace crypto only got up to sector: " << size_already_done;
- return false;
- }
- LOG(INFO) << "Inplace encryption complete";
- }
-
- LOG(DEBUG) << "Mounting metadata-encrypted filesystem:" << mount_point;
- mount_via_fs_mgr(data_rec->mount_point, crypto_blkdev.c_str());*/
- LOG(DEBUG) << "crypto block device '" << *crypto_blkdev << "\n";
- return true;
-}
diff --git a/crypto/ext4crypt/MetadataCrypt.h b/crypto/ext4crypt/MetadataCrypt.h
deleted file mode 100644
index 69addf3..0000000
--- a/crypto/ext4crypt/MetadataCrypt.h
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,25 +0,0 @@
-/*
- * Copyright (C) 2016 The Android Open Source Project
- *
- * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
- * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
- * You may obtain a copy of the License at
- *
- * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
- *
- * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
- * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
- * WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
- * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
- * limitations under the License.
- */
-
-#ifndef _METADATA_CRYPT_H
-#define _METADATA_CRYPT_H
-
-#include <string>
-__BEGIN_DECLS
-bool e4crypt_mount_metadata_encrypted(const std::string& mount_point, bool needs_encrypt, const std::string& key_dir, const std::string& blk_device, std::string* crypto_blkdev);
-__END_DECLS
-
-#endif
diff --git a/crypto/ext4crypt/ScryptParameters.cpp b/crypto/ext4crypt/ScryptParameters.cpp
deleted file mode 100644
index 669809b..0000000
--- a/crypto/ext4crypt/ScryptParameters.cpp
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,50 +0,0 @@
-/*
- * Copyright (C) 2016 The Android Open Source Project
- *
- * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
- * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
- * You may obtain a copy of the License at
- *
- * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
- *
- * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
- * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
- * WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
- * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
- * limitations under the License.
- */
-
-#include "ScryptParameters.h"
-
-#include <stdlib.h>
-#include <string.h>
-
-bool parse_scrypt_parameters(const char* paramstr, int *Nf, int *rf, int *pf) {
- int params[3];
- char *token;
- char *saveptr;
- int i;
-
- /*
- * The token we're looking for should be three integers separated by
- * colons (e.g., "12:8:1"). Scan the property to make sure it matches.
- */
- for (i = 0, token = strtok_r(const_cast<char *>(paramstr), ":", &saveptr);
- token != nullptr && i < 3;
- i++, token = strtok_r(nullptr, ":", &saveptr)) {
- char *endptr;
- params[i] = strtol(token, &endptr, 10);
-
- /*
- * Check that there was a valid number and it's 8-bit.
- */
- if ((*token == '\0') || (*endptr != '\0') || params[i] < 0 || params[i] > 255) {
- return false;
- }
- }
- if (token != nullptr) {
- return false;
- }
- *Nf = params[0]; *rf = params[1]; *pf = params[2];
- return true;
-}
diff --git a/crypto/ext4crypt/ScryptParameters.h b/crypto/ext4crypt/ScryptParameters.h
deleted file mode 100644
index 1b43ea5..0000000
--- a/crypto/ext4crypt/ScryptParameters.h
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,32 +0,0 @@
-/*
- * Copyright (C) 2016 The Android Open Source Project
- *
- * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
- * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
- * You may obtain a copy of the License at
- *
- * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
- *
- * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
- * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
- * WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
- * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
- * limitations under the License.
- */
-
-#ifndef ANDROID_VOLD_SCRYPT_PARAMETERS_H
-#define ANDROID_VOLD_SCRYPT_PARAMETERS_H
-
-#include <stdbool.h>
-#include <sys/cdefs.h>
-
-#define SCRYPT_PROP "ro.crypto.scrypt_params"
-#define SCRYPT_DEFAULTS "15:3:1"
-
-__BEGIN_DECLS
-
-bool parse_scrypt_parameters(const char* paramstr, int *Nf, int *rf, int *pf);
-
-__END_DECLS
-
-#endif
diff --git a/crypto/ext4crypt/Utils.cpp b/crypto/ext4crypt/Utils.cpp
deleted file mode 100644
index 9711cef..0000000
--- a/crypto/ext4crypt/Utils.cpp
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,307 +0,0 @@
-/*
- * Copyright (C) 2015 The Android Open Source Project
- *
- * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
- * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
- * You may obtain a copy of the License at
- *
- * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
- *
- * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
- * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
- * WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
- * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
- * limitations under the License.
- */
-
-#include "Utils.h"
-
-#include <android-base/file.h>
-#include <android-base/logging.h>
-#include <android-base/stringprintf.h>
-
-#include <fcntl.h>
-#include <linux/fs.h>
-#include <stdlib.h>
-#include <sys/mount.h>
-#include <sys/types.h>
-#include <sys/stat.h>
-#include <sys/wait.h>
-#include <sys/statvfs.h>
-
-#include <selinux/android.h>
-
-using android::base::ReadFileToString;
-using android::base::StringPrintf;
-
-namespace android {
-namespace vold {
-
-static const char* kKeyPath = "/data/misc/vold";
-
-status_t ForkExecvp(const std::vector<std::string>& args) {
- return ForkExecvp(args, nullptr);
-}
-
-status_t ForkExecvp(const std::vector<std::string>& args, security_context_t context) {
- size_t argc = args.size();
- char** argv = (char**) calloc(argc, sizeof(char*));
- for (size_t i = 0; i < argc; i++) {
- argv[i] = (char*) args[i].c_str();
- if (i == 0) {
- LOG(VERBOSE) << args[i];
- } else {
- LOG(VERBOSE) << " " << args[i];
- }
- }
-
- if (setexeccon(context)) {
- LOG(ERROR) << "Failed to setexeccon" << std::endl;
- abort();
- }
- abort();
- status_t res = 1;//android_fork_execvp(argc, argv, NULL, false, true);
- if (setexeccon(nullptr)) {
- LOG(ERROR) << "Failed to setexeccon" << std::endl;
- abort();
- }
-
- free(argv);
- return res;
-}
-
-status_t ForkExecvp(const std::vector<std::string>& args,
- std::vector<std::string>& output) {
- return ForkExecvp(args, output, nullptr);
-}
-
-status_t ForkExecvp(const std::vector<std::string>& args,
- std::vector<std::string>& output, security_context_t context) {
- std::string cmd;
- for (size_t i = 0; i < args.size(); i++) {
- cmd += args[i] + " ";
- if (i == 0) {
- LOG(VERBOSE) << args[i];
- } else {
- LOG(VERBOSE) << " " << args[i];
- }
- }
- output.clear();
-
- if (setexeccon(context)) {
- LOG(ERROR) << "Failed to setexeccon" << std::endl;
- abort();
- }
- FILE* fp = popen(cmd.c_str(), "r");
- if (setexeccon(nullptr)) {
- LOG(ERROR) << "Failed to setexeccon" << std::endl;
- abort();
- }
-
- if (!fp) {
- PLOG(ERROR) << "Failed to popen " << cmd << std::endl;
- return -errno;
- }
- char line[1024];
- while (fgets(line, sizeof(line), fp) != nullptr) {
- LOG(VERBOSE) << line;
- output.push_back(std::string(line));
- }
- if (pclose(fp) != 0) {
- PLOG(ERROR) << "Failed to pclose " << cmd << std::endl;
- return -errno;
- }
-
- return OK;
-}
-
-pid_t ForkExecvpAsync(const std::vector<std::string>& args) {
- size_t argc = args.size();
- char** argv = (char**) calloc(argc + 1, sizeof(char*));
- for (size_t i = 0; i < argc; i++) {
- argv[i] = (char*) args[i].c_str();
- if (i == 0) {
- LOG(VERBOSE) << args[i];
- } else {
- LOG(VERBOSE) << " " << args[i];
- }
- }
-
- pid_t pid = fork();
- if (pid == 0) {
- close(STDIN_FILENO);
- close(STDOUT_FILENO);
- close(STDERR_FILENO);
-
- if (execvp(argv[0], argv)) {
- PLOG(ERROR) << "Failed to exec" << std::endl;
- }
-
- _exit(1);
- }
-
- if (pid == -1) {
- PLOG(ERROR) << "Failed to exec" << std::endl;
- }
-
- free(argv);
- return pid;
-}
-
-status_t ReadRandomBytes(size_t bytes, std::string& out) {
- out.resize(bytes);
- return ReadRandomBytes(bytes, &out[0]);
-}
-
-status_t ReadRandomBytes(size_t bytes, char* buf) {
- int fd = TEMP_FAILURE_RETRY(open("/dev/urandom", O_RDONLY | O_CLOEXEC | O_NOFOLLOW));
- if (fd == -1) {
- return -errno;
- }
-
- size_t n;
- while ((n = TEMP_FAILURE_RETRY(read(fd, &buf[0], bytes))) > 0) {
- bytes -= n;
- buf += n;
- }
- close(fd);
-
- if (bytes == 0) {
- return OK;
- } else {
- return -EIO;
- }
-}
-
-status_t HexToStr(const std::string& hex, std::string& str) {
- str.clear();
- bool even = true;
- char cur = 0;
- for (size_t i = 0; i < hex.size(); i++) {
- int val = 0;
- switch (hex[i]) {
- case ' ': case '-': case ':': continue;
- case 'f': case 'F': val = 15; break;
- case 'e': case 'E': val = 14; break;
- case 'd': case 'D': val = 13; break;
- case 'c': case 'C': val = 12; break;
- case 'b': case 'B': val = 11; break;
- case 'a': case 'A': val = 10; break;
- case '9': val = 9; break;
- case '8': val = 8; break;
- case '7': val = 7; break;
- case '6': val = 6; break;
- case '5': val = 5; break;
- case '4': val = 4; break;
- case '3': val = 3; break;
- case '2': val = 2; break;
- case '1': val = 1; break;
- case '0': val = 0; break;
- default: return -EINVAL;
- }
-
- if (even) {
- cur = val << 4;
- } else {
- cur += val;
- str.push_back(cur);
- cur = 0;
- }
- even = !even;
- }
- return even ? OK : -EINVAL;
-}
-
-static bool isValidFilename(const std::string& name) {
- if (name.empty() || (name == ".") || (name == "..")
- || (name.find('/') != std::string::npos)) {
- return false;
- } else {
- return true;
- }
-}
-
-std::string BuildKeyPath(const std::string& partGuid) {
- return StringPrintf("%s/expand_%s.key", kKeyPath, partGuid.c_str());
-}
-
-std::string BuildDataSystemLegacyPath(userid_t userId) {
- return StringPrintf("%s/system/users/%u", BuildDataPath(nullptr).c_str(), userId);
-}
-
-std::string BuildDataSystemCePath(userid_t userId) {
- return StringPrintf("%s/system_ce/%u", BuildDataPath(nullptr).c_str(), userId);
-}
-
-std::string BuildDataSystemDePath(userid_t userId) {
- return StringPrintf("%s/system_de/%u", BuildDataPath(nullptr).c_str(), userId);
-}
-
-std::string BuildDataMiscLegacyPath(userid_t userId) {
- return StringPrintf("%s/misc/user/%u", BuildDataPath(nullptr).c_str(), userId);
-}
-
-std::string BuildDataMiscCePath(userid_t userId) {
- return StringPrintf("%s/misc_ce/%u", BuildDataPath(nullptr).c_str(), userId);
-}
-
-std::string BuildDataMiscDePath(userid_t userId) {
- return StringPrintf("%s/misc_de/%u", BuildDataPath(nullptr).c_str(), userId);
-}
-
-std::string BuildDataVendorCePath(userid_t userId) {
- return StringPrintf("%s/vendor_ce/%u", BuildDataPath(nullptr).c_str(), userId);
-}
-
-std::string BuildDataVendorDePath(userid_t userId) {
- return StringPrintf("%s/vendor_de/%u", BuildDataPath(nullptr).c_str(), userId);
-}
-
-// Keep in sync with installd (frameworks/native/cmds/installd/utils.h)
-std::string BuildDataProfilesDePath(userid_t userId) {
- return StringPrintf("%s/misc/profiles/cur/%u", BuildDataPath(nullptr).c_str(), userId);
-}
-
-std::string BuildDataProfilesForeignDexDePath(userid_t userId) {
- std::string profiles_path = BuildDataProfilesDePath(userId);
- return StringPrintf("%s/foreign-dex", profiles_path.c_str());
-}
-
-std::string BuildDataPath(const char* volumeUuid) {
- // TODO: unify with installd path generation logic
- if (volumeUuid == nullptr) {
- return "/data";
- } else {
- CHECK(isValidFilename(volumeUuid));
- return StringPrintf("/mnt/expand/%s", volumeUuid);
- }
-}
-
-std::string BuildDataMediaCePath(const char* volumeUuid, userid_t userId) {
- // TODO: unify with installd path generation logic
- std::string data(BuildDataPath(volumeUuid));
- return StringPrintf("%s/media/%u", data.c_str(), userId);
-}
-
-std::string BuildDataUserCePath(const char* volumeUuid, userid_t userId) {
- // TODO: unify with installd path generation logic
- std::string data(BuildDataPath(volumeUuid));
- if (volumeUuid == nullptr) {
- if (userId == 0) {
- return StringPrintf("%s/data", data.c_str());
- } else {
- return StringPrintf("%s/user/%u", data.c_str(), userId);
- }
- } else {
- return StringPrintf("%s/user/%u", data.c_str(), userId);
- }
-}
-
-std::string BuildDataUserDePath(const char* volumeUuid, userid_t userId) {
- // TODO: unify with installd path generation logic
- std::string data(BuildDataPath(volumeUuid));
- return StringPrintf("%s/user_de/%u", data.c_str(), userId);
-}
-
-} // namespace vold
-} // namespace android
diff --git a/crypto/ext4crypt/Utils.h b/crypto/ext4crypt/Utils.h
deleted file mode 100644
index 253541c..0000000
--- a/crypto/ext4crypt/Utils.h
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,76 +0,0 @@
-/*
- * Copyright (C) 2015 The Android Open Source Project
- *
- * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
- * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
- * You may obtain a copy of the License at
- *
- * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
- *
- * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
- * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
- * WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
- * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
- * limitations under the License.
- */
-
-#ifndef TWRP_VOLD_UTILS_H
-#define TWRP_VOLD_UTILS_H
-
-#include <utils/Errors.h>
-#include <cutils/multiuser.h>
-#include <selinux/selinux.h>
-
-#include <vector>
-#include <string>
-
-// DISALLOW_COPY_AND_ASSIGN disallows the copy and operator= functions. It goes in the private:
-// declarations in a class.
-#if !defined(DISALLOW_COPY_AND_ASSIGN)
-#define DISALLOW_COPY_AND_ASSIGN(TypeName) \
- TypeName(const TypeName&) = delete; \
- void operator=(const TypeName&) = delete
-#endif
-
-namespace android {
-namespace vold {
-
-/* Returns either WEXITSTATUS() status, or a negative errno */
-status_t ForkExecvp(const std::vector<std::string>& args);
-status_t ForkExecvp(const std::vector<std::string>& args, security_context_t context);
-
-status_t ForkExecvp(const std::vector<std::string>& args,
- std::vector<std::string>& output);
-status_t ForkExecvp(const std::vector<std::string>& args,
- std::vector<std::string>& output, security_context_t context);
-
-pid_t ForkExecvpAsync(const std::vector<std::string>& args);
-
-status_t ReadRandomBytes(size_t bytes, std::string& out);
-status_t ReadRandomBytes(size_t bytes, char* buffer);
-
-/* Converts hex string to raw bytes, ignoring [ :-] */
-status_t HexToStr(const std::string& hex, std::string& str);
-
-std::string BuildKeyPath(const std::string& partGuid);
-
-std::string BuildDataSystemLegacyPath(userid_t userid);
-std::string BuildDataSystemCePath(userid_t userid);
-std::string BuildDataSystemDePath(userid_t userid);
-std::string BuildDataMiscLegacyPath(userid_t userid);
-std::string BuildDataMiscCePath(userid_t userid);
-std::string BuildDataMiscDePath(userid_t userid);
-std::string BuildDataProfilesDePath(userid_t userid);
-std::string BuildDataProfilesForeignDexDePath(userid_t userid);
-std::string BuildDataVendorCePath(userid_t userid);
-std::string BuildDataVendorDePath(userid_t userid);
-
-std::string BuildDataPath(const char* volumeUuid);
-std::string BuildDataMediaCePath(const char* volumeUuid, userid_t userid);
-std::string BuildDataUserCePath(const char* volumeUuid, userid_t userid);
-std::string BuildDataUserDePath(const char* volumeUuid, userid_t userid);
-
-} // namespace vold
-} // namespace android
-
-#endif
diff --git a/crypto/ext4crypt/Weaver1.cpp b/crypto/ext4crypt/Weaver1.cpp
deleted file mode 100644
index ea357ed..0000000
--- a/crypto/ext4crypt/Weaver1.cpp
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,128 +0,0 @@
-/*
- * Copyright (C) 2017 Team Win Recovery Project
- *
- * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
- * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
- * You may obtain a copy of the License at
- *
- * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
- *
- * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
- * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
- * WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
- * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
- * limitations under the License.
- */
-
-/* To the best of my knowledge there is no native implementation for
- * Weaver so I made this by looking at the IWeaver.h file that gets
- * compiled by the build system. I took the information from this header
- * file and looked at keymaster source to get an idea of the proper way
- * to write the functions.
- */
-
-#include "Weaver1.h"
-
-//#include <android-base/logging.h>
-//#include <keystore/keymaster_tags.h>
-//#include <keystore/authorization_set.h>
-//#include <keystore/keystore_hidl_support.h>
-
-#include <android/hardware/weaver/1.0/IWeaver.h>
-
-#include <iostream>
-#define ERROR 1
-#define LOG(x) std::cout
-
-using namespace android::hardware::weaver;
-using android::hardware::hidl_string;
-using ::android::hardware::weaver::V1_0::IWeaver;
-using ::android::hardware::weaver::V1_0::WeaverConfig;
-using ::android::hardware::weaver::V1_0::WeaverReadStatus;
-using ::android::hardware::weaver::V1_0::WeaverReadResponse;
-using ::android::hardware::weaver::V1_0::WeaverStatus;
-using ::android::hardware::Return;
-using ::android::sp;
-
-namespace android {
-namespace vold {
-
-Weaver::Weaver() {
- mDevice = ::android::hardware::weaver::V1_0::IWeaver::getService();
- GottenConfig = false;
-}
-
-bool Weaver::GetConfig() {
- if (GottenConfig)
- return true;
-
- WeaverStatus status;
- WeaverConfig cfg;
-
- bool callbackCalled = false;
- auto ret = mDevice->getConfig([&](WeaverStatus s, WeaverConfig c) {
- callbackCalled = true;
- status = s;
- cfg = c;
- });
- if (ret.isOk() && callbackCalled && status == WeaverStatus::OK) {
- config = cfg;
- GottenConfig = true;
- return true;
- }
- return false;
-}
-
-bool Weaver::GetSlots(uint32_t* slots) {
- if (!GetConfig())
- return false;
- *slots = config.slots;
- return true;
-}
-
-bool Weaver::GetKeySize(uint32_t* keySize) {
- if (!GetConfig())
- return false;
- *keySize = config.keySize;
- return true;
-}
-
-bool Weaver::GetValueSize(uint32_t* valueSize) {
- if (!GetConfig())
- return false;
- *valueSize = config.valueSize;
- return true;
-}
-
-// TODO: we should return more information about the status including time delays before the next retry
-bool Weaver::WeaverVerify(const uint32_t slot, const void* weaver_key, std::vector<uint8_t>* payload) {
- bool callbackCalled = false;
- WeaverReadStatus status;
- std::vector<uint8_t> readValue;
- uint32_t timeout;
- uint32_t keySize;
- if (!GetKeySize(&keySize))
- return false;
- std::vector<uint8_t> key;
- key.resize(keySize);
- uint32_t index = 0;
- unsigned char* ptr = (unsigned char*)weaver_key;
- for (index = 0; index < keySize; index++) {
- key[index] = *ptr;
- ptr++;
- }
- const auto readRet = mDevice->read(slot, key, [&](WeaverReadStatus s, WeaverReadResponse r) {
- callbackCalled = true;
- status = s;
- readValue = r.value;
- timeout = r.timeout;
- });
- if (readRet.isOk() && callbackCalled && status == WeaverReadStatus::OK && timeout == 0) {
- *payload = readValue;
- return true;
- }
- return false;
-}
-
-} // namespace vold
-} // namespace android
diff --git a/crypto/ext4crypt/Weaver1.h b/crypto/ext4crypt/Weaver1.h
deleted file mode 100644
index 22f401e..0000000
--- a/crypto/ext4crypt/Weaver1.h
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,64 +0,0 @@
-/*
- * Copyright (C) 2017 Team Win Recovery Project
- *
- * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
- * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
- * You may obtain a copy of the License at
- *
- * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
- *
- * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
- * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
- * WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
- * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
- * limitations under the License.
- */
-
-/* To the best of my knowledge there is no native implementation for
- * Weaver so I made this by looking at the IWeaver.h file that gets
- * compiled by the build system. I took the information from this header
- * file and looked at keymaster source to get an idea of the proper way
- * to write the functions.
- */
-
-#ifndef TWRP_WEAVER_H
-#define TWRP_WEAVER_H
-
-#include <memory>
-#include <string>
-#include <utility>
-
-#include <android/hardware/weaver/1.0/IWeaver.h>
-#include "Utils.h"
-
-namespace android {
-namespace vold {
-using ::android::hardware::weaver::V1_0::IWeaver;
-
-// Wrapper for a Weaver device
-class Weaver {
- public:
- Weaver();
- // false if we failed to open the weaver device.
- explicit operator bool() { return mDevice.get() != nullptr; }
-
- bool GetSlots(uint32_t* slots);
- bool GetKeySize(uint32_t* keySize);
- bool GetValueSize(uint32_t* valueSize);
- // TODO: we should return more information about the status including time delays before the next retry
- bool WeaverVerify(const uint32_t slot, const void* weaver_key, std::vector<uint8_t>* payload);
-
- private:
- sp<hardware::weaver::V1_0::IWeaver> mDevice;
- hardware::weaver::V1_0::WeaverConfig config;
- bool GottenConfig;
-
- bool GetConfig();
-
- DISALLOW_COPY_AND_ASSIGN(Weaver);
-};
-
-} // namespace vold
-} // namespace android
-
-#endif
diff --git a/crypto/ext4crypt/e4policyget.cpp b/crypto/ext4crypt/e4policyget.cpp
deleted file mode 100644
index 05de86f..0000000
--- a/crypto/ext4crypt/e4policyget.cpp
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,41 +0,0 @@
-/*
- * Copyright (C) 2016 Team Win Recovery Project
- *
- * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
- * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
- * You may obtain a copy of the License at
- *
- * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
- *
- * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
- * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
- * WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
- * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
- * limitations under the License.
- */
-
-#include <stdio.h>
-#include <stdlib.h>
-#include <string.h>
-#include "ext4crypt_tar.h"
-
-#define EXT4_KEY_DESCRIPTOR_SIZE 8
-#define EXT4_KEY_DESCRIPTOR_SIZE_HEX 17
-
-int main(int argc, char *argv[]) {
- bool ret = false;
- if (argc != 2) {
- printf("Must specify a path\n");
- return -1;
- } else {
- ext4_encryption_policy eep;
- if (e4crypt_policy_get_struct(argv[1], &eep, sizeof(eep))) {
- char policy_hex[EXT4_KEY_DESCRIPTOR_SIZE_HEX];
- policy_to_hex(eep.master_key_descriptor, policy_hex);
- printf("%s\n", policy_hex);
- } else {
- printf("No policy set\n");
- }
- }
- return 0;
-}
diff --git a/crypto/ext4crypt/ext4_crypt.cpp b/crypto/ext4crypt/ext4_crypt.cpp
deleted file mode 100644
index 5a3b4b2..0000000
--- a/crypto/ext4crypt/ext4_crypt.cpp
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,207 +0,0 @@
-/*
- * Copyright (C) 2015 The Android Open Source Project
- *
- * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
- * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
- * You may obtain a copy of the License at
- *
- * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
- *
- * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
- * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
- * WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
- * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
- * limitations under the License.
- */
-
-/* TWRP NOTE: Kanged from system/extras/ext4_utils/ext4_crypt.cpp
- * because policy_to_hex, e4crypt_policy_set, and e4crypt_policy_get
- * are not exposed to be used. There was also a bug in e4crypt_policy_get
- * that may or may not be fixed in the user's local repo:
- * https://android.googlesource.com/platform/system/extras/+/30b93dd5715abcabd621235733733c0503f9c552
- */
-
-#include "ext4_crypt.h"
-#include "ext4crypt_tar.h"
-
-#include <dirent.h>
-#include <errno.h>
-#include <string.h>
-#include <unistd.h>
-
-#include <fcntl.h>
-#include <asm/ioctl.h>
-#include <sys/syscall.h>
-#include <sys/stat.h>
-#include <sys/types.h>
-
-#include <android-base/file.h>
-#include <android-base/logging.h>
-#include <cutils/properties.h>
-
-#define XATTR_NAME_ENCRYPTION_POLICY "encryption.policy"
-#define EXT4_KEYREF_DELIMITER ((char)'.')
-
-#define EXT4_ENCRYPTION_MODE_AES_256_XTS 1
-#define EXT4_ENCRYPTION_MODE_AES_256_CTS 4
-#define EXT4_ENCRYPTION_MODE_AES_256_HEH 126
-#define EXT4_ENCRYPTION_MODE_PRIVATE 127
-
-static int encryption_mode = EXT4_ENCRYPTION_MODE_PRIVATE;
-
-#define HEX_LOOKUP "0123456789abcdef"
-
-extern "C" void policy_to_hex(const char* policy, char* hex) {
- for (size_t i = 0, j = 0; i < EXT4_KEY_DESCRIPTOR_SIZE; i++) {
- hex[j++] = HEX_LOOKUP[(policy[i] & 0xF0) >> 4];
- hex[j++] = HEX_LOOKUP[policy[i] & 0x0F];
- }
- hex[EXT4_KEY_DESCRIPTOR_SIZE_HEX - 1] = '\0';
-}
-
-extern "C" bool e4crypt_policy_set(const char *directory, const char *policy,
- size_t policy_length, int contents_encryption_mode) {
- if (contents_encryption_mode == 0)
- contents_encryption_mode = encryption_mode;
- if (policy_length != EXT4_KEY_DESCRIPTOR_SIZE) {
- printf("policy wrong length\n");
- LOG(ERROR) << "Policy wrong length: " << policy_length;
- return false;
- }
- int fd = open(directory, O_DIRECTORY | O_NOFOLLOW | O_CLOEXEC);
- if (fd == -1) {
- printf("failed to open %s\n", directory);
- PLOG(ERROR) << "Failed to open directory " << directory;
- return false;
- }
-
- ext4_encryption_policy eep;
- eep.version = 0;
- eep.contents_encryption_mode = contents_encryption_mode;
- eep.filenames_encryption_mode = EXT4_ENCRYPTION_MODE_AES_256_CTS;
- eep.flags = 0;
- memcpy(eep.master_key_descriptor, policy, EXT4_KEY_DESCRIPTOR_SIZE);
- if (ioctl(fd, EXT4_IOC_SET_ENCRYPTION_POLICY, &eep)) {
- printf("failed to set policy for '%s' '%s'\n", directory, policy);
- PLOG(ERROR) << "Failed to set encryption policy for " << directory;
- close(fd);
- return false;
- }
- close(fd);
-
- char policy_hex[EXT4_KEY_DESCRIPTOR_SIZE_HEX];
- policy_to_hex(policy, policy_hex);
- LOG(INFO) << "Policy for " << directory << " set to " << policy_hex;
- return true;
-}
-
-extern "C" bool e4crypt_policy_get(const char *directory, char *policy,
- size_t policy_length, int contents_encryption_mode) {
- if (contents_encryption_mode == 0)
- contents_encryption_mode = encryption_mode;
- if (policy_length != EXT4_KEY_DESCRIPTOR_SIZE) {
- LOG(ERROR) << "Policy wrong length: " << policy_length;
- return false;
- }
-
- int fd = open(directory, O_DIRECTORY | O_NOFOLLOW | O_CLOEXEC);
- if (fd == -1) {
- PLOG(ERROR) << "Failed to open directory " << directory;
- return false;
- }
-
- ext4_encryption_policy eep;
- memset(&eep, 0, sizeof(ext4_encryption_policy));
- if (ioctl(fd, EXT4_IOC_GET_ENCRYPTION_POLICY, &eep) != 0) {
- PLOG(ERROR) << "Failed to get encryption policy for " << directory;
- close(fd);
- return false;
- }
- close(fd);
-
- if ((eep.version != 0)
- || (eep.contents_encryption_mode != contents_encryption_mode)
- || (eep.filenames_encryption_mode != EXT4_ENCRYPTION_MODE_AES_256_CTS)
- || (eep.flags != 0)) {
- LOG(ERROR) << "Failed to find matching encryption policy for " << directory;
- return false;
- }
- memcpy(policy, eep.master_key_descriptor, EXT4_KEY_DESCRIPTOR_SIZE);
-
- return true;
-}
-
-extern "C" void e4crypt_policy_fill_default_struct(ext4_encryption_policy *eep) {
- eep->version = 0;
- eep->contents_encryption_mode = encryption_mode;
- eep->filenames_encryption_mode = EXT4_ENCRYPTION_MODE_AES_256_CTS;
- eep->flags = 0;
- memset((void*)&eep->master_key_descriptor[0], 0, EXT4_KEY_DESCRIPTOR_SIZE);
-}
-
-extern "C" bool e4crypt_policy_set_struct(const char *directory, const ext4_encryption_policy *eep) {
- int fd = open(directory, O_DIRECTORY | O_NOFOLLOW | O_CLOEXEC);
- if (fd == -1) {
- printf("failed to open %s\n", directory);
- PLOG(ERROR) << "Failed to open directory " << directory;
- return false;
- }
- if (ioctl(fd, EXT4_IOC_SET_ENCRYPTION_POLICY, eep)) {
- printf("failed to set policy for '%s'\n", directory);
- PLOG(ERROR) << "Failed to set encryption policy for " << directory;
- close(fd);
- return false;
- }
- close(fd);
- return true;
-}
-
-extern "C" bool e4crypt_policy_get_struct(const char *directory, ext4_encryption_policy *eep) {
- int fd = open(directory, O_DIRECTORY | O_NOFOLLOW | O_CLOEXEC);
- if (fd == -1) {
- printf("Failed to open '%s'\n", directory);
- PLOG(ERROR) << "Failed to open directory " << directory;
- return false;
- }
- memset(eep, 0, sizeof(ext4_encryption_policy));
- if (ioctl(fd, EXT4_IOC_GET_ENCRYPTION_POLICY, eep) != 0) {
- PLOG(ERROR) << "Failed to get encryption policy for " << directory;
- close(fd);
- return false;
- }
- close(fd);
- return true;
-}
-
-extern "C" bool e4crypt_set_mode() {
- const char* mode_file = "/data/unencrypted/mode";
- struct stat st;
- if (stat(mode_file, &st) != 0 || st.st_size <= 0) {
- printf("Invalid encryption mode file %s\n", mode_file);
- return false;
- }
- size_t mode_size = st.st_size;
- char contents_encryption_mode[mode_size + 1];
- memset((void*)contents_encryption_mode, 0, mode_size + 1);
- int fd = open(mode_file, O_RDONLY);
- if (fd < 0) {
- printf("error opening '%s': %s\n", mode_file, strerror(errno));
- return false;
- }
- if (read(fd, contents_encryption_mode, mode_size) != mode_size) {
- printf("read error on '%s': %s\n", mode_file, strerror(errno));
- close(fd);
- return false;
- }
- close(fd);
- if (!strcmp(contents_encryption_mode, "software")) {
- encryption_mode = EXT4_ENCRYPTION_MODE_AES_256_XTS;
- } else if (!strcmp(contents_encryption_mode, "ice")) {
- encryption_mode = EXT4_ENCRYPTION_MODE_PRIVATE;
- } else {
- printf("Invalid encryption mode '%s'\n", contents_encryption_mode);
- return false;
- }
- printf("set encryption mode to %i\n", encryption_mode);
- return true;
-}
diff --git a/crypto/ext4crypt/ext4_crypt.h b/crypto/ext4crypt/ext4_crypt.h
deleted file mode 100644
index d410ccf..0000000
--- a/crypto/ext4crypt/ext4_crypt.h
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,39 +0,0 @@
-/*
- * Copyright (C) 2016 The Android Open Source Project
- *
- * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
- * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
- * You may obtain a copy of the License at
- *
- * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
- *
- * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
- * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
- * WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
- * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
- * limitations under the License.
- */
-
-#ifndef _EXT4_CRYPT_H_
-#define _EXT4_CRYPT_H_
-
-#include <sys/cdefs.h>
-#include <stdbool.h>
-#include <cutils/multiuser.h>
-
-__BEGIN_DECLS
-
-bool e4crypt_is_native();
-
-int e4crypt_policy_ensure(const char *directory, const char *policy,
- size_t policy_length,
- const char *contents_encryption_mode,
- const char *filenames_encryption_mode);
-
-static const char* e4crypt_unencrypted_folder = "/unencrypted";
-static const char* e4crypt_key_ref = "/unencrypted/ref";
-static const char* e4crypt_key_mode = "/unencrypted/mode";
-
-__END_DECLS
-
-#endif // _EXT4_CRYPT_H_
diff --git a/crypto/ext4crypt/ext4crypt_tar.h b/crypto/ext4crypt/ext4crypt_tar.h
deleted file mode 100644
index c35d115..0000000
--- a/crypto/ext4crypt/ext4crypt_tar.h
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,58 +0,0 @@
-/*
- * Copyright (C) 2016 Team Win Recovery Project
- *
- * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
- * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
- * You may obtain a copy of the License at
- *
- * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
- *
- * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
- * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
- * WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
- * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
- * limitations under the License.
- */
-
-#ifndef __EXT4CRYPT_TAR_H
-#define __EXT4CRYPT_TAR_H
-
-#include <sys/cdefs.h>
-#include <stdbool.h>
-#include <cutils/multiuser.h>
-
-// ext4enc:TODO Include structure from somewhere sensible
-// MUST be in sync with ext4_crypto.c in kernel
-#define EXT4_KEY_DESCRIPTOR_SIZE 8
-#define EXT4_KEY_DESCRIPTOR_SIZE_HEX 17
-
-// ext4enc:TODO Get value from somewhere sensible
-#define EXT4_IOC_SET_ENCRYPTION_POLICY _IOR('f', 19, struct ext4_encryption_policy)
-#define EXT4_IOC_GET_ENCRYPTION_POLICY _IOW('f', 21, struct ext4_encryption_policy)
-
-__BEGIN_DECLS
-
-struct ext4_encryption_policy {
- char version;
- char contents_encryption_mode;
- char filenames_encryption_mode;
- char flags;
- char master_key_descriptor[EXT4_KEY_DESCRIPTOR_SIZE];
-} __attribute__((__packed__));
-
-bool lookup_ref_key(const char* policy, char* policy_type);
-bool lookup_ref_tar(const char* policy_type, char* policy);
-
-void policy_to_hex(const char* policy, char* hex);
-bool e4crypt_policy_set(const char *directory, const char *policy,
- size_t policy_length, int contents_encryption_mode);
-bool e4crypt_policy_get(const char *directory, char *policy,
- size_t policy_length, int contents_encryption_mode);
-void e4crypt_policy_fill_default_struct(struct ext4_encryption_policy *eep);
-bool e4crypt_policy_set_struct(const char *directory, const struct ext4_encryption_policy *eep);
-bool e4crypt_policy_get_struct(const char *directory, struct ext4_encryption_policy *eep);
-
-bool e4crypt_set_mode();
-__END_DECLS
-
-#endif
diff --git a/crypto/ext4crypt/keystore_auth.cpp b/crypto/ext4crypt/keystore_auth.cpp
deleted file mode 100644
index 40d890f..0000000
--- a/crypto/ext4crypt/keystore_auth.cpp
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,107 +0,0 @@
-/*
- Copyright 2018 bigbiff/Dees_Troy TeamWin
- This file is part of TWRP/TeamWin Recovery Project.
-
- TWRP is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
- it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
- the Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the License, or
- (at your option) any later version.
-
- TWRP is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
- but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
- MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
- GNU General Public License for more details.
-
- You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
- along with TWRP. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
-*/
-
-/* The keystore refuses to allow the root user to supply auth tokens, so
- * we write the auth token to a file in TWRP and run a separate service
- * (this) that runs as the system user to add the auth token. TWRP waits
- * for /auth_token to be deleted and also looks for /auth_error to check
- * for errors. TWRP will error out after a while if /auth_token does not
- * get deleted. */
-
-#include <stdio.h>
-#include <string>
-
-#ifdef USE_SECURITY_NAMESPACE
-#include <android/security/IKeystoreService.h>
-#else
-#include <keystore/IKeystoreService.h>
-#include <keystore/authorization_set.h>
-#endif
-#include <binder/IPCThreadState.h>
-#include <binder/IServiceManager.h>
-
-#include <keystore/keystore.h>
-
-#ifndef LOG_TAG
-#define LOG_TAG "keystore_auth"
-#endif
-
-using namespace android;
-
-void create_error_file() {
- FILE* error_file = fopen("/auth_error", "wb");
- if (error_file == NULL) {
- printf("Failed to open /auth_error\n");
- ALOGE("Failed to open /auth_error\n");
- return;
- }
- fwrite("1", 1, 1, error_file);
- fclose(error_file);
- unlink("/auth_token");
-}
-
-int main() {
- unlink("/auth_error");
- FILE* auth_file = fopen("/auth_token", "rb");
- if (auth_file == NULL) {
- printf("Failed to open /auth_token\n");
- ALOGE("Failed to open /auth_token\n");
- create_error_file();
- return -1;
- }
- // Get the file size
- fseek(auth_file, 0, SEEK_END);
- int size = ftell(auth_file);
- fseek(auth_file, 0, SEEK_SET);
- uint8_t auth_token[size];
- fread(auth_token , sizeof(uint8_t), size, auth_file);
- fclose(auth_file);
- // First get the keystore service
- sp<IServiceManager> sm = defaultServiceManager();
- sp<IBinder> binder = sm->getService(String16("android.security.keystore"));
-#ifdef USE_SECURITY_NAMESPACE
- sp<security::IKeystoreService> service = interface_cast<security::IKeystoreService>(binder);
-#else
- sp<IKeystoreService> service = interface_cast<IKeystoreService>(binder);
-#endif
- if (service == NULL) {
- printf("error: could not connect to keystore service\n");
- ALOGE("error: could not connect to keystore service\n");
- create_error_file();
- return -2;
- }
-#ifdef USE_SECURITY_NAMESPACE
- std::vector<uint8_t> auth_token_vector(&auth_token[0], (&auth_token[0]) + size);
- int result = 0;
- auto binder_result = service->addAuthToken(auth_token_vector, &result);
- if (!binder_result.isOk() || !keystore::KeyStoreServiceReturnCode(result).isOk()) {
-#else
- ::keystore::KeyStoreServiceReturnCode auth_result = service->addAuthToken(auth_token, size);
- if (!auth_result.isOk()) {
-#endif
- // The keystore checks the uid of the calling process and will return a permission denied on this operation for user 0
- printf("keystore error adding auth token\n");
- ALOGE("keystore error adding auth token\n");
- create_error_file();
- return -3;
- }
- printf("successfully added auth token to keystore\n");
- ALOGD("successfully added auth token to keystore\n");
- unlink("/auth_token");
- return 0;
-}
diff --git a/crypto/ext4crypt/main.cpp b/crypto/ext4crypt/main.cpp
deleted file mode 100644
index f0266ae..0000000
--- a/crypto/ext4crypt/main.cpp
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,36 +0,0 @@
-/*
- * Copyright (C) 2016 Team Win Recovery Project
- *
- * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
- * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
- * You may obtain a copy of the License at
- *
- * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
- *
- * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
- * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
- * WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
- * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
- * limitations under the License.
- */
-
-#include <stdio.h>
-#include <stdlib.h>
-#include <string.h>
-#include "Decrypt.h"
-
-int main(int argc, char *argv[]) {
- bool ret = false;
- if (argc < 2) {
- Decrypt_DE();
- ret = Decrypt_User(0, "0000");
- } else if (argc < 3) {
- Decrypt_DE();
- ret = Decrypt_User(0, argv[1]);
- } else {
- ret = Decrypt_User(atoi(argv[1]), argv[2]);
- }
- if (!ret)
- printf("Failed to decrypt\n");
- return 0;
-}
diff --git a/crypto/fde/Android.mk b/crypto/fde/Android.mk
index f78697f..faf7da8 100755
--- a/crypto/fde/Android.mk
+++ b/crypto/fde/Android.mk
@@ -14,6 +14,8 @@
LOCAL_CPPFLAGS := -std=c++11
endif
+LOCAL_C_INCLUDES += $(commands_TWRP_local_path)/crypto/fscrypt
+
ifeq ($(shell test $(PLATFORM_SDK_VERSION) -ge 26; echo $$?),0)
#8.0 or higher
LOCAL_C_INCLUDES += external/boringssl/src/include
diff --git a/crypto/fde/cryptfs.cpp b/crypto/fde/cryptfs.cpp
index 2d1595f..fa0dc78 100644
--- a/crypto/fde/cryptfs.cpp
+++ b/crypto/fde/cryptfs.cpp
@@ -60,12 +60,7 @@
//#include "f2fs_sparseblock.h"
//#include "EncryptInplace.h"
//#include "Process.h"
-#if TW_KEYMASTER_MAX_API == 3
-#include "../ext4crypt/Keymaster3.h"
-#endif
-#if TW_KEYMASTER_MAX_API == 4
-#include "../ext4crypt/Keymaster4.h"
-#endif
+#include "Keymaster.h"
#if TW_KEYMASTER_MAX_API == 0
#include <hardware/keymaster.h>
#else // so far, all trees that have keymaster >= 1 have keymaster 1 support
@@ -879,7 +874,7 @@
return -1;
}
if (fname[0] != '/') {
- SLOGE("Unexpected value for crypto key location\n");
+ SLOGE("fde::get_crypt_ftr_and_key::Unexpected value for crypto key location: %s\n", fname);
return -1;
}
if ( (fd = open(fname, O_RDWR|O_CLOEXEC)) < 0) {
diff --git a/crypto/fscrypt/Android.mk b/crypto/fscrypt/Android.mk
index 0fa36c8..a10a7e6 100755
--- a/crypto/fscrypt/Android.mk
+++ b/crypto/fscrypt/Android.mk
@@ -5,16 +5,17 @@
LOCAL_MODULE := libtwrpfscrypt
LOCAL_MODULE_TAGS := optional
LOCAL_CFLAGS := -Wno-unused-variable -Wno-sign-compare -Wno-unused-parameter -Wno-comment -Wno-missing-field-initializers \
- -DHAVE_LIBKEYUTILS -std=gnu++2a -Wno-macro-redefined -Wno-unused-function
-LOCAL_SRC_FILES := Decrypt.cpp ScryptParameters.cpp Utils.cpp HashPassword.cpp \
- FsCrypt.cpp KeyUtil.cpp Keymaster.cpp KeyStorage.cpp MetadataCrypt.cpp KeyBuffer.cpp \
- Process.cpp EncryptInplace.cpp Weaver1.cpp fscrypt_policy.cpp
+ -DHAVE_LIBKEYUTILS -std=gnu++2a -Wno-macro-redefined -Wno-unused-function -fpic
+LOCAL_SRC_FILES := FsCrypt.cpp Decrypt.cpp ScryptParameters.cpp fscrypt_policy.cpp Utils.cpp HashPassword.cpp \
+ KeyUtil.cpp Keymaster.cpp KeyStorage.cpp MetadataCrypt.cpp KeyBuffer.cpp \
+ Process.cpp EncryptInplace.cpp Weaver1.cpp cryptfs.cpp Checkpoint.cpp CryptoType.cpp VoldUtil.cpp
LOCAL_SHARED_LIBRARIES := libselinux libc libc++ libext4_utils libbase libcrypto libcutils \
libkeymaster_messages libhardware libprotobuf-cpp-lite libfscrypt android.hardware.confirmationui@1.0 \
android.hardware.keymaster@3.0 libkeystore_binder libhidlbase libutils libbinder android.hardware.gatekeeper@1.0 \
-libfs_mgr android.hardware.keymaster@4.0 libkeymaster4support libf2fs_sparseblock libkeystore_parcelables \
-libkeystore_aidl android.hardware.weaver@1.0 libkeyutils liblog libhwbinder libchrome
-LOCAL_STATIC_LIBRARIES := libscrypt_static
+libfs_mgr android.hardware.keymaster@4.0 android.hardware.keymaster@4.1 libkeymaster4support libkeymaster4_1support \
+libf2fs_sparseblock libkeystore_parcelables libkeystore_aidl android.hardware.weaver@1.0 libkeyutils liblog libhwbinder \
+libchrome android.hardware.boot@1.0 libbootloader_message
+LOCAL_STATIC_LIBRARIES := libscrypt_static libvold_binder libc++fs
LOCAL_C_INCLUDES := system/extras/ext4_utils \
system/extras/ext4_utils/include/ext4_utils \
external/scrypt/lib/crypto \
@@ -32,7 +33,8 @@
system/core/init/ \
system/vold/model \
system/vold/ \
- system/extras/f2fs_utils/
+ system/extras/f2fs_utils/ \
+ bootable/recovery/bootloader_message/include
ifneq ($(wildcard hardware/libhardware/include/hardware/keymaster0.h),)
LOCAL_CFLAGS += -DTW_CRYPTO_HAVE_KEYMASTERX
@@ -43,7 +45,16 @@
LOCAL_CLANG := true
include $(BUILD_SHARED_LIBRARY)
+include $(CLEAR_VARS)
+LOCAL_MODULE := fscryptpolicyget
+LOCAL_MODULE_TAGS := optional
+LOCAL_MODULE_CLASS := RECOVERY_EXECUTABLES
+LOCAL_MODULE_PATH := $(TARGET_RECOVERY_ROOT_OUT)/system/bin
+LOCAL_C_INCLUDES += system/extras/libfscrypt/include
+LOCAL_SRC_FILES := fscryptpolicyget.cpp
+LOCAL_SHARED_LIBRARIES := libtwrpfscrypt
+include $(BUILD_EXECUTABLE)
include $(CLEAR_VARS)
LOCAL_MODULE := twrpfbe
@@ -56,16 +67,6 @@
include $(BUILD_EXECUTABLE)
include $(CLEAR_VARS)
-LOCAL_MODULE := fscryptpolicyget
-LOCAL_MODULE_TAGS := optional
-LOCAL_MODULE_CLASS := RECOVERY_EXECUTABLES
-LOCAL_MODULE_PATH := $(TARGET_RECOVERY_ROOT_OUT)/system/bin
-LOCAL_SRC_FILES := fscryptpolicyget.cpp
-LOCAL_SHARED_LIBRARIES := libtwrpfscrypt
-
-include $(BUILD_EXECUTABLE)
-
-include $(CLEAR_VARS)
LOCAL_MODULE := keystore_auth
LOCAL_MODULE_TAGS := optional
LOCAL_MODULE_CLASS := RECOVERY_EXECUTABLES
diff --git a/crypto/fscrypt/Checkpoint.cpp b/crypto/fscrypt/Checkpoint.cpp
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..cdfc8aa
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/fscrypt/Checkpoint.cpp
@@ -0,0 +1,743 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2018 The Android Open Source Project
+ *
+ * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+ * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+ * You may obtain a copy of the License at
+ *
+ * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+ *
+ * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+ * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+ * WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+ * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+ * limitations under the License.
+ */
+
+#define LOG_TAG "Checkpoint"
+#include "Checkpoint.h"
+#include "VoldUtil.h"
+#include "VolumeManager.h"
+
+#include <fstream>
+#include <list>
+#include <memory>
+#include <string>
+#include <thread>
+#include <vector>
+
+#include <android-base/file.h>
+#include <android-base/logging.h>
+#include <android-base/parseint.h>
+#include <android-base/properties.h>
+#include <android-base/unique_fd.h>
+#include <android/hardware/boot/1.0/IBootControl.h>
+#include <cutils/android_reboot.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <fs_mgr.h>
+#include <linux/fs.h>
+#include <mntent.h>
+#include <sys/mount.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+#include <sys/statvfs.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+
+using android::base::GetBoolProperty;
+using android::base::GetUintProperty;
+using android::base::SetProperty;
+using android::binder::Status;
+using android::fs_mgr::Fstab;
+using android::fs_mgr::ReadDefaultFstab;
+using android::fs_mgr::ReadFstabFromFile;
+using android::hardware::hidl_string;
+using android::hardware::boot::V1_0::BoolResult;
+using android::hardware::boot::V1_0::CommandResult;
+using android::hardware::boot::V1_0::IBootControl;
+using android::hardware::boot::V1_0::Slot;
+
+
+namespace {
+const std::string kMetadataCPFile = "/metadata/vold/checkpoint";
+
+android::binder::Status error(const std::string& msg) {
+ PLOG(ERROR) << msg;
+ return android::binder::Status::fromServiceSpecificError(errno, android::String8(msg.c_str()));
+}
+
+android::binder::Status error(int error, const std::string& msg) {
+ LOG(ERROR) << msg;
+ return android::binder::Status::fromServiceSpecificError(error, android::String8(msg.c_str()));
+}
+
+bool setBowState(std::string const& block_device, std::string const& state) {
+ std::string bow_device = fs_mgr_find_bow_device(block_device);
+ if (bow_device.empty()) return false;
+
+ if (!android::base::WriteStringToFile(state, bow_device + "/bow/state")) {
+ PLOG(ERROR) << "Failed to write to file " << bow_device + "/bow/state";
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ return true;
+}
+
+} // namespace
+
+Status cp_supportsCheckpoint(bool& result) {
+ result = false;
+
+ for (const auto& entry : fstab_default) {
+ if (entry.fs_mgr_flags.checkpoint_blk || entry.fs_mgr_flags.checkpoint_fs) {
+ result = true;
+ return Status::ok();
+ }
+ }
+ return Status::ok();
+}
+
+Status cp_supportsBlockCheckpoint(bool& result) {
+ result = false;
+
+ for (const auto& entry : fstab_default) {
+ if (entry.fs_mgr_flags.checkpoint_blk) {
+ result = true;
+ return Status::ok();
+ }
+ }
+ return Status::ok();
+}
+
+Status cp_supportsFileCheckpoint(bool& result) {
+ result = false;
+
+ for (const auto& entry : fstab_default) {
+ if (entry.fs_mgr_flags.checkpoint_fs) {
+ result = true;
+ return Status::ok();
+ }
+ }
+ return Status::ok();
+}
+
+Status cp_startCheckpoint(int retry) {
+ bool result;
+ if (!cp_supportsCheckpoint(result).isOk() || !result)
+ return error(ENOTSUP, "Checkpoints not supported");
+
+ if (retry < -1) return error(EINVAL, "Retry count must be more than -1");
+ std::string content = std::to_string(retry + 1);
+ if (retry == -1) {
+ android::sp<IBootControl> module = IBootControl::getService();
+ if (module) {
+ std::string suffix;
+ auto cb = [&suffix](hidl_string s) { suffix = s; };
+ if (module->getSuffix(module->getCurrentSlot(), cb).isOk()) content += " " + suffix;
+ }
+ }
+ if (!android::base::WriteStringToFile(content, kMetadataCPFile))
+ return error("Failed to write checkpoint file");
+ return Status::ok();
+}
+
+namespace {
+
+volatile bool isCheckpointing = false;
+
+volatile bool needsCheckpointWasCalled = false;
+
+// Protects isCheckpointing, needsCheckpointWasCalled and code that makes decisions based on status
+// of isCheckpointing
+std::mutex isCheckpointingLock;
+}
+
+Status cp_commitChanges() {
+ std::lock_guard<std::mutex> lock(isCheckpointingLock);
+
+ if (!isCheckpointing) {
+ return Status::ok();
+ }
+ if (android::base::GetProperty("persist.vold.dont_commit_checkpoint", "0") == "1") {
+ LOG(WARNING)
+ << "NOT COMMITTING CHECKPOINT BECAUSE persist.vold.dont_commit_checkpoint IS 1";
+ return Status::ok();
+ }
+ android::sp<IBootControl> module = IBootControl::getService();
+ if (module) {
+ CommandResult cr;
+ module->markBootSuccessful([&cr](CommandResult result) { cr = result; });
+ if (!cr.success)
+ return error(EINVAL, "Error marking booted successfully: " + std::string(cr.errMsg));
+ LOG(INFO) << "Marked slot as booted successfully.";
+ // Clears the warm reset flag for next reboot.
+ if (!SetProperty("ota.warm_reset", "0")) {
+ LOG(WARNING) << "Failed to reset the warm reset flag";
+ }
+ }
+ // Must take action for list of mounted checkpointed things here
+ // To do this, we walk the list of mounted file systems.
+ // But we also need to get the matching fstab entries to see
+ // the original flags
+ std::string err_str;
+
+ Fstab mounts;
+ if (!ReadFstabFromFile("/proc/mounts", &mounts)) {
+ return error(EINVAL, "Failed to get /proc/mounts");
+ }
+
+ // Walk mounted file systems
+ for (const auto& mount_rec : mounts) {
+ const auto fstab_rec = GetEntryForMountPoint(&fstab_default, mount_rec.mount_point);
+ if (!fstab_rec) continue;
+
+ if (fstab_rec->fs_mgr_flags.checkpoint_fs) {
+ if (fstab_rec->fs_type == "f2fs") {
+ std::string options = mount_rec.fs_options + ",checkpoint=enable";
+ if (mount(mount_rec.blk_device.c_str(), mount_rec.mount_point.c_str(), "none",
+ MS_REMOUNT | fstab_rec->flags, options.c_str())) {
+ return error(EINVAL, "Failed to remount");
+ }
+ }
+ } else if (fstab_rec->fs_mgr_flags.checkpoint_blk) {
+ if (!setBowState(mount_rec.blk_device, "2"))
+ return error(EINVAL, "Failed to set bow state");
+ }
+ }
+ SetProperty("vold.checkpoint_committed", "1");
+ LOG(INFO) << "Checkpoint has been committed.";
+ isCheckpointing = false;
+ if (!android::base::RemoveFileIfExists(kMetadataCPFile, &err_str))
+ return error(err_str.c_str());
+
+ return Status::ok();
+}
+
+namespace {
+void abort_metadata_file() {
+ std::string oldContent, newContent;
+ int retry = 0;
+ struct stat st;
+ int result = stat(kMetadataCPFile.c_str(), &st);
+
+ // If the file doesn't exist, we aren't managing a checkpoint retry counter
+ if (result != 0) return;
+ if (!android::base::ReadFileToString(kMetadataCPFile, &oldContent)) {
+ PLOG(ERROR) << "Failed to read checkpoint file";
+ return;
+ }
+ std::string retryContent = oldContent.substr(0, oldContent.find_first_of(" "));
+
+ if (!android::base::ParseInt(retryContent, &retry)) {
+ PLOG(ERROR) << "Could not parse retry count";
+ return;
+ }
+ if (retry > 0) {
+ newContent = "0";
+ if (!android::base::WriteStringToFile(newContent, kMetadataCPFile))
+ PLOG(ERROR) << "Could not write checkpoint file";
+ }
+}
+} // namespace
+
+void cp_abortChanges(const std::string& message, bool retry) {
+ if (!cp_needsCheckpoint()) return;
+ if (!retry) abort_metadata_file();
+ android_reboot(ANDROID_RB_RESTART2, 0, message.c_str());
+}
+
+bool cp_needsRollback() {
+ std::string content;
+ bool ret;
+
+ ret = android::base::ReadFileToString(kMetadataCPFile, &content);
+ if (ret) {
+ if (content == "0") return true;
+ if (content.substr(0, 3) == "-1 ") {
+ std::string oldSuffix = content.substr(3);
+ android::sp<IBootControl> module = IBootControl::getService();
+ std::string newSuffix;
+
+ if (module) {
+ auto cb = [&newSuffix](hidl_string s) { newSuffix = s; };
+ module->getSuffix(module->getCurrentSlot(), cb);
+ if (oldSuffix == newSuffix) return true;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ return false;
+}
+
+bool cp_needsCheckpoint() {
+ std::lock_guard<std::mutex> lock(isCheckpointingLock);
+
+ // Make sure we only return true during boot. See b/138952436 for discussion
+ if (needsCheckpointWasCalled) return isCheckpointing;
+ needsCheckpointWasCalled = true;
+
+ bool ret;
+ std::string content;
+ android::sp<IBootControl> module = IBootControl::getService();
+
+ if (isCheckpointing) return isCheckpointing;
+
+ if (module && module->isSlotMarkedSuccessful(module->getCurrentSlot()) == BoolResult::FALSE) {
+ isCheckpointing = true;
+ return true;
+ }
+ ret = android::base::ReadFileToString(kMetadataCPFile, &content);
+ if (ret) {
+ ret = content != "0";
+ isCheckpointing = ret;
+ return ret;
+ }
+ return false;
+}
+
+bool cp_isCheckpointing() {
+ return isCheckpointing;
+}
+
+namespace {
+const std::string kSleepTimeProp = "ro.sys.cp_msleeptime";
+const uint32_t msleeptime_default = 1000; // 1 s
+const uint32_t max_msleeptime = 3600000; // 1 h
+
+const std::string kMinFreeBytesProp = "ro.sys.cp_min_free_bytes";
+const uint64_t min_free_bytes_default = 100 * (1 << 20); // 100 MiB
+
+const std::string kCommitOnFullProp = "ro.sys.cp_commit_on_full";
+const bool commit_on_full_default = true;
+
+static void cp_healthDaemon(std::string mnt_pnt, std::string blk_device, bool is_fs_cp) {
+ struct statvfs data;
+ uint32_t msleeptime = GetUintProperty(kSleepTimeProp, msleeptime_default, max_msleeptime);
+ uint64_t min_free_bytes =
+ GetUintProperty(kMinFreeBytesProp, min_free_bytes_default, (uint64_t)-1);
+ bool commit_on_full = GetBoolProperty(kCommitOnFullProp, commit_on_full_default);
+
+ struct timespec req;
+ req.tv_sec = msleeptime / 1000;
+ msleeptime %= 1000;
+ req.tv_nsec = msleeptime * 1000000;
+ while (isCheckpointing) {
+ uint64_t free_bytes = 0;
+ if (is_fs_cp) {
+ statvfs(mnt_pnt.c_str(), &data);
+ free_bytes = ((uint64_t) data.f_bavail) * data.f_frsize;
+ } else {
+ std::string bow_device = fs_mgr_find_bow_device(blk_device);
+ if (!bow_device.empty()) {
+ std::string content;
+ if (android::base::ReadFileToString(bow_device + "/bow/free", &content)) {
+ free_bytes = std::strtoull(content.c_str(), NULL, 10);
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ if (free_bytes < min_free_bytes) {
+ if (commit_on_full) {
+ LOG(INFO) << "Low space for checkpointing. Commiting changes";
+ cp_commitChanges();
+ break;
+ } else {
+ LOG(INFO) << "Low space for checkpointing. Rebooting";
+ cp_abortChanges("checkpoint,low_space", false);
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ nanosleep(&req, NULL);
+ }
+}
+
+} // namespace
+
+Status cp_prepareCheckpoint() {
+ // Log to notify CTS - see b/137924328 for context
+ LOG(INFO) << "cp_prepareCheckpoint called";
+ std::lock_guard<std::mutex> lock(isCheckpointingLock);
+ if (!isCheckpointing) {
+ return Status::ok();
+ }
+
+ Fstab mounts;
+ if (!ReadFstabFromFile("/proc/mounts", &mounts)) {
+ return error(EINVAL, "Failed to get /proc/mounts");
+ }
+
+ for (const auto& mount_rec : mounts) {
+ const auto fstab_rec = GetEntryForMountPoint(&fstab_default, mount_rec.mount_point);
+ if (!fstab_rec) continue;
+
+ if (fstab_rec->fs_mgr_flags.checkpoint_blk) {
+ android::base::unique_fd fd(
+ TEMP_FAILURE_RETRY(open(mount_rec.mount_point.c_str(), O_RDONLY | O_CLOEXEC)));
+ if (fd == -1) {
+ PLOG(ERROR) << "Failed to open mount point" << mount_rec.mount_point;
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ struct fstrim_range range = {};
+ range.len = ULLONG_MAX;
+ nsecs_t start = systemTime(SYSTEM_TIME_BOOTTIME);
+ if (ioctl(fd, FITRIM, &range)) {
+ PLOG(ERROR) << "Failed to trim " << mount_rec.mount_point;
+ continue;
+ }
+ nsecs_t time = systemTime(SYSTEM_TIME_BOOTTIME) - start;
+ LOG(INFO) << "Trimmed " << range.len << " bytes on " << mount_rec.mount_point << " in "
+ << nanoseconds_to_milliseconds(time) << "ms for checkpoint";
+
+ setBowState(mount_rec.blk_device, "1");
+ }
+ if (fstab_rec->fs_mgr_flags.checkpoint_blk || fstab_rec->fs_mgr_flags.checkpoint_fs) {
+ std::thread(cp_healthDaemon, std::string(mount_rec.mount_point),
+ std::string(mount_rec.blk_device),
+ fstab_rec->fs_mgr_flags.checkpoint_fs == 1)
+ .detach();
+ }
+ }
+ return Status::ok();
+}
+
+namespace {
+const int kSectorSize = 512;
+
+typedef uint64_t sector_t;
+
+struct log_entry {
+ sector_t source; // in sectors of size kSectorSize
+ sector_t dest; // in sectors of size kSectorSize
+ uint32_t size; // in bytes
+ uint32_t checksum;
+} __attribute__((packed));
+
+struct log_sector_v1_0 {
+ uint32_t magic;
+ uint16_t header_version;
+ uint16_t header_size;
+ uint32_t block_size;
+ uint32_t count;
+ uint32_t sequence;
+ uint64_t sector0;
+} __attribute__((packed));
+
+// MAGIC is BOW in ascii
+const int kMagic = 0x00574f42;
+// Partially restored MAGIC is WOB in ascii
+const int kPartialRestoreMagic = 0x00424f57;
+
+void crc32(const void* data, size_t n_bytes, uint32_t* crc) {
+ static uint32_t table[0x100] = {
+ 0x00000000, 0x77073096, 0xEE0E612C, 0x990951BA, 0x076DC419, 0x706AF48F, 0xE963A535,
+ 0x9E6495A3, 0x0EDB8832, 0x79DCB8A4, 0xE0D5E91E, 0x97D2D988, 0x09B64C2B, 0x7EB17CBD,
+ 0xE7B82D07, 0x90BF1D91, 0x1DB71064, 0x6AB020F2, 0xF3B97148, 0x84BE41DE, 0x1ADAD47D,
+ 0x6DDDE4EB, 0xF4D4B551, 0x83D385C7, 0x136C9856, 0x646BA8C0, 0xFD62F97A, 0x8A65C9EC,
+ 0x14015C4F, 0x63066CD9, 0xFA0F3D63, 0x8D080DF5, 0x3B6E20C8, 0x4C69105E, 0xD56041E4,
+ 0xA2677172, 0x3C03E4D1, 0x4B04D447, 0xD20D85FD, 0xA50AB56B, 0x35B5A8FA, 0x42B2986C,
+ 0xDBBBC9D6, 0xACBCF940, 0x32D86CE3, 0x45DF5C75, 0xDCD60DCF, 0xABD13D59, 0x26D930AC,
+ 0x51DE003A, 0xC8D75180, 0xBFD06116, 0x21B4F4B5, 0x56B3C423, 0xCFBA9599, 0xB8BDA50F,
+ 0x2802B89E, 0x5F058808, 0xC60CD9B2, 0xB10BE924, 0x2F6F7C87, 0x58684C11, 0xC1611DAB,
+ 0xB6662D3D,
+
+ 0x76DC4190, 0x01DB7106, 0x98D220BC, 0xEFD5102A, 0x71B18589, 0x06B6B51F, 0x9FBFE4A5,
+ 0xE8B8D433, 0x7807C9A2, 0x0F00F934, 0x9609A88E, 0xE10E9818, 0x7F6A0DBB, 0x086D3D2D,
+ 0x91646C97, 0xE6635C01, 0x6B6B51F4, 0x1C6C6162, 0x856530D8, 0xF262004E, 0x6C0695ED,
+ 0x1B01A57B, 0x8208F4C1, 0xF50FC457, 0x65B0D9C6, 0x12B7E950, 0x8BBEB8EA, 0xFCB9887C,
+ 0x62DD1DDF, 0x15DA2D49, 0x8CD37CF3, 0xFBD44C65, 0x4DB26158, 0x3AB551CE, 0xA3BC0074,
+ 0xD4BB30E2, 0x4ADFA541, 0x3DD895D7, 0xA4D1C46D, 0xD3D6F4FB, 0x4369E96A, 0x346ED9FC,
+ 0xAD678846, 0xDA60B8D0, 0x44042D73, 0x33031DE5, 0xAA0A4C5F, 0xDD0D7CC9, 0x5005713C,
+ 0x270241AA, 0xBE0B1010, 0xC90C2086, 0x5768B525, 0x206F85B3, 0xB966D409, 0xCE61E49F,
+ 0x5EDEF90E, 0x29D9C998, 0xB0D09822, 0xC7D7A8B4, 0x59B33D17, 0x2EB40D81, 0xB7BD5C3B,
+ 0xC0BA6CAD,
+
+ 0xEDB88320, 0x9ABFB3B6, 0x03B6E20C, 0x74B1D29A, 0xEAD54739, 0x9DD277AF, 0x04DB2615,
+ 0x73DC1683, 0xE3630B12, 0x94643B84, 0x0D6D6A3E, 0x7A6A5AA8, 0xE40ECF0B, 0x9309FF9D,
+ 0x0A00AE27, 0x7D079EB1, 0xF00F9344, 0x8708A3D2, 0x1E01F268, 0x6906C2FE, 0xF762575D,
+ 0x806567CB, 0x196C3671, 0x6E6B06E7, 0xFED41B76, 0x89D32BE0, 0x10DA7A5A, 0x67DD4ACC,
+ 0xF9B9DF6F, 0x8EBEEFF9, 0x17B7BE43, 0x60B08ED5, 0xD6D6A3E8, 0xA1D1937E, 0x38D8C2C4,
+ 0x4FDFF252, 0xD1BB67F1, 0xA6BC5767, 0x3FB506DD, 0x48B2364B, 0xD80D2BDA, 0xAF0A1B4C,
+ 0x36034AF6, 0x41047A60, 0xDF60EFC3, 0xA867DF55, 0x316E8EEF, 0x4669BE79, 0xCB61B38C,
+ 0xBC66831A, 0x256FD2A0, 0x5268E236, 0xCC0C7795, 0xBB0B4703, 0x220216B9, 0x5505262F,
+ 0xC5BA3BBE, 0xB2BD0B28, 0x2BB45A92, 0x5CB36A04, 0xC2D7FFA7, 0xB5D0CF31, 0x2CD99E8B,
+ 0x5BDEAE1D,
+
+ 0x9B64C2B0, 0xEC63F226, 0x756AA39C, 0x026D930A, 0x9C0906A9, 0xEB0E363F, 0x72076785,
+ 0x05005713, 0x95BF4A82, 0xE2B87A14, 0x7BB12BAE, 0x0CB61B38, 0x92D28E9B, 0xE5D5BE0D,
+ 0x7CDCEFB7, 0x0BDBDF21, 0x86D3D2D4, 0xF1D4E242, 0x68DDB3F8, 0x1FDA836E, 0x81BE16CD,
+ 0xF6B9265B, 0x6FB077E1, 0x18B74777, 0x88085AE6, 0xFF0F6A70, 0x66063BCA, 0x11010B5C,
+ 0x8F659EFF, 0xF862AE69, 0x616BFFD3, 0x166CCF45, 0xA00AE278, 0xD70DD2EE, 0x4E048354,
+ 0x3903B3C2, 0xA7672661, 0xD06016F7, 0x4969474D, 0x3E6E77DB, 0xAED16A4A, 0xD9D65ADC,
+ 0x40DF0B66, 0x37D83BF0, 0xA9BCAE53, 0xDEBB9EC5, 0x47B2CF7F, 0x30B5FFE9, 0xBDBDF21C,
+ 0xCABAC28A, 0x53B39330, 0x24B4A3A6, 0xBAD03605, 0xCDD70693, 0x54DE5729, 0x23D967BF,
+ 0xB3667A2E, 0xC4614AB8, 0x5D681B02, 0x2A6F2B94, 0xB40BBE37, 0xC30C8EA1, 0x5A05DF1B,
+ 0x2D02EF8D};
+
+ for (size_t i = 0; i < n_bytes; ++i) {
+ *crc ^= ((uint8_t*)data)[i];
+ *crc = table[(uint8_t)*crc] ^ *crc >> 8;
+ }
+}
+
+// A map of relocations.
+// The map must be initialized so that relocations[0] = 0
+// During restore, we replay the log records in reverse, copying from dest to
+// source
+// To validate, we must be able to read the 'dest' sectors as though they had
+// been copied but without actually copying. This map represents how the sectors
+// would have been moved. To read a sector s, find the index <= s and read
+// relocations[index] + s - index
+typedef std::map<sector_t, sector_t> Relocations;
+
+void relocate(Relocations& relocations, sector_t dest, sector_t source, int count) {
+ // Find first one we're equal to or greater than
+ auto s = --relocations.upper_bound(source);
+
+ // Take slice
+ Relocations slice;
+ slice[dest] = source - s->first + s->second;
+ ++s;
+
+ // Add rest of elements
+ for (; s != relocations.end() && s->first < source + count; ++s)
+ slice[dest - source + s->first] = s->second;
+
+ // Split range at end of dest
+ auto dest_end = --relocations.upper_bound(dest + count);
+ relocations[dest + count] = dest + count - dest_end->first + dest_end->second;
+
+ // Remove all elements in [dest, dest + count)
+ relocations.erase(relocations.lower_bound(dest), relocations.lower_bound(dest + count));
+
+ // Add new elements
+ relocations.insert(slice.begin(), slice.end());
+}
+
+// A map of sectors that have been written to.
+// The final entry must always be False.
+// When we restart the restore after an interruption, we must take care that
+// when we copy from dest to source, that the block we copy to was not
+// previously copied from.
+// i e. A->B C->A; If we replay this sequence, we end up copying C->B
+// We must save our partial result whenever we finish a page, or when we copy
+// to a location that was copied from earlier (our source is an earlier dest)
+typedef std::map<sector_t, bool> Used_Sectors;
+
+bool checkCollision(Used_Sectors& used_sectors, sector_t start, sector_t end) {
+ auto second_overlap = used_sectors.upper_bound(start);
+ auto first_overlap = --second_overlap;
+
+ if (first_overlap->second) {
+ return true;
+ } else if (second_overlap != used_sectors.end() && second_overlap->first < end) {
+ return true;
+ }
+ return false;
+}
+
+void markUsed(Used_Sectors& used_sectors, sector_t start, sector_t end) {
+ auto start_pos = used_sectors.insert_or_assign(start, true).first;
+ auto end_pos = used_sectors.insert_or_assign(end, false).first;
+
+ if (start_pos == used_sectors.begin() || !std::prev(start_pos)->second) {
+ start_pos++;
+ }
+ if (std::next(end_pos) != used_sectors.end() && !std::next(end_pos)->second) {
+ end_pos++;
+ }
+ if (start_pos->first < end_pos->first) {
+ used_sectors.erase(start_pos, end_pos);
+ }
+}
+
+// Restores the given log_entry's data from dest -> source
+// If that entry is a log sector, set the magic to kPartialRestoreMagic and flush.
+void restoreSector(int device_fd, Used_Sectors& used_sectors, std::vector<char>& ls_buffer,
+ log_entry* le, std::vector<char>& buffer) {
+ log_sector_v1_0& ls = *reinterpret_cast<log_sector_v1_0*>(&ls_buffer[0]);
+ uint32_t index = le - ((log_entry*)&ls_buffer[ls.header_size]);
+ int count = (le->size - 1) / kSectorSize + 1;
+
+ if (checkCollision(used_sectors, le->source, le->source + count)) {
+ fsync(device_fd);
+ lseek64(device_fd, 0, SEEK_SET);
+ ls.count = index + 1;
+ ls.magic = kPartialRestoreMagic;
+ write(device_fd, &ls_buffer[0], ls.block_size);
+ fsync(device_fd);
+ used_sectors.clear();
+ used_sectors[0] = false;
+ }
+
+ markUsed(used_sectors, le->dest, le->dest + count);
+
+ if (index == 0 && ls.sequence != 0) {
+ log_sector_v1_0* next = reinterpret_cast<log_sector_v1_0*>(&buffer[0]);
+ if (next->magic == kMagic) {
+ next->magic = kPartialRestoreMagic;
+ }
+ }
+
+ lseek64(device_fd, le->source * kSectorSize, SEEK_SET);
+ write(device_fd, &buffer[0], le->size);
+
+ if (index == 0) {
+ fsync(device_fd);
+ }
+}
+
+// Read from the device
+// If we are validating, the read occurs as though the relocations had happened
+std::vector<char> relocatedRead(int device_fd, Relocations const& relocations, bool validating,
+ sector_t sector, uint32_t size, uint32_t block_size) {
+ if (!validating) {
+ std::vector<char> buffer(size);
+ lseek64(device_fd, sector * kSectorSize, SEEK_SET);
+ read(device_fd, &buffer[0], size);
+ return buffer;
+ }
+
+ std::vector<char> buffer(size);
+ for (uint32_t i = 0; i < size; i += block_size, sector += block_size / kSectorSize) {
+ auto relocation = --relocations.upper_bound(sector);
+ lseek64(device_fd, (sector + relocation->second - relocation->first) * kSectorSize,
+ SEEK_SET);
+ read(device_fd, &buffer[i], block_size);
+ }
+
+ return buffer;
+}
+
+} // namespace
+
+Status cp_restoreCheckpoint(const std::string& blockDevice, int restore_limit) {
+ bool validating = true;
+ std::string action = "Validating";
+ int restore_count = 0;
+
+ for (;;) {
+ Relocations relocations;
+ relocations[0] = 0;
+ Status status = Status::ok();
+
+ LOG(INFO) << action << " checkpoint on " << blockDevice;
+ android::base::unique_fd device_fd(open(blockDevice.c_str(), O_RDWR | O_CLOEXEC));
+ if (device_fd < 0) return error("Cannot open " + blockDevice);
+
+ log_sector_v1_0 original_ls;
+ read(device_fd, reinterpret_cast<char*>(&original_ls), sizeof(original_ls));
+ if (original_ls.magic == kPartialRestoreMagic) {
+ validating = false;
+ action = "Restoring";
+ } else if (original_ls.magic != kMagic) {
+ return error(EINVAL, "No magic");
+ }
+
+ LOG(INFO) << action << " " << original_ls.sequence << " log sectors";
+
+ for (int sequence = original_ls.sequence; sequence >= 0 && status.isOk(); sequence--) {
+ auto ls_buffer = relocatedRead(device_fd, relocations, validating, 0,
+ original_ls.block_size, original_ls.block_size);
+ log_sector_v1_0& ls = *reinterpret_cast<log_sector_v1_0*>(&ls_buffer[0]);
+
+ Used_Sectors used_sectors;
+ used_sectors[0] = false;
+
+ if (ls.magic != kMagic && (ls.magic != kPartialRestoreMagic || validating)) {
+ status = error(EINVAL, "No magic");
+ break;
+ }
+
+ if (ls.block_size != original_ls.block_size) {
+ status = error(EINVAL, "Block size mismatch");
+ break;
+ }
+
+ if ((int)ls.sequence != sequence) {
+ status = error(EINVAL, "Expecting log sector " + std::to_string(sequence) +
+ " but got " + std::to_string(ls.sequence));
+ break;
+ }
+
+ LOG(INFO) << action << " from log sector " << ls.sequence;
+ for (log_entry* le =
+ reinterpret_cast<log_entry*>(&ls_buffer[ls.header_size]) + ls.count - 1;
+ le >= reinterpret_cast<log_entry*>(&ls_buffer[ls.header_size]); --le) {
+ // This is very noisy - limit to DEBUG only
+ LOG(VERBOSE) << action << " " << le->size << " bytes from sector " << le->dest
+ << " to " << le->source << " with checksum " << std::hex
+ << le->checksum;
+
+ auto buffer = relocatedRead(device_fd, relocations, validating, le->dest, le->size,
+ ls.block_size);
+ uint32_t checksum = le->source / (ls.block_size / kSectorSize);
+ for (size_t i = 0; i < le->size; i += ls.block_size) {
+ crc32(&buffer[i], ls.block_size, &checksum);
+ }
+
+ if (le->checksum && checksum != le->checksum) {
+ status = error(EINVAL, "Checksums don't match");
+ break;
+ }
+
+ if (validating) {
+ relocate(relocations, le->source, le->dest, (le->size - 1) / kSectorSize + 1);
+ } else {
+ restoreSector(device_fd, used_sectors, ls_buffer, le, buffer);
+ restore_count++;
+ if (restore_limit && restore_count >= restore_limit) {
+ status = error(EAGAIN, "Hit the test limit");
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (!status.isOk()) {
+ if (!validating) {
+ LOG(ERROR) << "Checkpoint restore failed even though checkpoint validation passed";
+ return status;
+ }
+
+ LOG(WARNING) << "Checkpoint validation failed - attempting to roll forward";
+ auto buffer = relocatedRead(device_fd, relocations, false, original_ls.sector0,
+ original_ls.block_size, original_ls.block_size);
+ lseek64(device_fd, 0, SEEK_SET);
+ write(device_fd, &buffer[0], original_ls.block_size);
+ return Status::ok();
+ }
+
+ if (!validating) break;
+
+ validating = false;
+ action = "Restoring";
+ }
+
+ return Status::ok();
+}
+
+Status cp_markBootAttempt() {
+ std::string oldContent, newContent;
+ int retry = 0;
+ struct stat st;
+ int result = stat(kMetadataCPFile.c_str(), &st);
+
+ // If the file doesn't exist, we aren't managing a checkpoint retry counter
+ if (result != 0) return Status::ok();
+ if (!android::base::ReadFileToString(kMetadataCPFile, &oldContent))
+ return error("Failed to read checkpoint file");
+ std::string retryContent = oldContent.substr(0, oldContent.find_first_of(" "));
+
+ if (!android::base::ParseInt(retryContent, &retry))
+ return error(EINVAL, "Could not parse retry count");
+ if (retry > 0) {
+ retry--;
+
+ newContent = std::to_string(retry);
+ if (!android::base::WriteStringToFile(newContent, kMetadataCPFile))
+ return error("Could not write checkpoint file");
+ }
+ return Status::ok();
+}
+
+void cp_resetCheckpoint() {
+ std::lock_guard<std::mutex> lock(isCheckpointingLock);
+ needsCheckpointWasCalled = false;
+}
diff --git a/crypto/fscrypt/Checkpoint.h b/crypto/fscrypt/Checkpoint.h
index 63ead83..cd17c78 100644
--- a/crypto/fscrypt/Checkpoint.h
+++ b/crypto/fscrypt/Checkpoint.h
@@ -20,8 +20,6 @@
#include <binder/Status.h>
#include <string>
-namespace android {
-namespace vold {
android::binder::Status cp_supportsCheckpoint(bool& result);
@@ -39,13 +37,14 @@
bool cp_needsCheckpoint();
+bool cp_isCheckpointing();
+
android::binder::Status cp_prepareCheckpoint();
android::binder::Status cp_restoreCheckpoint(const std::string& mountPoint, int count = 0);
android::binder::Status cp_markBootAttempt();
-} // namespace vold
-} // namespace android
+void cp_resetCheckpoint();
#endif
diff --git a/crypto/fscrypt/CryptoType.cpp b/crypto/fscrypt/CryptoType.cpp
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..cf1ef42
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/fscrypt/CryptoType.cpp
@@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2020 The Android Open Source Project
+ *
+ * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+ * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+ * You may obtain a copy of the License at
+ *
+ * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+ *
+ * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+ * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+ * WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+ * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+ * limitations under the License.
+ */
+
+#include "CryptoType.h"
+
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include <android-base/logging.h>
+#include <cutils/properties.h>
+
+
+const CryptoType& lookup_crypto_algorithm(const CryptoType table[], int table_len,
+ const CryptoType& default_alg, const char* property) {
+ char paramstr[PROPERTY_VALUE_MAX];
+
+ property_get(property, paramstr, default_alg.get_config_name());
+ for (int i = 0; i < table_len; i++) {
+ if (strcmp(paramstr, table[i].get_config_name()) == 0) {
+ return table[i];
+ }
+ }
+ LOG(ERROR) << "Invalid name (" << paramstr << ") for " << property << ". Defaulting to "
+ << default_alg.get_config_name() << ".";
+ return default_alg;
+}
diff --git a/crypto/fscrypt/CryptoType.h b/crypto/fscrypt/CryptoType.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..79ea93d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/fscrypt/CryptoType.h
@@ -0,0 +1,98 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2020 The Android Open Source Project
+ *
+ * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+ * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+ * You may obtain a copy of the License at
+ *
+ * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+ *
+ * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+ * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+ * WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+ * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+ * limitations under the License.
+ */
+
+#pragma once
+
+#include <stdlib.h>
+
+
+// Struct representing an encryption algorithm supported by vold.
+// "config_name" represents the name we give the algorithm in
+// read-only properties and fstab files
+// "kernel_name" is the name we present to the Linux kernel
+// "keysize" is the size of the key in bytes.
+struct CryptoType {
+ // We should only be constructing CryptoTypes as part of
+ // supported_crypto_types[]. We do it via this pseudo-builder pattern,
+ // which isn't pure or fully protected as a concession to being able to
+ // do it all at compile time. Add new CryptoTypes in
+ // supported_crypto_types[] below.
+ constexpr CryptoType() : CryptoType(nullptr, nullptr, 0xFFFFFFFF) {}
+ constexpr CryptoType set_keysize(size_t size) const {
+ return CryptoType(this->config_name, this->kernel_name, size);
+ }
+ constexpr CryptoType set_config_name(const char* property) const {
+ return CryptoType(property, this->kernel_name, this->keysize);
+ }
+ constexpr CryptoType set_kernel_name(const char* crypto) const {
+ return CryptoType(this->config_name, crypto, this->keysize);
+ }
+
+ constexpr const char* get_config_name() const { return config_name; }
+ constexpr const char* get_kernel_name() const { return kernel_name; }
+ constexpr size_t get_keysize() const { return keysize; }
+
+ private:
+ const char* config_name;
+ const char* kernel_name;
+ size_t keysize;
+
+ constexpr CryptoType(const char* property, const char* crypto, size_t ksize)
+ : config_name(property), kernel_name(crypto), keysize(ksize) {}
+};
+
+// Use the named android property to look up a type from the table
+// If the property is not set or matches no table entry, return the default.
+const CryptoType& lookup_crypto_algorithm(const CryptoType table[], int table_len,
+ const CryptoType& default_alg, const char* property);
+
+// Some useful types
+
+constexpr CryptoType invalid_crypto_type = CryptoType();
+
+constexpr CryptoType aes_256_xts = CryptoType()
+ .set_config_name("aes-256-xts")
+ .set_kernel_name("aes-xts-plain64")
+ .set_keysize(64);
+
+constexpr CryptoType adiantum = CryptoType()
+ .set_config_name("adiantum")
+ .set_kernel_name("xchacha12,aes-adiantum-plain64")
+ .set_keysize(32);
+
+// Support compile-time validation of a crypto type table
+
+template <typename T, size_t N>
+constexpr size_t array_length(T (&)[N]) {
+ return N;
+}
+
+constexpr bool isValidCryptoType(size_t max_keylen, const CryptoType& crypto_type) {
+ return ((crypto_type.get_config_name() != nullptr) &&
+ (crypto_type.get_kernel_name() != nullptr) &&
+ (crypto_type.get_keysize() <= max_keylen));
+}
+
+// Confirms that all supported_crypto_types have a small enough keysize and
+// had both set_config_name() and set_kernel_name() called.
+// Note in C++11 that constexpr functions can only have a single line.
+// So our code is a bit convoluted (using recursion instead of a loop),
+// but it's asserting at compile time that all of our key lengths are valid.
+constexpr bool validateSupportedCryptoTypes(size_t max_keylen, const CryptoType types[],
+ size_t len) {
+ return len == 0 || (isValidCryptoType(max_keylen, types[len - 1]) &&
+ validateSupportedCryptoTypes(max_keylen, types, len - 1));
+}
diff --git a/crypto/fscrypt/Decrypt.cpp b/crypto/fscrypt/Decrypt.cpp
index 44eae08..5878d15 100755
--- a/crypto/fscrypt/Decrypt.cpp
+++ b/crypto/fscrypt/Decrypt.cpp
@@ -16,6 +16,7 @@
#include "Decrypt.h"
#include "FsCrypt.h"
+#include <fscrypt/fscrypt.h>
#include <map>
#include <string>
@@ -72,39 +73,37 @@
#include <keystore/OperationResult.h>
#include "keystore_client.pb.h"
-#include <keymasterV4_0/authorization_set.h>
-#include <keymasterV4_0/keymaster_utils.h>
+#include <keymasterV4_1/authorization_set.h>
+#include <keymasterV4_1/keymaster_utils.h>
extern "C" {
#include "crypto_scrypt.h"
}
#include "fscrypt_policy.h"
+#include "fscrypt-common.h"
#include "HashPassword.h"
#include "KeyStorage.h"
+#include "android/os/IVold.h"
using android::security::keystore::IKeystoreService;
using keystore::KeystoreResponsePromise;
using keystore::OperationResultPromise;
using android::security::keymaster::OperationResult;
-using android::hardware::keymaster::V4_0::support::blob2hidlVec;
+using android::hardware::keymaster::V4_1::support::blob2hidlVec;
-// Store main DE raw ref / policy
-extern std::string de_raw_ref;
-extern std::map<userid_t, std::string> s_de_key_raw_refs;
-extern std::map<userid_t, std::string> s_ce_key_raw_refs;
inline std::string hidlVec2String(const ::keystore::hidl_vec<uint8_t>& value) {
return std::string(reinterpret_cast<const std::string::value_type*>(&value[0]), value.size());
}
-static bool lookup_ref_key_internal(std::map<userid_t, std::string>& key_map, const uint8_t* policy, userid_t* user_id) {
- char policy_string_hex[FS_KEY_DESCRIPTOR_SIZE_HEX];
- char key_map_hex[FS_KEY_DESCRIPTOR_SIZE_HEX];
- policy_to_hex(policy, policy_string_hex);
+static bool lookup_ref_key_internal(std::map<userid_t, android::fscrypt::EncryptionPolicy> key_map, const uint8_t* policy, userid_t* user_id) {
+ char policy_string_hex[FSCRYPT_KEY_IDENTIFIER_HEX_SIZE];
+ char key_map_hex[FSCRYPT_KEY_IDENTIFIER_HEX_SIZE];
+ bytes_to_hex(policy, FSCRYPT_KEY_IDENTIFIER_SIZE, policy_string_hex);
- for (std::map<userid_t, std::string>::iterator it=key_map.begin(); it!=key_map.end(); ++it) {
- policy_to_hex(reinterpret_cast<const uint8_t*>(&it->second[0]), key_map_hex);
+ for (std::map<userid_t, android::fscrypt::EncryptionPolicy>::iterator it=key_map.begin(); it!=key_map.end(); ++it) {
+ bytes_to_hex(reinterpret_cast<const uint8_t*>(&it->second.key_raw_ref[0]), FSCRYPT_KEY_IDENTIFIER_SIZE, key_map_hex);
std::string key_map_hex_string = std::string(key_map_hex);
if (key_map_hex_string == policy_string_hex) {
*user_id = it->first;
@@ -114,65 +113,72 @@
return false;
}
-extern "C" bool lookup_ref_key(const uint8_t* policy, uint8_t* policy_type) {
- userid_t user_id = 0;
- char policy_string_hex[FS_KEY_DESCRIPTOR_SIZE_HEX];
- char de_raw_ref_hex[FS_KEY_DESCRIPTOR_SIZE_HEX];
- policy_to_hex(policy, policy_string_hex);
- policy_to_hex(reinterpret_cast<const uint8_t*>(&de_raw_ref[0]), de_raw_ref_hex);
- std::string de_raw_ref_hex_string = std::string(de_raw_ref_hex);
-
+#ifdef USE_FSCRYPT_POLICY_V1
+extern "C" bool lookup_ref_key(fscrypt_policy_v1* v1, uint8_t* policy_type) {
+#else
+extern "C" bool lookup_ref_key(fscrypt_policy_v2* v2, uint8_t* policy_type) {
+#endif
+ userid_t user_id = 0;
std::string policy_type_string;
- if (policy_string_hex == de_raw_ref_hex_string) {
+
+ char policy_hex[FSCRYPT_KEY_IDENTIFIER_HEX_SIZE];
+ bytes_to_hex(v2->master_key_identifier, FSCRYPT_KEY_IDENTIFIER_SIZE, policy_hex);
+ if (std::strncmp((const char*) v2->master_key_identifier, de_key_raw_ref.c_str(), FSCRYPT_KEY_IDENTIFIER_SIZE) == 0) {
policy_type_string = "0DK";
memcpy(policy_type, policy_type_string.data(), policy_type_string.size());
return true;
}
-
- if (!lookup_ref_key_internal(s_de_key_raw_refs, policy, &user_id)) {
- if (!lookup_ref_key_internal(s_ce_key_raw_refs, policy, &user_id)) {
+ if (!lookup_ref_key_internal(s_de_policies, v2->master_key_identifier, &user_id)) {
+ if (!lookup_ref_key_internal(s_ce_policies, v2->master_key_identifier, &user_id)) {
return false;
- } else
+ } else {
policy_type_string = "0CE" + std::to_string(user_id);
- } else
+ }
+ } else {
policy_type_string = "0DE" + std::to_string(user_id);
+ }
memcpy(policy_type, policy_type_string.data(), policy_type_string.size());
+ LOG(INFO) << "storing policy type: " << policy_type;
return true;
}
extern "C" bool lookup_ref_tar(const uint8_t* policy_type, uint8_t* policy) {
std::string policy_type_string = std::string((char *) policy_type);
- char policy_hex[FS_KEY_DESCRIPTOR_SIZE_HEX];
- policy_to_hex(policy_type, policy_hex);
+ char policy_hex[FSCRYPT_KEY_IDENTIFIER_HEX_SIZE];
+ bytes_to_hex(policy_type, FSCRYPT_KEY_IDENTIFIER_SIZE, policy_hex);
- // Current encryption fscrypt policy is v1 (which is stored as version 0e)
+ userid_t user_id = atoi(policy_type_string.substr(3, 4).c_str());
+
+ // TODO Update version # and make magic strings
if (policy_type_string.substr(0,1) != "0") {
- printf("Unexpected version %c\n", policy_type[0]);
+ LOG(ERROR) << "Unexpected version:" << policy_type[0];
return false;
}
if (policy_type_string.substr(1, 2) == "DK") {
- memcpy(policy, de_raw_ref.data(), de_raw_ref.size());
+ memcpy(policy, de_key_raw_ref.data(), de_key_raw_ref.size());
return true;
}
- userid_t user_id = atoi(policy_type_string.substr(3, 4).c_str());
std::string raw_ref;
if (policy_type_string.substr(1, 1) == "D") {
- if (lookup_key_ref(s_de_key_raw_refs, user_id, &raw_ref)) {
+ if (lookup_key_ref(s_de_policies, user_id, &raw_ref)) {
memcpy(policy, raw_ref.data(), raw_ref.size());
} else
return false;
} else if (policy_type_string.substr(1, 1) == "C") {
- if (lookup_key_ref(s_ce_key_raw_refs, user_id, &raw_ref)) {
+ if (lookup_key_ref(s_ce_policies, user_id, &raw_ref)) {
memcpy(policy, raw_ref.data(), raw_ref.size());
} else
return false;
} else {
- printf("unknown policy type '%s'\n", policy_type);
+ LOG(ERROR) << "unknown policy type: " << policy_type;
return false;
}
+
+ char found_policy_hex[FSCRYPT_KEY_IDENTIFIER_HEX_SIZE];
+ bytes_to_hex(policy, FSCRYPT_KEY_IDENTIFIER_SIZE, found_policy_hex);
return true;
}
@@ -688,14 +694,16 @@
return disk_decryption_secret_key;
}
OperationResult result = future.get();
- auto handle = std::move(result.token);
+ std::map<uint64_t, android::sp<android::IBinder>> active_operations_;
+ uint64_t next_virtual_handle_ = 1;
+ active_operations_[next_virtual_handle_] = result.token;
// The cipher.doFinal call triggers an update to the keystore followed by a finish https://android.googlesource.com/platform/frameworks/base/+/android-8.0.0_r23/services/core/java/com/android/server/locksettings/SyntheticPasswordCrypto.java#64
// See also https://android.googlesource.com/platform/frameworks/base/+/android-8.0.0_r23/keystore/java/android/security/keystore/KeyStoreCryptoOperationChunkedStreamer.java#208
future = {};
promise = new OperationResultPromise();
future = promise->get_future();
- binder_result = service->update(promise, handle, empty_params, cipher_text_hidlvec, &error_code);
+ binder_result = service->update(promise, active_operations_[next_virtual_handle_], empty_params, cipher_text_hidlvec, &error_code);
rc = ::keystore::KeyStoreNativeReturnCode(error_code);
if (!rc.isOk()) {
printf("Keystore update returned: %d\n", error_code);
@@ -717,11 +725,10 @@
future = {};
promise = new OperationResultPromise();
future = promise->get_future();
- std::tie(rc, keyBlob, charBlob, lockedEntry) = mKeyStore->getKeyForName(name8, callingUid, TYPE_KEYMASTER_10);
-
- auto hidlInput = blob2hidlVec(input_data);
- ::keystore::hidl_vec<uint8_t> signature;
- binder_result = service->finish(promise, handle, empty_params, hidlInput, signature, entropy, &error_code);
+
+ auto hidlSignature = blob2hidlVec("");
+ auto hidlInput = blob2hidlVec(disk_decryption_secret_key);
+ binder_result = service->finish(promise, active_operations_[next_virtual_handle_], empty_params, hidlInput, hidlSignature, ::keystore::hidl_vec<uint8_t>(), &error_code);
if (!binder_result.isOk()) {
printf("communication error while calling keystore\n");
free(keystore_result);
@@ -844,11 +851,7 @@
std::string secret; // this will be the disk decryption key that is sent to vold
std::string token = "!"; // there is no token used for this kind of decrypt, key escrow is handled by weaver
- int flags = FLAG_STORAGE_DE;
- if (user_id == 0)
- flags = FLAG_STORAGE_DE;
- else
- flags = FLAG_STORAGE_CE;
+ int flags = android::os::IVold::STORAGE_FLAG_CE;
char spblob_path_char[PATH_MAX];
sprintf(spblob_path_char, "/data/system_de/%d/spblob/", user_id);
std::string spblob_path = spblob_path_char;
@@ -1091,11 +1094,8 @@
printf("Unknown password type\n");
return false;
}
- int flags = FLAG_STORAGE_DE;
- if (user_id == 0)
- flags = FLAG_STORAGE_DE;
- else
- flags = FLAG_STORAGE_CE;
+
+ int flags = android::os::IVold::STORAGE_FLAG_CE;
if (Default_Password) {
if (!fscrypt_unlock_user_key(user_id, 0, "!", "!")) {
diff --git a/crypto/fscrypt/Decrypt.h b/crypto/fscrypt/Decrypt.h
index 8fb5160..f397749 100755
--- a/crypto/fscrypt/Decrypt.h
+++ b/crypto/fscrypt/Decrypt.h
@@ -27,8 +27,8 @@
static constexpr int FLAG_STORAGE_DE = 1 << 0;
static constexpr int FLAG_STORAGE_CE = 1 << 1;
// For 9.0 Ext4CryptPie.cpp
-static constexpr int STORAGE_FLAG_DE = 1 << 0;
-static constexpr int STORAGE_FLAG_CE = 1 << 1;
+static constexpr int STORAGE_FLAG_DE = 1;
+static constexpr int STORAGE_FLAG_CE = 2;
int Get_Password_Type(const userid_t user_id, std::string& filename);
diff --git a/crypto/fscrypt/EncryptInplace.cpp b/crypto/fscrypt/EncryptInplace.cpp
index 3755718..9d304da 100644
--- a/crypto/fscrypt/EncryptInplace.cpp
+++ b/crypto/fscrypt/EncryptInplace.cpp
@@ -391,6 +391,8 @@
struct encryptGroupsData data;
struct f2fs_info* f2fs_info = NULL;
int rc = ENABLE_INPLACE_ERR_OTHER;
+ struct timespec time_started = {0};
+
if (previously_encrypted_upto > *size_already_done) {
LOG(DEBUG) << "Not fast encrypting since resuming part way through";
return ENABLE_INPLACE_ERR_OTHER;
@@ -423,9 +425,14 @@
data.one_pct = data.tot_used_blocks / 100;
data.cur_pct = 0;
- data.time_started = time(NULL);
+ if (clock_gettime(CLOCK_MONOTONIC, &time_started)) {
+ LOG(WARNING) << "Error getting time at start";
+ // Note - continue anyway - we'll run with 0
+ }
+ data.time_started = time_started.tv_sec;
data.remaining_time = -1;
+
data.buffer = (char*)malloc(f2fs_info->block_size);
if (!data.buffer) {
LOG(ERROR) << "Failed to allocate crypto buffer";
diff --git a/crypto/fscrypt/EncryptInplace.h b/crypto/fscrypt/EncryptInplace.h
index bf0c314..a2b46cf 100644
--- a/crypto/fscrypt/EncryptInplace.h
+++ b/crypto/fscrypt/EncryptInplace.h
@@ -24,6 +24,11 @@
#define RETRY_MOUNT_ATTEMPTS 10
#define RETRY_MOUNT_DELAY_SECONDS 1
+/* Return values for cryptfs_enable_inplace() */
+#define ENABLE_INPLACE_OK 0
+#define ENABLE_INPLACE_ERR_OTHER (-1)
+#define ENABLE_INPLACE_ERR_DEV (-2) /* crypto_blkdev issue */
+
int cryptfs_enable_inplace(const char* crypto_blkdev, const char* real_blkdev, off64_t size,
off64_t* size_already_done, off64_t tot_size,
off64_t previously_encrypted_upto, bool set_progress_properties);
diff --git a/crypto/fscrypt/FsCrypt.cpp b/crypto/fscrypt/FsCrypt.cpp
index ade9fe8..418164e 100755
--- a/crypto/fscrypt/FsCrypt.cpp
+++ b/crypto/fscrypt/FsCrypt.cpp
@@ -16,14 +16,14 @@
#include "FsCrypt.h"
-#include "Keymaster.h"
#include "KeyStorage.h"
#include "KeyUtil.h"
#include "Utils.h"
-// #include "VoldUtil.h"
+#include "VoldUtil.h"
#include <algorithm>
#include <map>
+#include <optional>
#include <set>
#include <sstream>
#include <string>
@@ -40,10 +40,9 @@
#include <unistd.h>
#include <private/android_filesystem_config.h>
+#include <private/android_projectid_config.h>
-// #include "android/os/IVold.h"
-
-#include "cryptfs.h"
+#include "android/os/IVold.h"
#define EMULATED_USES_SELINUX 0
#define MANAGE_MISC_DIRS 0
@@ -52,37 +51,43 @@
#include <cutils/properties.h>
#include <fscrypt/fscrypt.h>
-#include <fs_mgr.h>
#include <keyutils.h>
+#include <libdm/dm.h>
#include <android-base/file.h>
#include <android-base/logging.h>
#include <android-base/properties.h>
#include <android-base/stringprintf.h>
+#include <android-base/strings.h>
#include <android-base/unique_fd.h>
+#include "fscrypt-common.h"
+using android::base::Basename;
+using android::base::Realpath;
+using android::base::StartsWith;
using android::base::StringPrintf;
using android::fs_mgr::GetEntryForMountPoint;
-using android::vold::kEmptyAuthentication;
-using android::vold::KeyBuffer;
-using android::vold::Keymaster;
-using android::hardware::keymaster::V4_0::KeyFormat;
-// using android::vold::writeStringToFile;
+using ::BuildDataPath;
+using ::IsFilesystemSupported;
+using ::kEmptyAuthentication;
+using ::KeyBuffer;
+using ::KeyGeneration;
+using ::retrieveKey;
+using ::retrieveOrGenerateKey;
+using ::SetQuotaInherit;
+using ::SetQuotaProjectId;
+using ::writeStringToFile;
+using namespace android::fscrypt;
+using namespace android::dm;
-// Store main DE raw ref / policy
-std::string de_raw_ref;
-std::map<userid_t, std::string> s_de_key_raw_refs;
-std::map<userid_t, std::string> s_ce_key_raw_refs;
+// Map user ids to encryption policies
+std::map<userid_t, EncryptionPolicy> s_de_policies;
+std::map<userid_t, EncryptionPolicy> s_ce_policies;
+std::string de_key_raw_ref;
namespace {
-struct PolicyKeyRef {
- std::string contents_mode;
- std::string filenames_mode;
- std::string key_raw_ref;
-};
-
const std::string device_key_dir = std::string() + DATA_MNT_POINT + fscrypt_unencrypted_folder;
const std::string device_key_path = device_key_dir + "/key";
const std::string device_key_temp = device_key_dir + "/temp";
@@ -93,21 +98,17 @@
const std::string systemwide_volume_key_dir =
std::string() + DATA_MNT_POINT + "/misc/vold/volume_keys";
-const int STORAGE_FLAG_DE = 1;
-const int STORAGE_FLAG_CE = 2;
-
-bool s_systemwide_keys_initialized = false;
-
-android::fs_mgr::Fstab fstab_default;
// Some users are ephemeral, don't try to wipe their keys from disk
std::set<userid_t> s_ephemeral_users;
-// TODO abolish this map, per b/26948053
-std::map<userid_t, KeyBuffer> s_ce_keys;
-
} // namespace
+// Returns KeyGeneration suitable for key as described in EncryptionOptions
+static KeyGeneration makeGen(const EncryptionOptions& options) {
+ return KeyGeneration{FSCRYPT_MAX_KEY_SIZE, true, options.use_hw_wrapped_key};
+}
+
static bool fscrypt_is_emulated() {
return property_get_bool("persist.sys.emulate_fbe", false);
}
@@ -143,7 +144,7 @@
break;
}
if (entry->d_type != DT_DIR || entry->d_name[0] != 'c') {
- LOG(DEBUG) << "Skipping non-key " << entry->d_name;
+ LOG(INFO) << "Skipping non-key " << entry->d_name;
continue;
}
result.emplace_back(directory_path + "/" + entry->d_name);
@@ -179,29 +180,29 @@
const std::vector<std::string>& paths) {
for (auto const other_path : paths) {
if (other_path != to_fix) {
- android::vold::destroyKey(other_path);
+ ::destroyKey(other_path);
}
}
auto const current_path = get_ce_key_current_path(directory_path);
if (to_fix != current_path) {
- LOG(DEBUG) << "Renaming " << to_fix << " to " << current_path;
+ LOG(INFO) << "Renaming " << to_fix << " to " << current_path;
if (rename(to_fix.c_str(), current_path.c_str()) != 0) {
PLOG(WARNING) << "Unable to rename " << to_fix << " to " << current_path;
return;
}
}
- android::vold::FsyncDirectory(directory_path);
+ ::FsyncDirectory(directory_path);
}
static bool read_and_fixate_user_ce_key(userid_t user_id,
- const android::vold::KeyAuthentication& auth,
+ const ::KeyAuthentication& auth,
KeyBuffer* ce_key) {
auto const directory_path = get_ce_key_directory_path(user_id);
auto const paths = get_ce_key_paths(directory_path);
for (auto const ce_key_path : paths) {
- LOG(DEBUG) << "Trying user CE key " << ce_key_path;
- if (android::vold::retrieveKey(ce_key_path, auth, ce_key)) {
- LOG(DEBUG) << "Successfully retrieved key";
+ LOG(INFO) << "Trying user CE key " << ce_key_path;
+ if (retrieveKey(ce_key_path, auth, ce_key)) {
+ LOG(INFO) << "Successfully retrieved key";
fixate_user_ce_key(directory_path, ce_key_path, paths);
return true;
}
@@ -210,65 +211,105 @@
return false;
}
-static bool is_wrapped_key_supported_common(const std::string& mount_point) {
- LOG(DEBUG) << "Determining wrapped-key support for " << mount_point;
- std::string wrapped_key_supported = android::base::GetProperty("fbe.data.wrappedkey", "false");
- LOG(DEBUG) << "fbe.data.wrappedkey = " << wrapped_key_supported;
- if (mount_point == DATA_MNT_POINT && wrapped_key_supported == "true") {
- LOG(DEBUG) << "Wrapped key supported on " << mount_point;
- return true;
- } else {
+static bool IsEmmcStorage(const std::string& blk_device) {
+ // Handle symlinks.
+ std::string real_path;
+ if (!Realpath(blk_device, &real_path)) {
+ real_path = blk_device;
+ }
+
+ // Handle logical volumes.
+ auto& dm = DeviceMapper::Instance();
+ for (;;) {
+ auto parent = dm.GetParentBlockDeviceByPath(real_path);
+ if (!parent.has_value()) break;
+ real_path = *parent;
+ }
+
+ // Now we should have the "real" block device.
+ LOG(INFO) << "IsEmmcStorage(): blk_device = " << blk_device << ", real_path=" << real_path;
+ return StartsWith(Basename(real_path), "mmcblk");
+}
+
+// Retrieve the options to use for encryption policies on the /data filesystem.
+static bool get_data_file_encryption_options(EncryptionOptions* options) {
+ if (!ReadDefaultFstab(&fstab_default)) {
+ PLOG(ERROR) << "Failed to open default fstab";
return false;
}
-}
-
-bool is_wrapped_key_supported() {
- return is_wrapped_key_supported_common(DATA_MNT_POINT);
-}
-
-bool is_wrapped_key_supported_external() {
- return false;
-}
-
-bool is_metadata_wrapped_key_supported_common(const std::string& mount_point) {
- LOG(DEBUG) << "Determining metadata wrapped-key support for " << mount_point;
- std::string wrapped_key_supported = android::base::GetProperty("fbe.metadata.wrappedkey", "false");
- LOG(DEBUG) << "fbe.metadata.wrappedkey = " << wrapped_key_supported;
- if (mount_point == METADATA_MNT_POINT && wrapped_key_supported == "true") {
- LOG(DEBUG) << "Wrapped key supported on " << mount_point;
- return true;
- } else {
+ auto entry = GetEntryForMountPoint(&fstab_default, DATA_MNT_POINT);
+ if (entry == nullptr) {
+ LOG(ERROR) << "No mount point entry for " << DATA_MNT_POINT;
return false;
}
+ if (!ParseOptions(entry->encryption_options, options)) {
+ LOG(ERROR) << "Unable to parse encryption options for " << DATA_MNT_POINT ": "
+ << entry->encryption_options;
+ return false;
+ }
+ if ((options->flags & FSCRYPT_POLICY_FLAG_IV_INO_LBLK_32) &&
+ !IsEmmcStorage(entry->blk_device)) {
+ LOG(ERROR) << "The emmc_optimized encryption flag is only allowed on eMMC storage. Remove "
+ "this flag from the device's fstab";
+ return false;
+ }
+ return true;
}
-bool is_metadata_wrapped_key_supported() {
- return is_metadata_wrapped_key_supported_common(METADATA_MNT_POINT);
+static bool install_storage_key(const std::string& mountpoint, const EncryptionOptions& options,
+ const KeyBuffer& key, EncryptionPolicy* policy) {
+ KeyBuffer ephemeral_wrapped_key;
+ if (options.use_hw_wrapped_key) {
+ if (!exportWrappedStorageKey(key, &ephemeral_wrapped_key)) {
+ LOG(ERROR) << "Failed to get ephemeral wrapped key";
+ return false;
+ }
+ }
+ return installKey(mountpoint, options, options.use_hw_wrapped_key ? ephemeral_wrapped_key : key,
+ policy);
+}
+
+// Retrieve the options to use for encryption policies on adoptable storage.
+static bool get_volume_file_encryption_options(EncryptionOptions* options) {
+ // If we give the empty string, libfscrypt will use the default (currently XTS)
+ auto contents_mode = android::base::GetProperty("ro.crypto.volume.contents_mode", "");
+ // HEH as default was always a mistake. Use the libfscrypt default (CTS)
+ // for devices launching on versions above Android 10.
+ auto first_api_level = GetFirstApiLevel();
+ constexpr uint64_t pre_gki_level = 29;
+ auto filenames_mode =
+ android::base::GetProperty("ro.crypto.volume.filenames_mode",
+ first_api_level > pre_gki_level ? "" : "aes-256-heh");
+ auto options_string = android::base::GetProperty("ro.crypto.volume.options",
+ contents_mode + ":" + filenames_mode);
+ if (!ParseOptionsForApiLevel(first_api_level, options_string, options)) {
+ LOG(ERROR) << "Unable to parse volume encryption options: " << options_string;
+ return false;
+ }
+ if (options->flags & FSCRYPT_POLICY_FLAG_IV_INO_LBLK_32) {
+ LOG(ERROR) << "The emmc_optimized encryption flag is only allowed on eMMC storage. Remove "
+ "this flag from ro.crypto.volume.options";
+ return false;
+ }
+ return true;
}
static bool read_and_install_user_ce_key(userid_t user_id,
- const android::vold::KeyAuthentication& auth) {
- if (s_ce_key_raw_refs.count(user_id) != 0) return true;
+ const ::KeyAuthentication& auth) {
+ if (s_ce_policies.count(user_id) != 0) return true;
+ EncryptionOptions options;
+ if (!get_data_file_encryption_options(&options)) return false;
KeyBuffer ce_key;
if (!read_and_fixate_user_ce_key(user_id, auth, &ce_key)) return false;
- std::string ce_raw_ref;
- if (is_wrapped_key_supported()) {
- KeyBuffer ephemeral_wrapped_key;
- if (!getEphemeralWrappedKey(KeyFormat::RAW, ce_key, &ephemeral_wrapped_key)) {
- LOG(ERROR) << "Failed to export ce key";
- return false;
- }
- ce_key = std::move(ephemeral_wrapped_key);
- }
- if (!android::vold::installKey(ce_key, &ce_raw_ref)) return false;
- s_ce_keys[user_id] = std::move(ce_key);
- s_ce_key_raw_refs[user_id] = ce_raw_ref;
- LOG(DEBUG) << "Installed ce key for user " << user_id;
+ EncryptionPolicy ce_policy;
+ if (!install_storage_key(DATA_MNT_POINT, options, ce_key, &ce_policy)) return false;
+ s_ce_policies[user_id] = ce_policy;
+ LOG(INFO) << "Installed ce key for user " << user_id;
return true;
}
static bool prepare_dir(const std::string& dir, mode_t mode, uid_t uid, gid_t gid) {
- LOG(DEBUG) << "Preparing: " << dir;
+ LOG(INFO) << "Preparing: " << dir;
if (fs_prepare_dir(dir.c_str(), mode, uid, gid) != 0) {
PLOG(ERROR) << "Failed to prepare " << dir;
return false;
@@ -277,7 +318,7 @@
}
static bool destroy_dir(const std::string& dir) {
- LOG(DEBUG) << "Destroying: " << dir;
+ LOG(INFO) << "Destroying: " << dir;
if (rmdir(dir.c_str()) != 0 && errno != ENOENT) {
PLOG(ERROR) << "Failed to destroy " << dir;
return false;
@@ -288,16 +329,12 @@
// NB this assumes that there is only one thread listening for crypt commands, because
// it creates keys in a fixed location.
static bool create_and_install_user_keys(userid_t user_id, bool create_ephemeral) {
+ LOG(INFO) << "fscrypt::create_and_install_user_keys";
+ EncryptionOptions options;
+ if (!get_data_file_encryption_options(&options)) return false;
KeyBuffer de_key, ce_key;
-
- if(is_wrapped_key_supported()) {
- if (!generateWrappedKey(user_id, android::vold::KeyType::DE_USER, &de_key)) return false;
- if (!generateWrappedKey(user_id, android::vold::KeyType::CE_USER, &ce_key)) return false;
- } else {
- if (!android::vold::randomKey(&de_key)) return false;
- if (!android::vold::randomKey(&ce_key)) return false;
- }
-
+ if (!generateStorageKey(makeGen(options), &de_key)) return false;
+ if (!generateStorageKey(makeGen(options), &ce_key)) return false;
if (create_ephemeral) {
// If the key should be created as ephemeral, don't store it.
s_ephemeral_users.insert(user_id);
@@ -307,81 +344,37 @@
auto const paths = get_ce_key_paths(directory_path);
std::string ce_key_path;
if (!get_ce_key_new_path(directory_path, paths, &ce_key_path)) return false;
- if (!android::vold::storeKeyAtomically(ce_key_path, user_key_temp, kEmptyAuthentication,
+ if (!::storeKeyAtomically(ce_key_path, user_key_temp, kEmptyAuthentication,
ce_key))
return false;
fixate_user_ce_key(directory_path, ce_key_path, paths);
// Write DE key second; once this is written, all is good.
- if (!android::vold::storeKeyAtomically(get_de_key_path(user_id), user_key_temp,
+ if (!::storeKeyAtomically(get_de_key_path(user_id), user_key_temp,
kEmptyAuthentication, de_key))
return false;
}
-
- std::string ce_raw_ref;
- if (is_wrapped_key_supported()) {
- KeyBuffer ephemeral_wrapped_de_key;
- KeyBuffer ephemeral_wrapped_ce_key;
-
- /* Export and install the DE keys */
- if (!getEphemeralWrappedKey(KeyFormat::RAW, de_key, &ephemeral_wrapped_de_key)) {
- LOG(ERROR) << "Failed to export de_key";
- return false;
- }
- /* Export and install the CE keys */
- if (!getEphemeralWrappedKey(KeyFormat::RAW, ce_key, &ephemeral_wrapped_ce_key)) {
- LOG(ERROR) << "Failed to export de_key";
- return false;
- }
-
- de_key = std::move(ephemeral_wrapped_de_key);
- ce_key = std::move(ephemeral_wrapped_ce_key);
- }
- if (!android::vold::installKey(de_key, &de_raw_ref)) return false;
- if (!android::vold::installKey(ce_key, &ce_raw_ref)) return false;
- s_ce_keys[user_id] = std::move(ce_key);
-
- s_de_key_raw_refs[user_id] = de_raw_ref;
- s_ce_key_raw_refs[user_id] = ce_raw_ref;
-
- LOG(DEBUG) << "Created keys for user " << user_id;
+ EncryptionPolicy de_policy;
+ if (!install_storage_key(DATA_MNT_POINT, options, de_key, &de_policy)) return false;
+ s_de_policies[user_id] = de_policy;
+ LOG(INFO) << "fscrypt::added de_policy";
+ EncryptionPolicy ce_policy;
+ if (!install_storage_key(DATA_MNT_POINT, options, ce_key, &ce_policy)) return false;
+ s_ce_policies[user_id] = ce_policy;
+ LOG(INFO) << "Created keys for user " << user_id;
return true;
}
-bool lookup_key_ref(const std::map<userid_t, std::string>& key_map, userid_t user_id,
- std::string* raw_ref) {
+bool lookup_policy(const std::map<userid_t, EncryptionPolicy>& key_map, userid_t user_id,
+ EncryptionPolicy* policy) {
auto refi = key_map.find(user_id);
if (refi == key_map.end()) {
- LOG(DEBUG) << "Cannot find key for " << user_id;
+ LOG(ERROR) << "Cannot find key for " << user_id;
return false;
}
- *raw_ref = refi->second;
+ *policy = refi->second;
return true;
}
-static void get_data_file_encryption_modes(PolicyKeyRef* key_ref) {
- if (!ReadDefaultFstab(&fstab_default)) {
- PLOG(ERROR) << "Failed to open default fstab";
- return;
- }
- /*auto entry = android::fs_mgr::GetEntryForMountPoint(&fstab_default, DATA_MNT_POINT);
- if (entry == nullptr) {
- LOG(ERROR) << "get_data_file_encryption_modes::failed\n";
- return;
- }*/
- LOG(INFO) << "contents mode '" << android::base::GetProperty("fbe.contents", "aes-256-xts") << "' filenames '" << android::base::GetProperty("fbe.filenames", "aes-256-heh") << "'\n";
- key_ref->contents_mode =
- android::base::GetProperty("fbe.contents", "aes-256-xts");
- key_ref->filenames_mode =
- android::base::GetProperty("fbe.filenames", "aes-256-heh");
-}
-
-static bool ensure_policy(const PolicyKeyRef& key_ref, const std::string& path) {
- return true;
- /*return fscrypt_policy_ensure(path.c_str(), key_ref.key_raw_ref.data(),
- key_ref.key_raw_ref.size(), key_ref.contents_mode.c_str(),
- key_ref.filenames_mode.c_str()) == 0;*/
-}
-
static bool is_numeric(const char* name) {
for (const char* p = name; *p != '\0'; p++) {
if (!isdigit(*p)) return false;
@@ -390,6 +383,9 @@
}
static bool load_all_de_keys() {
+ LOG(INFO) << "fscrypt::load_all_de_keys";
+ EncryptionOptions options;
+ if (!get_data_file_encryption_options(&options)) return false;
auto de_dir = user_key_dir + "/de";
auto dirp = std::unique_ptr<DIR, int (*)(DIR*)>(opendir(de_dir.c_str()), closedir);
if (!dirp) {
@@ -407,86 +403,92 @@
break;
}
if (entry->d_type != DT_DIR || !is_numeric(entry->d_name)) {
- LOG(DEBUG) << "Skipping non-de-key " << entry->d_name;
+ LOG(INFO) << "Skipping non-de-key " << entry->d_name;
continue;
}
userid_t user_id = std::stoi(entry->d_name);
- if (s_de_key_raw_refs.count(user_id) == 0) {
- auto key_path = de_dir + "/" + entry->d_name;
- KeyBuffer key;
- if (!android::vold::retrieveKey(key_path, kEmptyAuthentication, &key)) return false;
- std::string raw_ref;
- if (is_wrapped_key_supported()) {
- KeyBuffer ephemeral_wrapped_key;
- if (!getEphemeralWrappedKey(KeyFormat::RAW, key, &ephemeral_wrapped_key)) {
- LOG(ERROR) << "Failed to export de_key in create_and_install_user_keys";
- return false;
- }
- key = std::move(ephemeral_wrapped_key);
- }
- if (!android::vold::installKey(key, &raw_ref)) return false;
- s_de_key_raw_refs[user_id] = raw_ref;
- LOG(DEBUG) << "Installed de key for user " << user_id;
-
- std::string user_prop = "twrp.user." + std::to_string(user_id) + ".decrypt";
- property_set(user_prop.c_str(), "0");
+ auto key_path = de_dir + "/" + entry->d_name;
+ KeyBuffer de_key;
+ if (!retrieveKey(key_path, kEmptyAuthentication, &de_key)) return false;
+ EncryptionPolicy de_policy;
+ if (!install_storage_key(DATA_MNT_POINT, options, de_key, &de_policy)) return false;
+ auto ret = s_de_policies.insert({user_id, de_policy});
+ LOG(INFO) << "fscrypt::load_all_de_keys::s_de_policies::size::" << s_de_policies.size();
+ if (!ret.second && ret.first->second != de_policy) {
+ LOG(INFO) << "DE policy for user" << user_id << " changed";
+ return false;
}
+ LOG(INFO) << "Installed de key for user " << user_id;
+ std::string user_prop = "twrp.user." + std::to_string(user_id) + ".decrypt";
+ property_set(user_prop.c_str(), "0");
}
// fscrypt:TODO: go through all DE directories, ensure that all user dirs have the
// correct policy set on them, and that no rogue ones exist.
return true;
}
+// Attempt to reinstall CE keys for users that we think are unlocked.
+static bool try_reload_ce_keys() {
+ for (const auto& it : s_ce_policies) {
+ if (!::reloadKeyFromSessionKeyring(DATA_MNT_POINT, it.second)) {
+ LOG(ERROR) << "Failed to load CE key from session keyring for user " << it.first;
+ return false;
+ }
+ }
+ return true;
+}
+
bool fscrypt_initialize_systemwide_keys() {
LOG(INFO) << "fscrypt_initialize_systemwide_keys";
- bool wrapped_key_supported = false;
- if (s_systemwide_keys_initialized) {
- LOG(INFO) << "Already initialized";
- return true;
- }
+ EncryptionOptions options;
+ if (!get_data_file_encryption_options(&options)) return false;
- PolicyKeyRef device_ref;
- wrapped_key_supported = is_wrapped_key_supported();
-
- if (!android::vold::retrieveAndInstallKey(true, kEmptyAuthentication,
- device_key_path, device_key_temp,
- &device_ref.key_raw_ref, wrapped_key_supported))
+ KeyBuffer device_key;
+ if (!retrieveOrGenerateKey(device_key_path, device_key_temp, kEmptyAuthentication,
+ makeGen(options), &device_key))
return false;
- get_data_file_encryption_modes(&device_ref);
- std::string modestring = device_ref.contents_mode + ":" + device_ref.filenames_mode;
- std::string mode_filename = std::string("/data") + fscrypt_key_mode;
- if (!android::vold::writeStringToFile(modestring, mode_filename)) return false;
+ EncryptionPolicy device_policy;
+ if (!install_storage_key(DATA_MNT_POINT, options, device_key, &device_policy)) return false;
- std::string ref_filename = std::string("/data") + fscrypt_key_ref;
- if (!android::vold::writeStringToFile(device_ref.key_raw_ref, ref_filename)) return false;
+ std::string options_string;
+ if (!OptionsToString(device_policy.options, &options_string)) {
+ LOG(ERROR) << "Unable to serialize options";
+ return false;
+ }
+ std::string options_filename = std::string(DATA_MNT_POINT) + fscrypt_key_mode;
+ if (!::writeStringToFile(options_string, options_filename)) return false;
+
+ std::string ref_filename = std::string(DATA_MNT_POINT) + fscrypt_key_ref;
+ de_key_raw_ref = device_policy.key_raw_ref;
+ if (!::writeStringToFile(device_policy.key_raw_ref, ref_filename)) return false;
LOG(INFO) << "Wrote system DE key reference to:" << ref_filename;
KeyBuffer per_boot_key;
- if (!android::vold::randomKey(&per_boot_key)) return false;
- std::string per_boot_raw_ref;
- if (!android::vold::installKey(per_boot_key, &per_boot_raw_ref)) return false;
+ if (!generateStorageKey(makeGen(options), &per_boot_key)) return false;
+ EncryptionPolicy per_boot_policy;
+ if (!install_storage_key(DATA_MNT_POINT, options, per_boot_key, &per_boot_policy)) return false;
std::string per_boot_ref_filename = std::string("/data") + fscrypt_key_per_boot_ref;
- if (!android::vold::writeStringToFile(per_boot_raw_ref, per_boot_ref_filename)) return false;
+ if (!::writeStringToFile(per_boot_policy.key_raw_ref, per_boot_ref_filename))
+ return false;
LOG(INFO) << "Wrote per boot key reference to:" << per_boot_ref_filename;
- if (!android::vold::FsyncDirectory(device_key_dir)) return false;
- s_systemwide_keys_initialized = true;
- de_raw_ref = device_ref.key_raw_ref;
+ if (!::FsyncDirectory(device_key_dir)) return false;
return true;
}
bool fscrypt_init_user0() {
- if (!ReadDefaultFstab(&fstab_default)) {
+ if (!ReadDefaultFstab(&fstab_default)) {
PLOG(ERROR) << "Failed to open default fstab";
return -1;
}
+ LOG(INFO) << "fscrypt_init_user0";
if (fscrypt_is_native()) {
if (!prepare_dir(user_key_dir, 0700, AID_ROOT, AID_ROOT)) return false;
if (!prepare_dir(user_key_dir + "/ce", 0700, AID_ROOT, AID_ROOT)) return false;
if (!prepare_dir(user_key_dir + "/de", 0700, AID_ROOT, AID_ROOT)) return false;
- if (!android::vold::pathExists(get_de_key_path(0))) {
+ if (!::pathExists(get_de_key_path(0))) {
if (!create_and_install_user_keys(0, false)) return false;
}
// TODO: switch to loading only DE_0 here once framework makes
@@ -496,26 +498,37 @@
// We can only safely prepare DE storage here, since CE keys are probably
// entangled with user credentials. The framework will always prepare CE
// storage once CE keys are installed.
- if (!fscrypt_prepare_user_storage("", 0, 0, STORAGE_FLAG_DE)) {
+ LOG(INFO) << "attempting fscrypt_prepare_user_storage";
+ if (!fscrypt_prepare_user_storage("", 0, 0, android::os::IVold::STORAGE_FLAG_DE)) {
LOG(ERROR) << "Failed to prepare user 0 storage";
return false;
}
+
// If this is a non-FBE device that recently left an emulated mode,
// restore user data directories to known-good state.
if (!fscrypt_is_native() && !fscrypt_is_emulated()) {
+ LOG(INFO) << "unlocking data media";
fscrypt_unlock_user_key(0, 0, "!", "!");
}
+ // In some scenarios (e.g. userspace reboot) we might unmount userdata
+ // without doing a hard reboot. If CE keys were stored in fs keyring then
+ // they will be lost after unmount. Attempt to re-install them.
+ if (fscrypt_is_native() && ::isFsKeyringSupported()) {
+ LOG(INFO) << "reloading ce keys";
+ if (!try_reload_ce_keys()) return false;
+ }
+
return true;
}
bool fscrypt_vold_create_user_key(userid_t user_id, int serial, bool ephemeral) {
- LOG(DEBUG) << "fscrypt_vold_create_user_key for " << user_id << " serial " << serial;
+ LOG(INFO) << "fscrypt_vold_create_user_key for " << user_id << " serial " << serial;
if (!fscrypt_is_native()) {
- return true;
+ return true;
}
// FIXME test for existence of key that is not loaded yet
- if (s_ce_key_raw_refs.count(user_id) != 0) {
+ if (s_ce_policies.count(user_id) != 0) {
LOG(ERROR) << "Already exists, can't fscrypt_vold_create_user_key for " << user_id
<< " serial " << serial;
// FIXME should we fail the command?
@@ -527,49 +540,60 @@
return true;
}
-static void drop_caches() {
- // Clean any dirty pages (otherwise they won't be dropped).
+// "Lock" all encrypted directories whose key has been removed. This is needed
+// in the case where the keys are being put in the session keyring (rather in
+// the newer filesystem-level keyrings), because removing a key from the session
+// keyring doesn't affect inodes in the kernel's inode cache whose per-file key
+// was already set up. So to remove the per-file keys and make the files
+// "appear encrypted", these inodes must be evicted.
+//
+// To do this, sync() to clean all dirty inodes, then drop all reclaimable slab
+// objects systemwide. This is overkill, but it's the best available method
+// currently. Don't use drop_caches mode "3" because that also evicts pagecache
+// for in-use files; all files relevant here are already closed and sync'ed.
+static void drop_caches_if_needed() {
+ if (::isFsKeyringSupported()) {
+ return;
+ }
sync();
- // Drop inode and page caches.
- if (!android::vold::writeStringToFile("3", "/proc/sys/vm/drop_caches")) {
+ if (!writeStringToFile("2", "/proc/sys/vm/drop_caches")) {
PLOG(ERROR) << "Failed to drop caches during key eviction";
}
}
static bool evict_ce_key(userid_t user_id) {
- s_ce_keys.erase(user_id);
bool success = true;
- std::string raw_ref;
+ EncryptionPolicy policy;
// If we haven't loaded the CE key, no need to evict it.
- if (lookup_key_ref(s_ce_key_raw_refs, user_id, &raw_ref)) {
- success &= android::vold::evictKey(raw_ref);
- drop_caches();
+ if (lookup_policy(s_ce_policies, user_id, &policy)) {
+ success &= ::evictKey(DATA_MNT_POINT, policy);
+ drop_caches_if_needed();
}
- s_ce_key_raw_refs.erase(user_id);
+ s_ce_policies.erase(user_id);
return success;
}
bool fscrypt_destroy_user_key(userid_t user_id) {
- LOG(DEBUG) << "fscrypt_destroy_user_key(" << user_id << ")";
+ LOG(INFO) << "fscrypt_destroy_user_key(" << user_id << ")";
if (!fscrypt_is_native()) {
return true;
}
bool success = true;
- std::string raw_ref;
success &= evict_ce_key(user_id);
- success &=
- lookup_key_ref(s_de_key_raw_refs, user_id, &raw_ref) && android::vold::evictKey(raw_ref);
- s_de_key_raw_refs.erase(user_id);
+ EncryptionPolicy de_policy;
+ success &= lookup_policy(s_de_policies, user_id, &de_policy) &&
+ ::evictKey(DATA_MNT_POINT, de_policy);
+ s_de_policies.erase(user_id);
auto it = s_ephemeral_users.find(user_id);
if (it != s_ephemeral_users.end()) {
s_ephemeral_users.erase(it);
} else {
for (auto const path : get_ce_key_paths(get_ce_key_directory_path(user_id))) {
- success &= android::vold::destroyKey(path);
+ success &= ::destroyKey(path);
}
auto de_key_path = get_de_key_path(user_id);
- if (android::vold::pathExists(de_key_path)) {
- success &= android::vold::destroyKey(de_key_path);
+ if (::pathExists(de_key_path)) {
+ success &= ::destroyKey(de_key_path);
} else {
LOG(INFO) << "Not present so not erasing: " << de_key_path;
}
@@ -612,13 +636,25 @@
*result = "";
return true;
}
- if (android::vold::HexToStr(hex, *result) != 0) {
+ if (::HexToStr(hex, *result) != 0) {
LOG(ERROR) << "Invalid FBE hex string"; // Don't log the string for security reasons
return false;
}
return true;
}
+static std::optional<::KeyAuthentication> authentication_from_hex(
+ const std::string& token_hex, const std::string& secret_hex) {
+ std::string token, secret;
+ if (!parse_hex(token_hex, &token)) return std::optional<::KeyAuthentication>();
+ if (!parse_hex(secret_hex, &secret)) return std::optional<::KeyAuthentication>();
+ if (secret.empty()) {
+ return kEmptyAuthentication;
+ } else {
+ return ::KeyAuthentication(token, secret);
+ }
+}
+
static std::string volkey_path(const std::string& misc_path, const std::string& volume_uuid) {
return misc_path + "/vold/volume_keys/" + volume_uuid + "/default";
}
@@ -628,19 +664,18 @@
}
static bool read_or_create_volkey(const std::string& misc_path, const std::string& volume_uuid,
- PolicyKeyRef* key_ref) {
+ EncryptionPolicy* policy) {
auto secdiscardable_path = volume_secdiscardable_path(volume_uuid);
std::string secdiscardable_hash;
- bool wrapped_key_supported = false;
- if (android::vold::pathExists(secdiscardable_path)) {
- if (!android::vold::readSecdiscardable(secdiscardable_path, &secdiscardable_hash))
+ if (::pathExists(secdiscardable_path)) {
+ if (!readSecdiscardable(secdiscardable_path, &secdiscardable_hash))
return false;
} else {
if (fs_mkdirs(secdiscardable_path.c_str(), 0700) != 0) {
PLOG(ERROR) << "Creating directories for: " << secdiscardable_path;
return false;
}
- if (!android::vold::createSecdiscardable(secdiscardable_path, &secdiscardable_hash))
+ if (!::createSecdiscardable(secdiscardable_path, &secdiscardable_hash))
return false;
}
auto key_path = volkey_path(misc_path, volume_uuid);
@@ -648,107 +683,72 @@
PLOG(ERROR) << "Creating directories for: " << key_path;
return false;
}
- android::vold::KeyAuthentication auth("", secdiscardable_hash);
- wrapped_key_supported = is_wrapped_key_supported_external();
+ ::KeyAuthentication auth("", secdiscardable_hash);
- if (!android::vold::retrieveAndInstallKey(true, auth, key_path, key_path + "_tmp",
- &key_ref->key_raw_ref, wrapped_key_supported))
+ EncryptionOptions options;
+ if (!get_volume_file_encryption_options(&options)) return false;
+ KeyBuffer key;
+ if (!retrieveOrGenerateKey(key_path, key_path + "_tmp", auth, makeGen(options), &key))
return false;
- key_ref->contents_mode =
- android::base::GetProperty("ro.crypto.volume.contents_mode", "aes-256-xts");
- key_ref->filenames_mode =
- android::base::GetProperty("ro.crypto.volume.filenames_mode", "aes-256-heh");
+ if (!install_storage_key(BuildDataPath(volume_uuid), options, key, policy)) return false;
return true;
}
static bool destroy_volkey(const std::string& misc_path, const std::string& volume_uuid) {
auto path = volkey_path(misc_path, volume_uuid);
- if (!android::vold::pathExists(path)) return true;
- return android::vold::destroyKey(path);
+ if (!::pathExists(path)) return true;
+ return ::destroyKey(path);
+}
+
+static bool fscrypt_rewrap_user_key(userid_t user_id, int serial,
+ const ::KeyAuthentication& retrieve_auth,
+ const ::KeyAuthentication& store_auth) {
+ if (s_ephemeral_users.count(user_id) != 0) return true;
+ auto const directory_path = get_ce_key_directory_path(user_id);
+ KeyBuffer ce_key;
+ std::string ce_key_current_path = get_ce_key_current_path(directory_path);
+ if (retrieveKey(ce_key_current_path, retrieve_auth, &ce_key)) {
+ LOG(INFO) << "Successfully retrieved key";
+ // TODO(147732812): Remove this once Locksettingservice is fixed.
+ // Currently it calls fscrypt_clear_user_key_auth with a secret when lockscreen is
+ // changed from swipe to none or vice-versa
+ } else if (retrieveKey(ce_key_current_path, kEmptyAuthentication, &ce_key)) {
+ LOG(INFO) << "Successfully retrieved key with empty auth";
+ } else {
+ LOG(ERROR) << "Failed to retrieve key for user " << user_id;
+ return false;
+ }
+ auto const paths = get_ce_key_paths(directory_path);
+ std::string ce_key_path;
+ if (!get_ce_key_new_path(directory_path, paths, &ce_key_path)) return false;
+ if (!::storeKeyAtomically(ce_key_path, user_key_temp, store_auth, ce_key))
+ return false;
+ if (!::FsyncDirectory(directory_path)) return false;
+ return true;
}
bool fscrypt_add_user_key_auth(userid_t user_id, int serial, const std::string& token_hex,
const std::string& secret_hex) {
- LOG(DEBUG) << "fscrypt_add_user_key_auth " << user_id << " serial=" << serial
+ LOG(INFO) << "fscrypt_add_user_key_auth " << user_id << " serial=" << serial
<< " token_present=" << (token_hex != "!");
if (!fscrypt_is_native()) return true;
- if (s_ephemeral_users.count(user_id) != 0) return true;
- std::string token, secret;
- if (!parse_hex(token_hex, &token)) return false;
- if (!parse_hex(secret_hex, &secret)) return false;
- auto auth =
- secret.empty() ? kEmptyAuthentication : android::vold::KeyAuthentication(token, secret);
- auto const directory_path = get_ce_key_directory_path(user_id);
- auto const paths = get_ce_key_paths(directory_path);
-
- KeyBuffer ce_key;
- if(is_wrapped_key_supported()) {
- std::string ce_key_current_path = get_ce_key_current_path(directory_path);
- if (android::vold::retrieveKey(ce_key_current_path, kEmptyAuthentication, &ce_key)) {
- LOG(DEBUG) << "Successfully retrieved key";
- } else {
- if (android::vold::retrieveKey(ce_key_current_path, auth, &ce_key)) {
- LOG(DEBUG) << "Successfully retrieved key";
- }
- }
- } else {
- auto it = s_ce_keys.find(user_id);
- if (it == s_ce_keys.end()) {
- LOG(ERROR) << "Key not loaded into memory, can't change for user " << user_id;
- return false;
- }
- ce_key = it->second;
- }
-
- std::string ce_key_path;
- if (!get_ce_key_new_path(directory_path, paths, &ce_key_path)) return false;
- if (!android::vold::storeKeyAtomically(ce_key_path, user_key_temp, auth, ce_key)) return false;
- if (!android::vold::FsyncDirectory(directory_path)) return false;
- return true;
+ auto auth = authentication_from_hex(token_hex, secret_hex);
+ if (!auth) return false;
+ return fscrypt_rewrap_user_key(user_id, serial, kEmptyAuthentication, *auth);
}
bool fscrypt_clear_user_key_auth(userid_t user_id, int serial, const std::string& token_hex,
const std::string& secret_hex) {
- LOG(DEBUG) << "fscrypt_clear_user_key_auth " << user_id << " serial=" << serial
+ LOG(INFO) << "fscrypt_clear_user_key_auth " << user_id << " serial=" << serial
<< " token_present=" << (token_hex != "!");
if (!fscrypt_is_native()) return true;
- if (s_ephemeral_users.count(user_id) != 0) return true;
- std::string token, secret;
-
- if (!parse_hex(token_hex, &token)) return false;
- if (!parse_hex(secret_hex, &secret)) return false;
-
- if (is_wrapped_key_supported()) {
- auto const directory_path = get_ce_key_directory_path(user_id);
- auto const paths = get_ce_key_paths(directory_path);
-
- KeyBuffer ce_key;
- std::string ce_key_current_path = get_ce_key_current_path(directory_path);
-
- auto auth = android::vold::KeyAuthentication(token, secret);
- /* Retrieve key while removing a pin. A secret is needed */
- if (android::vold::retrieveKey(ce_key_current_path, auth, &ce_key)) {
- LOG(DEBUG) << "Successfully retrieved key";
- } else {
- /* Retrieve key when going None to swipe and vice versa when a
- synthetic password is present */
- if (android::vold::retrieveKey(ce_key_current_path, kEmptyAuthentication, &ce_key)) {
- LOG(DEBUG) << "Successfully retrieved key";
- }
- }
-
- std::string ce_key_path;
- if (!get_ce_key_new_path(directory_path, paths, &ce_key_path)) return false;
- if (!android::vold::storeKeyAtomically(ce_key_path, user_key_temp, kEmptyAuthentication, ce_key))
- return false;
- } else {
- if(!fscrypt_add_user_key_auth(user_id, serial, "!", "!")) return false;
- }
- return true;
+ auto auth = authentication_from_hex(token_hex, secret_hex);
+ if (!auth) return false;
+ return fscrypt_rewrap_user_key(user_id, serial, *auth, kEmptyAuthentication);
}
bool fscrypt_fixate_newest_user_key_auth(userid_t user_id) {
- LOG(DEBUG) << "fscrypt_fixate_newest_user_key_auth " << user_id;
+ LOG(INFO) << "fscrypt_fixate_newest_user_key_auth " << user_id;
if (!fscrypt_is_native()) return true;
if (s_ephemeral_users.count(user_id) != 0) return true;
auto const directory_path = get_ce_key_directory_path(user_id);
@@ -764,18 +764,16 @@
// TODO: rename to 'install' for consistency, and take flags to know which keys to install
bool fscrypt_unlock_user_key(userid_t user_id, int serial, const std::string& token_hex,
const std::string& secret_hex) {
- LOG(DEBUG) << "fscrypt_unlock_user_key " << user_id << " serial=" << serial
+ LOG(INFO) << "fscrypt_unlock_user_key " << user_id << " serial=" << serial
<< " token_present=" << (token_hex != "!");
if (fscrypt_is_native()) {
- if (s_ce_key_raw_refs.count(user_id) != 0) {
+ if (s_ce_policies.count(user_id) != 0) {
LOG(WARNING) << "Tried to unlock already-unlocked key for user " << user_id;
return true;
}
- std::string token, secret;
- if (!parse_hex(token_hex, &token)) return false;
- if (!parse_hex(secret_hex, &secret)) return false;
- android::vold::KeyAuthentication auth(token, secret);
- if (!read_and_install_user_ce_key(user_id, auth)) {
+ auto auth = authentication_from_hex(token_hex, secret_hex);
+ if (!auth) return false;
+ if (!read_and_install_user_ce_key(user_id, *auth)) {
LOG(ERROR) << "Couldn't read key for " << user_id;
return false;
}
@@ -783,10 +781,10 @@
// When in emulation mode, we just use chmod. However, we also
// unlock directories when not in emulation mode, to bring devices
// back into a known-good state.
- if (!emulated_unlock(android::vold::BuildDataSystemCePath(user_id), 0771) ||
- !emulated_unlock(android::vold::BuildDataMiscCePath(user_id), 01771) ||
- !emulated_unlock(android::vold::BuildDataMediaCePath("", user_id), 0770) ||
- !emulated_unlock(android::vold::BuildDataUserCePath("", user_id), 0771)) {
+ if (!emulated_unlock(::BuildDataSystemCePath(user_id), 0771) ||
+ !emulated_unlock(::BuildDataMiscCePath(user_id), 01771) ||
+ !emulated_unlock(::BuildDataMediaCePath("", user_id), 0770) ||
+ !emulated_unlock(::BuildDataUserCePath("", user_id), 0771)) {
LOG(ERROR) << "Failed to unlock user " << user_id;
return false;
}
@@ -796,15 +794,15 @@
// TODO: rename to 'evict' for consistency
bool fscrypt_lock_user_key(userid_t user_id) {
- LOG(DEBUG) << "fscrypt_lock_user_key " << user_id;
+ LOG(INFO) << "fscrypt_lock_user_key " << user_id;
if (fscrypt_is_native()) {
return evict_ce_key(user_id);
} else if (fscrypt_is_emulated()) {
// When in emulation mode, we just use chmod
- if (!emulated_lock(android::vold::BuildDataSystemCePath(user_id)) ||
- !emulated_lock(android::vold::BuildDataMiscCePath(user_id)) ||
- !emulated_lock(android::vold::BuildDataMediaCePath("", user_id)) ||
- !emulated_lock(android::vold::BuildDataUserCePath("", user_id))) {
+ if (!emulated_lock(::BuildDataSystemCePath(user_id)) ||
+ !emulated_lock(::BuildDataMiscCePath(user_id)) ||
+ !emulated_lock(::BuildDataMediaCePath("", user_id)) ||
+ !emulated_lock(::BuildDataUserCePath("", user_id))) {
LOG(ERROR) << "Failed to lock user " << user_id;
return false;
}
@@ -815,7 +813,7 @@
static bool prepare_subdirs(const std::string& action, const std::string& volume_uuid,
userid_t user_id, int flags) {
- if (0 != android::vold::ForkExecvp(
+ if (0 != ::ForkExecvp(
std::vector<std::string>{prepare_subdirs_path, action, volume_uuid,
std::to_string(user_id), std::to_string(flags)})) {
LOG(ERROR) << "vold_prepare_subdirs failed";
@@ -826,20 +824,20 @@
bool fscrypt_prepare_user_storage(const std::string& volume_uuid, userid_t user_id, int serial,
int flags) {
- LOG(DEBUG) << "fscrypt_prepare_user_storage for volume " << escape_empty(volume_uuid)
+ LOG(INFO) << "fscrypt_prepare_user_storage for volume " << escape_empty(volume_uuid)
<< ", user " << user_id << ", serial " << serial << ", flags " << flags;
- if (flags & STORAGE_FLAG_DE) {
+ if (flags & android::os::IVold::STORAGE_FLAG_DE) {
// DE_sys key
- auto system_legacy_path = android::vold::BuildDataSystemLegacyPath(user_id);
- auto misc_legacy_path = android::vold::BuildDataMiscLegacyPath(user_id);
- auto profiles_de_path = android::vold::BuildDataProfilesDePath(user_id);
+ auto system_legacy_path = ::BuildDataSystemLegacyPath(user_id);
+ auto misc_legacy_path = ::BuildDataMiscLegacyPath(user_id);
+ auto profiles_de_path = ::BuildDataProfilesDePath(user_id);
// DE_n key
- auto system_de_path = android::vold::BuildDataSystemDePath(user_id);
- auto misc_de_path = android::vold::BuildDataMiscDePath(user_id);
- auto vendor_de_path = android::vold::BuildDataVendorDePath(user_id);
- auto user_de_path = android::vold::BuildDataUserDePath(volume_uuid, user_id);
+ auto system_de_path = ::BuildDataSystemDePath(user_id);
+ auto misc_de_path = ::BuildDataMiscDePath(user_id);
+ auto vendor_de_path = ::BuildDataVendorDePath(user_id);
+ auto user_de_path = ::BuildDataUserDePath(volume_uuid, user_id);
if (volume_uuid.empty()) {
if (!prepare_dir(system_legacy_path, 0700, AID_SYSTEM, AID_SYSTEM)) return false;
@@ -855,28 +853,27 @@
if (!prepare_dir(vendor_de_path, 0771, AID_ROOT, AID_ROOT)) return false;
}
if (!prepare_dir(user_de_path, 0771, AID_SYSTEM, AID_SYSTEM)) return false;
-
if (fscrypt_is_native()) {
- PolicyKeyRef de_ref;
+ EncryptionPolicy de_policy;
if (volume_uuid.empty()) {
- if (!lookup_key_ref(s_de_key_raw_refs, user_id, &de_ref.key_raw_ref)) return false;
- get_data_file_encryption_modes(&de_ref);
- if (!ensure_policy(de_ref, system_de_path)) return false;
- if (!ensure_policy(de_ref, misc_de_path)) return false;
- if (!ensure_policy(de_ref, vendor_de_path)) return false;
+ if (!lookup_policy(s_de_policies, user_id, &de_policy)) return false;
+ if (!EnsurePolicy(de_policy, system_de_path)) return false;
+ if (!EnsurePolicy(de_policy, misc_de_path)) return false;
+ if (!EnsurePolicy(de_policy, vendor_de_path)) return false;
} else {
- if (!read_or_create_volkey(misc_de_path, volume_uuid, &de_ref)) return false;
+ if (!read_or_create_volkey(misc_de_path, volume_uuid, &de_policy)) return false;
}
- if (!ensure_policy(de_ref, user_de_path)) return false;
+ if (!EnsurePolicy(de_policy, user_de_path)) return false;
}
}
- if (flags & STORAGE_FLAG_CE) {
+
+ if (flags & android::os::IVold::STORAGE_FLAG_CE) {
// CE_n key
- auto system_ce_path = android::vold::BuildDataSystemCePath(user_id);
- auto misc_ce_path = android::vold::BuildDataMiscCePath(user_id);
- auto vendor_ce_path = android::vold::BuildDataVendorCePath(user_id);
- auto media_ce_path = android::vold::BuildDataMediaCePath(volume_uuid, user_id);
- auto user_ce_path = android::vold::BuildDataUserCePath(volume_uuid, user_id);
+ auto system_ce_path = ::BuildDataSystemCePath(user_id);
+ auto misc_ce_path = ::BuildDataMiscCePath(user_id);
+ auto vendor_ce_path = ::BuildDataVendorCePath(user_id);
+ auto media_ce_path = ::BuildDataMediaCePath(volume_uuid, user_id);
+ auto user_ce_path = ::BuildDataUserCePath(volume_uuid, user_id);
if (volume_uuid.empty()) {
if (!prepare_dir(system_ce_path, 0770, AID_SYSTEM, AID_SYSTEM)) return false;
@@ -884,31 +881,30 @@
if (!prepare_dir(vendor_ce_path, 0771, AID_ROOT, AID_ROOT)) return false;
}
if (!prepare_dir(media_ce_path, 0770, AID_MEDIA_RW, AID_MEDIA_RW)) return false;
+
if (!prepare_dir(user_ce_path, 0771, AID_SYSTEM, AID_SYSTEM)) return false;
if (fscrypt_is_native()) {
- PolicyKeyRef ce_ref;
+ EncryptionPolicy ce_policy;
if (volume_uuid.empty()) {
- if (!lookup_key_ref(s_ce_key_raw_refs, user_id, &ce_ref.key_raw_ref)) return false;
- get_data_file_encryption_modes(&ce_ref);
- if (!ensure_policy(ce_ref, system_ce_path)) return false;
- if (!ensure_policy(ce_ref, misc_ce_path)) return false;
- if (!ensure_policy(ce_ref, vendor_ce_path)) return false;
-
+ if (!lookup_policy(s_ce_policies, user_id, &ce_policy)) return false;
+ if (!EnsurePolicy(ce_policy, system_ce_path)) return false;
+ if (!EnsurePolicy(ce_policy, misc_ce_path)) return false;
+ if (!EnsurePolicy(ce_policy, vendor_ce_path)) return false;
} else {
- if (!read_or_create_volkey(misc_ce_path, volume_uuid, &ce_ref)) return false;
+ if (!read_or_create_volkey(misc_ce_path, volume_uuid, &ce_policy)) return false;
}
- if (!ensure_policy(ce_ref, media_ce_path)) return false;
- if (!ensure_policy(ce_ref, user_ce_path)) return false;
+ if (!EnsurePolicy(ce_policy, media_ce_path)) return false;
+ if (!EnsurePolicy(ce_policy, user_ce_path)) return false;
}
if (volume_uuid.empty()) {
// Now that credentials have been installed, we can run restorecon
// over these paths
// NOTE: these paths need to be kept in sync with libselinux
- android::vold::RestoreconRecursive(system_ce_path);
- android::vold::RestoreconRecursive(vendor_ce_path);
- android::vold::RestoreconRecursive(misc_ce_path);
+ ::RestoreconRecursive(system_ce_path);
+ ::RestoreconRecursive(vendor_ce_path);
+ ::RestoreconRecursive(misc_ce_path);
}
}
if (!prepare_subdirs("prepare", volume_uuid, user_id, flags)) return false;
@@ -917,19 +913,19 @@
}
bool fscrypt_destroy_user_storage(const std::string& volume_uuid, userid_t user_id, int flags) {
- LOG(DEBUG) << "fscrypt_destroy_user_storage for volume " << escape_empty(volume_uuid)
+ LOG(INFO) << "fscrypt_destroy_user_storage for volume " << escape_empty(volume_uuid)
<< ", user " << user_id << ", flags " << flags;
bool res = true;
res &= prepare_subdirs("destroy", volume_uuid, user_id, flags);
- if (flags & STORAGE_FLAG_CE) {
+ if (flags & android::os::IVold::STORAGE_FLAG_CE) {
// CE_n key
- auto system_ce_path = android::vold::BuildDataSystemCePath(user_id);
- auto misc_ce_path = android::vold::BuildDataMiscCePath(user_id);
- auto vendor_ce_path = android::vold::BuildDataVendorCePath(user_id);
- auto media_ce_path = android::vold::BuildDataMediaCePath(volume_uuid, user_id);
- auto user_ce_path = android::vold::BuildDataUserCePath(volume_uuid, user_id);
+ auto system_ce_path = ::BuildDataSystemCePath(user_id);
+ auto misc_ce_path = ::BuildDataMiscCePath(user_id);
+ auto vendor_ce_path = ::BuildDataVendorCePath(user_id);
+ auto media_ce_path = ::BuildDataMediaCePath(volume_uuid, user_id);
+ auto user_ce_path = ::BuildDataUserCePath(volume_uuid, user_id);
res &= destroy_dir(media_ce_path);
res &= destroy_dir(user_ce_path);
@@ -944,17 +940,17 @@
}
}
- if (flags & STORAGE_FLAG_DE) {
+ if (flags & android::os::IVold::STORAGE_FLAG_DE) {
// DE_sys key
- auto system_legacy_path = android::vold::BuildDataSystemLegacyPath(user_id);
- auto misc_legacy_path = android::vold::BuildDataMiscLegacyPath(user_id);
- auto profiles_de_path = android::vold::BuildDataProfilesDePath(user_id);
+ auto system_legacy_path = ::BuildDataSystemLegacyPath(user_id);
+ auto misc_legacy_path = ::BuildDataMiscLegacyPath(user_id);
+ auto profiles_de_path = ::BuildDataProfilesDePath(user_id);
// DE_n key
- auto system_de_path = android::vold::BuildDataSystemDePath(user_id);
- auto misc_de_path = android::vold::BuildDataMiscDePath(user_id);
- auto vendor_de_path = android::vold::BuildDataVendorDePath(user_id);
- auto user_de_path = android::vold::BuildDataUserDePath(volume_uuid, user_id);
+ auto system_de_path = ::BuildDataSystemDePath(user_id);
+ auto misc_de_path = ::BuildDataMiscDePath(user_id);
+ auto vendor_de_path = ::BuildDataVendorDePath(user_id);
+ auto user_de_path = ::BuildDataUserDePath(volume_uuid, user_id);
res &= destroy_dir(user_de_path);
if (volume_uuid.empty()) {
@@ -994,7 +990,7 @@
break;
}
if (entry->d_type != DT_DIR || entry->d_name[0] == '.') {
- LOG(DEBUG) << "Skipping non-user " << entry->d_name;
+ LOG(INFO) << "Skipping non-user " << entry->d_name;
continue;
}
res &= destroy_volkey(directory_path + "/" + entry->d_name, volume_uuid);
@@ -1004,10 +1000,21 @@
bool fscrypt_destroy_volume_keys(const std::string& volume_uuid) {
bool res = true;
- LOG(DEBUG) << "fscrypt_destroy_volume_keys for volume " << escape_empty(volume_uuid);
+ LOG(INFO) << "fscrypt_destroy_volume_keys for volume " << escape_empty(volume_uuid);
auto secdiscardable_path = volume_secdiscardable_path(volume_uuid);
- res &= android::vold::runSecdiscardSingle(secdiscardable_path);
+ res &= ::runSecdiscardSingle(secdiscardable_path);
res &= destroy_volume_keys("/data/misc_ce", volume_uuid);
res &= destroy_volume_keys("/data/misc_de", volume_uuid);
return res;
}
+
+bool lookup_key_ref(const std::map<userid_t, android::fscrypt::EncryptionPolicy>& key_map, userid_t user_id,
+ std::string* raw_ref) {
+ auto refi = key_map.find(user_id);
+ if (refi == key_map.end()) {
+ LOG(ERROR) << "Cannot find key for " << user_id;
+ return false;
+ }
+ *raw_ref = refi->second.key_raw_ref;
+ return true;
+}
diff --git a/crypto/fscrypt/FsCrypt.h b/crypto/fscrypt/FsCrypt.h
index c63e11f..f6db4b9 100755
--- a/crypto/fscrypt/FsCrypt.h
+++ b/crypto/fscrypt/FsCrypt.h
@@ -14,12 +14,14 @@
* limitations under the License.
*/
-#include <string>
#include <map>
-#include <vector>
+#include <string>
+#include <fscrypt/fscrypt.h>
#include <cutils/multiuser.h>
+using namespace android::fscrypt;
+
bool fscrypt_initialize_systemwide_keys();
bool fscrypt_init_user0();
@@ -27,8 +29,8 @@
bool fscrypt_destroy_user_key(userid_t user_id);
bool fscrypt_add_user_key_auth(userid_t user_id, int serial, const std::string& token,
const std::string& secret);
-bool fscrypt_clear_user_key_auth(userid_t user_id, int serial, const std::string& token_hex,
- const std::string& secret_hex);
+bool fscrypt_clear_user_key_auth(userid_t user_id, int serial, const std::string& token,
+ const std::string& secret);
bool fscrypt_fixate_newest_user_key_auth(userid_t user_id);
bool fscrypt_unlock_user_key(userid_t user_id, int serial, const std::string& token,
@@ -40,8 +42,8 @@
bool fscrypt_destroy_user_storage(const std::string& volume_uuid, userid_t user_id, int flags);
bool fscrypt_destroy_volume_keys(const std::string& volume_uuid);
-bool is_wrapped_key_supported();
-bool is_wrapped_key_supported_external();
-bool is_metadata_wrapped_key_supported();
-bool lookup_key_ref(const std::map<userid_t, std::string>& key_map, userid_t user_id,
- std::string* raw_ref);
\ No newline at end of file
+
+bool lookup_key_ref(const std::map<userid_t, android::fscrypt::EncryptionPolicy>& key_map, userid_t user_id,
+ std::string* raw_ref);
+bool lookup_policy(const std::map<userid_t, EncryptionPolicy>& key_map, userid_t user_id,
+ EncryptionPolicy* policy);
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/crypto/fscrypt/KeyBuffer.h b/crypto/fscrypt/KeyBuffer.h
index 2087187..2de9ac9 100644
--- a/crypto/fscrypt/KeyBuffer.h
+++ b/crypto/fscrypt/KeyBuffer.h
@@ -21,8 +21,6 @@
#include <memory>
#include <vector>
-namespace android {
-namespace vold {
/**
* Variant of memset() that should never be optimized away. Borrowed from keymaster code.
@@ -56,8 +54,5 @@
KeyBuffer operator+(KeyBuffer&& lhs, const KeyBuffer& rhs);
KeyBuffer operator+(KeyBuffer&& lhs, const char* rhs);
-} // namespace vold
-} // namespace android
-
#endif
diff --git a/crypto/fscrypt/KeyStorage.cpp b/crypto/fscrypt/KeyStorage.cpp
index 068c069..ad9d491 100755
--- a/crypto/fscrypt/KeyStorage.cpp
+++ b/crypto/fscrypt/KeyStorage.cpp
@@ -16,10 +16,10 @@
#include "KeyStorage.h"
+#include "Checkpoint.h"
#include "Keymaster.h"
#include "ScryptParameters.h"
#include "Utils.h"
-#include "Checkpoint.h"
#include <thread>
#include <vector>
@@ -37,23 +37,20 @@
#include <android-base/file.h>
#include <android-base/logging.h>
-#include <android-base/unique_fd.h>
#include <android-base/properties.h>
+#include <android-base/unique_fd.h>
#include <cutils/properties.h>
#include <hardware/hw_auth_token.h>
-#include <keymasterV4_0/authorization_set.h>
-#include <keymasterV4_0/keymaster_utils.h>
+#include <keymasterV4_1/authorization_set.h>
+#include <keymasterV4_1/keymaster_utils.h>
extern "C" {
#include "crypto_scrypt.h"
}
-namespace android {
-namespace vold {
-
const KeyAuthentication kEmptyAuthentication{"", ""};
static constexpr size_t AES_KEY_BYTES = 32;
@@ -64,7 +61,6 @@
static constexpr size_t STRETCHED_BYTES = 1 << 6;
static constexpr uint32_t AUTH_TIMEOUT = 30; // Seconds
-constexpr int EXT4_AES_256_XTS_KEY_SIZE = 64;
static const char* kCurrentVersion = "1";
static const char* kRmPath = "/system/bin/rm";
@@ -123,70 +119,42 @@
return false;
}
const hw_auth_token_t* at = reinterpret_cast<const hw_auth_token_t*>(auth.token.data());
- paramBuilder.Authorization(km::TAG_USER_SECURE_ID, at->user_id);
+ auto user_id = at->user_id; // Make a copy because at->user_id is unaligned.
+ paramBuilder.Authorization(km::TAG_USER_SECURE_ID, user_id);
paramBuilder.Authorization(km::TAG_USER_AUTH_TYPE, km::HardwareAuthenticatorType::PASSWORD);
paramBuilder.Authorization(km::TAG_AUTH_TIMEOUT, AUTH_TIMEOUT);
}
- return keymaster.generateKey(paramBuilder, key);
+
+ auto paramsWithRollback = paramBuilder;
+ paramsWithRollback.Authorization(km::TAG_ROLLBACK_RESISTANCE);
+
+ // Generate rollback-resistant key if possible.
+ return keymaster.generateKey(paramsWithRollback, key) ||
+ keymaster.generateKey(paramBuilder, key);
}
-bool generateWrappedKey(userid_t user_id, KeyType key_type,
- KeyBuffer* key) {
+bool generateWrappedStorageKey(KeyBuffer* key) {
Keymaster keymaster;
if (!keymaster) return false;
- *key = KeyBuffer(EXT4_AES_256_XTS_KEY_SIZE);
std::string key_temp;
- auto paramBuilder = km::AuthorizationSetBuilder()
- .AesEncryptionKey(AES_KEY_BYTES * 8)
- .GcmModeMinMacLen(GCM_MAC_BYTES * 8)
- .Authorization(km::TAG_USER_ID, user_id);
- km::KeyParameter param1;
- param1.tag = (km::Tag) (android::hardware::keymaster::V4_0::KM_TAG_FBE_ICE);
- param1.f.boolValue = true;
- paramBuilder.push_back(param1);
-
- km::KeyParameter param2;
- if ((key_type == KeyType::DE_USER) || (key_type == KeyType::DE_SYS || (key_type == KeyType::ME))) {
- param2.tag = (km::Tag) (android::hardware::keymaster::V4_0::KM_TAG_KEY_TYPE);
- param2.f.integer = 0;
- } else if (key_type == KeyType::CE_USER) {
- param2.tag = (km::Tag) (android::hardware::keymaster::V4_0::KM_TAG_KEY_TYPE);
- param2.f.integer = 1;
- }
- paramBuilder.push_back(param2);
-
+ auto paramBuilder = km::AuthorizationSetBuilder().AesEncryptionKey(AES_KEY_BYTES * 8);
+ paramBuilder.Authorization(km::TAG_ROLLBACK_RESISTANCE);
+ paramBuilder.Authorization(km::TAG_STORAGE_KEY);
if (!keymaster.generateKey(paramBuilder, &key_temp)) return false;
*key = KeyBuffer(key_temp.size());
memcpy(reinterpret_cast<void*>(key->data()), key_temp.c_str(), key->size());
return true;
}
-bool getEphemeralWrappedKey(km::KeyFormat format, KeyBuffer& kmKey, KeyBuffer* key) {
- std::string key_temp;
+bool exportWrappedStorageKey(const KeyBuffer& kmKey, KeyBuffer* key) {
Keymaster keymaster;
if (!keymaster) return false;
+ std::string key_temp;
- //Export once, if upgrade needed, upgrade and export again
- bool export_again = true;
- while (export_again) {
- export_again = false;
- auto ret = keymaster.exportKey(format, kmKey, "!", "!", &key_temp);
- if (ret == km::ErrorCode::OK) {
- *key = KeyBuffer(key_temp.size());
- memcpy(reinterpret_cast<void*>(key->data()), key_temp.c_str(), key->size());
- return true;
- }
- if (ret != km::ErrorCode::KEY_REQUIRES_UPGRADE) return false;
- LOG(DEBUG) << "Upgrading key";
- std::string kmKeyStr(reinterpret_cast<const char*>(kmKey.data()), kmKey.size());
- std::string newKey;
- if (!keymaster.upgradeKey(kmKeyStr, km::AuthorizationSet(), &newKey)) return false;
- memcpy(reinterpret_cast<void*>(kmKey.data()), newKey.c_str(), kmKey.size());
- LOG(INFO) << "Key upgraded";
- export_again = true;
- }
- //Should never come here
- return false;
+ if (!keymaster.exportKey(kmKey, &key_temp)) return false;
+ *key = KeyBuffer(key_temp.size());
+ memcpy(reinterpret_cast<void*>(key->data()), key_temp.c_str(), key->size());
+ return true;
}
static std::pair<km::AuthorizationSet, km::HardwareAuthToken> beginParams(
@@ -212,7 +180,7 @@
static bool readRandomBytesOrLog(size_t count, std::string* out) {
auto status = ReadRandomBytes(count, *out);
- if (status != OK) {
+ if (status != android::OK) {
LOG(ERROR) << "Random read failed with status: " << status;
return false;
}
@@ -234,27 +202,26 @@
return true;
}
-// static void deferedKmDeleteKey(const std::string& kmkey) {
-// while (!android::base::WaitForProperty("vold.checkpoint_committed", "1")) {
-// LOG(ERROR) << "Wait for boot timed out";
-// }
-// Keymaster keymaster;
-// if (!keymaster || !keymaster.deleteKey(kmkey)) {
-// LOG(ERROR) << "Defered Key deletion failed during upgrade";
-// }
-// }
+static void deferedKmDeleteKey(const std::string& kmkey) {
+ while (!android::base::WaitForProperty("vold.checkpoint_committed", "1")) {
+ LOG(ERROR) << "Wait for boot timed out";
+ }
+ Keymaster keymaster;
+ if (!keymaster || !keymaster.deleteKey(kmkey)) {
+ LOG(ERROR) << "Defered Key deletion failed during upgrade";
+ }
+}
bool kmDeleteKey(Keymaster& keymaster, const std::string& kmKey) {
- return true;
- // bool needs_cp = cp_needsCheckpoint();
+ bool needs_cp = cp_needsCheckpoint();
- // if (needs_cp) {
- // std::thread(deferedKmDeleteKey, kmKey).detach();
- // LOG(INFO) << "Deferring Key deletion during upgrade";
- // return true;
- // } else {
- // return keymaster.deleteKey(kmKey);
- // }
+ if (needs_cp) {
+ std::thread(deferedKmDeleteKey, kmKey).detach();
+ LOG(INFO) << "Deferring Key deletion during upgrade";
+ return true;
+ } else {
+ return keymaster.deleteKey(kmKey);
+ }
}
static KeymasterOperation begin(Keymaster& keymaster, const std::string& dir,
@@ -283,7 +250,7 @@
// PLOG(ERROR) << "Unable to move upgraded key to location: " << kmKeyPath;
// return KeymasterOperation();
// }
- // if (!android::vold::FsyncDirectory(dir)) {
+ // if (!::FsyncDirectory(dir)) {
// LOG(ERROR) << "Key dir sync failed: " << dir;
// return KeymasterOperation();
// }
@@ -292,7 +259,7 @@
// }
// }
kmKey = newKey;
- LOG(INFO) << "Key upgraded in memory: " << dir;
+ LOG(INFO) << "Key upgraded: " << dir;
}
}
@@ -522,7 +489,7 @@
if (!writeStringToFile(stretching, dir + "/" + kFn_stretching)) return false;
std::string salt;
if (stretchingNeedsSalt(stretching)) {
- if (ReadRandomBytes(SALT_BYTES, salt) != OK) {
+ if (ReadRandomBytes(SALT_BYTES, salt) != android::OK) {
LOG(ERROR) << "Random read failed";
return false;
}
@@ -561,7 +528,7 @@
LOG(DEBUG) << "Already exists, destroying: " << tmp_path;
destroyKey(tmp_path); // May be partially created so ignore errors
}
- if (!storeKey(tmp_path, auth, key)) return false;
+ if (!::storeKey(tmp_path, auth, key)) return false;
if (rename(tmp_path.c_str(), key_path.c_str()) != 0) {
PLOG(ERROR) << "Unable to move new key to location: " << key_path;
return false;
@@ -653,6 +620,3 @@
success &= recursiveDeleteKey(dir);
return success;
}
-
-} // namespace vold
-} // namespace android
diff --git a/crypto/fscrypt/KeyStorage.h b/crypto/fscrypt/KeyStorage.h
index 9959ce6..b88cdc6 100755
--- a/crypto/fscrypt/KeyStorage.h
+++ b/crypto/fscrypt/KeyStorage.h
@@ -17,13 +17,10 @@
#ifndef ANDROID_VOLD_KEYSTORAGE_H
#define ANDROID_VOLD_KEYSTORAGE_H
-#include "Keymaster.h"
#include "KeyBuffer.h"
-#include <cutils/multiuser.h>
+
#include <string>
-namespace android {
-namespace vold {
// Represents the information needed to decrypt a disk encryption key.
// If "token" is nonempty, it is passed in as a required Gatekeeper auth token.
@@ -40,13 +37,6 @@
const std::string secret;
};
-enum class KeyType {
- DE_SYS,
- DE_USER,
- CE_USER,
- ME,
-};
-
extern const KeyAuthentication kEmptyAuthentication;
// Checks if path "path" exists.
@@ -76,9 +66,10 @@
bool destroyKey(const std::string& dir);
bool runSecdiscardSingle(const std::string& file);
-bool generateWrappedKey(userid_t user_id, KeyType key_type, KeyBuffer* key);
-bool getEphemeralWrappedKey(km::KeyFormat format, KeyBuffer& kmKey, KeyBuffer* key);
-} // namespace vold
-} // namespace android
+
+// Generate wrapped storage key using keymaster. Uses STORAGE_KEY tag in keymaster.
+bool generateWrappedStorageKey(KeyBuffer* key);
+// Export the per-boot boot wrapped storage key using keymaster.
+bool exportWrappedStorageKey(const KeyBuffer& kmKey, KeyBuffer* key);
#endif
diff --git a/crypto/fscrypt/KeyUtil.cpp b/crypto/fscrypt/KeyUtil.cpp
index fa40640..8ec389f 100755
--- a/crypto/fscrypt/KeyUtil.cpp
+++ b/crypto/fscrypt/KeyUtil.cpp
@@ -16,32 +16,31 @@
#include "KeyUtil.h"
-#include <linux/fs.h>
#include <iomanip>
#include <sstream>
#include <string>
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <linux/fscrypt.h>
#include <openssl/sha.h>
+#include <sys/ioctl.h>
#include <android-base/file.h>
#include <android-base/logging.h>
+#include <android-base/properties.h>
#include <keyutils.h>
-#include "FsCrypt.h"
+#include <fscrypt_uapi.h>
#include "KeyStorage.h"
#include "Utils.h"
-#define MAX_USER_ID 0xFFFFFFFF
-using android::hardware::keymaster::V4_0::KeyFormat;
-using android::vold::KeyType;
-namespace android {
-namespace vold {
+const KeyGeneration neverGen() {
+ return KeyGeneration{0, false, false};
+}
-constexpr int FS_AES_256_XTS_KEY_SIZE = 64;
-
-bool randomKey(KeyBuffer* key) {
- *key = KeyBuffer(FS_AES_256_XTS_KEY_SIZE);
+static bool randomKey(size_t size, KeyBuffer* key) {
+ *key = KeyBuffer(size);
if (ReadRandomBytes(key->size(), key->data()) != 0) {
// TODO status_t plays badly with PLOG, fix it.
LOG(ERROR) << "Random read failed";
@@ -50,6 +49,56 @@
return true;
}
+bool generateStorageKey(const KeyGeneration& gen, KeyBuffer* key) {
+ if (!gen.allow_gen) return false;
+ if (gen.use_hw_wrapped_key) {
+ if (gen.keysize != FSCRYPT_MAX_KEY_SIZE) {
+ LOG(ERROR) << "Cannot generate a wrapped key " << gen.keysize << " bytes long";
+ return false;
+ }
+ return generateWrappedStorageKey(key);
+ } else {
+ return randomKey(gen.keysize, key);
+ }
+}
+
+// Return true if the kernel supports the ioctls to add/remove fscrypt keys
+// directly to/from the filesystem.
+bool isFsKeyringSupported(void) {
+ static bool initialized = false;
+ static bool supported;
+
+ if (!initialized) {
+ android::base::unique_fd fd(open("/data", O_RDONLY | O_DIRECTORY | O_CLOEXEC));
+
+ // FS_IOC_ADD_ENCRYPTION_KEY with a NULL argument will fail with ENOTTY
+ // if the ioctl isn't supported. Otherwise it will fail with another
+ // error code such as EFAULT.
+ errno = 0;
+ (void)ioctl(fd, FS_IOC_ADD_ENCRYPTION_KEY, NULL);
+ if (errno == ENOTTY) {
+ LOG(INFO) << "Kernel doesn't support FS_IOC_ADD_ENCRYPTION_KEY. Falling back to "
+ "session keyring";
+ supported = false;
+ } else {
+ if (errno != EFAULT) {
+ PLOG(WARNING) << "Unexpected error from FS_IOC_ADD_ENCRYPTION_KEY";
+ }
+ LOG(INFO) << "Detected support for FS_IOC_ADD_ENCRYPTION_KEY";
+ supported = true;
+ android::base::SetProperty("ro.crypto.uses_fs_ioc_add_encryption_key", "true");
+ }
+ // There's no need to check for FS_IOC_REMOVE_ENCRYPTION_KEY, since it's
+ // guaranteed to be available if FS_IOC_ADD_ENCRYPTION_KEY is. There's
+ // also no need to check for support on external volumes separately from
+ // /data, since either the kernel supports the ioctls on all
+ // fscrypt-capable filesystems or it doesn't.
+
+ initialized = true;
+ }
+ return supported;
+}
+
// Get raw keyref - used to make keyname and to pass to ioctl
static std::string generateKeyRef(const uint8_t* key, int length) {
SHA512_CTX c;
@@ -64,35 +113,39 @@
unsigned char key_ref2[SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH];
SHA512_Final(key_ref2, &c);
- static_assert(FS_KEY_DESCRIPTOR_SIZE <= SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH, "Hash too short for descriptor");
- return std::string((char*)key_ref2, FS_KEY_DESCRIPTOR_SIZE);
+ static_assert(FSCRYPT_KEY_DESCRIPTOR_SIZE <= SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH,
+ "Hash too short for descriptor");
+ return std::string((char*)key_ref2, FSCRYPT_KEY_DESCRIPTOR_SIZE);
}
static bool fillKey(const KeyBuffer& key, fscrypt_key* fs_key) {
- if (key.size() != FS_AES_256_XTS_KEY_SIZE) {
+ if (key.size() != FSCRYPT_MAX_KEY_SIZE) {
LOG(ERROR) << "Wrong size key " << key.size();
return false;
}
- static_assert(FS_AES_256_XTS_KEY_SIZE <= sizeof(fs_key->raw), "Key too long!");
- fs_key->mode = FS_ENCRYPTION_MODE_AES_256_XTS;
- fs_key->size = key.size();
- memset(fs_key->raw, 0, sizeof(fs_key->raw));
+ static_assert(FSCRYPT_MAX_KEY_SIZE == sizeof(fs_key->raw), "Mismatch of max key sizes");
+ fs_key->mode = 0; // unused by kernel
memcpy(fs_key->raw, key.data(), key.size());
+ fs_key->size = key.size();
return true;
}
static char const* const NAME_PREFIXES[] = {"ext4", "f2fs", "fscrypt", nullptr};
-static std::string keyname(const std::string& prefix, const std::string& raw_ref) {
+static std::string keyrefstring(const std::string& raw_ref) {
std::ostringstream o;
- o << prefix << ":";
for (unsigned char i : raw_ref) {
o << std::hex << std::setw(2) << std::setfill('0') << (int)i;
}
return o.str();
}
-// Get the keyring we store all keys in
+static std::string buildLegacyKeyName(const std::string& prefix, const std::string& raw_ref) {
+ return prefix + ":" + keyrefstring(raw_ref);
+}
+
+// Get the ID of the keyring we store all fscrypt keys in when the kernel is too
+// old to support FS_IOC_ADD_ENCRYPTION_KEY and FS_IOC_REMOVE_ENCRYPTION_KEY.
static bool fscryptKeyring(key_serial_t* device_keyring) {
*device_keyring = keyctl_search(KEY_SPEC_SESSION_KEYRING, "keyring", "fscrypt", 0);
if (*device_keyring == -1) {
@@ -102,44 +155,169 @@
return true;
}
-// Install password into global keyring
-// Return raw key reference for use in policy
-bool installKey(const KeyBuffer& key, std::string* raw_ref) {
+// Add an encryption key of type "logon" to the global session keyring.
+static bool installKeyLegacy(const KeyBuffer& key, const std::string& raw_ref) {
// Place fscrypt_key into automatically zeroing buffer.
KeyBuffer fsKeyBuffer(sizeof(fscrypt_key));
fscrypt_key& fs_key = *reinterpret_cast<fscrypt_key*>(fsKeyBuffer.data());
if (!fillKey(key, &fs_key)) return false;
- if (is_wrapped_key_supported()) {
- /* When wrapped key is supported, only the first 32 bytes are
- the same per boot. The second 32 bytes can change as the ephemeral
- key is different. */
- *raw_ref = generateKeyRef(fs_key.raw, (fs_key.size)/2);
- } else {
- *raw_ref = generateKeyRef(fs_key.raw, fs_key.size);
- }
key_serial_t device_keyring;
if (!fscryptKeyring(&device_keyring)) return false;
for (char const* const* name_prefix = NAME_PREFIXES; *name_prefix != nullptr; name_prefix++) {
- auto ref = keyname(*name_prefix, *raw_ref);
+ auto ref = buildLegacyKeyName(*name_prefix, raw_ref);
key_serial_t key_id =
add_key("logon", ref.c_str(), (void*)&fs_key, sizeof(fs_key), device_keyring);
if (key_id == -1) {
PLOG(ERROR) << "Failed to insert key into keyring " << device_keyring;
return false;
}
- LOG(DEBUG) << "Added key " << key_id << " (" << ref << ") to keyring " << device_keyring
+ LOG(INFO) << "Added key " << key_id << " (" << ref << ") to keyring " << device_keyring
<< " in process " << getpid();
}
return true;
}
-bool evictKey(const std::string& raw_ref) {
+// Installs fscrypt-provisioning key into session level kernel keyring.
+// This allows for the given key to be installed back into filesystem keyring.
+// For more context see reloadKeyFromSessionKeyring.
+static bool installProvisioningKey(const KeyBuffer& key, const std::string& ref,
+ const fscrypt_key_specifier& key_spec) {
+ key_serial_t device_keyring;
+ if (!fscryptKeyring(&device_keyring)) return false;
+
+ // Place fscrypt_provisioning_key_payload into automatically zeroing buffer.
+ KeyBuffer buf(sizeof(fscrypt_provisioning_key_payload) + key.size(), 0);
+ fscrypt_provisioning_key_payload& provisioning_key =
+ *reinterpret_cast<fscrypt_provisioning_key_payload*>(buf.data());
+ memcpy(provisioning_key.raw, key.data(), key.size());
+ provisioning_key.type = key_spec.type;
+
+ key_serial_t key_id = add_key("fscrypt-provisioning", ref.c_str(), (void*)&provisioning_key,
+ buf.size(), device_keyring);
+ if (key_id == -1) {
+ PLOG(ERROR) << "Failed to insert fscrypt-provisioning key for " << ref
+ << " into session keyring";
+ return false;
+ }
+ LOG(INFO) << "Added fscrypt-provisioning key for " << ref << " to session keyring";
+ return true;
+}
+
+// Build a struct fscrypt_key_specifier for use in the key management ioctls.
+static bool buildKeySpecifier(fscrypt_key_specifier* spec, const EncryptionPolicy& policy) {
+ switch (policy.options.version) {
+ case 1:
+ if (policy.key_raw_ref.size() != FSCRYPT_KEY_DESCRIPTOR_SIZE) {
+ LOG(ERROR) << "Invalid key specifier size for v1 encryption policy: "
+ << policy.key_raw_ref.size();
+ return false;
+ }
+ spec->type = FSCRYPT_KEY_SPEC_TYPE_DESCRIPTOR;
+ memcpy(spec->u.descriptor, policy.key_raw_ref.c_str(), FSCRYPT_KEY_DESCRIPTOR_SIZE);
+ return true;
+ case 2:
+ if (policy.key_raw_ref.size() != FSCRYPT_KEY_IDENTIFIER_SIZE) {
+ LOG(ERROR) << "Invalid key specifier size for v2 encryption policy: "
+ << policy.key_raw_ref.size();
+ return false;
+ }
+ spec->type = FSCRYPT_KEY_SPEC_TYPE_IDENTIFIER;
+ memcpy(spec->u.identifier, policy.key_raw_ref.c_str(), FSCRYPT_KEY_IDENTIFIER_SIZE);
+ return true;
+ default:
+ LOG(ERROR) << "Invalid encryption policy version: " << policy.options.version;
+ return false;
+ }
+}
+
+// Installs key into keyring of a filesystem mounted on |mountpoint|.
+//
+// It's callers responsibility to fill key specifier, and either arg->raw or arg->key_id.
+//
+// In case arg->key_spec.type equals to FSCRYPT_KEY_SPEC_TYPE_IDENTIFIER
+// arg->key_spec.u.identifier will be populated with raw key reference generated
+// by kernel.
+//
+// For documentation on difference between arg->raw and arg->key_id see
+// https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/filesystems/fscrypt.html#fs-ioc-add-encryption-key
+static bool installFsKeyringKey(const std::string& mountpoint, const EncryptionOptions& options,
+ fscrypt_add_key_arg* arg) {
+ if (options.use_hw_wrapped_key) arg->flags |= FSCRYPT_ADD_KEY_FLAG_WRAPPED;
+
+ android::base::unique_fd fd(open(mountpoint.c_str(), O_RDONLY | O_DIRECTORY | O_CLOEXEC));
+ if (fd == -1) {
+ PLOG(ERROR) << "Failed to open " << mountpoint << " to install key";
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ if (ioctl(fd, FS_IOC_ADD_ENCRYPTION_KEY, arg) != 0) {
+ PLOG(ERROR) << "Failed to install fscrypt key to " << mountpoint;
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ return true;
+}
+
+bool installKey(const std::string& mountpoint, const EncryptionOptions& options,
+ const KeyBuffer& key, EncryptionPolicy* policy) {
+ policy->options = options;
+ // Put the fscrypt_add_key_arg in an automatically-zeroing buffer, since we
+ // have to copy the raw key into it.
+ KeyBuffer arg_buf(sizeof(struct fscrypt_add_key_arg) + key.size(), 0);
+ struct fscrypt_add_key_arg* arg = (struct fscrypt_add_key_arg*)arg_buf.data();
+
+ // Initialize the "key specifier", which is like a name for the key.
+ switch (options.version) {
+ case 1:
+ // A key for a v1 policy is specified by an arbitrary 8-byte
+ // "descriptor", which must be provided by userspace. We use the
+ // first 8 bytes from the double SHA-512 of the key itself.
+ policy->key_raw_ref = generateKeyRef((const uint8_t*)key.data(), key.size());
+ if (!isFsKeyringSupported()) {
+ return installKeyLegacy(key, policy->key_raw_ref);
+ }
+ if (!buildKeySpecifier(&arg->key_spec, *policy)) {
+ return false;
+ }
+ break;
+ case 2:
+ // A key for a v2 policy is specified by an 16-byte "identifier",
+ // which is a cryptographic hash of the key itself which the kernel
+ // computes and returns. Any user-provided value is ignored; we
+ // just need to set the specifier type to indicate that we're adding
+ // this type of key.
+ arg->key_spec.type = FSCRYPT_KEY_SPEC_TYPE_IDENTIFIER;
+ break;
+ default:
+ LOG(ERROR) << "Invalid encryption policy version: " << options.version;
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ arg->raw_size = key.size();
+ memcpy(arg->raw, key.data(), key.size());
+
+ if (!installFsKeyringKey(mountpoint, options, arg)) return false;
+
+ if (arg->key_spec.type == FSCRYPT_KEY_SPEC_TYPE_IDENTIFIER) {
+ // Retrieve the key identifier that the kernel computed.
+ policy->key_raw_ref =
+ std::string((char*)arg->key_spec.u.identifier, FSCRYPT_KEY_IDENTIFIER_SIZE);
+ }
+ std::string ref = keyrefstring(policy->key_raw_ref);
+ LOG(INFO) << "Installed fscrypt key with ref " << ref << " to " << mountpoint;
+
+ if (!installProvisioningKey(key, ref, arg->key_spec)) return false;
+ return true;
+}
+
+// Remove an encryption key of type "logon" from the global session keyring.
+static bool evictKeyLegacy(const std::string& raw_ref) {
key_serial_t device_keyring;
if (!fscryptKeyring(&device_keyring)) return false;
bool success = true;
for (char const* const* name_prefix = NAME_PREFIXES; *name_prefix != nullptr; name_prefix++) {
- auto ref = keyname(*name_prefix, raw_ref);
+ auto ref = buildLegacyKeyName(*name_prefix, raw_ref);
auto key_serial = keyctl_search(device_keyring, "logon", ref.c_str(), 0);
// Unlink the key from the keyring. Prefer unlinking to revoking or
@@ -150,88 +328,110 @@
PLOG(ERROR) << "Failed to unlink key with serial " << key_serial << " ref " << ref;
success = false;
} else {
- LOG(DEBUG) << "Unlinked key with serial " << key_serial << " ref " << ref;
+ LOG(ERROR) << "Unlinked key with serial " << key_serial << " ref " << ref;
}
}
return success;
}
-bool retrieveAndInstallKey(bool create_if_absent, const KeyAuthentication& key_authentication,
- const std::string& key_path, const std::string& tmp_path,
- std::string* key_ref, bool wrapped_key_supported) {
- KeyBuffer key;
- if (pathExists(key_path)) {
- LOG(DEBUG) << "Key exists, using: " << key_path;
- if (!retrieveKey(key_path, key_authentication, &key)) return false;
- } else {
- if (!create_if_absent) {
- LOG(ERROR) << "No key found in " << key_path;
- return false;
- }
- LOG(INFO) << "Creating new key in " << key_path;
- if (wrapped_key_supported) {
- if(!generateWrappedKey(MAX_USER_ID, KeyType::DE_SYS, &key)) return false;
- } else {
- if (!randomKey(&key)) return false;
- }
- if (!storeKeyAtomically(key_path, tmp_path, key_authentication, key)) return false;
+static bool evictProvisioningKey(const std::string& ref) {
+ key_serial_t device_keyring;
+ if (!fscryptKeyring(&device_keyring)) {
+ return false;
}
- if (wrapped_key_supported) {
- KeyBuffer ephemeral_wrapped_key;
- if (!getEphemeralWrappedKey(KeyFormat::RAW, key, &ephemeral_wrapped_key)) {
- LOG(ERROR) << "Failed to export key in retrieveAndInstallKey";
- return false;
- }
- key = std::move(ephemeral_wrapped_key);
+ auto key_serial = keyctl_search(device_keyring, "fscrypt-provisioning", ref.c_str(), 0);
+ if (key_serial == -1 && errno != ENOKEY) {
+ PLOG(ERROR) << "Error searching session keyring for fscrypt-provisioning key for " << ref;
+ return false;
}
- if (!installKey(key, key_ref)) {
- LOG(ERROR) << "Failed to install key in " << key_path;
+ if (key_serial != -1 && keyctl_unlink(key_serial, device_keyring) != 0) {
+ PLOG(ERROR) << "Failed to unlink fscrypt-provisioning key for " << ref
+ << " from session keyring";
return false;
}
return true;
}
-bool retrieveKey(bool create_if_absent, const std::string& key_path, const std::string& tmp_path,
- KeyBuffer* key, bool keepOld) {
- LOG(ERROR) << "retreiveKey1";
+bool evictKey(const std::string& mountpoint, const EncryptionPolicy& policy) {
+ if (policy.options.version == 1 && !isFsKeyringSupported()) {
+ return evictKeyLegacy(policy.key_raw_ref);
+ }
+
+ android::base::unique_fd fd(open(mountpoint.c_str(), O_RDONLY | O_DIRECTORY | O_CLOEXEC));
+ if (fd == -1) {
+ PLOG(ERROR) << "Failed to open " << mountpoint << " to evict key";
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ struct fscrypt_remove_key_arg arg;
+ memset(&arg, 0, sizeof(arg));
+
+ if (!buildKeySpecifier(&arg.key_spec, policy)) {
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ std::string ref = keyrefstring(policy.key_raw_ref);
+
+ if (ioctl(fd, FS_IOC_REMOVE_ENCRYPTION_KEY, &arg) != 0) {
+ PLOG(ERROR) << "Failed to evict fscrypt key with ref " << ref << " from " << mountpoint;
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ LOG(ERROR) << "Evicted fscrypt key with ref " << ref << " from " << mountpoint;
+ if (arg.removal_status_flags & FSCRYPT_KEY_REMOVAL_STATUS_FLAG_OTHER_USERS) {
+ // Should never happen because keys are only added/removed as root.
+ LOG(ERROR) << "Unexpected case: key with ref " << ref << " is still added by other users!";
+ } else if (arg.removal_status_flags & FSCRYPT_KEY_REMOVAL_STATUS_FLAG_FILES_BUSY) {
+ LOG(ERROR) << "Files still open after removing key with ref " << ref
+ << ". These files were not locked!";
+ }
+
+ if (!evictProvisioningKey(ref)) return false;
+ return true;
+}
+
+bool retrieveOrGenerateKey(const std::string& key_path, const std::string& tmp_path,
+ const KeyAuthentication& key_authentication, const KeyGeneration& gen,
+ KeyBuffer* key, bool keepOld) {
if (pathExists(key_path)) {
- LOG(ERROR) << "Key exists, using: " << key_path;
- if (!retrieveKey(key_path, kEmptyAuthentication, key, keepOld)) return false;
- if (is_metadata_wrapped_key_supported()) {
- KeyBuffer ephemeral_wrapped_key;
- if (!getEphemeralWrappedKey(KeyFormat::RAW, *key, &ephemeral_wrapped_key)) {
- LOG(ERROR) << "Failed to export key for retrieved key";
- return false;
- }
- *key = std::move(ephemeral_wrapped_key);
- }
+ LOG(INFO) << "Key exists, using: " << key_path;
+ if (!retrieveKey(key_path, key_authentication, key, keepOld)) return false;
} else {
- if (!create_if_absent) {
+ if (!gen.allow_gen) {
LOG(ERROR) << "No key found in " << key_path;
return false;
}
- LOG(ERROR) << "Creating new key in " << key_path;
- if (is_metadata_wrapped_key_supported()) {
- if(!generateWrappedKey(MAX_USER_ID, KeyType::ME, key)) return false;
- } else {
- if (!randomKey(key)) return false;
- }
- LOG(ERROR) << "retrieveKey1";
- if (!storeKeyAtomically(key_path, tmp_path,
- kEmptyAuthentication, *key)) return false;
- if (is_metadata_wrapped_key_supported()) {
- KeyBuffer ephemeral_wrapped_key;
- if (!getEphemeralWrappedKey(KeyFormat::RAW, *key, &ephemeral_wrapped_key)) {
- LOG(ERROR) << "Failed to export key for generated key";
- return false;
- }
- *key = std::move(ephemeral_wrapped_key);
- }
+ LOG(INFO) << "Creating new key in " << key_path;
+ if (!::generateStorageKey(gen, key)) return false;
+ if (!storeKeyAtomically(key_path, tmp_path, key_authentication, *key)) return false;
}
return true;
}
-} // namespace vold
-} // namespace android
+bool reloadKeyFromSessionKeyring(const std::string& mountpoint, const EncryptionPolicy& policy) {
+ key_serial_t device_keyring;
+ if (!fscryptKeyring(&device_keyring)) {
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ std::string ref = keyrefstring(policy.key_raw_ref);
+ auto key_serial = keyctl_search(device_keyring, "fscrypt-provisioning", ref.c_str(), 0);
+ if (key_serial == -1) {
+ PLOG(ERROR) << "Failed to find fscrypt-provisioning key for " << ref
+ << " in session keyring";
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ LOG(INFO) << "Installing fscrypt-provisioning key for " << ref << " back into " << mountpoint
+ << " fs-keyring";
+
+ struct fscrypt_add_key_arg arg;
+ memset(&arg, 0, sizeof(arg));
+ if (!buildKeySpecifier(&arg.key_spec, policy)) return false;
+ arg.key_id = key_serial;
+ if (!installFsKeyringKey(mountpoint, policy.options, &arg)) return false;
+
+ return true;
+}
diff --git a/crypto/fscrypt/KeyUtil.h b/crypto/fscrypt/KeyUtil.h
index 2839b4a..dcfcde8 100755
--- a/crypto/fscrypt/KeyUtil.h
+++ b/crypto/fscrypt/KeyUtil.h
@@ -19,24 +19,65 @@
#include "KeyBuffer.h"
#include "KeyStorage.h"
-#include "Keymaster.h"
+
+#include <fscrypt/fscrypt.h>
#include <memory>
#include <string>
-namespace android {
-namespace vold {
-bool randomKey(KeyBuffer* key);
-bool installKey(const KeyBuffer& key, std::string* raw_ref);
-bool evictKey(const std::string& raw_ref);
-bool retrieveAndInstallKey(bool create_if_absent, const KeyAuthentication& key_authentication,
- const std::string& key_path, const std::string& tmp_path,
- std::string* key_ref, bool wrapped_key_supported);
-bool retrieveKey(bool create_if_absent, const std::string& key_path, const std::string& tmp_path,
- KeyBuffer* key, bool keepOld = true);
+using namespace android::fscrypt;
-} // namespace vold
-} // namespace android
+// Description of how to generate a key when needed.
+struct KeyGeneration {
+ size_t keysize;
+ bool allow_gen;
+ bool use_hw_wrapped_key;
+};
+
+// Generate a key as specified in KeyGeneration
+bool generateStorageKey(const KeyGeneration& gen, KeyBuffer* key);
+
+// Returns a key with allow_gen false so generateStorageKey returns false;
+// this is used to indicate to retrieveOrGenerateKey that a key should not
+// be generated.
+const KeyGeneration neverGen();
+
+bool isFsKeyringSupported(void);
+
+// Install a file-based encryption key to the kernel, for use by encrypted files
+// on the specified filesystem using the specified encryption policy version.
+//
+// For v1 policies, we use FS_IOC_ADD_ENCRYPTION_KEY if the kernel supports it.
+// Otherwise we add the key to the global session keyring as a "logon" key.
+//
+// For v2 policies, we always use FS_IOC_ADD_ENCRYPTION_KEY; it's the only way
+// the kernel supports.
+//
+// If kernel supports FS_IOC_ADD_ENCRYPTION_KEY, also installs key of
+// fscrypt-provisioning type to the global session keyring. This makes it
+// possible to unmount and then remount mountpoint without losing the file-based
+// key.
+//
+// Returns %true on success, %false on failure. On success also sets *policy
+// to the EncryptionPolicy used to refer to this key.
+bool installKey(const std::string& mountpoint, const EncryptionOptions& options,
+ const KeyBuffer& key, EncryptionPolicy* policy);
+
+// Evict a file-based encryption key from the kernel.
+//
+// This undoes the effect of installKey().
+//
+// If the kernel doesn't support the filesystem-level keyring, the caller is
+// responsible for dropping caches.
+bool evictKey(const std::string& mountpoint, const EncryptionPolicy& policy);
+
+bool retrieveOrGenerateKey(const std::string& key_path, const std::string& tmp_path,
+ const KeyAuthentication& key_authentication, const KeyGeneration& gen,
+ KeyBuffer* key, bool keepOld = true);
+
+// Re-installs a file-based encryption key of fscrypt-provisioning type from the
+// global session keyring back into fs keyring of the mountpoint.
+bool reloadKeyFromSessionKeyring(const std::string& mountpoint, const EncryptionPolicy& policy);
#endif
diff --git a/crypto/fscrypt/Keymaster.cpp b/crypto/fscrypt/Keymaster.cpp
index 706181d..27353f1 100755
--- a/crypto/fscrypt/Keymaster.cpp
+++ b/crypto/fscrypt/Keymaster.cpp
@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@
*
* Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
* you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
- * You may obtain a copy of the License at
+ * You may obtain a copy of the License at
*
* http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
*
@@ -17,11 +17,9 @@
#include "Keymaster.h"
#include <android-base/logging.h>
-#include <keymasterV4_0/authorization_set.h>
-#include <keymasterV4_0/keymaster_utils.h>
+#include <keymasterV4_1/authorization_set.h>
+#include <keymasterV4_1/keymaster_utils.h>
-namespace android {
-namespace vold {
using ::android::hardware::hidl_string;
using ::android::hardware::hidl_vec;
@@ -138,30 +136,25 @@
return true;
}
-km::ErrorCode Keymaster::exportKey(km::KeyFormat format, KeyBuffer& kmKey, const std::string& clientId,
- const std::string& appData, std::string* key) {
+bool Keymaster::exportKey(const KeyBuffer& kmKey, std::string* key) {
auto kmKeyBlob = km::support::blob2hidlVec(std::string(kmKey.data(), kmKey.size()));
- auto emptyAssign = NULL;
- auto kmClientId = (clientId == "!") ? emptyAssign: km::support::blob2hidlVec(clientId);
- auto kmAppData = (appData == "!") ? emptyAssign: km::support::blob2hidlVec(appData);
km::ErrorCode km_error;
auto hidlCb = [&](km::ErrorCode ret, const hidl_vec<uint8_t>& exportedKeyBlob) {
km_error = ret;
if (km_error != km::ErrorCode::OK) return;
- if(key)
- key->assign(reinterpret_cast<const char*>(&exportedKeyBlob[0]),
- exportedKeyBlob.size());
+ if (key)
+ key->assign(reinterpret_cast<const char*>(&exportedKeyBlob[0]), exportedKeyBlob.size());
};
- auto error = mDevice->exportKey(format, kmKeyBlob, kmClientId, kmAppData, hidlCb);
+ auto error = mDevice->exportKey(km::KeyFormat::RAW, kmKeyBlob, {}, {}, hidlCb);
if (!error.isOk()) {
LOG(ERROR) << "export_key failed: " << error.description();
- return km::ErrorCode::UNKNOWN_ERROR;
+ return false;
}
if (km_error != km::ErrorCode::OK) {
LOG(ERROR) << "export_key failed, code " << int32_t(km_error);
- return km_error;
+ return false;
}
- return km::ErrorCode::OK;
+ return true;
}
bool Keymaster::deleteKey(const std::string& key) {
@@ -233,10 +226,22 @@
return mDevice->halVersion().securityLevel != km::SecurityLevel::SOFTWARE;
}
-} // namespace vold
-} // namespace android
-
-using namespace ::android::vold;
+void Keymaster::earlyBootEnded() {
+ auto devices = KmDevice::enumerateAvailableDevices();
+ for (auto& dev : devices) {
+ auto error = dev->earlyBootEnded();
+ if (!error.isOk()) {
+ LOG(ERROR) << "earlyBootEnded call failed: " << error.description() << " for "
+ << dev->halVersion().keymasterName;
+ }
+ km::V4_1_ErrorCode km_error = error;
+ if (km_error != km::V4_1_ErrorCode::OK && km_error != km::V4_1_ErrorCode::UNIMPLEMENTED) {
+ LOG(ERROR) << "Error reporting early boot ending to keymaster: "
+ << static_cast<int32_t>(km_error) << " for "
+ << dev->halVersion().keymasterName;
+ }
+ }
+}
int keymaster_compatibility_cryptfs_scrypt() {
Keymaster dev;
diff --git a/crypto/fscrypt/Keymaster.h b/crypto/fscrypt/Keymaster.h
index 429a0a6..c3da4c8 100644
--- a/crypto/fscrypt/Keymaster.h
+++ b/crypto/fscrypt/Keymaster.h
@@ -25,12 +25,21 @@
#include <android-base/macros.h>
#include <keymasterV4_1/Keymaster.h>
-#include <keymasterV4_0/authorization_set.h>
+#include <keymasterV4_1/authorization_set.h>
-namespace android {
-namespace vold {
+namespace km {
-namespace km = ::android::hardware::keymaster::V4_1;
+using namespace ::android::hardware::keymaster::V4_1;
+
+// Surprisingly -- to me, at least -- this is totally fine. You can re-define symbols that were
+// brought in via a using directive (the "using namespace") above. In general this seems like a
+// dangerous thing to rely on, but in this case its implications are simple and straightforward:
+// km::ErrorCode refers to the 4.0 ErrorCode, though we pull everything else from 4.1.
+using ErrorCode = ::android::hardware::keymaster::V4_0::ErrorCode;
+using V4_1_ErrorCode = ::android::hardware::keymaster::V4_1::ErrorCode;
+
+} // namespace km
+
using KmDevice = km::support::Keymaster;
// C++ wrappers to the Keymaster hidl interface.
@@ -102,9 +111,8 @@
explicit operator bool() { return mDevice.get() != nullptr; }
// Generate a key in the keymaster from the given params.
bool generateKey(const km::AuthorizationSet& inParams, std::string* key);
- // Export a key from keymaster.
- km::ErrorCode exportKey(km::KeyFormat format, KeyBuffer& kmKey, const std::string& clientId,
- const std::string& appData, std::string* key);
+ // Exports a keymaster key with STORAGE_KEY tag wrapped with a per-boot ephemeral key
+ bool exportKey(const KeyBuffer& kmKey, std::string* key);
// If the keymaster supports it, permanently delete a key.
bool deleteKey(const std::string& key);
// Replace stored key blob in response to KM_ERROR_KEY_REQUIRES_UPGRADE.
@@ -117,15 +125,16 @@
km::AuthorizationSet* outParams);
bool isSecure();
+ // Tell all Keymaster instances that early boot has ended and early boot-only keys can no longer
+ // be created or used.
+ static void earlyBootEnded();
+
private:
- std::unique_ptr<KmDevice> mDevice;
+ android::sp<KmDevice> mDevice;
DISALLOW_COPY_AND_ASSIGN(Keymaster);
static bool hmacKeyGenerated;
};
-} // namespace vold
-} // namespace android
-
// FIXME no longer needed now cryptfs is in C++.
/*
diff --git a/crypto/fscrypt/MetadataCrypt.cpp b/crypto/fscrypt/MetadataCrypt.cpp
index 45f3af3..d875ff0 100755
--- a/crypto/fscrypt/MetadataCrypt.cpp
+++ b/crypto/fscrypt/MetadataCrypt.cpp
@@ -23,21 +23,21 @@
#include <vector>
#include <fcntl.h>
-#include <sys/ioctl.h>
#include <sys/param.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
#include <sys/types.h>
-#include <linux/dm-ioctl.h>
-
#include <android-base/file.h>
#include <android-base/logging.h>
#include <android-base/properties.h>
+#include <android-base/strings.h>
#include <android-base/unique_fd.h>
#include <cutils/fs.h>
#include <fs_mgr.h>
+#include <libdm/dm.h>
#include "Checkpoint.h"
+#include "CryptoType.h"
#include "EncryptInplace.h"
#include "KeyStorage.h"
#include "KeyUtil.h"
@@ -45,30 +45,64 @@
#include "Utils.h"
#include "VoldUtil.h"
-#define DM_CRYPT_BUF_SIZE 4096
#define TABLE_LOAD_RETRIES 10
-#define DEFAULT_KEY_TARGET_TYPE "default-key"
+
using android::fs_mgr::FstabEntry;
using android::fs_mgr::GetEntryForMountPoint;
-using android::fs_mgr::ReadDefaultFstab;
-using android::vold::KeyBuffer;
+using ::KeyBuffer;
+using namespace android::dm;
+
+// Parsed from metadata options
+struct CryptoOptions {
+ struct CryptoType cipher = invalid_crypto_type;
+ bool use_legacy_options_format = false;
+ bool set_dun = true; // Non-legacy driver always sets DUN
+ bool use_hw_wrapped_key = false;
+};
static const std::string kDmNameUserdata = "userdata";
static const char* kFn_keymaster_key_blob = "keymaster_key_blob";
static const char* kFn_keymaster_key_blob_upgraded = "keymaster_key_blob_upgraded";
+// The first entry in this table is the default crypto type.
+constexpr CryptoType supported_crypto_types[] = {aes_256_xts, adiantum};
+
+static_assert(validateSupportedCryptoTypes(64, supported_crypto_types,
+ array_length(supported_crypto_types)),
+ "We have a CryptoType which was incompletely constructed.");
+
+constexpr CryptoType legacy_aes_256_xts =
+ CryptoType().set_config_name("aes-256-xts").set_kernel_name("AES-256-XTS").set_keysize(64);
+
+static_assert(isValidCryptoType(64, legacy_aes_256_xts),
+ "We have a CryptoType which was incompletely constructed.");
+
+// Returns KeyGeneration suitable for key as described in CryptoOptions
+const KeyGeneration makeGen(const CryptoOptions& options) {
+ return KeyGeneration{options.cipher.get_keysize(), true, options.use_hw_wrapped_key};
+}
+
static bool mount_via_fs_mgr(const char* mount_point, const char* blk_device) {
+ // We're about to mount data not verified by verified boot. Tell Keymaster instances that early
+ // boot has ended.
+ ::Keymaster::earlyBootEnded();
+
// fs_mgr_do_mount runs fsck. Use setexeccon to run trusted
// partitions in the fsck domain.
- if (setexeccon(android::vold::sFsckContext)) {
+ if (setexeccon(::sFsckContext)) {
PLOG(ERROR) << "Failed to setexeccon";
return false;
}
+
+ if (!ReadDefaultFstab(&fstab_default)) {
+ PLOG(ERROR) << "Failed to open default fstab";
+ return -1;
+ }
auto mount_rc = fs_mgr_do_mount(&fstab_default, const_cast<char*>(mount_point),
const_cast<char*>(blk_device), nullptr,
- false);
+ ::cp_needsCheckpoint(), true);
if (setexeccon(nullptr)) {
PLOG(ERROR) << "Failed to clear setexeccon";
return false;
@@ -77,15 +111,10 @@
LOG(ERROR) << "fs_mgr_do_mount failed with rc " << mount_rc;
return false;
}
- LOG(DEBUG) << "Mounted " << mount_point;
+ LOG(INFO) << "mount_via_fs_mgr::Mounted " << mount_point;
return true;
}
-android::fs_mgr::Fstab fstab_default;
-
-namespace android {
-namespace vold {
-
// Note: It is possible to orphan a key if it is removed before deleting
// Update this once keymaster APIs change, and we have a proper commit.
static void commit_key(const std::string& dir) {
@@ -111,20 +140,20 @@
LOG(INFO) << "Old Key deleted: " << dir;
}
-static bool read_key(const FstabEntry& data_rec, bool create_if_absent, KeyBuffer* key) {
- if (data_rec.key_dir.empty()) {
- LOG(ERROR) << "Failed to get key_dir";
+static bool read_key(const std::string& metadata_key_dir, const KeyGeneration& gen,
+ KeyBuffer* key) {
+ if (metadata_key_dir.empty()) {
+ LOG(ERROR) << "Failed to get metadata_key_dir";
return false;
}
- std::string key_dir = data_rec.key_dir;
std::string sKey;
- auto dir = key_dir + "/key";
- LOG(DEBUG) << "key_dir/key: " << dir;
+ auto dir = metadata_key_dir + "/key";
+ LOG(INFO) << "metadata_key_dir/key: " << dir;
if (fs_mkdirs(dir.c_str(), 0700)) {
PLOG(ERROR) << "Creating directories: " << dir;
return false;
}
- auto temp = key_dir + "/tmp";
+ auto temp = metadata_key_dir + "/tmp";
auto newKeyPath = dir + "/" + kFn_keymaster_key_blob_upgraded;
/* If we have a leftover upgraded key, delete it.
* We either failed an update and must return to the old key,
@@ -134,152 +163,170 @@
Keymaster keymaster;
if (pathExists(newKeyPath)) {
if (!android::base::ReadFileToString(newKeyPath, &sKey))
- LOG(ERROR) << "Failed to read old key: " << dir;
+ LOG(ERROR) << "Failed to read incomplete key: " << dir;
else if (!keymaster.deleteKey(sKey))
- LOG(ERROR) << "Old key deletion failed, continuing anyway: " << dir;
+ LOG(ERROR) << "Incomplete key deletion failed, continuing anyway: " << dir;
else
unlink(newKeyPath.c_str());
}
- // bool needs_cp = cp_needsCheckpoint();
- bool needs_cp = false;
- if (!android::vold::retrieveKey(create_if_absent, dir, temp, key, needs_cp)) return false;
+ bool needs_cp = cp_needsCheckpoint();
+ if (!retrieveOrGenerateKey(dir, temp, kEmptyAuthentication, gen, key, needs_cp)) return false;
if (needs_cp && pathExists(newKeyPath)) std::thread(commit_key, dir).detach();
return true;
}
-} // namespace vold
-} // namespace android
-
-static KeyBuffer default_key_params(const std::string& real_blkdev, const KeyBuffer& key) {
- KeyBuffer hex_key;
- if (android::vold::StrToHex(key, hex_key) != android::OK) {
- LOG(ERROR) << "Failed to turn key to hex";
- return KeyBuffer();
- }
- auto res = KeyBuffer() + "AES-256-XTS " + hex_key + " " + real_blkdev.c_str() + " 0";
- return res;
-}
-
static bool get_number_of_sectors(const std::string& real_blkdev, uint64_t* nr_sec) {
- if (android::vold::GetBlockDev512Sectors(real_blkdev, nr_sec) != android::OK) {
+ if (::GetBlockDev512Sectors(real_blkdev, nr_sec) != android::OK) {
PLOG(ERROR) << "Unable to measure size of " << real_blkdev;
return false;
}
return true;
}
-static struct dm_ioctl* dm_ioctl_init(char* buffer, size_t buffer_size, const std::string& dm_name) {
- if (buffer_size < sizeof(dm_ioctl)) {
- LOG(ERROR) << "dm_ioctl buffer too small";
- return nullptr;
+static bool create_crypto_blk_dev(const std::string& dm_name, const std::string& blk_device,
+ const KeyBuffer& key, const CryptoOptions& options,
+ std::string* crypto_blkdev, uint64_t* nr_sec) {
+ if (!get_number_of_sectors(blk_device, nr_sec)) return false;
+ // TODO(paulcrowley): don't hardcode that DmTargetDefaultKey uses 4096-byte
+ // sectors
+ *nr_sec &= ~7;
+
+ KeyBuffer module_key;
+ if (options.use_hw_wrapped_key) {
+ if (!exportWrappedStorageKey(key, &module_key)) {
+ LOG(ERROR) << "Failed to get ephemeral wrapped key";
+ return false;
+ }
+ } else {
+ module_key = key;
}
- memset(buffer, 0, buffer_size);
- struct dm_ioctl* io = (struct dm_ioctl*)buffer;
- io->data_size = buffer_size;
- io->data_start = sizeof(struct dm_ioctl);
- io->version[0] = 4;
- io->version[1] = 0;
- io->version[2] = 0;
- io->flags = 0;
- dm_name.copy(io->name, sizeof(io->name));
- return io;
-}
-
-static bool create_crypto_blk_dev(const std::string& dm_name, uint64_t nr_sec,
- const std::string& target_type, const KeyBuffer& crypt_params,
- std::string* crypto_blkdev) {
- android::base::unique_fd dm_fd(
- TEMP_FAILURE_RETRY(open("/dev/device-mapper", O_RDWR | O_CLOEXEC, 0)));
- if (dm_fd == -1) {
- PLOG(ERROR) << "Cannot open device-mapper";
+ KeyBuffer hex_key_buffer;
+ if (::StrToHex(module_key, hex_key_buffer) != android::OK) {
+ LOG(ERROR) << "Failed to turn key to hex";
return false;
}
- alignas(struct dm_ioctl) char buffer[DM_CRYPT_BUF_SIZE];
- auto io = dm_ioctl_init(buffer, sizeof(buffer), dm_name);
- if (!io || ioctl(dm_fd.get(), DM_DEV_CREATE, io) != 0) {
- PLOG(ERROR) << "Cannot create dm-crypt device " << dm_name;
- return false;
- }
+ std::string hex_key(hex_key_buffer.data(), hex_key_buffer.size());
- // Get the device status, in particular, the name of its device file
- io = dm_ioctl_init(buffer, sizeof(buffer), dm_name);
- if (ioctl(dm_fd.get(), DM_DEV_STATUS, io) != 0) {
- PLOG(ERROR) << "Cannot retrieve dm-crypt device status " << dm_name;
- return false;
- }
- *crypto_blkdev = std::string() + "/dev/block/dm-" +
- std::to_string((io->dev & 0xff) | ((io->dev >> 12) & 0xfff00));
+ auto target = std::make_unique<DmTargetDefaultKey>(0, *nr_sec, options.cipher.get_kernel_name(),
+ hex_key, blk_device, 0);
+ if (options.use_legacy_options_format) target->SetUseLegacyOptionsFormat();
+ if (options.set_dun) target->SetSetDun();
+ if (options.use_hw_wrapped_key) target->SetWrappedKeyV0();
- io = dm_ioctl_init(buffer, sizeof(buffer), dm_name);
- size_t paramix = io->data_start + sizeof(struct dm_target_spec);
- size_t nullix = paramix + crypt_params.size();
- size_t endix = (nullix + 1 + 7) & 8; // Add room for \0 and align to 8 byte boundary
+ DmTable table;
+ table.AddTarget(std::move(target));
- if (endix > sizeof(buffer)) {
- LOG(ERROR) << "crypt_params too big for DM_CRYPT_BUF_SIZE";
- return false;
- }
-
- io->target_count = 1;
- auto tgt = (struct dm_target_spec*)(buffer + io->data_start);
- tgt->status = 0;
- tgt->sector_start = 0;
- tgt->length = nr_sec;
- target_type.copy(tgt->target_type, sizeof(tgt->target_type));
- memcpy(buffer + paramix, crypt_params.data(),
- std::min(crypt_params.size(), sizeof(buffer) - paramix));
- buffer[nullix] = '\0';
- tgt->next = endix;
-
+ auto& dm = DeviceMapper::Instance();
for (int i = 0;; i++) {
- if (ioctl(dm_fd.get(), DM_TABLE_LOAD, io) == 0) {
+ if (dm.CreateDevice(dm_name, table)) {
break;
}
if (i + 1 >= TABLE_LOAD_RETRIES) {
- PLOG(ERROR) << "DM_TABLE_LOAD ioctl failed";
+ PLOG(ERROR) << "Could not create default-key device " << dm_name;
return false;
}
- PLOG(INFO) << "DM_TABLE_LOAD ioctl failed, retrying";
+ PLOG(INFO) << "Could not create default-key device, retrying";
usleep(500000);
}
- // Resume this device to activate it
- io = dm_ioctl_init(buffer, sizeof(buffer), dm_name);
- if (ioctl(dm_fd.get(), DM_DEV_SUSPEND, io)) {
- PLOG(ERROR) << "Cannot resume dm-crypt device " << dm_name;
+ if (!dm.GetDmDevicePathByName(dm_name, crypto_blkdev)) {
+ LOG(ERROR) << "Cannot retrieve default-key device status " << dm_name;
return false;
}
+ std::stringstream ss;
+ ss << *crypto_blkdev;
+ LOG(INFO) << "Created device: " << ss.str();
+ return true;
+}
+
+static const CryptoType& lookup_cipher(const std::string& cipher_name) {
+ if (cipher_name.empty()) return supported_crypto_types[0];
+ for (size_t i = 0; i < array_length(supported_crypto_types); i++) {
+ if (cipher_name == supported_crypto_types[i].get_config_name()) {
+ return supported_crypto_types[i];
+ }
+ }
+ return invalid_crypto_type;
+}
+
+static bool parse_options(const std::string& options_string, CryptoOptions* options) {
+ auto parts = android::base::Split(options_string, ":");
+ if (parts.size() < 1 || parts.size() > 2) {
+ LOG(ERROR) << "Invalid metadata encryption option: " << options_string;
+ return false;
+ }
+ std::string cipher_name = parts[0];
+ options->cipher = lookup_cipher(cipher_name);
+ if (options->cipher.get_kernel_name() == nullptr) {
+ LOG(ERROR) << "No metadata cipher named " << cipher_name << " found";
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ if (parts.size() == 2) {
+ if (parts[1] == "wrappedkey_v0") {
+ options->use_hw_wrapped_key = true;
+ } else {
+ LOG(ERROR) << "Invalid metadata encryption flag: " << parts[1];
+ return false;
+ }
+ }
return true;
}
bool fscrypt_mount_metadata_encrypted(const std::string& blk_device, const std::string& mount_point,
bool needs_encrypt) {
- LOG(ERROR) << "fscrypt_mount_metadata_encrypted: " << blk_device << " " << mount_point << " " << needs_encrypt;
- // auto encrypted_state = android::base::GetProperty("ro.crypto.state", "");
- // if (encrypted_state != "") {
- // LOG(ERROR) << "fscrypt_enable_crypto got unexpected starting state: " << encrypted_state;
- // return false;
- // }
-
+ LOG(INFO) << "fscrypt_mount_metadata_encrypted: " << mount_point << " " << needs_encrypt;
+ auto encrypted_state = android::base::GetProperty("ro.crypto.state", "");
+ if (encrypted_state != "" && encrypted_state != "encrypted") {
+ LOG(ERROR) << "fscrypt_enable_crypto got unexpected starting state: " << encrypted_state;
+ return false;
+ }
if (!ReadDefaultFstab(&fstab_default)) {
PLOG(ERROR) << "Failed to open default fstab";
return -1;
}
-
auto data_rec = GetEntryForMountPoint(&fstab_default, mount_point);
if (!data_rec) {
- LOG(ERROR) << "Failed to get data_rec";
+ LOG(ERROR) << "Failed to get data_rec for " << mount_point;
return false;
}
- KeyBuffer key;
- if (!read_key(*data_rec, needs_encrypt, &key)) return false;
- uint64_t nr_sec;
- if (!get_number_of_sectors(data_rec->blk_device, &nr_sec)) return false;
- std::string crypto_blkdev;
- if (!create_crypto_blk_dev(kDmNameUserdata, nr_sec, DEFAULT_KEY_TARGET_TYPE,
- default_key_params(blk_device, key), &crypto_blkdev))
+
+ constexpr unsigned int pre_gki_level = 29;
+ unsigned int options_format_version = android::base::GetUintProperty<unsigned int>(
+ "ro.crypto.dm_default_key.options_format.version",
+ (GetFirstApiLevel() <= pre_gki_level ? 1 : 2));
+
+ CryptoOptions options;
+ if (options_format_version == 1) {
+ if (!data_rec->metadata_encryption.empty()) {
+ LOG(ERROR) << "metadata_encryption options cannot be set in legacy mode";
+ return false;
+ }
+ options.cipher = legacy_aes_256_xts;
+ options.use_legacy_options_format = true;
+ options.set_dun = android::base::GetBoolProperty("ro.crypto.set_dun", false);
+ if (!options.set_dun && data_rec->fs_mgr_flags.checkpoint_blk) {
+ LOG(ERROR)
+ << "Block checkpoints and metadata encryption require ro.crypto.set_dun option";
+ return false;
+ }
+ } else if (options_format_version == 2) {
+ if (!parse_options(data_rec->metadata_encryption, &options)) return false;
+ } else {
+ LOG(ERROR) << "Unknown options_format_version: " << options_format_version;
return false;
+ }
+
+ auto gen = needs_encrypt ? makeGen(options) : neverGen();
+ KeyBuffer key;
+ if (!read_key(data_rec->metadata_key_dir, gen, &key)) return false;
+
+ std::string crypto_blkdev;
+ uint64_t nr_sec;
+ if (!create_crypto_blk_dev(kDmNameUserdata, blk_device, key, options, &crypto_blkdev, &nr_sec))
+ return false;
+
// FIXME handle the corrupt case
if (needs_encrypt) {
LOG(INFO) << "Beginning inplace encryption, nr_sec: " << nr_sec;
@@ -297,8 +344,35 @@
LOG(INFO) << "Inplace encryption complete";
}
- LOG(ERROR) << "Mounting metadata-encrypted filesystem:" << mount_point;
- mount_via_fs_mgr(data_rec->mount_point.c_str(), crypto_blkdev.c_str());
+ LOG(INFO) << "Mounting metadata-encrypted filesystem:" << mount_point;
+ mount_via_fs_mgr(mount_point.c_str(), crypto_blkdev.c_str());
android::base::SetProperty("ro.crypto.fs_crypto_blkdev", crypto_blkdev);
+
+ // Record that there's at least one fstab entry with metadata encryption
+ if (!android::base::SetProperty("ro.crypto.metadata.enabled", "true")) {
+ LOG(WARNING) << "failed to set ro.crypto.metadata.enabled"; // This isn't fatal
+ }
return true;
}
+
+static bool get_volume_options(CryptoOptions* options) {
+ return parse_options(android::base::GetProperty("ro.crypto.volume.metadata.encryption", ""),
+ options);
+}
+
+bool defaultkey_volume_keygen(KeyGeneration* gen) {
+ CryptoOptions options;
+ if (!get_volume_options(&options)) return false;
+ *gen = makeGen(options);
+ return true;
+}
+
+bool defaultkey_setup_ext_volume(const std::string& label, const std::string& blk_device,
+ const KeyBuffer& key, std::string* out_crypto_blkdev) {
+ LOG(ERROR) << "defaultkey_setup_ext_volume: " << label << " " << blk_device;
+
+ CryptoOptions options;
+ if (!get_volume_options(&options)) return false;
+ uint64_t nr_sec;
+ return create_crypto_blk_dev(label, blk_device, key, options, out_crypto_blkdev, &nr_sec);
+}
diff --git a/crypto/fscrypt/MetadataCrypt.h b/crypto/fscrypt/MetadataCrypt.h
index cd0f5e5..0370664 100644
--- a/crypto/fscrypt/MetadataCrypt.h
+++ b/crypto/fscrypt/MetadataCrypt.h
@@ -19,7 +19,17 @@
#include <string>
+#include "KeyBuffer.h"
+#include "KeyUtil.h"
+
+
bool fscrypt_mount_metadata_encrypted(const std::string& block_device,
const std::string& mount_point, bool needs_encrypt);
+bool defaultkey_volume_keygen(KeyGeneration* gen);
+
+bool defaultkey_setup_ext_volume(const std::string& label, const std::string& blk_device,
+ const KeyBuffer& key,
+ std::string* out_crypto_blkdev);
+
#endif
diff --git a/crypto/fscrypt/Process.cpp b/crypto/fscrypt/Process.cpp
index 3d8e3d7..277d6a3 100644
--- a/crypto/fscrypt/Process.cpp
+++ b/crypto/fscrypt/Process.cpp
@@ -29,6 +29,7 @@
#include <unistd.h>
#include <fstream>
+#include <mntent.h>
#include <unordered_set>
#include <android-base/file.h>
@@ -81,6 +82,51 @@
return false;
}
+// TODO: Refactor the code with KillProcessesWithOpenFiles().
+int KillProcessesWithMounts(const std::string& prefix, int signal) {
+ std::unordered_set<pid_t> pids;
+
+ auto proc_d = std::unique_ptr<DIR, int (*)(DIR*)>(opendir("/proc"), closedir);
+ if (!proc_d) {
+ PLOG(ERROR) << "Failed to open proc";
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ struct dirent* proc_de;
+ while ((proc_de = readdir(proc_d.get())) != nullptr) {
+ // We only care about valid PIDs
+ pid_t pid;
+ if (proc_de->d_type != DT_DIR) continue;
+ if (!android::base::ParseInt(proc_de->d_name, &pid)) continue;
+
+ // Look for references to prefix
+ std::string mounts_file(StringPrintf("/proc/%d/mounts", pid));
+ auto fp = std::unique_ptr<FILE, int (*)(FILE*)>(
+ setmntent(mounts_file.c_str(), "r"), endmntent);
+ if (!fp) {
+ PLOG(WARNING) << "Failed to open " << mounts_file;
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ // Check if obb directory is mounted, and get all packages of mounted app data directory.
+ mntent* mentry;
+ while ((mentry = getmntent(fp.get())) != nullptr) {
+ if (android::base::StartsWith(mentry->mnt_dir, prefix)) {
+ pids.insert(pid);
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ if (signal != 0) {
+ for (const auto& pid : pids) {
+ LOG(WARNING) << "Killing pid "<< pid << " with signal " << strsignal(signal) <<
+ " because it has a mount with prefix " << prefix;
+ kill(pid, signal);
+ }
+ }
+ return pids.size();
+}
+
int KillProcessesWithOpenFiles(const std::string& prefix, int signal) {
std::unordered_set<pid_t> pids;
diff --git a/crypto/fscrypt/Process.h b/crypto/fscrypt/Process.h
index 1406782..1c59812 100644
--- a/crypto/fscrypt/Process.h
+++ b/crypto/fscrypt/Process.h
@@ -21,6 +21,7 @@
namespace vold {
int KillProcessesWithOpenFiles(const std::string& path, int signal);
+int KillProcessesWithMounts(const std::string& path, int signal);
} // namespace vold
} // namespace android
diff --git a/crypto/fscrypt/Utils.cpp b/crypto/fscrypt/Utils.cpp
index aa71d8f..3b0eda0 100755
--- a/crypto/fscrypt/Utils.cpp
+++ b/crypto/fscrypt/Utils.cpp
@@ -29,23 +29,29 @@
#include <cutils/fs.h>
#include <logwrap/logwrap.h>
#include <private/android_filesystem_config.h>
+#include <private/android_projectid_config.h>
#include <dirent.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <linux/fs.h>
+#include <linux/posix_acl.h>
+#include <linux/posix_acl_xattr.h>
#include <mntent.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
-#include <unistd.h>
#include <sys/mount.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
#include <sys/statvfs.h>
#include <sys/sysmacros.h>
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/wait.h>
+#include <sys/xattr.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <filesystem>
#include <list>
#include <mutex>
+#include <regex>
#include <thread>
#ifndef UMOUNT_NOFOLLOW
@@ -53,33 +59,47 @@
#endif
using namespace std::chrono_literals;
+using android::base::EndsWith;
using android::base::ReadFileToString;
+using android::base::StartsWith;
using android::base::StringPrintf;
+using android::base::unique_fd;
-namespace android {
-namespace vold {
+struct selabel_handle* sehandle;
security_context_t sBlkidContext = nullptr;
security_context_t sBlkidUntrustedContext = nullptr;
security_context_t sFsckContext = nullptr;
security_context_t sFsckUntrustedContext = nullptr;
-struct selabel_handle* sehandle;
bool sSleepOnUnmount = true;
static const char* kBlkidPath = "/system/bin/blkid";
static const char* kKeyPath = "/data/misc/vold";
+static const char* kProcDevices = "/proc/devices";
static const char* kProcFilesystems = "/proc/filesystems";
+static const char* kAndroidDir = "/Android/";
+static const char* kAppDataDir = "/Android/data/";
+static const char* kAppMediaDir = "/Android/media/";
+static const char* kAppObbDir = "/Android/obb/";
+
+static const char* kMediaProviderCtx = "u:r:mediaprovider:";
+static const char* kMediaProviderAppCtx = "u:r:mediaprovider_app:";
+
// Lock used to protect process-level SELinux changes from racing with each
// other between multiple threads.
static std::mutex kSecurityLock;
-status_t CreateDeviceNode(const std::string& path, dev_t dev) {
+std::string GetFuseMountPathForUser(userid_t user_id, const std::string& relative_upper_path) {
+ return StringPrintf("/mnt/user/%d/%s", user_id, relative_upper_path.c_str());
+}
+
+android::status_t CreateDeviceNode(const std::string& path, dev_t dev) {
std::lock_guard<std::mutex> lock(kSecurityLock);
const char* cpath = path.c_str();
- status_t res = 0;
+ android::status_t res = 0;
char* secontext = nullptr;
if (sehandle) {
@@ -105,16 +125,297 @@
return res;
}
-status_t DestroyDeviceNode(const std::string& path) {
+android::status_t DestroyDeviceNode(const std::string& path) {
const char* cpath = path.c_str();
if (TEMP_FAILURE_RETRY(unlink(cpath))) {
return -errno;
} else {
- return OK;
+ return android::OK;
}
}
-status_t PrepareDir(const std::string& path, mode_t mode, uid_t uid, gid_t gid) {
+// Sets a default ACL on the directory.
+int SetDefaultAcl(const std::string& path, mode_t mode, uid_t uid, gid_t gid,
+ std::vector<gid_t> additionalGids) {
+ if (IsSdcardfsUsed()) {
+ // sdcardfs magically takes care of this
+ return android::OK;
+ }
+
+ size_t num_entries = 3 + (additionalGids.size() > 0 ? additionalGids.size() + 1 : 0);
+ size_t size = sizeof(posix_acl_xattr_header) + num_entries * sizeof(posix_acl_xattr_entry);
+ auto buf = std::make_unique<uint8_t[]>(size);
+
+ posix_acl_xattr_header* acl_header = reinterpret_cast<posix_acl_xattr_header*>(buf.get());
+ acl_header->a_version = POSIX_ACL_XATTR_VERSION;
+
+ posix_acl_xattr_entry* entry =
+ reinterpret_cast<posix_acl_xattr_entry*>(buf.get() + sizeof(posix_acl_xattr_header));
+
+ int tag_index = 0;
+
+ entry[tag_index].e_tag = ACL_USER_OBJ;
+ // The existing mode_t mask has the ACL in the lower 9 bits:
+ // the lowest 3 for "other", the next 3 the group, the next 3 for the owner
+ // Use the mode_t masks to get these bits out, and shift them to get the
+ // correct value per entity.
+ //
+ // Eg if mode_t = 0700, rwx for the owner, then & S_IRWXU >> 6 results in 7
+ entry[tag_index].e_perm = (mode & S_IRWXU) >> 6;
+ entry[tag_index].e_id = uid;
+ tag_index++;
+
+ entry[tag_index].e_tag = ACL_GROUP_OBJ;
+ entry[tag_index].e_perm = (mode & S_IRWXG) >> 3;
+ entry[tag_index].e_id = gid;
+ tag_index++;
+
+ if (additionalGids.size() > 0) {
+ for (gid_t additional_gid : additionalGids) {
+ entry[tag_index].e_tag = ACL_GROUP;
+ entry[tag_index].e_perm = (mode & S_IRWXG) >> 3;
+ entry[tag_index].e_id = additional_gid;
+ tag_index++;
+ }
+
+ entry[tag_index].e_tag = ACL_MASK;
+ entry[tag_index].e_perm = (mode & S_IRWXG) >> 3;
+ entry[tag_index].e_id = 0;
+ tag_index++;
+ }
+
+ entry[tag_index].e_tag = ACL_OTHER;
+ entry[tag_index].e_perm = mode & S_IRWXO;
+ entry[tag_index].e_id = 0;
+
+ int ret = setxattr(path.c_str(), XATTR_NAME_POSIX_ACL_DEFAULT, acl_header, size, 0);
+
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ PLOG(ERROR) << "Failed to set default ACL on " << path;
+ }
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+int SetQuotaInherit(const std::string& path) {
+ unsigned long flags;
+
+ android::base::unique_fd fd(TEMP_FAILURE_RETRY(open(path.c_str(), O_RDONLY | O_CLOEXEC)));
+ if (fd == -1) {
+ PLOG(ERROR) << "Failed to open " << path << " to set project id inheritance.";
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ int ret = ioctl(fd, FS_IOC_GETFLAGS, &flags);
+ if (ret == -1) {
+ PLOG(ERROR) << "Failed to get flags for " << path << " to set project id inheritance.";
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ flags |= FS_PROJINHERIT_FL;
+
+ ret = ioctl(fd, FS_IOC_SETFLAGS, &flags);
+ if (ret == -1) {
+ PLOG(ERROR) << "Failed to set flags for " << path << " to set project id inheritance.";
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int SetQuotaProjectId(const std::string& path, long projectId) {
+ struct fsxattr fsx;
+
+ android::base::unique_fd fd(TEMP_FAILURE_RETRY(open(path.c_str(), O_RDONLY | O_CLOEXEC)));
+ if (fd == -1) {
+ PLOG(ERROR) << "Failed to open " << path << " to set project id.";
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ int ret = ioctl(fd, FS_IOC_FSGETXATTR, &fsx);
+ if (ret == -1) {
+ PLOG(ERROR) << "Failed to get extended attributes for " << path << " to get project id.";
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ fsx.fsx_projid = projectId;
+ return ioctl(fd, FS_IOC_FSSETXATTR, &fsx);
+}
+
+int PrepareDirWithProjectId(const std::string& path, mode_t mode, uid_t uid, gid_t gid,
+ long projectId) {
+ int ret = fs_prepare_dir(path.c_str(), mode, uid, gid);
+
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ if (!IsSdcardfsUsed()) {
+ ret = SetQuotaProjectId(path, projectId);
+ }
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static int FixupAppDir(const std::string& path, mode_t mode, uid_t uid, gid_t gid, long projectId) {
+ namespace fs = std::filesystem;
+
+ // Setup the directory itself correctly
+ int ret = PrepareDirWithProjectId(path, mode, uid, gid, projectId);
+ if (ret != android::OK) {
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ // Fixup all of its file entries
+ for (const auto& itEntry : fs::directory_iterator(path)) {
+ ret = lchown(itEntry.path().c_str(), uid, gid);
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ ret = chmod(itEntry.path().c_str(), mode);
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ if (!IsSdcardfsUsed()) {
+ ret = SetQuotaProjectId(itEntry.path(), projectId);
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ return ret;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ return android::OK;
+}
+
+int PrepareAppDirFromRoot(const std::string& path, const std::string& root, int appUid,
+ bool fixupExisting) {
+ long projectId;
+ size_t pos;
+ int ret = 0;
+ bool sdcardfsSupport = IsSdcardfsUsed();
+
+ // Make sure the Android/ directories exist and are setup correctly
+ ret = PrepareAndroidDirs(root);
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ LOG(ERROR) << "Failed to prepare Android/ directories.";
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ // Now create the application-specific subdir(s)
+ // path is something like /data/media/0/Android/data/com.foo/files
+ // First, chop off the volume root, eg /data/media/0
+ std::string pathFromRoot = path.substr(root.length());
+
+ uid_t uid = appUid;
+ gid_t gid = AID_MEDIA_RW;
+ std::vector<gid_t> additionalGids;
+ std::string appDir;
+
+ // Check that the next part matches one of the allowed Android/ dirs
+ if (StartsWith(pathFromRoot, kAppDataDir)) {
+ appDir = kAppDataDir;
+ if (!sdcardfsSupport) {
+ gid = AID_EXT_DATA_RW;
+ // Also add the app's own UID as a group; since apps belong to a group
+ // that matches their UID, this ensures that they will always have access to
+ // the files created in these dirs, even if they are created by other processes
+ additionalGids.push_back(uid);
+ }
+ } else if (StartsWith(pathFromRoot, kAppMediaDir)) {
+ appDir = kAppMediaDir;
+ if (!sdcardfsSupport) {
+ gid = AID_MEDIA_RW;
+ }
+ } else if (StartsWith(pathFromRoot, kAppObbDir)) {
+ appDir = kAppObbDir;
+ if (!sdcardfsSupport) {
+ gid = AID_EXT_OBB_RW;
+ // See comments for kAppDataDir above
+ additionalGids.push_back(uid);
+ }
+ } else {
+ LOG(ERROR) << "Invalid application directory: " << path;
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ // mode = 770, plus sticky bit on directory to inherit GID when apps
+ // create subdirs
+ mode_t mode = S_IRWXU | S_IRWXG | S_ISGID;
+ // the project ID for application-specific directories is directly
+ // derived from their uid
+
+ // Chop off the generic application-specific part, eg /Android/data/
+ // this leaves us with something like com.foo/files/
+ std::string leftToCreate = pathFromRoot.substr(appDir.length());
+ if (!EndsWith(leftToCreate, "/")) {
+ leftToCreate += "/";
+ }
+ std::string pathToCreate = root + appDir;
+ int depth = 0;
+ // Derive initial project ID
+ if (appDir == kAppDataDir || appDir == kAppMediaDir) {
+ projectId = uid - AID_APP_START + PROJECT_ID_EXT_DATA_START;
+ } else if (appDir == kAppObbDir) {
+ projectId = uid - AID_APP_START + PROJECT_ID_EXT_OBB_START;
+ }
+
+ while ((pos = leftToCreate.find('/')) != std::string::npos) {
+ std::string component = leftToCreate.substr(0, pos + 1);
+ leftToCreate = leftToCreate.erase(0, pos + 1);
+ pathToCreate = pathToCreate + component;
+
+ if (appDir == kAppDataDir && depth == 1 && component == "cache/") {
+ // All dirs use the "app" project ID, except for the cache dirs in
+ // Android/data, eg Android/data/com.foo/cache
+ // Note that this "sticks" - eg subdirs of this dir need the same
+ // project ID.
+ projectId = uid - AID_APP_START + PROJECT_ID_EXT_CACHE_START;
+ }
+
+ if (fixupExisting && access(pathToCreate.c_str(), F_OK) == 0) {
+ // Fixup all files in this existing directory with the correct UID/GID
+ // and project ID.
+ ret = FixupAppDir(pathToCreate, mode, uid, gid, projectId);
+ } else {
+ ret = PrepareDirWithProjectId(pathToCreate, mode, uid, gid, projectId);
+ }
+
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ if (depth == 0) {
+ // Set the default ACL on the top-level application-specific directories,
+ // to ensure that even if applications run with a umask of 0077,
+ // new directories within these directories will allow the GID
+ // specified here to write; this is necessary for apps like
+ // installers and MTP, that require access here.
+ //
+ // See man (5) acl for more details.
+ ret = SetDefaultAcl(pathToCreate, mode, uid, gid, additionalGids);
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ if (!sdcardfsSupport) {
+ // Set project ID inheritance, so that future subdirectories inherit the
+ // same project ID
+ ret = SetQuotaInherit(pathToCreate);
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ return ret;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ depth++;
+ }
+
+ return android::OK;
+}
+
+android::status_t PrepareDir(const std::string& path, mode_t mode, uid_t uid, gid_t gid) {
std::lock_guard<std::mutex> lock(kSecurityLock);
const char* cpath = path.c_str();
@@ -133,68 +434,93 @@
}
if (res == 0) {
- return OK;
+ return android::OK;
} else {
return -errno;
}
}
-status_t ForceUnmount(const std::string& path) {
+android::status_t ForceUnmount(const std::string& path) {
const char* cpath = path.c_str();
if (!umount2(cpath, UMOUNT_NOFOLLOW) || errno == EINVAL || errno == ENOENT) {
- return OK;
+ return android::OK;
}
// Apps might still be handling eject request, so wait before
// we start sending signals
if (sSleepOnUnmount) sleep(5);
- KillProcessesWithOpenFiles(path, SIGINT);
+ android::vold::KillProcessesWithOpenFiles(path, SIGINT);
if (sSleepOnUnmount) sleep(5);
if (!umount2(cpath, UMOUNT_NOFOLLOW) || errno == EINVAL || errno == ENOENT) {
- return OK;
+ return android::OK;
}
- KillProcessesWithOpenFiles(path, SIGTERM);
+ android::vold::KillProcessesWithOpenFiles(path, SIGTERM);
if (sSleepOnUnmount) sleep(5);
if (!umount2(cpath, UMOUNT_NOFOLLOW) || errno == EINVAL || errno == ENOENT) {
- return OK;
+ return android::OK;
}
- KillProcessesWithOpenFiles(path, SIGKILL);
+ android::vold::KillProcessesWithOpenFiles(path, SIGKILL);
if (sSleepOnUnmount) sleep(5);
if (!umount2(cpath, UMOUNT_NOFOLLOW) || errno == EINVAL || errno == ENOENT) {
- return OK;
+ return android::OK;
}
-
+ PLOG(INFO) << "ForceUnmount failed";
return -errno;
}
-status_t KillProcessesUsingPath(const std::string& path) {
- if (KillProcessesWithOpenFiles(path, SIGINT) == 0) {
- return OK;
+android::status_t KillProcessesWithMountPrefix(const std::string& path) {
+ if (android::vold::KillProcessesWithMounts(path, SIGINT) == 0) {
+ return android::OK;
}
if (sSleepOnUnmount) sleep(5);
- if (KillProcessesWithOpenFiles(path, SIGTERM) == 0) {
- return OK;
+ if (android::vold::KillProcessesWithMounts(path, SIGTERM) == 0) {
+ return android::OK;
}
if (sSleepOnUnmount) sleep(5);
- if (KillProcessesWithOpenFiles(path, SIGKILL) == 0) {
- return OK;
+ if (android::vold::KillProcessesWithMounts(path, SIGKILL) == 0) {
+ return android::OK;
}
if (sSleepOnUnmount) sleep(5);
// Send SIGKILL a second time to determine if we've
- // actually killed everyone with open files
- if (KillProcessesWithOpenFiles(path, SIGKILL) == 0) {
- return OK;
+ // actually killed everyone mount
+ if (android::vold::KillProcessesWithMounts(path, SIGKILL) == 0) {
+ return android::OK;
}
PLOG(ERROR) << "Failed to kill processes using " << path;
return -EBUSY;
}
-status_t BindMount(const std::string& source, const std::string& target) {
+android::status_t KillProcessesUsingPath(const std::string& path) {
+ if (android::vold::KillProcessesWithOpenFiles(path, SIGINT) == 0) {
+ return android::OK;
+ }
+ if (sSleepOnUnmount) sleep(5);
+
+ if (android::vold::KillProcessesWithOpenFiles(path, SIGTERM) == 0) {
+ return android::OK;
+ }
+ if (sSleepOnUnmount) sleep(5);
+
+ if (android::vold::KillProcessesWithOpenFiles(path, SIGKILL) == 0) {
+ return android::OK;
+ }
+ if (sSleepOnUnmount) sleep(5);
+
+ // Send SIGKILL a second time to determine if we've
+ // actually killed everyone with open files
+ if (android::vold::KillProcessesWithOpenFiles(path, SIGKILL) == 0) {
+ return android::OK;
+ }
+ PLOG(ERROR) << "Failed to kill processes using " << path;
+ return -EBUSY;
+}
+
+android::status_t BindMount(const std::string& source, const std::string& target) {
if (UnmountTree(target) < 0) {
return -errno;
}
@@ -202,10 +528,10 @@
PLOG(ERROR) << "Failed to bind mount " << source << " to " << target;
return -errno;
}
- return OK;
+ return android::OK;
}
-status_t Symlink(const std::string& target, const std::string& linkpath) {
+android::status_t Symlink(const std::string& target, const std::string& linkpath) {
if (Unlink(linkpath) < 0) {
return -errno;
}
@@ -213,22 +539,22 @@
PLOG(ERROR) << "Failed to create symlink " << linkpath << " to " << target;
return -errno;
}
- return OK;
+ return android::OK;
}
-status_t Unlink(const std::string& linkpath) {
+android::status_t Unlink(const std::string& linkpath) {
if (TEMP_FAILURE_RETRY(unlink(linkpath.c_str())) < 0 && errno != EINVAL && errno != ENOENT) {
PLOG(ERROR) << "Failed to unlink " << linkpath;
return -errno;
}
- return OK;
+ return android::OK;
}
-status_t CreateDir(const std::string& dir, mode_t mode) {
+android::status_t CreateDir(const std::string& dir, mode_t mode) {
struct stat sb;
if (TEMP_FAILURE_RETRY(stat(dir.c_str(), &sb)) == 0) {
if (S_ISDIR(sb.st_mode)) {
- return OK;
+ return android::OK;
} else if (TEMP_FAILURE_RETRY(unlink(dir.c_str())) == -1) {
PLOG(ERROR) << "Failed to unlink " << dir;
return -errno;
@@ -241,7 +567,7 @@
PLOG(ERROR) << "Failed to mkdir " << dir;
return -errno;
}
- return OK;
+ return android::OK;
}
bool FindValue(const std::string& raw, const std::string& key, std::string* value) {
@@ -264,7 +590,7 @@
return true;
}
-static status_t readMetadata(const std::string& path, std::string* fsType, std::string* fsUuid,
+static android::status_t readMetadata(const std::string& path, std::string* fsType, std::string* fsUuid,
std::string* fsLabel, bool untrusted) {
fsType->clear();
fsUuid->clear();
@@ -283,8 +609,8 @@
cmd.push_back(path);
std::vector<std::string> output;
- status_t res = ForkExecvp(cmd, &output, untrusted ? sBlkidUntrustedContext : sBlkidContext);
- if (res != OK) {
+ android::status_t res = ForkExecvp(cmd, &output, untrusted ? sBlkidUntrustedContext : sBlkidContext);
+ if (res != android::OK) {
LOG(WARNING) << "blkid failed to identify " << path;
return res;
}
@@ -296,15 +622,15 @@
FindValue(line, "LABEL", fsLabel);
}
- return OK;
+ return android::OK;
}
-status_t ReadMetadata(const std::string& path, std::string* fsType, std::string* fsUuid,
+android::status_t ReadMetadata(const std::string& path, std::string* fsType, std::string* fsUuid,
std::string* fsLabel) {
return readMetadata(path, fsType, fsUuid, fsLabel, false);
}
-status_t ReadMetadataUntrusted(const std::string& path, std::string* fsType, std::string* fsUuid,
+android::status_t ReadMetadataUntrusted(const std::string& path, std::string* fsType, std::string* fsUuid,
std::string* fsLabel) {
return readMetadata(path, fsType, fsUuid, fsLabel, true);
}
@@ -324,7 +650,7 @@
return argv;
}
-static status_t ReadLinesFromFdAndLog(std::vector<std::string>* output,
+static android::status_t ReadLinesFromFdAndLog(std::vector<std::string>* output,
android::base::unique_fd ufd) {
std::unique_ptr<FILE, int (*)(FILE*)> fp(android::base::Fdopen(std::move(ufd), "r"), fclose);
if (!fp) {
@@ -337,10 +663,10 @@
LOG(DEBUG) << line;
if (output) output->emplace_back(line);
}
- return OK;
+ return android::OK;
}
-status_t ForkExecvp(const std::vector<std::string>& args, std::vector<std::string>* output,
+android::status_t ForkExecvp(const std::vector<std::string>& args, std::vector<std::string>* output,
security_context_t context) {
auto argv = ConvertToArgv(args);
@@ -365,7 +691,7 @@
}
pipe_write.reset();
execvp(argv[0], const_cast<char**>(argv.data()));
- PLOG(ERROR) << "exec in ForkExecvp" << " cmd: " << argv[0];
+ PLOG(ERROR) << "exec in ForkExecvp";
_exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
}
if (pid == -1) {
@@ -390,7 +716,7 @@
LOG(ERROR) << "Process exited with code: " << WEXITSTATUS(status);
return WEXITSTATUS(status);
}
- return OK;
+ return android::OK;
}
pid_t ForkExecvpAsync(const std::vector<std::string>& args) {
@@ -413,12 +739,12 @@
return pid;
}
-status_t ReadRandomBytes(size_t bytes, std::string& out) {
+android::status_t ReadRandomBytes(size_t bytes, std::string& out) {
out.resize(bytes);
return ReadRandomBytes(bytes, &out[0]);
}
-status_t ReadRandomBytes(size_t bytes, char* buf) {
+android::status_t ReadRandomBytes(size_t bytes, char* buf) {
int fd = TEMP_FAILURE_RETRY(open("/dev/urandom", O_RDONLY | O_CLOEXEC | O_NOFOLLOW));
if (fd == -1) {
return -errno;
@@ -432,15 +758,15 @@
close(fd);
if (bytes == 0) {
- return OK;
+ return android::OK;
} else {
return -EIO;
}
}
-status_t GenerateRandomUuid(std::string& out) {
- status_t res = ReadRandomBytes(16, out);
- if (res == OK) {
+android::status_t GenerateRandomUuid(std::string& out) {
+ android::status_t res = ReadRandomBytes(16, out);
+ if (res == android::OK) {
out[6] &= 0x0f; /* clear version */
out[6] |= 0x40; /* set to version 4 */
out[8] &= 0x3f; /* clear variant */
@@ -449,7 +775,7 @@
return res;
}
-status_t HexToStr(const std::string& hex, std::string& str) {
+android::status_t HexToStr(const std::string& hex, std::string& str) {
str.clear();
bool even = true;
char cur = 0;
@@ -487,30 +813,30 @@
}
even = !even;
}
- return even ? OK : -EINVAL;
+ return even ? android::OK : -EINVAL;
}
static const char* kLookup = "0123456789abcdef";
-status_t StrToHex(const std::string& str, std::string& hex) {
+android::status_t StrToHex(const std::string& str, std::string& hex) {
hex.clear();
for (size_t i = 0; i < str.size(); i++) {
hex.push_back(kLookup[(str[i] & 0xF0) >> 4]);
hex.push_back(kLookup[str[i] & 0x0F]);
}
- return OK;
+ return android::OK;
}
-status_t StrToHex(const KeyBuffer& str, KeyBuffer& hex) {
+android::status_t StrToHex(const KeyBuffer& str, KeyBuffer& hex) {
hex.clear();
for (size_t i = 0; i < str.size(); i++) {
hex.push_back(kLookup[(str.data()[i] & 0xF0) >> 4]);
hex.push_back(kLookup[str.data()[i] & 0x0F]);
}
- return OK;
+ return android::OK;
}
-status_t NormalizeHex(const std::string& in, std::string& out) {
+android::status_t NormalizeHex(const std::string& in, std::string& out) {
std::string tmp;
if (HexToStr(in, tmp)) {
return -EINVAL;
@@ -518,17 +844,17 @@
return StrToHex(tmp, out);
}
-status_t GetBlockDevSize(int fd, uint64_t* size) {
+android::status_t GetBlockDevSize(int fd, uint64_t* size) {
if (ioctl(fd, BLKGETSIZE64, size)) {
return -errno;
}
- return OK;
+ return android::OK;
}
-status_t GetBlockDevSize(const std::string& path, uint64_t* size) {
+android::status_t GetBlockDevSize(const std::string& path, uint64_t* size) {
int fd = open(path.c_str(), O_RDONLY | O_CLOEXEC);
- status_t res = OK;
+ android::status_t res = android::OK;
if (fd < 0) {
return -errno;
@@ -541,17 +867,17 @@
return res;
}
-status_t GetBlockDev512Sectors(const std::string& path, uint64_t* nr_sec) {
+android::status_t GetBlockDev512Sectors(const std::string& path, uint64_t* nr_sec) {
uint64_t size;
- status_t res = GetBlockDevSize(path, &size);
+ android::status_t res = GetBlockDevSize(path, &size);
- if (res != OK) {
+ if (res != android::OK) {
return res;
}
*nr_sec = size / 512;
- return OK;
+ return android::OK;
}
uint64_t GetFreeBytes(const std::string& path) {
@@ -626,6 +952,19 @@
}
}
+// TODO: Use a better way to determine if it's media provider app.
+bool IsFuseDaemon(const pid_t pid) {
+ auto path = StringPrintf("/proc/%d/mounts", pid);
+ char* tmp;
+ if (lgetfilecon(path.c_str(), &tmp) < 0) {
+ return false;
+ }
+ bool result = android::base::StartsWith(tmp, kMediaProviderAppCtx)
+ || android::base::StartsWith(tmp, kMediaProviderCtx);
+ freecon(tmp);
+ return result;
+}
+
bool IsFilesystemSupported(const std::string& fsType) {
std::string supported;
if (!ReadFileToString(kProcFilesystems, &supported)) {
@@ -635,8 +974,13 @@
return supported.find(fsType + "\n") != std::string::npos;
}
-status_t WipeBlockDevice(const std::string& path) {
- status_t res = -1;
+bool IsSdcardfsUsed() {
+ return IsFilesystemSupported("sdcardfs") &&
+ android::base::GetBoolProperty(kExternalStorageSdcardfs, true);
+}
+
+android::status_t WipeBlockDevice(const std::string& path) {
+ android::status_t res = -1;
const char* c_path = path.c_str();
uint64_t range[2] = {0, 0};
@@ -646,7 +990,7 @@
goto done;
}
- if (GetBlockDevSize(fd, &range[1]) != OK) {
+ if (GetBlockDevSize(fd, &range[1]) != android::OK) {
PLOG(ERROR) << "Failed to determine size of " << path;
goto done;
}
@@ -759,7 +1103,7 @@
}
}
-status_t RestoreconRecursive(const std::string& path) {
+android::status_t RestoreconRecursive(const std::string& path) {
LOG(DEBUG) << "Starting restorecon of " << path;
static constexpr const char* kRestoreconString = "selinux.restorecon_recursive";
@@ -770,7 +1114,7 @@
android::base::WaitForProperty(kRestoreconString, path);
LOG(DEBUG) << "Finished restorecon of " << path;
- return OK;
+ return android::OK;
}
bool Readlinkat(int dirfd, const std::string& path, std::string* result) {
@@ -796,11 +1140,42 @@
}
}
-bool IsRunningInEmulator() {
- return android::base::GetBoolProperty("ro.kernel.qemu", false);
+static unsigned int GetMajorBlockVirtioBlk() {
+ std::string devices;
+ if (!ReadFileToString(kProcDevices, &devices)) {
+ PLOG(ERROR) << "Unable to open /proc/devices";
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ bool blockSection = false;
+ for (auto line : android::base::Split(devices, "\n")) {
+ if (line == "Block devices:") {
+ blockSection = true;
+ } else if (line == "Character devices:") {
+ blockSection = false;
+ } else if (blockSection) {
+ auto tokens = android::base::Split(line, " ");
+ if (tokens.size() == 2 && tokens[1] == "virtblk") {
+ return std::stoul(tokens[0]);
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ return 0;
}
-static status_t findMountPointsWithPrefix(const std::string& prefix,
+bool IsVirtioBlkDevice(unsigned int major) {
+ // Most virtualized platforms expose block devices with the virtio-blk
+ // block device driver. Unfortunately, this driver does not use a fixed
+ // major number, but relies on the kernel to assign one from a specific
+ // range of block majors, which are allocated for "LOCAL/EXPERIMENAL USE"
+ // per Documentation/devices.txt. This is true even for the latest Linux
+ // kernel (4.4; see init() in drivers/block/virtio_blk.c).
+ static unsigned int kMajorBlockVirtioBlk = GetMajorBlockVirtioBlk();
+ return kMajorBlockVirtioBlk && major == kMajorBlockVirtioBlk;
+}
+
+static android::status_t findMountPointsWithPrefix(const std::string& prefix,
std::list<std::string>& mountPoints) {
// Add a trailing slash if the client didn't provide one so that we don't match /foo/barbaz
// when the prefix is /foo/bar
@@ -824,13 +1199,13 @@
mountPoints.push_front(mountPoint);
}
}
- return OK;
+ return android::OK;
}
// Unmount all mountpoints that start with prefix. prefix itself doesn't need to be a mountpoint.
-status_t UnmountTreeWithPrefix(const std::string& prefix) {
+android::status_t UnmountTreeWithPrefix(const std::string& prefix) {
std::list<std::string> toUnmount;
- status_t result = findMountPointsWithPrefix(prefix, toUnmount);
+ android::status_t result = findMountPointsWithPrefix(prefix, toUnmount);
if (result < 0) {
return result;
}
@@ -843,23 +1218,23 @@
return result;
}
-status_t UnmountTree(const std::string& mountPoint) {
+android::status_t UnmountTree(const std::string& mountPoint) {
if (TEMP_FAILURE_RETRY(umount2(mountPoint.c_str(), MNT_DETACH)) < 0 && errno != EINVAL &&
errno != ENOENT) {
PLOG(ERROR) << "Failed to unmount " << mountPoint;
return -errno;
}
- return OK;
+ return android::OK;
}
-static status_t delete_dir_contents(DIR* dir) {
+static android::status_t delete_dir_contents(DIR* dir) {
// Shamelessly borrowed from android::installd
int dfd = dirfd(dir);
if (dfd < 0) {
return -errno;
}
- status_t result = OK;
+ android::status_t result = android::OK;
struct dirent* de;
while ((de = readdir(dir))) {
const char* name = de->d_name;
@@ -899,8 +1274,8 @@
return result;
}
-status_t DeleteDirContentsAndDir(const std::string& pathname) {
- status_t res = DeleteDirContents(pathname);
+android::status_t DeleteDirContentsAndDir(const std::string& pathname) {
+ android::status_t res = DeleteDirContents(pathname);
if (res < 0) {
return res;
}
@@ -909,15 +1284,15 @@
return -errno;
}
LOG(VERBOSE) << "Success: rmdir on " << pathname;
- return OK;
+ return android::OK;
}
-status_t DeleteDirContents(const std::string& pathname) {
+android::status_t DeleteDirContents(const std::string& pathname) {
// Shamelessly borrowed from android::installd
std::unique_ptr<DIR, decltype(&closedir)> dirp(opendir(pathname.c_str()), closedir);
if (!dirp) {
if (errno == ENOENT) {
- return OK;
+ return android::OK;
}
PLOG(ERROR) << "Failed to opendir " << pathname;
return -errno;
@@ -926,7 +1301,7 @@
}
// TODO(118708649): fix duplication with init/util.h
-status_t WaitForFile(const char* filename, std::chrono::nanoseconds timeout) {
+android::status_t WaitForFile(const char* filename, std::chrono::nanoseconds timeout) {
android::base::Timer t;
while (t.duration() < timeout) {
struct stat sb;
@@ -985,5 +1360,263 @@
return true;
}
-} // namespace vold
-} // namespace android
+android::status_t AbortFuseConnections() {
+ namespace fs = std::filesystem;
+
+ for (const auto& itEntry : fs::directory_iterator("/sys/fs/fuse/connections")) {
+ std::string abortPath = itEntry.path().string() + "/abort";
+ LOG(DEBUG) << "Aborting fuse connection entry " << abortPath;
+ bool ret = writeStringToFile("1", abortPath);
+ if (!ret) {
+ LOG(WARNING) << "Failed to write to " << abortPath;
+ }
+ }
+
+ return android::OK;
+}
+
+android::status_t EnsureDirExists(const std::string& path, mode_t mode, uid_t uid, gid_t gid) {
+ if (access(path.c_str(), F_OK) != 0) {
+ PLOG(WARNING) << "Dir does not exist: " << path;
+ if (fs_prepare_dir(path.c_str(), mode, uid, gid) != 0) {
+ return -errno;
+ }
+ }
+ return android::OK;
+}
+
+// Gets the sysfs path for parameters of the backing device info (bdi)
+static std::string getBdiPathForMount(const std::string& mount) {
+ // First figure out MAJOR:MINOR of mount. Simplest way is to stat the path.
+ struct stat info;
+ if (stat(mount.c_str(), &info) != 0) {
+ PLOG(ERROR) << "Failed to stat " << mount;
+ return "";
+ }
+ unsigned int maj = major(info.st_dev);
+ unsigned int min = minor(info.st_dev);
+
+ return StringPrintf("/sys/class/bdi/%u:%u", maj, min);
+}
+
+// Configures max_ratio for the FUSE filesystem.
+void ConfigureMaxDirtyRatioForFuse(const std::string& fuse_mount, unsigned int max_ratio) {
+ LOG(INFO) << "Configuring max_ratio of " << fuse_mount << " fuse filesystem to " << max_ratio;
+ if (max_ratio > 100) {
+ LOG(ERROR) << "Invalid max_ratio: " << max_ratio;
+ return;
+ }
+ std::string fuseBdiPath = getBdiPathForMount(fuse_mount);
+ if (fuseBdiPath == "") {
+ return;
+ }
+ std::string max_ratio_file = StringPrintf("%s/max_ratio", fuseBdiPath.c_str());
+ unique_fd fd(TEMP_FAILURE_RETRY(open(max_ratio_file.c_str(), O_WRONLY | O_CLOEXEC)));
+ if (fd.get() == -1) {
+ PLOG(ERROR) << "Failed to open " << max_ratio_file;
+ return;
+ }
+ LOG(INFO) << "Writing " << max_ratio << " to " << max_ratio_file;
+ if (!WriteStringToFd(std::to_string(max_ratio), fd)) {
+ PLOG(ERROR) << "Failed to write to " << max_ratio_file;
+ }
+}
+
+// Configures read ahead property of the fuse filesystem with the mount point |fuse_mount| by
+// writing |read_ahead_kb| to the /sys/class/bdi/MAJOR:MINOR/read_ahead_kb.
+void ConfigureReadAheadForFuse(const std::string& fuse_mount, size_t read_ahead_kb) {
+ LOG(INFO) << "Configuring read_ahead of " << fuse_mount << " fuse filesystem to "
+ << read_ahead_kb << "kb";
+ std::string fuseBdiPath = getBdiPathForMount(fuse_mount);
+ if (fuseBdiPath == "") {
+ return;
+ }
+ // We found the bdi path for our filesystem, time to configure read ahead!
+ std::string read_ahead_file = StringPrintf("%s/read_ahead_kb", fuseBdiPath.c_str());
+ unique_fd fd(TEMP_FAILURE_RETRY(open(read_ahead_file.c_str(), O_WRONLY | O_CLOEXEC)));
+ if (fd.get() == -1) {
+ PLOG(ERROR) << "Failed to open " << read_ahead_file;
+ return;
+ }
+ LOG(INFO) << "Writing " << read_ahead_kb << " to " << read_ahead_file;
+ if (!WriteStringToFd(std::to_string(read_ahead_kb), fd)) {
+ PLOG(ERROR) << "Failed to write to " << read_ahead_file;
+ }
+}
+
+android::status_t MountUserFuse(userid_t user_id, const std::string& absolute_lower_path,
+ const std::string& relative_upper_path, android::base::unique_fd* fuse_fd) {
+ std::string pre_fuse_path(StringPrintf("/mnt/user/%d", user_id));
+ std::string fuse_path(
+ StringPrintf("%s/%s", pre_fuse_path.c_str(), relative_upper_path.c_str()));
+
+ std::string pre_pass_through_path(StringPrintf("/mnt/pass_through/%d", user_id));
+ std::string pass_through_path(
+ StringPrintf("%s/%s", pre_pass_through_path.c_str(), relative_upper_path.c_str()));
+
+ // Ensure that /mnt/user is 0700. With FUSE, apps don't need access to /mnt/user paths directly.
+ // Without FUSE however, apps need /mnt/user access so /mnt/user in init.rc is 0755 until here
+ auto result = PrepareDir("/mnt/user", 0750, AID_ROOT, AID_MEDIA_RW);
+ if (result != android::OK) {
+ PLOG(ERROR) << "Failed to prepare directory /mnt/user";
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ // Shell is neither AID_ROOT nor AID_EVERYBODY. Since it equally needs 'execute' access to
+ // /mnt/user/0 to 'adb shell ls /sdcard' for instance, we set the uid bit of /mnt/user/0 to
+ // AID_SHELL. This gives shell access along with apps running as group everybody (user 0 apps)
+ // These bits should be consistent with what is set in zygote in
+ // com_android_internal_os_Zygote#MountEmulatedStorage on volume bind mount during app fork
+ result = PrepareDir(pre_fuse_path, 0710, user_id ? AID_ROOT : AID_SHELL,
+ multiuser_get_uid(user_id, AID_EVERYBODY));
+ if (result != android::OK) {
+ PLOG(ERROR) << "Failed to prepare directory " << pre_fuse_path;
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ result = PrepareDir(fuse_path, 0700, AID_ROOT, AID_ROOT);
+ if (result != android::OK) {
+ PLOG(ERROR) << "Failed to prepare directory " << fuse_path;
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ result = PrepareDir(pre_pass_through_path, 0710, AID_ROOT, AID_MEDIA_RW);
+ if (result != android::OK) {
+ PLOG(ERROR) << "Failed to prepare directory " << pre_pass_through_path;
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ result = PrepareDir(pass_through_path, 0710, AID_ROOT, AID_MEDIA_RW);
+ if (result != android::OK) {
+ PLOG(ERROR) << "Failed to prepare directory " << pass_through_path;
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ if (relative_upper_path == "emulated") {
+ std::string linkpath(StringPrintf("/mnt/user/%d/self", user_id));
+ result = PrepareDir(linkpath, 0755, AID_ROOT, AID_ROOT);
+ if (result != android::OK) {
+ PLOG(ERROR) << "Failed to prepare directory " << linkpath;
+ return -1;
+ }
+ linkpath += "/primary";
+ Symlink("/storage/emulated/" + std::to_string(user_id), linkpath);
+
+ std::string pass_through_linkpath(StringPrintf("/mnt/pass_through/%d/self", user_id));
+ result = PrepareDir(pass_through_linkpath, 0710, AID_ROOT, AID_MEDIA_RW);
+ if (result != android::OK) {
+ PLOG(ERROR) << "Failed to prepare directory " << pass_through_linkpath;
+ return -1;
+ }
+ pass_through_linkpath += "/primary";
+ Symlink("/storage/emulated/" + std::to_string(user_id), pass_through_linkpath);
+ }
+
+ // Open fuse fd.
+ fuse_fd->reset(open("/dev/fuse", O_RDWR | O_CLOEXEC));
+ if (fuse_fd->get() == -1) {
+ PLOG(ERROR) << "Failed to open /dev/fuse";
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ // Note: leaving out default_permissions since we don't want kernel to do lower filesystem
+ // permission checks before routing to FUSE daemon.
+ const auto opts = StringPrintf(
+ "fd=%i,"
+ "rootmode=40000,"
+ "allow_other,"
+ "user_id=0,group_id=0,",
+ fuse_fd->get());
+
+ result = TEMP_FAILURE_RETRY(mount("/dev/fuse", fuse_path.c_str(), "fuse",
+ MS_NOSUID | MS_NODEV | MS_NOEXEC | MS_NOATIME | MS_LAZYTIME,
+ opts.c_str()));
+ if (result != 0) {
+ PLOG(ERROR) << "Failed to mount " << fuse_path;
+ return -errno;
+ }
+
+ if (IsSdcardfsUsed()) {
+ std::string sdcardfs_path(
+ StringPrintf("/mnt/runtime/full/%s", relative_upper_path.c_str()));
+
+ LOG(INFO) << "Bind mounting " << sdcardfs_path << " to " << pass_through_path;
+ return BindMount(sdcardfs_path, pass_through_path);
+ } else {
+ LOG(INFO) << "Bind mounting " << absolute_lower_path << " to " << pass_through_path;
+ return BindMount(absolute_lower_path, pass_through_path);
+ }
+}
+
+android::status_t UnmountUserFuse(userid_t user_id, const std::string& absolute_lower_path,
+ const std::string& relative_upper_path) {
+ std::string fuse_path(StringPrintf("/mnt/user/%d/%s", user_id, relative_upper_path.c_str()));
+ std::string pass_through_path(
+ StringPrintf("/mnt/pass_through/%d/%s", user_id, relative_upper_path.c_str()));
+
+ // Best effort unmount pass_through path
+ sSleepOnUnmount = false;
+ LOG(INFO) << "Unmounting pass_through_path " << pass_through_path;
+ auto status = ForceUnmount(pass_through_path);
+ if (status != android::OK) {
+ LOG(ERROR) << "Failed to unmount " << pass_through_path;
+ }
+ rmdir(pass_through_path.c_str());
+
+ LOG(INFO) << "Unmounting fuse path " << fuse_path;
+ android::status_t result = ForceUnmount(fuse_path);
+ sSleepOnUnmount = true;
+ if (result != android::OK) {
+ // TODO(b/135341433): MNT_DETACH is needed for fuse because umount2 can fail with EBUSY.
+ // Figure out why we get EBUSY and remove this special casing if possible.
+ PLOG(ERROR) << "Failed to unmount. Trying MNT_DETACH " << fuse_path << " ...";
+ if (umount2(fuse_path.c_str(), UMOUNT_NOFOLLOW | MNT_DETACH) && errno != EINVAL &&
+ errno != ENOENT) {
+ PLOG(ERROR) << "Failed to unmount with MNT_DETACH " << fuse_path;
+ return -errno;
+ }
+ result = android::OK;
+ }
+ rmdir(fuse_path.c_str());
+
+ return result;
+}
+
+android::status_t PrepareAndroidDirs(const std::string& volumeRoot) {
+ std::string androidDir = volumeRoot + kAndroidDir;
+ std::string androidDataDir = volumeRoot + kAppDataDir;
+ std::string androidObbDir = volumeRoot + kAppObbDir;
+ std::string androidMediaDir = volumeRoot + kAppMediaDir;
+
+ bool useSdcardFs = IsSdcardfsUsed();
+
+ // mode 0771 + sticky bit for inheriting GIDs
+ mode_t mode = S_IRWXU | S_IRWXG | S_IXOTH | S_ISGID;
+ if (fs_prepare_dir(androidDir.c_str(), mode, AID_MEDIA_RW, AID_MEDIA_RW) != 0) {
+ PLOG(ERROR) << "Failed to create " << androidDir;
+ return -errno;
+ }
+
+ gid_t dataGid = useSdcardFs ? AID_MEDIA_RW : AID_EXT_DATA_RW;
+ if (fs_prepare_dir(androidDataDir.c_str(), mode, AID_MEDIA_RW, dataGid) != 0) {
+ PLOG(ERROR) << "Failed to create " << androidDataDir;
+ return -errno;
+ }
+
+ gid_t obbGid = useSdcardFs ? AID_MEDIA_RW : AID_EXT_OBB_RW;
+ if (fs_prepare_dir(androidObbDir.c_str(), mode, AID_MEDIA_RW, obbGid) != 0) {
+ PLOG(ERROR) << "Failed to create " << androidObbDir;
+ return -errno;
+ }
+ // Some other apps, like installers, have write access to the OBB directory
+ // to pre-download them. To make sure newly created folders in this directory
+ // have the right permissions, set a default ACL.
+ SetDefaultAcl(androidObbDir, mode, AID_MEDIA_RW, obbGid, {});
+
+ if (fs_prepare_dir(androidMediaDir.c_str(), mode, AID_MEDIA_RW, AID_MEDIA_RW) != 0) {
+ PLOG(ERROR) << "Failed to create " << androidMediaDir;
+ return -errno;
+ }
+
+ return android::OK;
+}
diff --git a/crypto/fscrypt/Utils.h b/crypto/fscrypt/Utils.h
index af4e401..e820711 100755
--- a/crypto/fscrypt/Utils.h
+++ b/crypto/fscrypt/Utils.h
@@ -20,6 +20,7 @@
#include "KeyBuffer.h"
#include <android-base/macros.h>
+#include <android-base/unique_fd.h>
#include <cutils/multiuser.h>
#include <selinux/selinux.h>
#include <utils/Errors.h>
@@ -30,8 +31,9 @@
struct DIR;
-namespace android {
-namespace vold {
+static const char* kPropFuse = "persist.sys.fuse";
+static const char* kVoldAppDataIsolationEnabled = "persist.sys.vold_app_data_isolation_enabled";
+static const char* kExternalStorageSdcardfs = "external_storage.sdcardfs.enabled";
/* SELinux contexts used depending on the block device type */
extern security_context_t sBlkidContext;
@@ -42,72 +44,93 @@
// TODO remove this with better solution, b/64143519
extern bool sSleepOnUnmount;
-status_t CreateDeviceNode(const std::string& path, dev_t dev);
-status_t DestroyDeviceNode(const std::string& path);
+std::string GetFuseMountPathForUser(userid_t user_id, const std::string& relative_upper_path);
+
+android::status_t CreateDeviceNode(const std::string& path, dev_t dev);
+android::status_t DestroyDeviceNode(const std::string& path);
+
+android::status_t AbortFuseConnections();
+
+int SetQuotaInherit(const std::string& path);
+int SetQuotaProjectId(const std::string& path, long projectId);
+/*
+ * Creates and sets up an application-specific path on external
+ * storage with the correct ACL and project ID (if needed).
+ *
+ * ONLY for use with app-specific data directories on external storage!
+ * (eg, /Android/data/com.foo, /Android/obb/com.foo, etc.)
+ */
+int PrepareAppDirFromRoot(const std::string& path, const std::string& root, int appUid,
+ bool fixupExisting);
/* fs_prepare_dir wrapper that creates with SELinux context */
-status_t PrepareDir(const std::string& path, mode_t mode, uid_t uid, gid_t gid);
+android::status_t PrepareDir(const std::string& path, mode_t mode, uid_t uid, gid_t gid);
/* Really unmounts the path, killing active processes along the way */
-status_t ForceUnmount(const std::string& path);
+android::status_t ForceUnmount(const std::string& path);
/* Kills any processes using given path */
-status_t KillProcessesUsingPath(const std::string& path);
+android::status_t KillProcessesUsingPath(const std::string& path);
+
+/* Kills any processes using given mount prifix */
+android::status_t KillProcessesWithMountPrefix(const std::string& path);
/* Creates bind mount from source to target */
-status_t BindMount(const std::string& source, const std::string& target);
+android::status_t BindMount(const std::string& source, const std::string& target);
/** Creates a symbolic link to target */
-status_t Symlink(const std::string& target, const std::string& linkpath);
+android::status_t Symlink(const std::string& target, const std::string& linkpath);
/** Calls unlink(2) at linkpath */
-status_t Unlink(const std::string& linkpath);
+android::status_t Unlink(const std::string& linkpath);
/** Creates the given directory if it is not already available */
-status_t CreateDir(const std::string& dir, mode_t mode);
+android::status_t CreateDir(const std::string& dir, mode_t mode);
bool FindValue(const std::string& raw, const std::string& key, std::string* value);
/* Reads filesystem metadata from device at path */
-status_t ReadMetadata(const std::string& path, std::string* fsType, std::string* fsUuid,
+android::status_t ReadMetadata(const std::string& path, std::string* fsType, std::string* fsUuid,
std::string* fsLabel);
/* Reads filesystem metadata from untrusted device at path */
-status_t ReadMetadataUntrusted(const std::string& path, std::string* fsType, std::string* fsUuid,
+android::status_t ReadMetadataUntrusted(const std::string& path, std::string* fsType, std::string* fsUuid,
std::string* fsLabel);
/* Returns either WEXITSTATUS() status, or a negative errno */
-status_t ForkExecvp(const std::vector<std::string>& args, std::vector<std::string>* output = nullptr,
+android::status_t ForkExecvp(const std::vector<std::string>& args, std::vector<std::string>* output = nullptr,
security_context_t context = nullptr);
pid_t ForkExecvpAsync(const std::vector<std::string>& args);
/* Gets block device size in bytes */
-status_t GetBlockDevSize(int fd, uint64_t* size);
-status_t GetBlockDevSize(const std::string& path, uint64_t* size);
+android::status_t GetBlockDevSize(int fd, uint64_t* size);
+android::status_t GetBlockDevSize(const std::string& path, uint64_t* size);
/* Gets block device size in 512 byte sectors */
-status_t GetBlockDev512Sectors(const std::string& path, uint64_t* nr_sec);
+android::status_t GetBlockDev512Sectors(const std::string& path, uint64_t* nr_sec);
-status_t ReadRandomBytes(size_t bytes, std::string& out);
-status_t ReadRandomBytes(size_t bytes, char* buffer);
-status_t GenerateRandomUuid(std::string& out);
+android::status_t ReadRandomBytes(size_t bytes, std::string& out);
+android::status_t ReadRandomBytes(size_t bytes, char* buffer);
+android::status_t GenerateRandomUuid(std::string& out);
/* Converts hex string to raw bytes, ignoring [ :-] */
-status_t HexToStr(const std::string& hex, std::string& str);
+android::status_t HexToStr(const std::string& hex, std::string& str);
/* Converts raw bytes to hex string */
-status_t StrToHex(const std::string& str, std::string& hex);
+android::status_t StrToHex(const std::string& str, std::string& hex);
/* Converts raw key bytes to hex string */
-status_t StrToHex(const KeyBuffer& str, KeyBuffer& hex);
+android::status_t StrToHex(const KeyBuffer& str, KeyBuffer& hex);
/* Normalize given hex string into consistent format */
-status_t NormalizeHex(const std::string& in, std::string& out);
+android::status_t NormalizeHex(const std::string& in, std::string& out);
uint64_t GetFreeBytes(const std::string& path);
uint64_t GetTreeBytes(const std::string& path);
bool IsFilesystemSupported(const std::string& fsType);
+bool IsSdcardfsUsed();
+bool IsFuseDaemon(const pid_t pid);
/* Wipes contents of block device at given path */
-status_t WipeBlockDevice(const std::string& path);
+android::status_t WipeBlockDevice(const std::string& path);
std::string BuildKeyPath(const std::string& partGuid);
@@ -128,26 +151,38 @@
dev_t GetDevice(const std::string& path);
-status_t RestoreconRecursive(const std::string& path);
+android::status_t EnsureDirExists(const std::string& path, mode_t mode, uid_t uid, gid_t gid);
+
+android::status_t RestoreconRecursive(const std::string& path);
// TODO: promote to android::base
bool Readlinkat(int dirfd, const std::string& path, std::string* result);
-/* Checks if Android is running in QEMU */
-bool IsRunningInEmulator();
+// Handles dynamic major assignment for virtio-block
+bool IsVirtioBlkDevice(unsigned int major);
-status_t UnmountTreeWithPrefix(const std::string& prefix);
-status_t UnmountTree(const std::string& mountPoint);
+android::status_t UnmountTreeWithPrefix(const std::string& prefix);
+android::status_t UnmountTree(const std::string& mountPoint);
-status_t DeleteDirContentsAndDir(const std::string& pathname);
-status_t DeleteDirContents(const std::string& pathname);
+android::status_t DeleteDirContentsAndDir(const std::string& pathname);
+android::status_t DeleteDirContents(const std::string& pathname);
-status_t WaitForFile(const char* filename, std::chrono::nanoseconds timeout);
+android::status_t WaitForFile(const char* filename, std::chrono::nanoseconds timeout);
bool FsyncDirectory(const std::string& dirname);
bool writeStringToFile(const std::string& payload, const std::string& filename);
-} // namespace vold
-} // namespace android
+
+void ConfigureMaxDirtyRatioForFuse(const std::string& fuse_mount, unsigned int max_ratio);
+
+void ConfigureReadAheadForFuse(const std::string& fuse_mount, size_t read_ahead_kb);
+
+android::status_t MountUserFuse(userid_t user_id, const std::string& absolute_lower_path,
+ const std::string& relative_upper_path, android::base::unique_fd* fuse_fd);
+
+android::status_t UnmountUserFuse(userid_t userId, const std::string& absolute_lower_path,
+ const std::string& relative_upper_path);
+
+android::status_t PrepareAndroidDirs(const std::string& volumeRoot);
#endif
diff --git a/crypto/fscrypt/VoldUtil.h b/crypto/fscrypt/VoldUtil.h
index 173c598..ce6b411 100644
--- a/crypto/fscrypt/VoldUtil.h
+++ b/crypto/fscrypt/VoldUtil.h
@@ -17,8 +17,7 @@
#pragma once
#include <fstab/fstab.h>
-#include <sys/cdefs.h>
extern android::fs_mgr::Fstab fstab_default;
-#define ARRAY_SIZE(a) (sizeof(a) / sizeof(*(a)))
+#define DATA_MNT_POINT "/data"
diff --git a/crypto/fscrypt/cryptfs.cpp b/crypto/fscrypt/cryptfs.cpp
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..b58c343
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/fscrypt/cryptfs.cpp
@@ -0,0 +1,2902 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2010 The Android Open Source Project
+ *
+ * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+ * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+ * You may obtain a copy of the License at
+ *
+ * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+ *
+ * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+ * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+ * WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+ * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+ * limitations under the License.
+ */
+
+#define LOG_TAG "Cryptfs"
+
+#include "cryptfs.h"
+
+#include "Checkpoint.h"
+#include "CryptoType.h"
+#include "EncryptInplace.h"
+#include "FsCrypt.h"
+#include "Keymaster.h"
+#include "Process.h"
+#include "ScryptParameters.h"
+#include "Utils.h"
+#include "VoldUtil.h"
+#include "VolumeManager.h"
+
+#include <android-base/parseint.h>
+#include <android-base/properties.h>
+#include <android-base/stringprintf.h>
+#include <android-base/strings.h>
+#include <bootloader_message/bootloader_message.h>
+#include <cutils/android_reboot.h>
+#include <cutils/properties.h>
+#include <ext4_utils/ext4_utils.h>
+#include <f2fs_sparseblock.h>
+#include <fs_mgr.h>
+#include <fscrypt/fscrypt.h>
+#include <libdm/dm.h>
+#include <log/log.h>
+#include <logwrap/logwrap.h>
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/sha.h>
+#include <selinux/selinux.h>
+// #include <wakelock/wakelock.h>
+
+#include <ctype.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <inttypes.h>
+#include <libgen.h>
+#include <linux/kdev_t.h>
+#include <math.h>
+#include <mntent.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <sys/mount.h>
+#include <sys/param.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/wait.h>
+#include <time.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+
+#include <chrono>
+#include <thread>
+
+extern "C" {
+#include <crypto_scrypt.h>
+}
+
+using android::base::ParseUint;
+using android::base::StringPrintf;
+using android::fs_mgr::GetEntryForMountPoint;
+using ::CryptoType;
+using ::KeyBuffer;
+using ::KeyGeneration;
+using namespace android::dm;
+using namespace std::chrono_literals;
+
+/* The current cryptfs version */
+#define CURRENT_MAJOR_VERSION 1
+#define CURRENT_MINOR_VERSION 3
+
+#define CRYPT_FOOTER_TO_PERSIST_OFFSET 0x1000
+#define CRYPT_PERSIST_DATA_SIZE 0x1000
+
+#define MAX_CRYPTO_TYPE_NAME_LEN 64
+
+#define MAX_KEY_LEN 48
+#define SALT_LEN 16
+#define SCRYPT_LEN 32
+
+/* definitions of flags in the structure below */
+#define CRYPT_MNT_KEY_UNENCRYPTED 0x1 /* The key for the partition is not encrypted. */
+#define CRYPT_ENCRYPTION_IN_PROGRESS \
+ 0x2 /* Encryption partially completed, \
+ encrypted_upto valid*/
+#define CRYPT_INCONSISTENT_STATE \
+ 0x4 /* Set when starting encryption, clear when \
+ exit cleanly, either through success or \
+ correctly marked partial encryption */
+#define CRYPT_DATA_CORRUPT \
+ 0x8 /* Set when encryption is fine, but the \
+ underlying volume is corrupt */
+#define CRYPT_FORCE_ENCRYPTION \
+ 0x10 /* Set when it is time to encrypt this \
+ volume on boot. Everything in this \
+ structure is set up correctly as \
+ though device is encrypted except \
+ that the master key is encrypted with the \
+ default password. */
+#define CRYPT_FORCE_COMPLETE \
+ 0x20 /* Set when the above encryption cycle is \
+ complete. On next cryptkeeper entry, match \
+ the password. If it matches fix the master \
+ key and remove this flag. */
+
+/* Allowed values for type in the structure below */
+#define CRYPT_TYPE_PASSWORD \
+ 0 /* master_key is encrypted with a password \
+ * Must be zero to be compatible with pre-L \
+ * devices where type is always password.*/
+#define CRYPT_TYPE_DEFAULT \
+ 1 /* master_key is encrypted with default \
+ * password */
+#define CRYPT_TYPE_PATTERN 2 /* master_key is encrypted with a pattern */
+#define CRYPT_TYPE_PIN 3 /* master_key is encrypted with a pin */
+#define CRYPT_TYPE_MAX_TYPE 3 /* type cannot be larger than this value */
+
+#define CRYPT_MNT_MAGIC 0xD0B5B1C4
+#define PERSIST_DATA_MAGIC 0xE950CD44
+
+/* Key Derivation Function algorithms */
+#define KDF_PBKDF2 1
+#define KDF_SCRYPT 2
+/* Algorithms 3 & 4 deprecated before shipping outside of google, so removed */
+#define KDF_SCRYPT_KEYMASTER 5
+
+/* Maximum allowed keymaster blob size. */
+#define KEYMASTER_BLOB_SIZE 2048
+
+/* __le32 and __le16 defined in system/extras/ext4_utils/ext4_utils.h */
+#define __le8 unsigned char
+
+#if !defined(SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH)
+#define SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH 32
+#endif
+
+/* This structure starts 16,384 bytes before the end of a hardware
+ * partition that is encrypted, or in a separate partition. It's location
+ * is specified by a property set in init.<device>.rc.
+ * The structure allocates 48 bytes for a key, but the real key size is
+ * specified in the struct. Currently, the code is hardcoded to use 128
+ * bit keys.
+ * The fields after salt are only valid in rev 1.1 and later stuctures.
+ * Obviously, the filesystem does not include the last 16 kbytes
+ * of the partition if the crypt_mnt_ftr lives at the end of the
+ * partition.
+ */
+
+struct crypt_mnt_ftr {
+ __le32 magic; /* See above */
+ __le16 major_version;
+ __le16 minor_version;
+ __le32 ftr_size; /* in bytes, not including key following */
+ __le32 flags; /* See above */
+ __le32 keysize; /* in bytes */
+ __le32 crypt_type; /* how master_key is encrypted. Must be a
+ * CRYPT_TYPE_XXX value */
+ __le64 fs_size; /* Size of the encrypted fs, in 512 byte sectors */
+ __le32 failed_decrypt_count; /* count of # of failed attempts to decrypt and
+ mount, set to 0 on successful mount */
+ unsigned char crypto_type_name[MAX_CRYPTO_TYPE_NAME_LEN]; /* The type of encryption
+ needed to decrypt this
+ partition, null terminated */
+ __le32 spare2; /* ignored */
+ unsigned char master_key[MAX_KEY_LEN]; /* The encrypted key for decrypting the filesystem */
+ unsigned char salt[SALT_LEN]; /* The salt used for this encryption */
+ __le64 persist_data_offset[2]; /* Absolute offset to both copies of crypt_persist_data
+ * on device with that info, either the footer of the
+ * real_blkdevice or the metadata partition. */
+
+ __le32 persist_data_size; /* The number of bytes allocated to each copy of the
+ * persistent data table*/
+
+ __le8 kdf_type; /* The key derivation function used. */
+
+ /* scrypt parameters. See www.tarsnap.com/scrypt/scrypt.pdf */
+ __le8 N_factor; /* (1 << N) */
+ __le8 r_factor; /* (1 << r) */
+ __le8 p_factor; /* (1 << p) */
+ __le64 encrypted_upto; /* If we are in state CRYPT_ENCRYPTION_IN_PROGRESS and
+ we have to stop (e.g. power low) this is the last
+ encrypted 512 byte sector.*/
+ __le8 hash_first_block[SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH]; /* When CRYPT_ENCRYPTION_IN_PROGRESS
+ set, hash of first block, used
+ to validate before continuing*/
+
+ /* key_master key, used to sign the derived key which is then used to generate
+ * the intermediate key
+ * This key should be used for no other purposes! We use this key to sign unpadded
+ * data, which is acceptable but only if the key is not reused elsewhere. */
+ __le8 keymaster_blob[KEYMASTER_BLOB_SIZE];
+ __le32 keymaster_blob_size;
+
+ /* Store scrypt of salted intermediate key. When decryption fails, we can
+ check if this matches, and if it does, we know that the problem is with the
+ drive, and there is no point in asking the user for more passwords.
+
+ Note that if any part of this structure is corrupt, this will not match and
+ we will continue to believe the user entered the wrong password. In that
+ case the only solution is for the user to enter a password enough times to
+ force a wipe.
+
+ Note also that there is no need to worry about migration. If this data is
+ wrong, we simply won't recognise a right password, and will continue to
+ prompt. On the first password change, this value will be populated and
+ then we will be OK.
+ */
+ unsigned char scrypted_intermediate_key[SCRYPT_LEN];
+
+ /* sha of this structure with this element set to zero
+ Used when encrypting on reboot to validate structure before doing something
+ fatal
+ */
+ unsigned char sha256[SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH];
+};
+
+/* Persistant data that should be available before decryption.
+ * Things like airplane mode, locale and timezone are kept
+ * here and can be retrieved by the CryptKeeper UI to properly
+ * configure the phone before asking for the password
+ * This is only valid if the major and minor version above
+ * is set to 1.1 or higher.
+ *
+ * This is a 4K structure. There are 2 copies, and the code alternates
+ * writing one and then clearing the previous one. The reading
+ * code reads the first valid copy it finds, based on the magic number.
+ * The absolute offset to the first of the two copies is kept in rev 1.1
+ * and higher crypt_mnt_ftr structures.
+ */
+struct crypt_persist_entry {
+ char key[PROPERTY_KEY_MAX];
+ char val[PROPERTY_VALUE_MAX];
+};
+
+/* Should be exactly 4K in size */
+struct crypt_persist_data {
+ __le32 persist_magic;
+ __le32 persist_valid_entries;
+ __le32 persist_spare[30];
+ struct crypt_persist_entry persist_entry[0];
+};
+
+static int wait_and_unmount(const char* mountpoint, bool kill);
+
+typedef int (*kdf_func)(const char* passwd, const unsigned char* salt, unsigned char* ikey,
+ void* params);
+
+#define UNUSED __attribute__((unused))
+
+#define HASH_COUNT 2000
+
+constexpr size_t INTERMEDIATE_KEY_LEN_BYTES = 16;
+constexpr size_t INTERMEDIATE_IV_LEN_BYTES = 16;
+constexpr size_t INTERMEDIATE_BUF_SIZE = (INTERMEDIATE_KEY_LEN_BYTES + INTERMEDIATE_IV_LEN_BYTES);
+
+// SCRYPT_LEN is used by struct crypt_mnt_ftr for its intermediate key.
+static_assert(INTERMEDIATE_BUF_SIZE == SCRYPT_LEN, "Mismatch of intermediate key sizes");
+
+#define KEY_IN_FOOTER "footer"
+
+#define DEFAULT_PASSWORD "default_password"
+
+#define CRYPTO_BLOCK_DEVICE "userdata"
+
+#define BREADCRUMB_FILE "/data/misc/vold/convert_fde"
+
+#define EXT4_FS 1
+#define F2FS_FS 2
+
+#define TABLE_LOAD_RETRIES 10
+
+#define RSA_KEY_SIZE 2048
+#define RSA_KEY_SIZE_BYTES (RSA_KEY_SIZE / 8)
+#define RSA_EXPONENT 0x10001
+#define KEYMASTER_CRYPTFS_RATE_LIMIT 1 // Maximum one try per second
+
+#define RETRY_MOUNT_ATTEMPTS 10
+#define RETRY_MOUNT_DELAY_SECONDS 1
+
+#define CREATE_CRYPTO_BLK_DEV_FLAGS_ALLOW_ENCRYPT_OVERRIDE (1)
+
+static int put_crypt_ftr_and_key(struct crypt_mnt_ftr* crypt_ftr);
+
+static unsigned char saved_master_key[MAX_KEY_LEN];
+static char* saved_mount_point;
+static int master_key_saved = 0;
+static struct crypt_persist_data* persist_data = NULL;
+
+constexpr CryptoType aes_128_cbc = CryptoType()
+ .set_config_name("AES-128-CBC")
+ .set_kernel_name("aes-cbc-essiv:sha256")
+ .set_keysize(16);
+
+constexpr CryptoType supported_crypto_types[] = {aes_128_cbc, ::adiantum};
+
+static_assert(validateSupportedCryptoTypes(MAX_KEY_LEN, supported_crypto_types,
+ array_length(supported_crypto_types)),
+ "We have a CryptoType with keysize > MAX_KEY_LEN or which was "
+ "incompletely constructed.");
+
+static const CryptoType& get_crypto_type() {
+ // We only want to parse this read-only property once. But we need to wait
+ // until the system is initialized before we can read it. So we use a static
+ // scoped within this function to get it only once.
+ static CryptoType crypto_type =
+ lookup_crypto_algorithm(supported_crypto_types, array_length(supported_crypto_types),
+ aes_128_cbc, "ro.crypto.fde_algorithm");
+ return crypto_type;
+}
+
+const KeyGeneration cryptfs_get_keygen() {
+ return KeyGeneration{get_crypto_type().get_keysize(), true, false};
+}
+
+/* Should we use keymaster? */
+static int keymaster_check_compatibility() {
+ return keymaster_compatibility_cryptfs_scrypt();
+}
+
+/* Create a new keymaster key and store it in this footer */
+static int keymaster_create_key(struct crypt_mnt_ftr* ftr) {
+ if (ftr->keymaster_blob_size) {
+ SLOGI("Already have key");
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ int rc = keymaster_create_key_for_cryptfs_scrypt(
+ RSA_KEY_SIZE, RSA_EXPONENT, KEYMASTER_CRYPTFS_RATE_LIMIT, ftr->keymaster_blob,
+ KEYMASTER_BLOB_SIZE, &ftr->keymaster_blob_size);
+ if (rc) {
+ if (ftr->keymaster_blob_size > KEYMASTER_BLOB_SIZE) {
+ SLOGE("Keymaster key blob too large");
+ ftr->keymaster_blob_size = 0;
+ }
+ SLOGE("Failed to generate keypair");
+ return -1;
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/* This signs the given object using the keymaster key. */
+static int keymaster_sign_object(struct crypt_mnt_ftr* ftr, const unsigned char* object,
+ const size_t object_size, unsigned char** signature,
+ size_t* signature_size) {
+ unsigned char to_sign[RSA_KEY_SIZE_BYTES];
+ size_t to_sign_size = sizeof(to_sign);
+ memset(to_sign, 0, RSA_KEY_SIZE_BYTES);
+
+ // To sign a message with RSA, the message must satisfy two
+ // constraints:
+ //
+ // 1. The message, when interpreted as a big-endian numeric value, must
+ // be strictly less than the public modulus of the RSA key. Note
+ // that because the most significant bit of the public modulus is
+ // guaranteed to be 1 (else it's an (n-1)-bit key, not an n-bit
+ // key), an n-bit message with most significant bit 0 always
+ // satisfies this requirement.
+ //
+ // 2. The message must have the same length in bits as the public
+ // modulus of the RSA key. This requirement isn't mathematically
+ // necessary, but is necessary to ensure consistency in
+ // implementations.
+ switch (ftr->kdf_type) {
+ case KDF_SCRYPT_KEYMASTER:
+ // This ensures the most significant byte of the signed message
+ // is zero. We could have zero-padded to the left instead, but
+ // this approach is slightly more robust against changes in
+ // object size. However, it's still broken (but not unusably
+ // so) because we really should be using a proper deterministic
+ // RSA padding function, such as PKCS1.
+ memcpy(to_sign + 1, object, std::min((size_t)RSA_KEY_SIZE_BYTES - 1, object_size));
+ SLOGI("Signing safely-padded object");
+ break;
+ default:
+ SLOGE("Unknown KDF type %d", ftr->kdf_type);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ for (;;) {
+ auto result = keymaster_sign_object_for_cryptfs_scrypt(
+ ftr->keymaster_blob, ftr->keymaster_blob_size, KEYMASTER_CRYPTFS_RATE_LIMIT, to_sign,
+ to_sign_size, signature, signature_size);
+ switch (result) {
+ case KeymasterSignResult::ok:
+ return 0;
+ case KeymasterSignResult::upgrade:
+ break;
+ default:
+ return -1;
+ }
+ SLOGD("Upgrading key");
+ if (keymaster_upgrade_key_for_cryptfs_scrypt(
+ RSA_KEY_SIZE, RSA_EXPONENT, KEYMASTER_CRYPTFS_RATE_LIMIT, ftr->keymaster_blob,
+ ftr->keymaster_blob_size, ftr->keymaster_blob, KEYMASTER_BLOB_SIZE,
+ &ftr->keymaster_blob_size) != 0) {
+ SLOGE("Failed to upgrade key");
+ return -1;
+ }
+ if (put_crypt_ftr_and_key(ftr) != 0) {
+ SLOGE("Failed to write upgraded key to disk");
+ }
+ SLOGD("Key upgraded successfully");
+ }
+}
+
+/* Store password when userdata is successfully decrypted and mounted.
+ * Cleared by cryptfs_clear_password
+ *
+ * To avoid a double prompt at boot, we need to store the CryptKeeper
+ * password and pass it to KeyGuard, which uses it to unlock KeyStore.
+ * Since the entire framework is torn down and rebuilt after encryption,
+ * we have to use a daemon or similar to store the password. Since vold
+ * is secured against IPC except from system processes, it seems a reasonable
+ * place to store this.
+ *
+ * password should be cleared once it has been used.
+ *
+ * password is aged out after password_max_age_seconds seconds.
+ */
+static char* password = 0;
+static int password_expiry_time = 0;
+static const int password_max_age_seconds = 60;
+
+enum class RebootType { reboot, recovery, shutdown };
+static void cryptfs_reboot(RebootType rt) {
+ switch (rt) {
+ case RebootType::reboot:
+ property_set(ANDROID_RB_PROPERTY, "reboot");
+ break;
+
+ case RebootType::recovery:
+ property_set(ANDROID_RB_PROPERTY, "reboot,recovery");
+ break;
+
+ case RebootType::shutdown:
+ property_set(ANDROID_RB_PROPERTY, "shutdown");
+ break;
+ }
+
+ sleep(20);
+
+ /* Shouldn't get here, reboot should happen before sleep times out */
+ return;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Gets the default device scrypt parameters for key derivation time tuning.
+ * The parameters should lead to about one second derivation time for the
+ * given device.
+ */
+static void get_device_scrypt_params(struct crypt_mnt_ftr* ftr) {
+ char paramstr[PROPERTY_VALUE_MAX];
+ int Nf, rf, pf;
+
+ property_get(SCRYPT_PROP, paramstr, SCRYPT_DEFAULTS);
+ if (!parse_scrypt_parameters(paramstr, &Nf, &rf, &pf)) {
+ SLOGW("bad scrypt parameters '%s' should be like '12:8:1'; using defaults", paramstr);
+ parse_scrypt_parameters(SCRYPT_DEFAULTS, &Nf, &rf, &pf);
+ }
+ ftr->N_factor = Nf;
+ ftr->r_factor = rf;
+ ftr->p_factor = pf;
+}
+
+static uint64_t get_fs_size(const char* dev) {
+ int fd, block_size;
+ struct ext4_super_block sb;
+ uint64_t len;
+
+ if ((fd = open(dev, O_RDONLY | O_CLOEXEC)) < 0) {
+ SLOGE("Cannot open device to get filesystem size ");
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (lseek64(fd, 1024, SEEK_SET) < 0) {
+ SLOGE("Cannot seek to superblock");
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (read(fd, &sb, sizeof(sb)) != sizeof(sb)) {
+ SLOGE("Cannot read superblock");
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ close(fd);
+
+ if (le32_to_cpu(sb.s_magic) != EXT4_SUPER_MAGIC) {
+ SLOGE("Not a valid ext4 superblock");
+ return 0;
+ }
+ block_size = 1024 << sb.s_log_block_size;
+ /* compute length in bytes */
+ len = (((uint64_t)sb.s_blocks_count_hi << 32) + sb.s_blocks_count_lo) * block_size;
+
+ /* return length in sectors */
+ return len / 512;
+}
+
+static void get_crypt_info(std::string* key_loc, std::string* real_blk_device) {
+ for (const auto& entry : fstab_default) {
+ if (!entry.fs_mgr_flags.vold_managed &&
+ (entry.fs_mgr_flags.crypt || entry.fs_mgr_flags.force_crypt ||
+ entry.fs_mgr_flags.force_fde_or_fbe || entry.fs_mgr_flags.file_encryption)) {
+ if (key_loc != nullptr) {
+ *key_loc = entry.key_loc;
+ }
+ if (real_blk_device != nullptr) {
+ *real_blk_device = entry.blk_device;
+ }
+ return;
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+static int get_crypt_ftr_info(char** metadata_fname, off64_t* off) {
+ static int cached_data = 0;
+ static uint64_t cached_off = 0;
+ static char cached_metadata_fname[PROPERTY_VALUE_MAX] = "";
+ char key_loc[PROPERTY_VALUE_MAX];
+ char real_blkdev[PROPERTY_VALUE_MAX];
+ int rc = -1;
+
+ if (!cached_data) {
+ std::string key_loc;
+ std::string real_blkdev;
+ get_crypt_info(&key_loc, &real_blkdev);
+
+ if (key_loc == KEY_IN_FOOTER) {
+ if (::GetBlockDevSize(real_blkdev, &cached_off) == android::OK) {
+ /* If it's an encrypted Android partition, the last 16 Kbytes contain the
+ * encryption info footer and key, and plenty of bytes to spare for future
+ * growth.
+ */
+ strlcpy(cached_metadata_fname, real_blkdev.c_str(), sizeof(cached_metadata_fname));
+ cached_off -= CRYPT_FOOTER_OFFSET;
+ cached_data = 1;
+ } else {
+ SLOGE("Cannot get size of block device %s\n", real_blkdev.c_str());
+ }
+ } else {
+ strlcpy(cached_metadata_fname, key_loc.c_str(), sizeof(cached_metadata_fname));
+ cached_off = 0;
+ cached_data = 1;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (cached_data) {
+ if (metadata_fname) {
+ *metadata_fname = cached_metadata_fname;
+ }
+ if (off) {
+ *off = cached_off;
+ }
+ rc = 0;
+ }
+
+ return rc;
+}
+
+/* Set sha256 checksum in structure */
+static void set_ftr_sha(struct crypt_mnt_ftr* crypt_ftr) {
+ SHA256_CTX c;
+ SHA256_Init(&c);
+ memset(crypt_ftr->sha256, 0, sizeof(crypt_ftr->sha256));
+ SHA256_Update(&c, crypt_ftr, sizeof(*crypt_ftr));
+ SHA256_Final(crypt_ftr->sha256, &c);
+}
+
+/* key or salt can be NULL, in which case just skip writing that value. Useful to
+ * update the failed mount count but not change the key.
+ */
+static int put_crypt_ftr_and_key(struct crypt_mnt_ftr* crypt_ftr) {
+ int fd;
+ unsigned int cnt;
+ /* starting_off is set to the SEEK_SET offset
+ * where the crypto structure starts
+ */
+ off64_t starting_off;
+ int rc = -1;
+ char* fname = NULL;
+ struct stat statbuf;
+
+ set_ftr_sha(crypt_ftr);
+
+ if (get_crypt_ftr_info(&fname, &starting_off)) {
+ SLOGE("Unable to get crypt_ftr_info\n");
+ return -1;
+ }
+ if (fname[0] != '/') {
+ SLOGE("put_crypt_ftr_and_key::Unexpected value for crypto key location: %s\n", fname);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ if ((fd = open(fname, O_RDWR | O_CREAT | O_CLOEXEC, 0600)) < 0) {
+ SLOGE("Cannot open footer file %s for put\n", fname);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ /* Seek to the start of the crypt footer */
+ if (lseek64(fd, starting_off, SEEK_SET) == -1) {
+ SLOGE("Cannot seek to real block device footer\n");
+ goto errout;
+ }
+
+ if ((cnt = write(fd, crypt_ftr, sizeof(struct crypt_mnt_ftr))) != sizeof(struct crypt_mnt_ftr)) {
+ SLOGE("Cannot write real block device footer\n");
+ goto errout;
+ }
+
+ fstat(fd, &statbuf);
+ /* If the keys are kept on a raw block device, do not try to truncate it. */
+ if (S_ISREG(statbuf.st_mode)) {
+ if (ftruncate(fd, 0x4000)) {
+ SLOGE("Cannot set footer file size\n");
+ goto errout;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* Success! */
+ rc = 0;
+
+errout:
+ close(fd);
+ return rc;
+}
+
+static bool check_ftr_sha(const struct crypt_mnt_ftr* crypt_ftr) {
+ struct crypt_mnt_ftr copy;
+ memcpy(©, crypt_ftr, sizeof(copy));
+ set_ftr_sha(©);
+ return memcmp(copy.sha256, crypt_ftr->sha256, sizeof(copy.sha256)) == 0;
+}
+
+static inline int unix_read(int fd, void* buff, int len) {
+ return TEMP_FAILURE_RETRY(read(fd, buff, len));
+}
+
+static inline int unix_write(int fd, const void* buff, int len) {
+ return TEMP_FAILURE_RETRY(write(fd, buff, len));
+}
+
+static void init_empty_persist_data(struct crypt_persist_data* pdata, int len) {
+ memset(pdata, 0, len);
+ pdata->persist_magic = PERSIST_DATA_MAGIC;
+ pdata->persist_valid_entries = 0;
+}
+
+/* A routine to update the passed in crypt_ftr to the lastest version.
+ * fd is open read/write on the device that holds the crypto footer and persistent
+ * data, crypt_ftr is a pointer to the struct to be updated, and offset is the
+ * absolute offset to the start of the crypt_mnt_ftr on the passed in fd.
+ */
+static void upgrade_crypt_ftr(int fd, struct crypt_mnt_ftr* crypt_ftr, off64_t offset) {
+ int orig_major = crypt_ftr->major_version;
+ int orig_minor = crypt_ftr->minor_version;
+
+ if ((crypt_ftr->major_version == 1) && (crypt_ftr->minor_version == 0)) {
+ struct crypt_persist_data* pdata;
+ off64_t pdata_offset = offset + CRYPT_FOOTER_TO_PERSIST_OFFSET;
+
+ SLOGW("upgrading crypto footer to 1.1");
+
+ pdata = (crypt_persist_data*)malloc(CRYPT_PERSIST_DATA_SIZE);
+ if (pdata == NULL) {
+ SLOGE("Cannot allocate persisent data\n");
+ return;
+ }
+ memset(pdata, 0, CRYPT_PERSIST_DATA_SIZE);
+
+ /* Need to initialize the persistent data area */
+ if (lseek64(fd, pdata_offset, SEEK_SET) == -1) {
+ SLOGE("Cannot seek to persisent data offset\n");
+ free(pdata);
+ return;
+ }
+ /* Write all zeros to the first copy, making it invalid */
+ unix_write(fd, pdata, CRYPT_PERSIST_DATA_SIZE);
+
+ /* Write a valid but empty structure to the second copy */
+ init_empty_persist_data(pdata, CRYPT_PERSIST_DATA_SIZE);
+ unix_write(fd, pdata, CRYPT_PERSIST_DATA_SIZE);
+
+ /* Update the footer */
+ crypt_ftr->persist_data_size = CRYPT_PERSIST_DATA_SIZE;
+ crypt_ftr->persist_data_offset[0] = pdata_offset;
+ crypt_ftr->persist_data_offset[1] = pdata_offset + CRYPT_PERSIST_DATA_SIZE;
+ crypt_ftr->minor_version = 1;
+ free(pdata);
+ }
+
+ if ((crypt_ftr->major_version == 1) && (crypt_ftr->minor_version == 1)) {
+ SLOGW("upgrading crypto footer to 1.2");
+ /* But keep the old kdf_type.
+ * It will get updated later to KDF_SCRYPT after the password has been verified.
+ */
+ crypt_ftr->kdf_type = KDF_PBKDF2;
+ get_device_scrypt_params(crypt_ftr);
+ crypt_ftr->minor_version = 2;
+ }
+
+ if ((crypt_ftr->major_version == 1) && (crypt_ftr->minor_version == 2)) {
+ SLOGW("upgrading crypto footer to 1.3");
+ crypt_ftr->crypt_type = CRYPT_TYPE_PASSWORD;
+ crypt_ftr->minor_version = 3;
+ }
+
+ if ((orig_major != crypt_ftr->major_version) || (orig_minor != crypt_ftr->minor_version)) {
+ if (lseek64(fd, offset, SEEK_SET) == -1) {
+ SLOGE("Cannot seek to crypt footer\n");
+ return;
+ }
+ unix_write(fd, crypt_ftr, sizeof(struct crypt_mnt_ftr));
+ }
+}
+
+static int get_crypt_ftr_and_key(struct crypt_mnt_ftr* crypt_ftr) {
+ int fd;
+ unsigned int cnt;
+ off64_t starting_off;
+ int rc = -1;
+ char* fname = NULL;
+ struct stat statbuf;
+
+ if (get_crypt_ftr_info(&fname, &starting_off)) {
+ SLOGE("Unable to get crypt_ftr_info\n");
+ return -1;
+ }
+ if (fname[0] != '/') {
+ SLOGE("get_crypt_ftr_and_key::Unexpected value for crypto key location: %s\n", fname);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ if ((fd = open(fname, O_RDWR | O_CLOEXEC)) < 0) {
+ SLOGE("Cannot open footer file %s for get\n", fname);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ /* Make sure it's 16 Kbytes in length */
+ fstat(fd, &statbuf);
+ if (S_ISREG(statbuf.st_mode) && (statbuf.st_size != 0x4000)) {
+ SLOGE("footer file %s is not the expected size!\n", fname);
+ goto errout;
+ }
+
+ /* Seek to the start of the crypt footer */
+ if (lseek64(fd, starting_off, SEEK_SET) == -1) {
+ SLOGE("Cannot seek to real block device footer\n");
+ goto errout;
+ }
+
+ if ((cnt = read(fd, crypt_ftr, sizeof(struct crypt_mnt_ftr))) != sizeof(struct crypt_mnt_ftr)) {
+ SLOGE("Cannot read real block device footer\n");
+ goto errout;
+ }
+
+ if (crypt_ftr->magic != CRYPT_MNT_MAGIC) {
+ SLOGE("Bad magic for real block device %s\n", fname);
+ goto errout;
+ }
+
+ if (crypt_ftr->major_version != CURRENT_MAJOR_VERSION) {
+ SLOGE("Cannot understand major version %d real block device footer; expected %d\n",
+ crypt_ftr->major_version, CURRENT_MAJOR_VERSION);
+ goto errout;
+ }
+
+ // We risk buffer overflows with oversized keys, so we just reject them.
+ // 0-sized keys are problematic (essentially by-passing encryption), and
+ // AES-CBC key wrapping only works for multiples of 16 bytes.
+ if ((crypt_ftr->keysize == 0) || ((crypt_ftr->keysize % 16) != 0) ||
+ (crypt_ftr->keysize > MAX_KEY_LEN)) {
+ SLOGE(
+ "Invalid keysize (%u) for block device %s; Must be non-zero, "
+ "divisible by 16, and <= %d\n",
+ crypt_ftr->keysize, fname, MAX_KEY_LEN);
+ goto errout;
+ }
+
+ if (crypt_ftr->minor_version > CURRENT_MINOR_VERSION) {
+ SLOGW("Warning: crypto footer minor version %d, expected <= %d, continuing...\n",
+ crypt_ftr->minor_version, CURRENT_MINOR_VERSION);
+ }
+
+ /* If this is a verion 1.0 crypt_ftr, make it a 1.1 crypt footer, and update the
+ * copy on disk before returning.
+ */
+ if (crypt_ftr->minor_version < CURRENT_MINOR_VERSION) {
+ upgrade_crypt_ftr(fd, crypt_ftr, starting_off);
+ }
+
+ /* Success! */
+ rc = 0;
+
+errout:
+ close(fd);
+ return rc;
+}
+
+static int validate_persistent_data_storage(struct crypt_mnt_ftr* crypt_ftr) {
+ if (crypt_ftr->persist_data_offset[0] + crypt_ftr->persist_data_size >
+ crypt_ftr->persist_data_offset[1]) {
+ SLOGE("Crypt_ftr persist data regions overlap");
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ if (crypt_ftr->persist_data_offset[0] >= crypt_ftr->persist_data_offset[1]) {
+ SLOGE("Crypt_ftr persist data region 0 starts after region 1");
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ if (((crypt_ftr->persist_data_offset[1] + crypt_ftr->persist_data_size) -
+ (crypt_ftr->persist_data_offset[0] - CRYPT_FOOTER_TO_PERSIST_OFFSET)) >
+ CRYPT_FOOTER_OFFSET) {
+ SLOGE("Persistent data extends past crypto footer");
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int load_persistent_data(void) {
+ struct crypt_mnt_ftr crypt_ftr;
+ struct crypt_persist_data* pdata = NULL;
+ char encrypted_state[PROPERTY_VALUE_MAX];
+ char* fname;
+ int found = 0;
+ int fd;
+ int ret;
+ int i;
+
+ if (persist_data) {
+ /* Nothing to do, we've already loaded or initialized it */
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /* If not encrypted, just allocate an empty table and initialize it */
+ property_get("ro.crypto.state", encrypted_state, "");
+ if (strcmp(encrypted_state, "encrypted")) {
+ pdata = (crypt_persist_data*)malloc(CRYPT_PERSIST_DATA_SIZE);
+ if (pdata) {
+ init_empty_persist_data(pdata, CRYPT_PERSIST_DATA_SIZE);
+ persist_data = pdata;
+ return 0;
+ }
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ if (get_crypt_ftr_and_key(&crypt_ftr)) {
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ if ((crypt_ftr.major_version < 1) ||
+ (crypt_ftr.major_version == 1 && crypt_ftr.minor_version < 1)) {
+ SLOGE("Crypt_ftr version doesn't support persistent data");
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ if (get_crypt_ftr_info(&fname, NULL)) {
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ ret = validate_persistent_data_storage(&crypt_ftr);
+ if (ret) {
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ fd = open(fname, O_RDONLY | O_CLOEXEC);
+ if (fd < 0) {
+ SLOGE("Cannot open %s metadata file", fname);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ pdata = (crypt_persist_data*)malloc(crypt_ftr.persist_data_size);
+ if (pdata == NULL) {
+ SLOGE("Cannot allocate memory for persistent data");
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ for (i = 0; i < 2; i++) {
+ if (lseek64(fd, crypt_ftr.persist_data_offset[i], SEEK_SET) < 0) {
+ SLOGE("Cannot seek to read persistent data on %s", fname);
+ goto err2;
+ }
+ if (unix_read(fd, pdata, crypt_ftr.persist_data_size) < 0) {
+ SLOGE("Error reading persistent data on iteration %d", i);
+ goto err2;
+ }
+ if (pdata->persist_magic == PERSIST_DATA_MAGIC) {
+ found = 1;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (!found) {
+ SLOGI("Could not find valid persistent data, creating");
+ init_empty_persist_data(pdata, crypt_ftr.persist_data_size);
+ }
+
+ /* Success */
+ persist_data = pdata;
+ close(fd);
+ return 0;
+
+err2:
+ free(pdata);
+
+err:
+ close(fd);
+ return -1;
+}
+
+static int save_persistent_data(void) {
+ struct crypt_mnt_ftr crypt_ftr;
+ struct crypt_persist_data* pdata;
+ char* fname;
+ off64_t write_offset;
+ off64_t erase_offset;
+ int fd;
+ int ret;
+
+ if (persist_data == NULL) {
+ SLOGE("No persistent data to save");
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ if (get_crypt_ftr_and_key(&crypt_ftr)) {
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ if ((crypt_ftr.major_version < 1) ||
+ (crypt_ftr.major_version == 1 && crypt_ftr.minor_version < 1)) {
+ SLOGE("Crypt_ftr version doesn't support persistent data");
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ ret = validate_persistent_data_storage(&crypt_ftr);
+ if (ret) {
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ if (get_crypt_ftr_info(&fname, NULL)) {
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ fd = open(fname, O_RDWR | O_CLOEXEC);
+ if (fd < 0) {
+ SLOGE("Cannot open %s metadata file", fname);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ pdata = (crypt_persist_data*)malloc(crypt_ftr.persist_data_size);
+ if (pdata == NULL) {
+ SLOGE("Cannot allocate persistant data");
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (lseek64(fd, crypt_ftr.persist_data_offset[0], SEEK_SET) < 0) {
+ SLOGE("Cannot seek to read persistent data on %s", fname);
+ goto err2;
+ }
+
+ if (unix_read(fd, pdata, crypt_ftr.persist_data_size) < 0) {
+ SLOGE("Error reading persistent data before save");
+ goto err2;
+ }
+
+ if (pdata->persist_magic == PERSIST_DATA_MAGIC) {
+ /* The first copy is the curent valid copy, so write to
+ * the second copy and erase this one */
+ write_offset = crypt_ftr.persist_data_offset[1];
+ erase_offset = crypt_ftr.persist_data_offset[0];
+ } else {
+ /* The second copy must be the valid copy, so write to
+ * the first copy, and erase the second */
+ write_offset = crypt_ftr.persist_data_offset[0];
+ erase_offset = crypt_ftr.persist_data_offset[1];
+ }
+
+ /* Write the new copy first, if successful, then erase the old copy */
+ if (lseek64(fd, write_offset, SEEK_SET) < 0) {
+ SLOGE("Cannot seek to write persistent data");
+ goto err2;
+ }
+ if (unix_write(fd, persist_data, crypt_ftr.persist_data_size) ==
+ (int)crypt_ftr.persist_data_size) {
+ if (lseek64(fd, erase_offset, SEEK_SET) < 0) {
+ SLOGE("Cannot seek to erase previous persistent data");
+ goto err2;
+ }
+ fsync(fd);
+ memset(pdata, 0, crypt_ftr.persist_data_size);
+ if (unix_write(fd, pdata, crypt_ftr.persist_data_size) != (int)crypt_ftr.persist_data_size) {
+ SLOGE("Cannot write to erase previous persistent data");
+ goto err2;
+ }
+ fsync(fd);
+ } else {
+ SLOGE("Cannot write to save persistent data");
+ goto err2;
+ }
+
+ /* Success */
+ free(pdata);
+ close(fd);
+ return 0;
+
+err2:
+ free(pdata);
+err:
+ close(fd);
+ return -1;
+}
+
+/* Convert a binary key of specified length into an ascii hex string equivalent,
+ * without the leading 0x and with null termination
+ */
+static void convert_key_to_hex_ascii(const unsigned char* master_key, unsigned int keysize,
+ char* master_key_ascii) {
+ unsigned int i, a;
+ unsigned char nibble;
+
+ for (i = 0, a = 0; i < keysize; i++, a += 2) {
+ /* For each byte, write out two ascii hex digits */
+ nibble = (master_key[i] >> 4) & 0xf;
+ master_key_ascii[a] = nibble + (nibble > 9 ? 0x37 : 0x30);
+
+ nibble = master_key[i] & 0xf;
+ master_key_ascii[a + 1] = nibble + (nibble > 9 ? 0x37 : 0x30);
+ }
+
+ /* Add the null termination */
+ master_key_ascii[a] = '\0';
+}
+
+/*
+ * If the ro.crypto.fde_sector_size system property is set, append the
+ * parameters to make dm-crypt use the specified crypto sector size and round
+ * the crypto device size down to a crypto sector boundary.
+ */
+static int add_sector_size_param(DmTargetCrypt* target, struct crypt_mnt_ftr* ftr) {
+ constexpr char DM_CRYPT_SECTOR_SIZE[] = "ro.crypto.fde_sector_size";
+ char value[PROPERTY_VALUE_MAX];
+
+ if (property_get(DM_CRYPT_SECTOR_SIZE, value, "") > 0) {
+ unsigned int sector_size;
+
+ if (!ParseUint(value, §or_size) || sector_size < 512 || sector_size > 4096 ||
+ (sector_size & (sector_size - 1)) != 0) {
+ SLOGE("Invalid value for %s: %s. Must be >= 512, <= 4096, and a power of 2\n",
+ DM_CRYPT_SECTOR_SIZE, value);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ target->SetSectorSize(sector_size);
+
+ // With this option, IVs will match the sector numbering, instead
+ // of being hard-coded to being based on 512-byte sectors.
+ target->SetIvLargeSectors();
+
+ // Round the crypto device size down to a crypto sector boundary.
+ ftr->fs_size &= ~((sector_size / 512) - 1);
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int create_crypto_blk_dev(struct crypt_mnt_ftr* crypt_ftr, const unsigned char* master_key,
+ const char* real_blk_name, std::string* crypto_blk_name,
+ const char* name, uint32_t flags) {
+ auto& dm = DeviceMapper::Instance();
+ ALOGE("create_crypto_blk_dev\n");
+
+ // We need two ASCII characters to represent each byte, and need space for
+ // the '\0' terminator.
+ char master_key_ascii[MAX_KEY_LEN * 2 + 1];
+ convert_key_to_hex_ascii(master_key, crypt_ftr->keysize, master_key_ascii);
+
+ auto target = std::make_unique<DmTargetCrypt>(0, crypt_ftr->fs_size,
+ (const char*)crypt_ftr->crypto_type_name,
+ master_key_ascii, 0, real_blk_name, 0);
+ target->AllowDiscards();
+
+ if (flags & CREATE_CRYPTO_BLK_DEV_FLAGS_ALLOW_ENCRYPT_OVERRIDE) {
+ target->AllowEncryptOverride();
+ }
+ if (add_sector_size_param(target.get(), crypt_ftr)) {
+ SLOGE("Error processing dm-crypt sector size param\n");
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ DmTable table;
+ table.AddTarget(std::move(target));
+
+ int load_count = 1;
+ while (load_count < TABLE_LOAD_RETRIES) {
+ if (dm.CreateDevice(name, table)) {
+ break;
+ }
+ load_count++;
+ }
+
+ if (load_count >= TABLE_LOAD_RETRIES) {
+ SLOGE("Cannot load dm-crypt mapping table.\n");
+ return -1;
+ }
+ if (load_count > 1) {
+ SLOGI("Took %d tries to load dmcrypt table.\n", load_count);
+ }
+
+ // ALOGE("GetDmDevicePathByName::%s::%s\n", name, crypto_blk_name->c_str());
+ if (!dm.GetDmDevicePathByName(name, crypto_blk_name)) {
+ SLOGE("Cannot determine dm-crypt path for %s.\n", name);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ /* Ensure the dm device has been created before returning. */
+ if (::WaitForFile(crypto_blk_name->c_str(), 1s) < 0) {
+ // WaitForFile generates a suitable log message
+ return -1;
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int delete_crypto_blk_dev(const std::string& name) {
+ bool ret;
+ auto& dm = DeviceMapper::Instance();
+ // TODO(b/149396179) there appears to be a race somewhere in the system where trying
+ // to delete the device fails with EBUSY; for now, work around this by retrying.
+ int tries = 5;
+ while (tries-- > 0) {
+ ret = dm.DeleteDevice(name);
+ if (ret || errno != EBUSY) {
+ break;
+ }
+ SLOGW("DM_DEV Cannot remove dm-crypt device %s: %s, retrying...\n", name.c_str(),
+ strerror(errno));
+ std::this_thread::sleep_for(std::chrono::milliseconds(100));
+ }
+ if (!ret) {
+ SLOGE("DM_DEV Cannot remove dm-crypt device %s: %s\n", name.c_str(), strerror(errno));
+ return -1;
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int pbkdf2(const char* passwd, const unsigned char* salt, unsigned char* ikey,
+ void* params UNUSED) {
+ SLOGI("Using pbkdf2 for cryptfs KDF");
+
+ /* Turn the password into a key and IV that can decrypt the master key */
+ return PKCS5_PBKDF2_HMAC_SHA1(passwd, strlen(passwd), salt, SALT_LEN, HASH_COUNT,
+ INTERMEDIATE_BUF_SIZE, ikey) != 1;
+}
+
+static int scrypt(const char* passwd, const unsigned char* salt, unsigned char* ikey, void* params) {
+ SLOGI("Using scrypt for cryptfs KDF");
+
+ struct crypt_mnt_ftr* ftr = (struct crypt_mnt_ftr*)params;
+
+ int N = 1 << ftr->N_factor;
+ int r = 1 << ftr->r_factor;
+ int p = 1 << ftr->p_factor;
+
+ /* Turn the password into a key and IV that can decrypt the master key */
+ crypto_scrypt((const uint8_t*)passwd, strlen(passwd), salt, SALT_LEN, N, r, p, ikey,
+ INTERMEDIATE_BUF_SIZE);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int scrypt_keymaster(const char* passwd, const unsigned char* salt, unsigned char* ikey,
+ void* params) {
+ SLOGI("Using scrypt with keymaster for cryptfs KDF");
+
+ int rc;
+ size_t signature_size;
+ unsigned char* signature;
+ struct crypt_mnt_ftr* ftr = (struct crypt_mnt_ftr*)params;
+
+ int N = 1 << ftr->N_factor;
+ int r = 1 << ftr->r_factor;
+ int p = 1 << ftr->p_factor;
+
+ rc = crypto_scrypt((const uint8_t*)passwd, strlen(passwd), salt, SALT_LEN, N, r, p, ikey,
+ INTERMEDIATE_BUF_SIZE);
+
+ if (rc) {
+ SLOGE("scrypt failed");
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ if (keymaster_sign_object(ftr, ikey, INTERMEDIATE_BUF_SIZE, &signature, &signature_size)) {
+ SLOGE("Signing failed");
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ rc = crypto_scrypt(signature, signature_size, salt, SALT_LEN, N, r, p, ikey,
+ INTERMEDIATE_BUF_SIZE);
+ free(signature);
+
+ if (rc) {
+ SLOGE("scrypt failed");
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int encrypt_master_key(const char* passwd, const unsigned char* salt,
+ const unsigned char* decrypted_master_key,
+ unsigned char* encrypted_master_key, struct crypt_mnt_ftr* crypt_ftr) {
+ unsigned char ikey[INTERMEDIATE_BUF_SIZE] = {0};
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX e_ctx;
+ int encrypted_len, final_len;
+ int rc = 0;
+
+ /* Turn the password into an intermediate key and IV that can decrypt the master key */
+ get_device_scrypt_params(crypt_ftr);
+
+ switch (crypt_ftr->kdf_type) {
+ case KDF_SCRYPT_KEYMASTER:
+ if (keymaster_create_key(crypt_ftr)) {
+ SLOGE("keymaster_create_key failed");
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ if (scrypt_keymaster(passwd, salt, ikey, crypt_ftr)) {
+ SLOGE("scrypt failed");
+ return -1;
+ }
+ break;
+
+ case KDF_SCRYPT:
+ if (scrypt(passwd, salt, ikey, crypt_ftr)) {
+ SLOGE("scrypt failed");
+ return -1;
+ }
+ break;
+
+ default:
+ SLOGE("Invalid kdf_type");
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ /* Initialize the decryption engine */
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&e_ctx);
+ if (!EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&e_ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL, ikey,
+ ikey + INTERMEDIATE_KEY_LEN_BYTES)) {
+ SLOGE("EVP_EncryptInit failed\n");
+ return -1;
+ }
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_padding(&e_ctx, 0); /* Turn off padding as our data is block aligned */
+
+ /* Encrypt the master key */
+ if (!EVP_EncryptUpdate(&e_ctx, encrypted_master_key, &encrypted_len, decrypted_master_key,
+ crypt_ftr->keysize)) {
+ SLOGE("EVP_EncryptUpdate failed\n");
+ return -1;
+ }
+ if (!EVP_EncryptFinal_ex(&e_ctx, encrypted_master_key + encrypted_len, &final_len)) {
+ SLOGE("EVP_EncryptFinal failed\n");
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ if (encrypted_len + final_len != static_cast<int>(crypt_ftr->keysize)) {
+ SLOGE("EVP_Encryption length check failed with %d, %d bytes\n", encrypted_len, final_len);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ /* Store the scrypt of the intermediate key, so we can validate if it's a
+ password error or mount error when things go wrong.
+ Note there's no need to check for errors, since if this is incorrect, we
+ simply won't wipe userdata, which is the correct default behavior
+ */
+ int N = 1 << crypt_ftr->N_factor;
+ int r = 1 << crypt_ftr->r_factor;
+ int p = 1 << crypt_ftr->p_factor;
+
+ rc = crypto_scrypt(ikey, INTERMEDIATE_KEY_LEN_BYTES, crypt_ftr->salt, sizeof(crypt_ftr->salt),
+ N, r, p, crypt_ftr->scrypted_intermediate_key,
+ sizeof(crypt_ftr->scrypted_intermediate_key));
+
+ if (rc) {
+ SLOGE("encrypt_master_key: crypto_scrypt failed");
+ }
+
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&e_ctx);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int decrypt_master_key_aux(const char* passwd, unsigned char* salt,
+ const unsigned char* encrypted_master_key, size_t keysize,
+ unsigned char* decrypted_master_key, kdf_func kdf,
+ void* kdf_params, unsigned char** intermediate_key,
+ size_t* intermediate_key_size) {
+ unsigned char ikey[INTERMEDIATE_BUF_SIZE] = {0};
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX d_ctx;
+ int decrypted_len, final_len;
+
+ /* Turn the password into an intermediate key and IV that can decrypt the
+ master key */
+ if (kdf(passwd, salt, ikey, kdf_params)) {
+ SLOGE("kdf failed");
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ /* Initialize the decryption engine */
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&d_ctx);
+ if (!EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&d_ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL, ikey,
+ ikey + INTERMEDIATE_KEY_LEN_BYTES)) {
+ return -1;
+ }
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_padding(&d_ctx, 0); /* Turn off padding as our data is block aligned */
+ /* Decrypt the master key */
+ if (!EVP_DecryptUpdate(&d_ctx, decrypted_master_key, &decrypted_len, encrypted_master_key,
+ keysize)) {
+ return -1;
+ }
+ if (!EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(&d_ctx, decrypted_master_key + decrypted_len, &final_len)) {
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ if (decrypted_len + final_len != static_cast<int>(keysize)) {
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ /* Copy intermediate key if needed by params */
+ if (intermediate_key && intermediate_key_size) {
+ *intermediate_key = (unsigned char*)malloc(INTERMEDIATE_KEY_LEN_BYTES);
+ if (*intermediate_key) {
+ memcpy(*intermediate_key, ikey, INTERMEDIATE_KEY_LEN_BYTES);
+ *intermediate_key_size = INTERMEDIATE_KEY_LEN_BYTES;
+ }
+ }
+
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&d_ctx);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static void get_kdf_func(struct crypt_mnt_ftr* ftr, kdf_func* kdf, void** kdf_params) {
+ if (ftr->kdf_type == KDF_SCRYPT_KEYMASTER) {
+ *kdf = scrypt_keymaster;
+ *kdf_params = ftr;
+ } else if (ftr->kdf_type == KDF_SCRYPT) {
+ *kdf = scrypt;
+ *kdf_params = ftr;
+ } else {
+ *kdf = pbkdf2;
+ *kdf_params = NULL;
+ }
+}
+
+static int decrypt_master_key(const char* passwd, unsigned char* decrypted_master_key,
+ struct crypt_mnt_ftr* crypt_ftr, unsigned char** intermediate_key,
+ size_t* intermediate_key_size) {
+ kdf_func kdf;
+ void* kdf_params;
+ int ret;
+
+ get_kdf_func(crypt_ftr, &kdf, &kdf_params);
+ ret = decrypt_master_key_aux(passwd, crypt_ftr->salt, crypt_ftr->master_key, crypt_ftr->keysize,
+ decrypted_master_key, kdf, kdf_params, intermediate_key,
+ intermediate_key_size);
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ SLOGW("failure decrypting master key");
+ }
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static int create_encrypted_random_key(const char* passwd, unsigned char* master_key,
+ unsigned char* salt, struct crypt_mnt_ftr* crypt_ftr) {
+ unsigned char key_buf[MAX_KEY_LEN];
+
+ /* Get some random bits for a key and salt */
+ if (::ReadRandomBytes(sizeof(key_buf), reinterpret_cast<char*>(key_buf)) != 0) {
+ return -1;
+ }
+ if (::ReadRandomBytes(SALT_LEN, reinterpret_cast<char*>(salt)) != 0) {
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ /* Now encrypt it with the password */
+ return encrypt_master_key(passwd, salt, key_buf, master_key, crypt_ftr);
+}
+
+static void ensure_subdirectory_unmounted(const char *prefix) {
+ std::vector<std::string> umount_points;
+ std::unique_ptr<FILE, int (*)(FILE*)> mnts(setmntent("/proc/mounts", "r"), endmntent);
+ if (!mnts) {
+ SLOGW("could not read mount files");
+ return;
+ }
+
+ //Find sudirectory mount point
+ mntent* mentry;
+ std::string top_directory(prefix);
+ if (!android::base::EndsWith(prefix, "/")) {
+ top_directory = top_directory + "/";
+ }
+ while ((mentry = getmntent(mnts.get())) != nullptr) {
+ if (strcmp(mentry->mnt_dir, top_directory.c_str()) == 0) {
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ if (android::base::StartsWith(mentry->mnt_dir, top_directory)) {
+ SLOGW("found sub-directory mount %s - %s\n", prefix, mentry->mnt_dir);
+ umount_points.push_back(mentry->mnt_dir);
+ }
+ }
+
+ //Sort by path length to umount longest path first
+ std::sort(std::begin(umount_points), std::end(umount_points),
+ [](const std::string& s1, const std::string& s2) {return s1.length() > s2.length(); });
+
+ for (std::string& mount_point : umount_points) {
+ umount(mount_point.c_str());
+ SLOGW("umount sub-directory mount %s\n", mount_point.c_str());
+ }
+}
+
+static int wait_and_unmount(const char* mountpoint, bool kill) {
+ int i, err, rc;
+
+ // Subdirectory mount will cause a failure of umount.
+ ensure_subdirectory_unmounted(mountpoint);
+#define WAIT_UNMOUNT_COUNT 20
+
+ /* Now umount the tmpfs filesystem */
+ for (i = 0; i < WAIT_UNMOUNT_COUNT; i++) {
+ if (umount(mountpoint) == 0) {
+ break;
+ }
+
+ if (errno == EINVAL) {
+ /* EINVAL is returned if the directory is not a mountpoint,
+ * i.e. there is no filesystem mounted there. So just get out.
+ */
+ break;
+ }
+
+ err = errno;
+
+ /* If allowed, be increasingly aggressive before the last two retries */
+ if (kill) {
+ if (i == (WAIT_UNMOUNT_COUNT - 3)) {
+ SLOGW("sending SIGHUP to processes with open files\n");
+ android::vold::KillProcessesWithOpenFiles(mountpoint, SIGTERM);
+ } else if (i == (WAIT_UNMOUNT_COUNT - 2)) {
+ SLOGW("sending SIGKILL to processes with open files\n");
+ android::vold::KillProcessesWithOpenFiles(mountpoint, SIGKILL);
+ }
+ }
+
+ sleep(1);
+ }
+
+ if (i < WAIT_UNMOUNT_COUNT) {
+ SLOGD("unmounting %s succeeded\n", mountpoint);
+ rc = 0;
+ } else {
+ android::vold::KillProcessesWithOpenFiles(mountpoint, 0);
+ SLOGE("unmounting %s failed: %s\n", mountpoint, strerror(err));
+ rc = -1;
+ }
+
+ return rc;
+}
+
+static void prep_data_fs(void) {
+ // NOTE: post_fs_data results in init calling back around to vold, so all
+ // callers to this method must be async
+
+ /* Do the prep of the /data filesystem */
+ property_set("vold.post_fs_data_done", "0");
+ property_set("vold.decrypt", "trigger_post_fs_data");
+ SLOGD("Just triggered post_fs_data");
+
+ /* Wait a max of 50 seconds, hopefully it takes much less */
+ while (!android::base::WaitForProperty("vold.post_fs_data_done", "1", std::chrono::seconds(15))) {
+ /* We timed out to prep /data in time. Continue wait. */
+ SLOGE("waited 15s for vold.post_fs_data_done, still waiting...");
+ }
+ SLOGD("post_fs_data done");
+}
+
+static void cryptfs_set_corrupt() {
+ // Mark the footer as bad
+ struct crypt_mnt_ftr crypt_ftr;
+ if (get_crypt_ftr_and_key(&crypt_ftr)) {
+ SLOGE("Failed to get crypto footer - panic");
+ return;
+ }
+
+ crypt_ftr.flags |= CRYPT_DATA_CORRUPT;
+ if (put_crypt_ftr_and_key(&crypt_ftr)) {
+ SLOGE("Failed to set crypto footer - panic");
+ return;
+ }
+}
+
+static void cryptfs_trigger_restart_min_framework() {
+ if (fs_mgr_do_tmpfs_mount(DATA_MNT_POINT)) {
+ SLOGE("Failed to mount tmpfs on data - panic");
+ return;
+ }
+
+ if (property_set("vold.decrypt", "trigger_post_fs_data")) {
+ SLOGE("Failed to trigger post fs data - panic");
+ return;
+ }
+
+ if (property_set("vold.decrypt", "trigger_restart_min_framework")) {
+ SLOGE("Failed to trigger restart min framework - panic");
+ return;
+ }
+}
+
+/* returns < 0 on failure */
+static int cryptfs_restart_internal(int restart_main) {
+ char crypto_blkdev[MAXPATHLEN];
+ int rc = -1;
+ static int restart_successful = 0;
+
+ /* Validate that it's OK to call this routine */
+ if (!master_key_saved) {
+ SLOGE("Encrypted filesystem not validated, aborting");
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ if (restart_successful) {
+ SLOGE("System already restarted with encrypted disk, aborting");
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ if (restart_main) {
+ /* Here is where we shut down the framework. The init scripts
+ * start all services in one of these classes: core, early_hal, hal,
+ * main and late_start. To get to the minimal UI for PIN entry, we
+ * need to start core, early_hal, hal and main. When we want to
+ * shutdown the framework again, we need to stop most of the services in
+ * these classes, but only those services that were started after
+ * /data was mounted. This excludes critical services like vold and
+ * ueventd, which need to keep running. We could possible stop
+ * even fewer services, but because we want services to pick up APEX
+ * libraries from the real /data, restarting is better, as it makes
+ * these devices consistent with FBE devices and lets them use the
+ * most recent code.
+ *
+ * Once these services have stopped, we should be able
+ * to umount the tmpfs /data, then mount the encrypted /data.
+ * We then restart the class core, hal, main, and also the class
+ * late_start.
+ *
+ * At the moment, I've only put a few things in late_start that I know
+ * are not needed to bring up the framework, and that also cause problems
+ * with unmounting the tmpfs /data, but I hope to add add more services
+ * to the late_start class as we optimize this to decrease the delay
+ * till the user is asked for the password to the filesystem.
+ */
+
+ /* The init files are setup to stop the right set of services when
+ * vold.decrypt is set to trigger_shutdown_framework.
+ */
+ property_set("vold.decrypt", "trigger_shutdown_framework");
+ SLOGD("Just asked init to shut down class main\n");
+
+ /* Ugh, shutting down the framework is not synchronous, so until it
+ * can be fixed, this horrible hack will wait a moment for it all to
+ * shut down before proceeding. Without it, some devices cannot
+ * restart the graphics services.
+ */
+ sleep(2);
+ }
+
+ /* Now that the framework is shutdown, we should be able to umount()
+ * the tmpfs filesystem, and mount the real one.
+ */
+
+ property_get("ro.crypto.fs_crypto_blkdev", crypto_blkdev, "");
+ if (strlen(crypto_blkdev) == 0) {
+ SLOGE("fs_crypto_blkdev not set\n");
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ if (!(rc = wait_and_unmount(DATA_MNT_POINT, true))) {
+ /* If ro.crypto.readonly is set to 1, mount the decrypted
+ * filesystem readonly. This is used when /data is mounted by
+ * recovery mode.
+ */
+ char ro_prop[PROPERTY_VALUE_MAX];
+ property_get("ro.crypto.readonly", ro_prop, "");
+ if (strlen(ro_prop) > 0 && std::stoi(ro_prop)) {
+ auto entry = GetEntryForMountPoint(&fstab_default, DATA_MNT_POINT);
+ if (entry != nullptr) {
+ entry->flags |= MS_RDONLY;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* If that succeeded, then mount the decrypted filesystem */
+ int retries = RETRY_MOUNT_ATTEMPTS;
+ int mount_rc;
+
+ /*
+ * fs_mgr_do_mount runs fsck. Use setexeccon to run trusted
+ * partitions in the fsck domain.
+ */
+ if (setexeccon(::sFsckContext)) {
+ SLOGE("Failed to setexeccon");
+ return -1;
+ }
+ bool needs_cp = ::cp_needsCheckpoint();
+ while ((mount_rc = fs_mgr_do_mount(&fstab_default, DATA_MNT_POINT, crypto_blkdev, 0,
+ needs_cp, false)) != 0) {
+ if (mount_rc == FS_MGR_DOMNT_BUSY) {
+ /* TODO: invoke something similar to
+ Process::killProcessWithOpenFiles(DATA_MNT_POINT,
+ retries > RETRY_MOUNT_ATTEMPT/2 ? 1 : 2 ) */
+ SLOGI("Failed to mount %s because it is busy - waiting", crypto_blkdev);
+ if (--retries) {
+ sleep(RETRY_MOUNT_DELAY_SECONDS);
+ } else {
+ /* Let's hope that a reboot clears away whatever is keeping
+ the mount busy */
+ cryptfs_reboot(RebootType::reboot);
+ }
+ } else {
+ SLOGE("Failed to mount decrypted data");
+ cryptfs_set_corrupt();
+ cryptfs_trigger_restart_min_framework();
+ SLOGI("Started framework to offer wipe");
+ if (setexeccon(NULL)) {
+ SLOGE("Failed to setexeccon");
+ }
+ return -1;
+ }
+ }
+ if (setexeccon(NULL)) {
+ SLOGE("Failed to setexeccon");
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ /* Create necessary paths on /data */
+ prep_data_fs();
+ property_set("vold.decrypt", "trigger_load_persist_props");
+
+ /* startup service classes main and late_start */
+ property_set("vold.decrypt", "trigger_restart_framework");
+ SLOGD("Just triggered restart_framework\n");
+
+ /* Give it a few moments to get started */
+ sleep(1);
+ }
+
+ if (rc == 0) {
+ restart_successful = 1;
+ }
+
+ return rc;
+}
+
+int cryptfs_restart(void) {
+ SLOGI("cryptfs_restart");
+ if (fscrypt_is_native()) {
+ SLOGE("cryptfs_restart not valid for file encryption:");
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ /* Call internal implementation forcing a restart of main service group */
+ return cryptfs_restart_internal(1);
+}
+
+static int do_crypto_complete(const char* mount_point) {
+ struct crypt_mnt_ftr crypt_ftr;
+ char encrypted_state[PROPERTY_VALUE_MAX];
+
+ property_get("ro.crypto.state", encrypted_state, "");
+ if (strcmp(encrypted_state, "encrypted")) {
+ SLOGE("not running with encryption, aborting");
+ return CRYPTO_COMPLETE_NOT_ENCRYPTED;
+ }
+
+ // crypto_complete is full disk encrypted status
+ if (fscrypt_is_native()) {
+ return CRYPTO_COMPLETE_NOT_ENCRYPTED;
+ }
+
+ if (get_crypt_ftr_and_key(&crypt_ftr)) {
+ std::string key_loc;
+ get_crypt_info(&key_loc, nullptr);
+
+ /*
+ * Only report this error if key_loc is a file and it exists.
+ * If the device was never encrypted, and /data is not mountable for
+ * some reason, returning 1 should prevent the UI from presenting the
+ * a "enter password" screen, or worse, a "press button to wipe the
+ * device" screen.
+ */
+ if (!key_loc.empty() && key_loc[0] == '/' && (access("key_loc", F_OK) == -1)) {
+ SLOGE("master key file does not exist, aborting");
+ return CRYPTO_COMPLETE_NOT_ENCRYPTED;
+ } else {
+ SLOGE("Error getting crypt footer and key\n");
+ return CRYPTO_COMPLETE_BAD_METADATA;
+ }
+ }
+
+ // Test for possible error flags
+ if (crypt_ftr.flags & CRYPT_ENCRYPTION_IN_PROGRESS) {
+ SLOGE("Encryption process is partway completed\n");
+ return CRYPTO_COMPLETE_PARTIAL;
+ }
+
+ if (crypt_ftr.flags & CRYPT_INCONSISTENT_STATE) {
+ SLOGE("Encryption process was interrupted but cannot continue\n");
+ return CRYPTO_COMPLETE_INCONSISTENT;
+ }
+
+ if (crypt_ftr.flags & CRYPT_DATA_CORRUPT) {
+ SLOGE("Encryption is successful but data is corrupt\n");
+ return CRYPTO_COMPLETE_CORRUPT;
+ }
+
+ /* We passed the test! We shall diminish, and return to the west */
+ return CRYPTO_COMPLETE_ENCRYPTED;
+}
+
+static int test_mount_encrypted_fs(struct crypt_mnt_ftr* crypt_ftr, const char* passwd,
+ const char* mount_point, const char* label) {
+ unsigned char decrypted_master_key[MAX_KEY_LEN];
+ std::string crypto_blkdev;
+ std::string real_blkdev;
+ char tmp_mount_point[64];
+ unsigned int orig_failed_decrypt_count;
+ int rc;
+ int use_keymaster = 0;
+ int upgrade = 0;
+ unsigned char* intermediate_key = 0;
+ size_t intermediate_key_size = 0;
+ int N = 1 << crypt_ftr->N_factor;
+ int r = 1 << crypt_ftr->r_factor;
+ int p = 1 << crypt_ftr->p_factor;
+
+ SLOGD("crypt_ftr->fs_size = %lld\n", crypt_ftr->fs_size);
+ orig_failed_decrypt_count = crypt_ftr->failed_decrypt_count;
+
+ if (!(crypt_ftr->flags & CRYPT_MNT_KEY_UNENCRYPTED)) {
+ if (decrypt_master_key(passwd, decrypted_master_key, crypt_ftr, &intermediate_key,
+ &intermediate_key_size)) {
+ SLOGE("Failed to decrypt master key\n");
+ rc = -1;
+ goto errout;
+ }
+ }
+
+ get_crypt_info(nullptr, &real_blkdev);
+
+ // Create crypto block device - all (non fatal) code paths
+ // need it
+ if (create_crypto_blk_dev(crypt_ftr, decrypted_master_key, real_blkdev.c_str(), &crypto_blkdev,
+ label, 0)) {
+ SLOGE("Error creating decrypted block device\n");
+ rc = -1;
+ goto errout;
+ }
+
+ /* Work out if the problem is the password or the data */
+ unsigned char scrypted_intermediate_key[sizeof(crypt_ftr->scrypted_intermediate_key)];
+
+ rc = crypto_scrypt(intermediate_key, intermediate_key_size, crypt_ftr->salt,
+ sizeof(crypt_ftr->salt), N, r, p, scrypted_intermediate_key,
+ sizeof(scrypted_intermediate_key));
+
+ // Does the key match the crypto footer?
+ if (rc == 0 && memcmp(scrypted_intermediate_key, crypt_ftr->scrypted_intermediate_key,
+ sizeof(scrypted_intermediate_key)) == 0) {
+ SLOGI("Password matches");
+ rc = 0;
+ } else {
+ /* Try mounting the file system anyway, just in case the problem's with
+ * the footer, not the key. */
+ snprintf(tmp_mount_point, sizeof(tmp_mount_point), "%s/tmp_mnt", mount_point);
+ mkdir(tmp_mount_point, 0755);
+ if (fs_mgr_do_mount(&fstab_default, DATA_MNT_POINT,
+ const_cast<char*>(crypto_blkdev.c_str()), tmp_mount_point)) {
+ SLOGE("Error temp mounting decrypted block device\n");
+ delete_crypto_blk_dev(label);
+
+ rc = ++crypt_ftr->failed_decrypt_count;
+ put_crypt_ftr_and_key(crypt_ftr);
+ } else {
+ /* Success! */
+ SLOGI("Password did not match but decrypted drive mounted - continue");
+ umount(tmp_mount_point);
+ rc = 0;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (rc == 0) {
+ crypt_ftr->failed_decrypt_count = 0;
+ if (orig_failed_decrypt_count != 0) {
+ put_crypt_ftr_and_key(crypt_ftr);
+ }
+
+ /* Save the name of the crypto block device
+ * so we can mount it when restarting the framework. */
+ property_set("ro.crypto.fs_crypto_blkdev", crypto_blkdev.c_str());
+
+ /* Also save a the master key so we can reencrypted the key
+ * the key when we want to change the password on it. */
+ memcpy(saved_master_key, decrypted_master_key, crypt_ftr->keysize);
+ saved_mount_point = strdup(mount_point);
+ master_key_saved = 1;
+ SLOGD("%s(): Master key saved\n", __FUNCTION__);
+ rc = 0;
+
+ // Upgrade if we're not using the latest KDF.
+ use_keymaster = keymaster_check_compatibility();
+ if (crypt_ftr->kdf_type == KDF_SCRYPT_KEYMASTER) {
+ // Don't allow downgrade
+ } else if (use_keymaster == 1 && crypt_ftr->kdf_type != KDF_SCRYPT_KEYMASTER) {
+ crypt_ftr->kdf_type = KDF_SCRYPT_KEYMASTER;
+ upgrade = 1;
+ } else if (use_keymaster == 0 && crypt_ftr->kdf_type != KDF_SCRYPT) {
+ crypt_ftr->kdf_type = KDF_SCRYPT;
+ upgrade = 1;
+ }
+
+ if (upgrade) {
+ rc = encrypt_master_key(passwd, crypt_ftr->salt, saved_master_key,
+ crypt_ftr->master_key, crypt_ftr);
+ if (!rc) {
+ rc = put_crypt_ftr_and_key(crypt_ftr);
+ }
+ SLOGD("Key Derivation Function upgrade: rc=%d\n", rc);
+
+ // Do not fail even if upgrade failed - machine is bootable
+ // Note that if this code is ever hit, there is a *serious* problem
+ // since KDFs should never fail. You *must* fix the kdf before
+ // proceeding!
+ if (rc) {
+ SLOGW(
+ "Upgrade failed with error %d,"
+ " but continuing with previous state",
+ rc);
+ rc = 0;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+errout:
+ if (intermediate_key) {
+ memset(intermediate_key, 0, intermediate_key_size);
+ free(intermediate_key);
+ }
+ return rc;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Called by vold when it's asked to mount an encrypted external
+ * storage volume. The incoming partition has no crypto header/footer,
+ * as any metadata is been stored in a separate, small partition. We
+ * assume it must be using our same crypt type and keysize.
+ */
+int cryptfs_setup_ext_volume(const char* label, const char* real_blkdev, const KeyBuffer& key,
+ std::string* out_crypto_blkdev) {
+ auto crypto_type = get_crypto_type();
+ if (key.size() != crypto_type.get_keysize()) {
+ SLOGE("Raw keysize %zu does not match crypt keysize %zu", key.size(),
+ crypto_type.get_keysize());
+ return -1;
+ }
+ uint64_t nr_sec = 0;
+ if (::GetBlockDev512Sectors(real_blkdev, &nr_sec) != android::OK) {
+ SLOGE("Failed to get size of %s: %s", real_blkdev, strerror(errno));
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ struct crypt_mnt_ftr ext_crypt_ftr;
+ memset(&ext_crypt_ftr, 0, sizeof(ext_crypt_ftr));
+ ext_crypt_ftr.fs_size = nr_sec;
+ ext_crypt_ftr.keysize = crypto_type.get_keysize();
+ strlcpy((char*)ext_crypt_ftr.crypto_type_name, crypto_type.get_kernel_name(),
+ MAX_CRYPTO_TYPE_NAME_LEN);
+ uint32_t flags = 0;
+ if (fscrypt_is_native() &&
+ android::base::GetBoolProperty("ro.crypto.allow_encrypt_override", false))
+ flags |= CREATE_CRYPTO_BLK_DEV_FLAGS_ALLOW_ENCRYPT_OVERRIDE;
+
+ return create_crypto_blk_dev(&ext_crypt_ftr, reinterpret_cast<const unsigned char*>(key.data()),
+ real_blkdev, out_crypto_blkdev, label, flags);
+}
+
+int cryptfs_crypto_complete(void) {
+ return do_crypto_complete("/data");
+}
+
+int check_unmounted_and_get_ftr(struct crypt_mnt_ftr* crypt_ftr) {
+ char encrypted_state[PROPERTY_VALUE_MAX];
+ property_get("ro.crypto.state", encrypted_state, "");
+ if (master_key_saved || strcmp(encrypted_state, "encrypted")) {
+ SLOGE(
+ "encrypted fs already validated or not running with encryption,"
+ " aborting");
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ if (get_crypt_ftr_and_key(crypt_ftr)) {
+ SLOGE("Error getting crypt footer and key");
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int cryptfs_check_passwd(const char* passwd) {
+ SLOGI("cryptfs_check_passwd");
+ if (fscrypt_is_native()) {
+ SLOGE("cryptfs_check_passwd not valid for file encryption");
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ struct crypt_mnt_ftr crypt_ftr;
+ int rc;
+
+ rc = check_unmounted_and_get_ftr(&crypt_ftr);
+ if (rc) {
+ SLOGE("Could not get footer");
+ return rc;
+ }
+
+ rc = test_mount_encrypted_fs(&crypt_ftr, passwd, DATA_MNT_POINT, CRYPTO_BLOCK_DEVICE);
+ if (rc) {
+ SLOGE("Password did not match");
+ return rc;
+ }
+
+ if (crypt_ftr.flags & CRYPT_FORCE_COMPLETE) {
+ // Here we have a default actual password but a real password
+ // we must test against the scrypted value
+ // First, we must delete the crypto block device that
+ // test_mount_encrypted_fs leaves behind as a side effect
+ delete_crypto_blk_dev(CRYPTO_BLOCK_DEVICE);
+ rc = test_mount_encrypted_fs(&crypt_ftr, DEFAULT_PASSWORD, DATA_MNT_POINT,
+ CRYPTO_BLOCK_DEVICE);
+ if (rc) {
+ SLOGE("Default password did not match on reboot encryption");
+ return rc;
+ }
+
+ crypt_ftr.flags &= ~CRYPT_FORCE_COMPLETE;
+ put_crypt_ftr_and_key(&crypt_ftr);
+ rc = cryptfs_changepw(crypt_ftr.crypt_type, passwd);
+ if (rc) {
+ SLOGE("Could not change password on reboot encryption");
+ return rc;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (crypt_ftr.crypt_type != CRYPT_TYPE_DEFAULT) {
+ cryptfs_clear_password();
+ password = strdup(passwd);
+ struct timespec now;
+ clock_gettime(CLOCK_BOOTTIME, &now);
+ password_expiry_time = now.tv_sec + password_max_age_seconds;
+ }
+
+ return rc;
+}
+
+int cryptfs_verify_passwd(const char* passwd) {
+ struct crypt_mnt_ftr crypt_ftr;
+ unsigned char decrypted_master_key[MAX_KEY_LEN];
+ char encrypted_state[PROPERTY_VALUE_MAX];
+ int rc;
+
+ property_get("ro.crypto.state", encrypted_state, "");
+ if (strcmp(encrypted_state, "encrypted")) {
+ SLOGE("device not encrypted, aborting");
+ return -2;
+ }
+
+ if (!master_key_saved) {
+ SLOGE("encrypted fs not yet mounted, aborting");
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ if (!saved_mount_point) {
+ SLOGE("encrypted fs failed to save mount point, aborting");
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ if (get_crypt_ftr_and_key(&crypt_ftr)) {
+ SLOGE("Error getting crypt footer and key\n");
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ if (crypt_ftr.flags & CRYPT_MNT_KEY_UNENCRYPTED) {
+ /* If the device has no password, then just say the password is valid */
+ rc = 0;
+ } else {
+ decrypt_master_key(passwd, decrypted_master_key, &crypt_ftr, 0, 0);
+ if (!memcmp(decrypted_master_key, saved_master_key, crypt_ftr.keysize)) {
+ /* They match, the password is correct */
+ rc = 0;
+ } else {
+ /* If incorrect, sleep for a bit to prevent dictionary attacks */
+ sleep(1);
+ rc = 1;
+ }
+ }
+
+ return rc;
+}
+
+/* Initialize a crypt_mnt_ftr structure. The keysize is
+ * defaulted to get_crypto_type().get_keysize() bytes, and the filesystem size to 0.
+ * Presumably, at a minimum, the caller will update the
+ * filesystem size and crypto_type_name after calling this function.
+ */
+static int cryptfs_init_crypt_mnt_ftr(struct crypt_mnt_ftr* ftr) {
+ off64_t off;
+
+ memset(ftr, 0, sizeof(struct crypt_mnt_ftr));
+ ftr->magic = CRYPT_MNT_MAGIC;
+ ftr->major_version = CURRENT_MAJOR_VERSION;
+ ftr->minor_version = CURRENT_MINOR_VERSION;
+ ftr->ftr_size = sizeof(struct crypt_mnt_ftr);
+ ftr->keysize = get_crypto_type().get_keysize();
+
+ switch (keymaster_check_compatibility()) {
+ case 1:
+ ftr->kdf_type = KDF_SCRYPT_KEYMASTER;
+ break;
+
+ case 0:
+ ftr->kdf_type = KDF_SCRYPT;
+ break;
+
+ default:
+ SLOGE("keymaster_check_compatibility failed");
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ get_device_scrypt_params(ftr);
+
+ ftr->persist_data_size = CRYPT_PERSIST_DATA_SIZE;
+ if (get_crypt_ftr_info(NULL, &off) == 0) {
+ ftr->persist_data_offset[0] = off + CRYPT_FOOTER_TO_PERSIST_OFFSET;
+ ftr->persist_data_offset[1] = off + CRYPT_FOOTER_TO_PERSIST_OFFSET + ftr->persist_data_size;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+#define FRAMEWORK_BOOT_WAIT 60
+
+static int cryptfs_SHA256_fileblock(const char* filename, __le8* buf) {
+ int fd = open(filename, O_RDONLY | O_CLOEXEC);
+ if (fd == -1) {
+ SLOGE("Error opening file %s", filename);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ char block[CRYPT_INPLACE_BUFSIZE];
+ memset(block, 0, sizeof(block));
+ if (unix_read(fd, block, sizeof(block)) < 0) {
+ SLOGE("Error reading file %s", filename);
+ close(fd);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ close(fd);
+
+ SHA256_CTX c;
+ SHA256_Init(&c);
+ SHA256_Update(&c, block, sizeof(block));
+ SHA256_Final(buf, &c);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int cryptfs_enable_all_volumes(struct crypt_mnt_ftr* crypt_ftr, const char* crypto_blkdev,
+ const char* real_blkdev, int previously_encrypted_upto) {
+ off64_t cur_encryption_done = 0, tot_encryption_size = 0;
+ int rc = -1;
+
+ /* The size of the userdata partition, and add in the vold volumes below */
+ tot_encryption_size = crypt_ftr->fs_size;
+
+ rc = cryptfs_enable_inplace(crypto_blkdev, real_blkdev, crypt_ftr->fs_size, &cur_encryption_done,
+ tot_encryption_size, previously_encrypted_upto, true);
+
+ if (rc == ENABLE_INPLACE_ERR_DEV) {
+ /* Hack for b/17898962 */
+ SLOGE("cryptfs_enable: crypto block dev failure. Must reboot...\n");
+ cryptfs_reboot(RebootType::reboot);
+ }
+
+ if (!rc) {
+ crypt_ftr->encrypted_upto = cur_encryption_done;
+ }
+
+ if (!rc && crypt_ftr->encrypted_upto == crypt_ftr->fs_size) {
+ /* The inplace routine never actually sets the progress to 100% due
+ * to the round down nature of integer division, so set it here */
+ property_set("vold.encrypt_progress", "100");
+ }
+
+ return rc;
+}
+
+// static int vold_unmountAll(void) {
+// VolumeManager* vm = VolumeManager::Instance();
+// return vm->unmountAll();
+// }
+
+int cryptfs_enable_internal(int crypt_type, const char* passwd, int no_ui) {
+ std::string crypto_blkdev;
+ std::string real_blkdev;
+ unsigned char decrypted_master_key[MAX_KEY_LEN];
+ int rc = -1, i;
+ struct crypt_mnt_ftr crypt_ftr;
+ struct crypt_persist_data* pdata;
+ char encrypted_state[PROPERTY_VALUE_MAX];
+ char lockid[32] = {0};
+ std::string key_loc;
+ int num_vols;
+ off64_t previously_encrypted_upto = 0;
+ bool rebootEncryption = false;
+ bool onlyCreateHeader = false;
+ // std::unique_ptr<android::wakelock::WakeLock> wakeLock = nullptr;
+
+ if (get_crypt_ftr_and_key(&crypt_ftr) == 0) {
+ if (crypt_ftr.flags & CRYPT_ENCRYPTION_IN_PROGRESS) {
+ /* An encryption was underway and was interrupted */
+ previously_encrypted_upto = crypt_ftr.encrypted_upto;
+ crypt_ftr.encrypted_upto = 0;
+ crypt_ftr.flags &= ~CRYPT_ENCRYPTION_IN_PROGRESS;
+
+ /* At this point, we are in an inconsistent state. Until we successfully
+ complete encryption, a reboot will leave us broken. So mark the
+ encryption failed in case that happens.
+ On successfully completing encryption, remove this flag */
+ crypt_ftr.flags |= CRYPT_INCONSISTENT_STATE;
+
+ put_crypt_ftr_and_key(&crypt_ftr);
+ } else if (crypt_ftr.flags & CRYPT_FORCE_ENCRYPTION) {
+ if (!check_ftr_sha(&crypt_ftr)) {
+ memset(&crypt_ftr, 0, sizeof(crypt_ftr));
+ put_crypt_ftr_and_key(&crypt_ftr);
+ goto error_unencrypted;
+ }
+
+ /* Doing a reboot-encryption*/
+ crypt_ftr.flags &= ~CRYPT_FORCE_ENCRYPTION;
+ crypt_ftr.flags |= CRYPT_FORCE_COMPLETE;
+ rebootEncryption = true;
+ }
+ } else {
+ // We don't want to accidentally reference invalid data.
+ memset(&crypt_ftr, 0, sizeof(crypt_ftr));
+ }
+
+ property_get("ro.crypto.state", encrypted_state, "");
+ if (!strcmp(encrypted_state, "encrypted") && !previously_encrypted_upto) {
+ SLOGE("Device is already running encrypted, aborting");
+ goto error_unencrypted;
+ }
+
+ get_crypt_info(&key_loc, &real_blkdev);
+
+ /* Get the size of the real block device */
+ uint64_t nr_sec;
+ if (::GetBlockDev512Sectors(real_blkdev, &nr_sec) != android::OK) {
+ SLOGE("Cannot get size of block device %s\n", real_blkdev.c_str());
+ goto error_unencrypted;
+ }
+
+ /* If doing inplace encryption, make sure the orig fs doesn't include the crypto footer */
+ if (key_loc == KEY_IN_FOOTER) {
+ uint64_t fs_size_sec, max_fs_size_sec;
+ fs_size_sec = get_fs_size(real_blkdev.c_str());
+ if (fs_size_sec == 0) fs_size_sec = get_f2fs_filesystem_size_sec(real_blkdev.data());
+
+ max_fs_size_sec = nr_sec - (CRYPT_FOOTER_OFFSET / CRYPT_SECTOR_SIZE);
+
+ if (fs_size_sec > max_fs_size_sec) {
+ SLOGE("Orig filesystem overlaps crypto footer region. Cannot encrypt in place.");
+ goto error_unencrypted;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* Get a wakelock as this may take a while, and we don't want the
+ * device to sleep on us. We'll grab a partial wakelock, and if the UI
+ * wants to keep the screen on, it can grab a full wakelock.
+ */
+ snprintf(lockid, sizeof(lockid), "enablecrypto%d", (int)getpid());
+ // wakeLock = std::make_unique<android::wakelock::WakeLock>(lockid);
+
+ /* The init files are setup to stop the class main and late start when
+ * vold sets trigger_shutdown_framework.
+ */
+ property_set("vold.decrypt", "trigger_shutdown_framework");
+ SLOGD("Just asked init to shut down class main\n");
+
+ /* Ask vold to unmount all devices that it manages */
+ // if (vold_unmountAll()) {
+ // SLOGE("Failed to unmount all vold managed devices");
+ // }
+
+ /* no_ui means we are being called from init, not settings.
+ Now we always reboot from settings, so !no_ui means reboot
+ */
+ if (!no_ui) {
+ /* Try fallback, which is to reboot and try there */
+ onlyCreateHeader = true;
+ FILE* breadcrumb = fopen(BREADCRUMB_FILE, "we");
+ if (breadcrumb == 0) {
+ SLOGE("Failed to create breadcrumb file");
+ goto error_shutting_down;
+ }
+ fclose(breadcrumb);
+ }
+
+ /* Do extra work for a better UX when doing the long inplace encryption */
+ if (!onlyCreateHeader) {
+ /* Now that /data is unmounted, we need to mount a tmpfs
+ * /data, set a property saying we're doing inplace encryption,
+ * and restart the framework.
+ */
+ wait_and_unmount(DATA_MNT_POINT, true);
+ if (fs_mgr_do_tmpfs_mount(DATA_MNT_POINT)) {
+ goto error_shutting_down;
+ }
+ /* Tells the framework that inplace encryption is starting */
+ property_set("vold.encrypt_progress", "0");
+
+ /* restart the framework. */
+ /* Create necessary paths on /data */
+ prep_data_fs();
+
+ /* Ugh, shutting down the framework is not synchronous, so until it
+ * can be fixed, this horrible hack will wait a moment for it all to
+ * shut down before proceeding. Without it, some devices cannot
+ * restart the graphics services.
+ */
+ sleep(2);
+ }
+
+ /* Start the actual work of making an encrypted filesystem */
+ /* Initialize a crypt_mnt_ftr for the partition */
+ if (previously_encrypted_upto == 0 && !rebootEncryption) {
+ if (cryptfs_init_crypt_mnt_ftr(&crypt_ftr)) {
+ goto error_shutting_down;
+ }
+
+ if (key_loc == KEY_IN_FOOTER) {
+ crypt_ftr.fs_size = nr_sec - (CRYPT_FOOTER_OFFSET / CRYPT_SECTOR_SIZE);
+ } else {
+ crypt_ftr.fs_size = nr_sec;
+ }
+ /* At this point, we are in an inconsistent state. Until we successfully
+ complete encryption, a reboot will leave us broken. So mark the
+ encryption failed in case that happens.
+ On successfully completing encryption, remove this flag */
+ if (onlyCreateHeader) {
+ crypt_ftr.flags |= CRYPT_FORCE_ENCRYPTION;
+ } else {
+ crypt_ftr.flags |= CRYPT_INCONSISTENT_STATE;
+ }
+ crypt_ftr.crypt_type = crypt_type;
+ strlcpy((char*)crypt_ftr.crypto_type_name, get_crypto_type().get_kernel_name(),
+ MAX_CRYPTO_TYPE_NAME_LEN);
+
+ /* Make an encrypted master key */
+ if (create_encrypted_random_key(onlyCreateHeader ? DEFAULT_PASSWORD : passwd,
+ crypt_ftr.master_key, crypt_ftr.salt, &crypt_ftr)) {
+ SLOGE("Cannot create encrypted master key\n");
+ goto error_shutting_down;
+ }
+
+ /* Replace scrypted intermediate key if we are preparing for a reboot */
+ if (onlyCreateHeader) {
+ unsigned char fake_master_key[MAX_KEY_LEN];
+ unsigned char encrypted_fake_master_key[MAX_KEY_LEN];
+ memset(fake_master_key, 0, sizeof(fake_master_key));
+ encrypt_master_key(passwd, crypt_ftr.salt, fake_master_key, encrypted_fake_master_key,
+ &crypt_ftr);
+ }
+
+ /* Write the key to the end of the partition */
+ put_crypt_ftr_and_key(&crypt_ftr);
+
+ /* If any persistent data has been remembered, save it.
+ * If none, create a valid empty table and save that.
+ */
+ if (!persist_data) {
+ pdata = (crypt_persist_data*)malloc(CRYPT_PERSIST_DATA_SIZE);
+ if (pdata) {
+ init_empty_persist_data(pdata, CRYPT_PERSIST_DATA_SIZE);
+ persist_data = pdata;
+ }
+ }
+ if (persist_data) {
+ save_persistent_data();
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (onlyCreateHeader) {
+ sleep(2);
+ cryptfs_reboot(RebootType::reboot);
+ }
+
+ if (!no_ui || rebootEncryption) {
+ /* startup service classes main and late_start */
+ property_set("vold.decrypt", "trigger_restart_min_framework");
+ SLOGD("Just triggered restart_min_framework\n");
+
+ /* OK, the framework is restarted and will soon be showing a
+ * progress bar. Time to setup an encrypted mapping, and
+ * either write a new filesystem, or encrypt in place updating
+ * the progress bar as we work.
+ */
+ }
+
+ decrypt_master_key(passwd, decrypted_master_key, &crypt_ftr, 0, 0);
+ ALOGE("cryptfs_enable_internal\n");
+ create_crypto_blk_dev(&crypt_ftr, decrypted_master_key, real_blkdev.c_str(), &crypto_blkdev,
+ CRYPTO_BLOCK_DEVICE, 0);
+
+ /* If we are continuing, check checksums match */
+ rc = 0;
+ if (previously_encrypted_upto) {
+ __le8 hash_first_block[SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH];
+ rc = cryptfs_SHA256_fileblock(crypto_blkdev.c_str(), hash_first_block);
+
+ if (!rc &&
+ memcmp(hash_first_block, crypt_ftr.hash_first_block, sizeof(hash_first_block)) != 0) {
+ SLOGE("Checksums do not match - trigger wipe");
+ rc = -1;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (!rc) {
+ rc = cryptfs_enable_all_volumes(&crypt_ftr, crypto_blkdev.c_str(), real_blkdev.data(),
+ previously_encrypted_upto);
+ }
+
+ /* Calculate checksum if we are not finished */
+ if (!rc && crypt_ftr.encrypted_upto != crypt_ftr.fs_size) {
+ rc = cryptfs_SHA256_fileblock(crypto_blkdev.c_str(), crypt_ftr.hash_first_block);
+ if (rc) {
+ SLOGE("Error calculating checksum for continuing encryption");
+ rc = -1;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* Undo the dm-crypt mapping whether we succeed or not */
+ delete_crypto_blk_dev(CRYPTO_BLOCK_DEVICE);
+
+ if (!rc) {
+ /* Success */
+ crypt_ftr.flags &= ~CRYPT_INCONSISTENT_STATE;
+
+ if (crypt_ftr.encrypted_upto != crypt_ftr.fs_size) {
+ SLOGD("Encrypted up to sector %lld - will continue after reboot",
+ crypt_ftr.encrypted_upto);
+ crypt_ftr.flags |= CRYPT_ENCRYPTION_IN_PROGRESS;
+ }
+
+ put_crypt_ftr_and_key(&crypt_ftr);
+
+ if (crypt_ftr.encrypted_upto == crypt_ftr.fs_size) {
+ char value[PROPERTY_VALUE_MAX];
+ property_get("ro.crypto.state", value, "");
+ if (!strcmp(value, "")) {
+ /* default encryption - continue first boot sequence */
+ property_set("ro.crypto.state", "encrypted");
+ property_set("ro.crypto.type", "block");
+ // wakeLock.reset(nullptr);
+ if (rebootEncryption && crypt_ftr.crypt_type != CRYPT_TYPE_DEFAULT) {
+ // Bring up cryptkeeper that will check the password and set it
+ property_set("vold.decrypt", "trigger_shutdown_framework");
+ sleep(2);
+ property_set("vold.encrypt_progress", "");
+ cryptfs_trigger_restart_min_framework();
+ } else {
+ cryptfs_check_passwd(DEFAULT_PASSWORD);
+ cryptfs_restart_internal(1);
+ }
+ return 0;
+ } else {
+ sleep(2); /* Give the UI a chance to show 100% progress */
+ cryptfs_reboot(RebootType::reboot);
+ }
+ } else {
+ sleep(2); /* Partially encrypted, ensure writes flushed to ssd */
+ cryptfs_reboot(RebootType::shutdown);
+ }
+ } else {
+ char value[PROPERTY_VALUE_MAX];
+
+ property_get("ro.vold.wipe_on_crypt_fail", value, "0");
+ if (!strcmp(value, "1")) {
+ /* wipe data if encryption failed */
+ SLOGE("encryption failed - rebooting into recovery to wipe data\n");
+ std::string err;
+ const std::vector<std::string> options = {
+ "--wipe_data\n--reason=cryptfs_enable_internal\n"};
+ if (!write_bootloader_message(options, &err)) {
+ SLOGE("could not write bootloader message: %s", err.c_str());
+ }
+ cryptfs_reboot(RebootType::recovery);
+ } else {
+ /* set property to trigger dialog */
+ property_set("vold.encrypt_progress", "error_partially_encrypted");
+ }
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ /* hrm, the encrypt step claims success, but the reboot failed.
+ * This should not happen.
+ * Set the property and return. Hope the framework can deal with it.
+ */
+ property_set("vold.encrypt_progress", "error_reboot_failed");
+ return rc;
+
+error_unencrypted:
+ property_set("vold.encrypt_progress", "error_not_encrypted");
+ return -1;
+
+error_shutting_down:
+ /* we failed, and have not encrypted anthing, so the users's data is still intact,
+ * but the framework is stopped and not restarted to show the error, so it's up to
+ * vold to restart the system.
+ */
+ SLOGE(
+ "Error enabling encryption after framework is shutdown, no data changed, restarting "
+ "system");
+ cryptfs_reboot(RebootType::reboot);
+
+ /* shouldn't get here */
+ property_set("vold.encrypt_progress", "error_shutting_down");
+ return -1;
+}
+
+int cryptfs_enable(int type, const char* passwd, int no_ui) {
+ return cryptfs_enable_internal(type, passwd, no_ui);
+}
+
+int cryptfs_enable_default(int no_ui) {
+ return cryptfs_enable_internal(CRYPT_TYPE_DEFAULT, DEFAULT_PASSWORD, no_ui);
+}
+
+int cryptfs_changepw(int crypt_type, const char* newpw) {
+ if (fscrypt_is_native()) {
+ SLOGE("cryptfs_changepw not valid for file encryption");
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ struct crypt_mnt_ftr crypt_ftr;
+ int rc;
+
+ /* This is only allowed after we've successfully decrypted the master key */
+ if (!master_key_saved) {
+ SLOGE("Key not saved, aborting");
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ if (crypt_type < 0 || crypt_type > CRYPT_TYPE_MAX_TYPE) {
+ SLOGE("Invalid crypt_type %d", crypt_type);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ /* get key */
+ if (get_crypt_ftr_and_key(&crypt_ftr)) {
+ SLOGE("Error getting crypt footer and key");
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ crypt_ftr.crypt_type = crypt_type;
+
+ rc = encrypt_master_key(crypt_type == CRYPT_TYPE_DEFAULT ? DEFAULT_PASSWORD : newpw,
+ crypt_ftr.salt, saved_master_key, crypt_ftr.master_key, &crypt_ftr);
+ if (rc) {
+ SLOGE("Encrypt master key failed: %d", rc);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ /* save the key */
+ put_crypt_ftr_and_key(&crypt_ftr);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static unsigned int persist_get_max_entries(int encrypted) {
+ struct crypt_mnt_ftr crypt_ftr;
+ unsigned int dsize;
+
+ /* If encrypted, use the values from the crypt_ftr, otherwise
+ * use the values for the current spec.
+ */
+ if (encrypted) {
+ if (get_crypt_ftr_and_key(&crypt_ftr)) {
+ /* Something is wrong, assume no space for entries */
+ return 0;
+ }
+ dsize = crypt_ftr.persist_data_size;
+ } else {
+ dsize = CRYPT_PERSIST_DATA_SIZE;
+ }
+
+ if (dsize > sizeof(struct crypt_persist_data)) {
+ return (dsize - sizeof(struct crypt_persist_data)) / sizeof(struct crypt_persist_entry);
+ } else {
+ return 0;
+ }
+}
+
+static int persist_get_key(const char* fieldname, char* value) {
+ unsigned int i;
+
+ if (persist_data == NULL) {
+ return -1;
+ }
+ for (i = 0; i < persist_data->persist_valid_entries; i++) {
+ if (!strncmp(persist_data->persist_entry[i].key, fieldname, PROPERTY_KEY_MAX)) {
+ /* We found it! */
+ strlcpy(value, persist_data->persist_entry[i].val, PROPERTY_VALUE_MAX);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+
+ return -1;
+}
+
+static int persist_set_key(const char* fieldname, const char* value, int encrypted) {
+ unsigned int i;
+ unsigned int num;
+ unsigned int max_persistent_entries;
+
+ if (persist_data == NULL) {
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ max_persistent_entries = persist_get_max_entries(encrypted);
+
+ num = persist_data->persist_valid_entries;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < num; i++) {
+ if (!strncmp(persist_data->persist_entry[i].key, fieldname, PROPERTY_KEY_MAX)) {
+ /* We found an existing entry, update it! */
+ memset(persist_data->persist_entry[i].val, 0, PROPERTY_VALUE_MAX);
+ strlcpy(persist_data->persist_entry[i].val, value, PROPERTY_VALUE_MAX);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* We didn't find it, add it to the end, if there is room */
+ if (persist_data->persist_valid_entries < max_persistent_entries) {
+ memset(&persist_data->persist_entry[num], 0, sizeof(struct crypt_persist_entry));
+ strlcpy(persist_data->persist_entry[num].key, fieldname, PROPERTY_KEY_MAX);
+ strlcpy(persist_data->persist_entry[num].val, value, PROPERTY_VALUE_MAX);
+ persist_data->persist_valid_entries++;
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ return -1;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Test if key is part of the multi-entry (field, index) sequence. Return non-zero if key is in the
+ * sequence and its index is greater than or equal to index. Return 0 otherwise.
+ */
+int match_multi_entry(const char* key, const char* field, unsigned index) {
+ std::string key_ = key;
+ std::string field_ = field;
+
+ std::string parsed_field;
+ unsigned parsed_index;
+
+ std::string::size_type split = key_.find_last_of('_');
+ if (split == std::string::npos) {
+ parsed_field = key_;
+ parsed_index = 0;
+ } else {
+ parsed_field = key_.substr(0, split);
+ parsed_index = std::stoi(key_.substr(split + 1));
+ }
+
+ return parsed_field == field_ && parsed_index >= index;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Delete entry/entries from persist_data. If the entries are part of a multi-segment field, all
+ * remaining entries starting from index will be deleted.
+ * returns PERSIST_DEL_KEY_OK if deletion succeeds,
+ * PERSIST_DEL_KEY_ERROR_NO_FIELD if the field does not exist,
+ * and PERSIST_DEL_KEY_ERROR_OTHER if error occurs.
+ *
+ */
+static int persist_del_keys(const char* fieldname, unsigned index) {
+ unsigned int i;
+ unsigned int j;
+ unsigned int num;
+
+ if (persist_data == NULL) {
+ return PERSIST_DEL_KEY_ERROR_OTHER;
+ }
+
+ num = persist_data->persist_valid_entries;
+
+ j = 0; // points to the end of non-deleted entries.
+ // Filter out to-be-deleted entries in place.
+ for (i = 0; i < num; i++) {
+ if (!match_multi_entry(persist_data->persist_entry[i].key, fieldname, index)) {
+ persist_data->persist_entry[j] = persist_data->persist_entry[i];
+ j++;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (j < num) {
+ persist_data->persist_valid_entries = j;
+ // Zeroise the remaining entries
+ memset(&persist_data->persist_entry[j], 0, (num - j) * sizeof(struct crypt_persist_entry));
+ return PERSIST_DEL_KEY_OK;
+ } else {
+ // Did not find an entry matching the given fieldname
+ return PERSIST_DEL_KEY_ERROR_NO_FIELD;
+ }
+}
+
+static int persist_count_keys(const char* fieldname) {
+ unsigned int i;
+ unsigned int count;
+
+ if (persist_data == NULL) {
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ count = 0;
+ for (i = 0; i < persist_data->persist_valid_entries; i++) {
+ if (match_multi_entry(persist_data->persist_entry[i].key, fieldname, 0)) {
+ count++;
+ }
+ }
+
+ return count;
+}
+
+/* Return the value of the specified field. */
+int cryptfs_getfield(const char* fieldname, char* value, int len) {
+ if (fscrypt_is_native()) {
+ SLOGE("Cannot get field when file encrypted");
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ char temp_value[PROPERTY_VALUE_MAX];
+ /* CRYPTO_GETFIELD_OK is success,
+ * CRYPTO_GETFIELD_ERROR_NO_FIELD is value not set,
+ * CRYPTO_GETFIELD_ERROR_BUF_TOO_SMALL is buffer (as given by len) too small,
+ * CRYPTO_GETFIELD_ERROR_OTHER is any other error
+ */
+ int rc = CRYPTO_GETFIELD_ERROR_OTHER;
+ int i;
+ char temp_field[PROPERTY_KEY_MAX];
+
+ if (persist_data == NULL) {
+ load_persistent_data();
+ if (persist_data == NULL) {
+ SLOGE("Getfield error, cannot load persistent data");
+ goto out;
+ }
+ }
+
+ // Read value from persistent entries. If the original value is split into multiple entries,
+ // stitch them back together.
+ if (!persist_get_key(fieldname, temp_value)) {
+ // We found it, copy it to the caller's buffer and keep going until all entries are read.
+ if (strlcpy(value, temp_value, len) >= (unsigned)len) {
+ // value too small
+ rc = CRYPTO_GETFIELD_ERROR_BUF_TOO_SMALL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ rc = CRYPTO_GETFIELD_OK;
+
+ for (i = 1; /* break explicitly */; i++) {
+ if (snprintf(temp_field, sizeof(temp_field), "%s_%d", fieldname, i) >=
+ (int)sizeof(temp_field)) {
+ // If the fieldname is very long, we stop as soon as it begins to overflow the
+ // maximum field length. At this point we have in fact fully read out the original
+ // value because cryptfs_setfield would not allow fields with longer names to be
+ // written in the first place.
+ break;
+ }
+ if (!persist_get_key(temp_field, temp_value)) {
+ if (strlcat(value, temp_value, len) >= (unsigned)len) {
+ // value too small.
+ rc = CRYPTO_GETFIELD_ERROR_BUF_TOO_SMALL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ } else {
+ // Exhaust all entries.
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ } else {
+ /* Sadness, it's not there. Return the error */
+ rc = CRYPTO_GETFIELD_ERROR_NO_FIELD;
+ }
+
+out:
+ return rc;
+}
+
+/* Set the value of the specified field. */
+int cryptfs_setfield(const char* fieldname, const char* value) {
+ if (fscrypt_is_native()) {
+ SLOGE("Cannot set field when file encrypted");
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ char encrypted_state[PROPERTY_VALUE_MAX];
+ /* 0 is success, negative values are error */
+ int rc = CRYPTO_SETFIELD_ERROR_OTHER;
+ int encrypted = 0;
+ unsigned int field_id;
+ char temp_field[PROPERTY_KEY_MAX];
+ unsigned int num_entries;
+ unsigned int max_keylen;
+
+ if (persist_data == NULL) {
+ load_persistent_data();
+ if (persist_data == NULL) {
+ SLOGE("Setfield error, cannot load persistent data");
+ goto out;
+ }
+ }
+
+ property_get("ro.crypto.state", encrypted_state, "");
+ if (!strcmp(encrypted_state, "encrypted")) {
+ encrypted = 1;
+ }
+
+ // Compute the number of entries required to store value, each entry can store up to
+ // (PROPERTY_VALUE_MAX - 1) chars
+ if (strlen(value) == 0) {
+ // Empty value also needs one entry to store.
+ num_entries = 1;
+ } else {
+ num_entries = (strlen(value) + (PROPERTY_VALUE_MAX - 1) - 1) / (PROPERTY_VALUE_MAX - 1);
+ }
+
+ max_keylen = strlen(fieldname);
+ if (num_entries > 1) {
+ // Need an extra "_%d" suffix.
+ max_keylen += 1 + log10(num_entries);
+ }
+ if (max_keylen > PROPERTY_KEY_MAX - 1) {
+ rc = CRYPTO_SETFIELD_ERROR_FIELD_TOO_LONG;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ // Make sure we have enough space to write the new value
+ if (persist_data->persist_valid_entries + num_entries - persist_count_keys(fieldname) >
+ persist_get_max_entries(encrypted)) {
+ rc = CRYPTO_SETFIELD_ERROR_VALUE_TOO_LONG;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ // Now that we know persist_data has enough space for value, let's delete the old field first
+ // to make up space.
+ persist_del_keys(fieldname, 0);
+
+ if (persist_set_key(fieldname, value, encrypted)) {
+ // fail to set key, should not happen as we have already checked the available space
+ SLOGE("persist_set_key() error during setfield()");
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ for (field_id = 1; field_id < num_entries; field_id++) {
+ snprintf(temp_field, sizeof(temp_field), "%s_%u", fieldname, field_id);
+
+ if (persist_set_key(temp_field, value + field_id * (PROPERTY_VALUE_MAX - 1), encrypted)) {
+ // fail to set key, should not happen as we have already checked the available space.
+ SLOGE("persist_set_key() error during setfield()");
+ goto out;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* If we are running encrypted, save the persistent data now */
+ if (encrypted) {
+ if (save_persistent_data()) {
+ SLOGE("Setfield error, cannot save persistent data");
+ goto out;
+ }
+ }
+
+ rc = CRYPTO_SETFIELD_OK;
+
+out:
+ return rc;
+}
+
+/* Checks userdata. Attempt to mount the volume if default-
+ * encrypted.
+ * On success trigger next init phase and return 0.
+ * Currently do not handle failure - see TODO below.
+ */
+int cryptfs_mount_default_encrypted(void) {
+ int crypt_type = cryptfs_get_password_type();
+ if (crypt_type < 0 || crypt_type > CRYPT_TYPE_MAX_TYPE) {
+ SLOGE("Bad crypt type - error");
+ } else if (crypt_type != CRYPT_TYPE_DEFAULT) {
+ SLOGD(
+ "Password is not default - "
+ "starting min framework to prompt");
+ property_set("vold.decrypt", "trigger_restart_min_framework");
+ return 0;
+ } else if (cryptfs_check_passwd(DEFAULT_PASSWORD) == 0) {
+ SLOGD("Password is default - restarting filesystem");
+ cryptfs_restart_internal(0);
+ return 0;
+ } else {
+ SLOGE("Encrypted, default crypt type but can't decrypt");
+ }
+
+ /** Corrupt. Allow us to boot into framework, which will detect bad
+ crypto when it calls do_crypto_complete, then do a factory reset
+ */
+ property_set("vold.decrypt", "trigger_restart_min_framework");
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/* Returns type of the password, default, pattern, pin or password.
+ */
+int cryptfs_get_password_type(void) {
+ if (fscrypt_is_native()) {
+ SLOGE("cryptfs_get_password_type not valid for file encryption");
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ struct crypt_mnt_ftr crypt_ftr;
+
+ if (get_crypt_ftr_and_key(&crypt_ftr)) {
+ SLOGE("Error getting crypt footer and key\n");
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ if (crypt_ftr.flags & CRYPT_INCONSISTENT_STATE) {
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ return crypt_ftr.crypt_type;
+}
+
+const char* cryptfs_get_password() {
+ if (fscrypt_is_native()) {
+ SLOGE("cryptfs_get_password not valid for file encryption");
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ struct timespec now;
+ clock_gettime(CLOCK_BOOTTIME, &now);
+ if (now.tv_sec < password_expiry_time) {
+ return password;
+ } else {
+ cryptfs_clear_password();
+ return 0;
+ }
+}
+
+void cryptfs_clear_password() {
+ if (password) {
+ size_t len = strlen(password);
+ memset(password, 0, len);
+ free(password);
+ password = 0;
+ password_expiry_time = 0;
+ }
+}
+
+int cryptfs_isConvertibleToFBE() {
+ auto entry = GetEntryForMountPoint(&fstab_default, DATA_MNT_POINT);
+ return entry && entry->fs_mgr_flags.force_fde_or_fbe;
+}
diff --git a/crypto/fscrypt/cryptfs.h b/crypto/fscrypt/cryptfs.h
index a4fe87b..728b775 100644
--- a/crypto/fscrypt/cryptfs.h
+++ b/crypto/fscrypt/cryptfs.h
@@ -17,17 +17,7 @@
#ifndef ANDROID_VOLD_CRYPTFS_H
#define ANDROID_VOLD_CRYPTFS_H
-/* This structure starts 16,384 bytes before the end of a hardware
- * partition that is encrypted, or in a separate partition. It's location
- * is specified by a property set in init.<device>.rc.
- * The structure allocates 48 bytes for a key, but the real key size is
- * specified in the struct. Currently, the code is hardcoded to use 128
- * bit keys.
- * The fields after salt are only valid in rev 1.1 and later stuctures.
- * Obviously, the filesystem does not include the last 16 kbytes
- * of the partition if the crypt_mnt_ftr lives at the end of the
- * partition.
- */
+#include <string>
#include <linux/types.h>
#include <stdbool.h>
@@ -35,172 +25,10 @@
#include <cutils/properties.h>
-/* The current cryptfs version */
-#define CURRENT_MAJOR_VERSION 1
-#define CURRENT_MINOR_VERSION 3
+#include "KeyBuffer.h"
+#include "KeyUtil.h"
#define CRYPT_FOOTER_OFFSET 0x4000
-#define CRYPT_FOOTER_TO_PERSIST_OFFSET 0x1000
-#define CRYPT_PERSIST_DATA_SIZE 0x1000
-
-#define MAX_CRYPTO_TYPE_NAME_LEN 64
-
-#define MAX_KEY_LEN 48
-#define SALT_LEN 16
-#define SCRYPT_LEN 32
-
-/* definitions of flags in the structure below */
-#define CRYPT_MNT_KEY_UNENCRYPTED 0x1 /* The key for the partition is not encrypted. */
-#define CRYPT_ENCRYPTION_IN_PROGRESS \
- 0x2 /* Encryption partially completed, \
- encrypted_upto valid*/
-#define CRYPT_INCONSISTENT_STATE \
- 0x4 /* Set when starting encryption, clear when \
- exit cleanly, either through success or \
- correctly marked partial encryption */
-#define CRYPT_DATA_CORRUPT \
- 0x8 /* Set when encryption is fine, but the \
- underlying volume is corrupt */
-#define CRYPT_FORCE_ENCRYPTION \
- 0x10 /* Set when it is time to encrypt this \
- volume on boot. Everything in this \
- structure is set up correctly as \
- though device is encrypted except \
- that the master key is encrypted with the \
- default password. */
-#define CRYPT_FORCE_COMPLETE \
- 0x20 /* Set when the above encryption cycle is \
- complete. On next cryptkeeper entry, match \
- the password. If it matches fix the master \
- key and remove this flag. */
-
-/* Allowed values for type in the structure below */
-#define CRYPT_TYPE_PASSWORD \
- 0 /* master_key is encrypted with a password \
- * Must be zero to be compatible with pre-L \
- * devices where type is always password.*/
-#define CRYPT_TYPE_DEFAULT \
- 1 /* master_key is encrypted with default \
- * password */
-#define CRYPT_TYPE_PATTERN 2 /* master_key is encrypted with a pattern */
-#define CRYPT_TYPE_PIN 3 /* master_key is encrypted with a pin */
-#define CRYPT_TYPE_MAX_TYPE 3 /* type cannot be larger than this value */
-
-#define CRYPT_MNT_MAGIC 0xD0B5B1C4
-#define PERSIST_DATA_MAGIC 0xE950CD44
-
-/* Key Derivation Function algorithms */
-#define KDF_PBKDF2 1
-#define KDF_SCRYPT 2
-/* Algorithms 3 & 4 deprecated before shipping outside of google, so removed */
-#define KDF_SCRYPT_KEYMASTER 5
-
-/* Maximum allowed keymaster blob size. */
-#define KEYMASTER_BLOB_SIZE 2048
-
-/* __le32 and __le16 defined in system/extras/ext4_utils/ext4_utils.h */
-#define __le8 unsigned char
-
-#if !defined(SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH)
-#define SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH 32
-#endif
-
-struct crypt_mnt_ftr {
- __le32 magic; /* See above */
- __le16 major_version;
- __le16 minor_version;
- __le32 ftr_size; /* in bytes, not including key following */
- __le32 flags; /* See above */
- __le32 keysize; /* in bytes */
- __le32 crypt_type; /* how master_key is encrypted. Must be a
- * CRYPT_TYPE_XXX value */
- __le64 fs_size; /* Size of the encrypted fs, in 512 byte sectors */
- __le32 failed_decrypt_count; /* count of # of failed attempts to decrypt and
- mount, set to 0 on successful mount */
- unsigned char crypto_type_name[MAX_CRYPTO_TYPE_NAME_LEN]; /* The type of encryption
- needed to decrypt this
- partition, null terminated */
- __le32 spare2; /* ignored */
- unsigned char master_key[MAX_KEY_LEN]; /* The encrypted key for decrypting the filesystem */
- unsigned char salt[SALT_LEN]; /* The salt used for this encryption */
- __le64 persist_data_offset[2]; /* Absolute offset to both copies of crypt_persist_data
- * on device with that info, either the footer of the
- * real_blkdevice or the metadata partition. */
-
- __le32 persist_data_size; /* The number of bytes allocated to each copy of the
- * persistent data table*/
-
- __le8 kdf_type; /* The key derivation function used. */
-
- /* scrypt parameters. See www.tarsnap.com/scrypt/scrypt.pdf */
- __le8 N_factor; /* (1 << N) */
- __le8 r_factor; /* (1 << r) */
- __le8 p_factor; /* (1 << p) */
- __le64 encrypted_upto; /* If we are in state CRYPT_ENCRYPTION_IN_PROGRESS and
- we have to stop (e.g. power low) this is the last
- encrypted 512 byte sector.*/
- __le8 hash_first_block[SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH]; /* When CRYPT_ENCRYPTION_IN_PROGRESS
- set, hash of first block, used
- to validate before continuing*/
-
- /* key_master key, used to sign the derived key which is then used to generate
- * the intermediate key
- * This key should be used for no other purposes! We use this key to sign unpadded
- * data, which is acceptable but only if the key is not reused elsewhere. */
- __le8 keymaster_blob[KEYMASTER_BLOB_SIZE];
- __le32 keymaster_blob_size;
-
- /* Store scrypt of salted intermediate key. When decryption fails, we can
- check if this matches, and if it does, we know that the problem is with the
- drive, and there is no point in asking the user for more passwords.
-
- Note that if any part of this structure is corrupt, this will not match and
- we will continue to believe the user entered the wrong password. In that
- case the only solution is for the user to enter a password enough times to
- force a wipe.
-
- Note also that there is no need to worry about migration. If this data is
- wrong, we simply won't recognise a right password, and will continue to
- prompt. On the first password change, this value will be populated and
- then we will be OK.
- */
- unsigned char scrypted_intermediate_key[SCRYPT_LEN];
-
- /* sha of this structure with this element set to zero
- Used when encrypting on reboot to validate structure before doing something
- fatal
- */
- unsigned char sha256[SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH];
-};
-
-/* Persistant data that should be available before decryption.
- * Things like airplane mode, locale and timezone are kept
- * here and can be retrieved by the CryptKeeper UI to properly
- * configure the phone before asking for the password
- * This is only valid if the major and minor version above
- * is set to 1.1 or higher.
- *
- * This is a 4K structure. There are 2 copies, and the code alternates
- * writing one and then clearing the previous one. The reading
- * code reads the first valid copy it finds, based on the magic number.
- * The absolute offset to the first of the two copies is kept in rev 1.1
- * and higher crypt_mnt_ftr structures.
- */
-struct crypt_persist_entry {
- char key[PROPERTY_KEY_MAX];
- char val[PROPERTY_VALUE_MAX];
-};
-
-/* Should be exactly 4K in size */
-struct crypt_persist_data {
- __le32 persist_magic;
- __le32 persist_valid_entries;
- __le32 persist_spare[30];
- struct crypt_persist_entry persist_entry[0];
-};
-
-#define DATA_MNT_POINT "/data"
-#define METADATA_MNT_POINT "/metadata"
/* Return values for cryptfs_crypto_complete */
#define CRYPTO_COMPLETE_NOT_ENCRYPTED 1
@@ -210,11 +38,6 @@
#define CRYPTO_COMPLETE_INCONSISTENT (-3)
#define CRYPTO_COMPLETE_CORRUPT (-4)
-/* Return values for cryptfs_enable_inplace*() */
-#define ENABLE_INPLACE_OK 0
-#define ENABLE_INPLACE_ERR_OTHER (-1)
-#define ENABLE_INPLACE_ERR_DEV (-2) /* crypto_blkdev issue */
-
/* Return values for cryptfs_getfield */
#define CRYPTO_GETFIELD_OK 0
#define CRYPTO_GETFIELD_ERROR_NO_FIELD (-1)
@@ -232,11 +55,8 @@
#define PERSIST_DEL_KEY_ERROR_OTHER (-1)
#define PERSIST_DEL_KEY_ERROR_NO_FIELD (-2)
+// Exposed for testing only
int match_multi_entry(const char* key, const char* field, unsigned index);
-int wait_and_unmount(const char* mountpoint, bool kill);
-
-typedef int (*kdf_func)(const char* passwd, const unsigned char* salt, unsigned char* ikey,
- void* params);
int cryptfs_crypto_complete(void);
int cryptfs_check_passwd(const char* pw);
@@ -245,9 +65,8 @@
int cryptfs_enable(int type, const char* passwd, int no_ui);
int cryptfs_changepw(int type, const char* newpw);
int cryptfs_enable_default(int no_ui);
-int cryptfs_setup_ext_volume(const char* label, const char* real_blkdev, const unsigned char* key,
- char* out_crypto_blkdev);
-int cryptfs_revert_ext_volume(const char* label);
+int cryptfs_setup_ext_volume(const char* label, const char* real_blkdev,
+ const ::KeyBuffer& key, std::string* out_crypto_blkdev);
int cryptfs_getfield(const char* fieldname, char* value, int len);
int cryptfs_setfield(const char* fieldname, const char* value);
int cryptfs_mount_default_encrypted(void);
@@ -255,8 +74,6 @@
const char* cryptfs_get_password(void);
void cryptfs_clear_password(void);
int cryptfs_isConvertibleToFBE(void);
-
-uint32_t cryptfs_get_keysize();
-const char* cryptfs_get_crypto_name();
+const KeyGeneration cryptfs_get_keygen();
#endif /* ANDROID_VOLD_CRYPTFS_H */
diff --git a/crypto/fscrypt/fscrypt-common.h b/crypto/fscrypt/fscrypt-common.h
new file mode 100755
index 0000000..e5733c6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/fscrypt/fscrypt-common.h
@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+#include <map>
+// Store main DE/CE policy
+extern std::map<userid_t, EncryptionPolicy> s_de_policies;
+extern std::map<userid_t, EncryptionPolicy> s_ce_policies;
+extern std::string de_key_raw_ref;
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/crypto/fscrypt/fscrypt_policy.cpp b/crypto/fscrypt/fscrypt_policy.cpp
index 43d9552..99833f8 100755
--- a/crypto/fscrypt/fscrypt_policy.cpp
+++ b/crypto/fscrypt/fscrypt_policy.cpp
@@ -14,8 +14,6 @@
* limitations under the License.
*/
-#include "fscrypt/fscrypt.h"
-
#include <array>
#include <asm/ioctl.h>
@@ -34,44 +32,23 @@
#include <cutils/properties.h>
#include <logwrap/logwrap.h>
#include <utils/misc.h>
+#include <fscrypt/fscrypt.h>
#include "fscrypt_policy.h"
static int encryption_mode = FS_ENCRYPTION_MODE_PRIVATE;
bool fscrypt_is_native() {
+ LOG(ERROR) << "fscrypt_is_native::ro.crypto.type";
char value[PROPERTY_VALUE_MAX];
property_get("ro.crypto.type", value, "none");
return !strcmp(value, "file");
}
-static void log_ls(const char* dirname) {
- std::array<const char*, 3> argv = {"ls", "-laZ", dirname};
- int status = 0;
- auto res =
- android_fork_execvp(argv.size(), const_cast<char**>(argv.data()), &status, false, true);
- if (res != 0) {
- PLOG(ERROR) << argv[0] << " " << argv[1] << " " << argv[2] << "failed";
- return;
- }
- if (!WIFEXITED(status)) {
- LOG(ERROR) << argv[0] << " " << argv[1] << " " << argv[2]
- << " did not exit normally, status: " << status;
- return;
- }
- if (WEXITSTATUS(status) != 0) {
- LOG(ERROR) << argv[0] << " " << argv[1] << " " << argv[2]
- << " returned failure: " << WEXITSTATUS(status);
- return;
- }
-}
-
-extern "C" void policy_to_hex(const uint8_t* policy, char* hex) {
- for (size_t i = 0, j = 0; i < FS_KEY_DESCRIPTOR_SIZE; i++) {
- hex[j++] = HEX_LOOKUP[(policy[i] & 0xF0) >> 4];
- hex[j++] = HEX_LOOKUP[policy[i] & 0x0F];
- }
- hex[FS_KEY_DESCRIPTOR_SIZE_HEX - 1] = '\0';
+extern "C" void bytes_to_hex(const uint8_t *bytes, size_t num_bytes, char *hex) {
+ for (size_t i = 0; i < num_bytes; i++) {
+ sprintf(&hex[2 * i], "%02x", bytes[i]);
+ }
}
static bool is_dir_empty(const char *dirname, bool *is_empty)
@@ -121,153 +98,6 @@
return FS_POLICY_FLAGS_PAD_16;
}
-static bool fscrypt_policy_set(const char *directory, uint8_t *policy,
- size_t policy_length,
- int contents_encryption_mode,
- int filenames_encryption_mode) {
- if (policy_length != FS_KEY_DESCRIPTOR_SIZE) {
- LOG(ERROR) << "Policy wrong length: " << policy_length;
- return false;
- }
- char policy_hex[FS_KEY_DESCRIPTOR_SIZE_HEX];
- policy_to_hex(policy, policy_hex);
-
- int fd = open(directory, O_DIRECTORY | O_NOFOLLOW | O_CLOEXEC);
- if (fd == -1) {
- PLOG(ERROR) << "Failed to open directory " << directory;
- return false;
- }
-
- fscrypt_policy fp;
- fp.version = 0;
- fp.contents_encryption_mode = contents_encryption_mode;
- fp.filenames_encryption_mode = filenames_encryption_mode;
- fp.flags = fscrypt_get_policy_flags(filenames_encryption_mode);
- memcpy(fp.master_key_descriptor, policy, FS_KEY_DESCRIPTOR_SIZE);
- if (ioctl(fd, FS_IOC_SET_ENCRYPTION_POLICY, &fp)) {
- PLOG(ERROR) << "Failed to set encryption policy for " << directory << " to " << policy_hex
- << " modes " << contents_encryption_mode << "/" << filenames_encryption_mode;
- close(fd);
- return false;
- }
- close(fd);
-
- LOG(INFO) << "Policy for " << directory << " set to " << policy_hex
- << " modes " << contents_encryption_mode << "/" << filenames_encryption_mode;
- return true;
-}
-
-static bool fscrypt_policy_get(const char *directory, uint8_t *policy,
- size_t policy_length,
- int contents_encryption_mode,
- int filenames_encryption_mode) {
- if (policy_length != FS_KEY_DESCRIPTOR_SIZE) {
- LOG(ERROR) << "Policy wrong length: " << policy_length;
- return false;
- }
-
- int fd = open(directory, O_DIRECTORY | O_NOFOLLOW | O_CLOEXEC);
- if (fd == -1) {
- PLOG(ERROR) << "Failed to open directory " << directory;
- return false;
- }
-
- fscrypt_policy fp;
- memset(&fp, 0, sizeof(fscrypt_policy));
- if (ioctl(fd, FS_IOC_GET_ENCRYPTION_POLICY, &fp) != 0) {
- PLOG(ERROR) << "Failed to get encryption policy for " << directory;
- close(fd);
- log_ls(directory);
- return false;
- }
- close(fd);
-
- if ((fp.version != 0)
- || (fp.contents_encryption_mode != contents_encryption_mode)
- || (fp.filenames_encryption_mode != filenames_encryption_mode)
- || (fp.flags !=
- fscrypt_get_policy_flags(filenames_encryption_mode))) {
- LOG(ERROR) << "Failed to find matching encryption policy for " << directory;
- return false;
- }
- memcpy(policy, fp.master_key_descriptor, FS_KEY_DESCRIPTOR_SIZE);
-
- return true;
-}
-
-static bool fscrypt_policy_check(const char *directory, uint8_t *policy,
- size_t policy_length,
- int contents_encryption_mode,
- int filenames_encryption_mode) {
- if (policy_length != FS_KEY_DESCRIPTOR_SIZE) {
- LOG(ERROR) << "Policy wrong length: " << policy_length;
- return false;
- }
- uint8_t existing_policy[FS_KEY_DESCRIPTOR_SIZE];
- if (!fscrypt_policy_get(directory, existing_policy, FS_KEY_DESCRIPTOR_SIZE,
- contents_encryption_mode,
- filenames_encryption_mode)) return false;
- char existing_policy_hex[FS_KEY_DESCRIPTOR_SIZE_HEX];
-
- policy_to_hex(existing_policy, existing_policy_hex);
-
- if (memcmp(policy, existing_policy, FS_KEY_DESCRIPTOR_SIZE) != 0) {
- char policy_hex[FS_KEY_DESCRIPTOR_SIZE_HEX];
- policy_to_hex(policy, policy_hex);
- LOG(ERROR) << "Found policy " << existing_policy_hex << " at " << directory
- << " which doesn't match expected value " << policy_hex;
- log_ls(directory);
- return false;
- }
- LOG(INFO) << "Found policy " << existing_policy_hex << " at " << directory
- << " which matches expected value";
- return true;
-}
-
-int fscrypt_policy_ensure(const char *directory, uint8_t *policy,
- size_t policy_length,
- const char *contents_encryption_mode,
- const char *filenames_encryption_mode) {
- int contents_mode = 0;
- int filenames_mode = 0;
-
- if (!strcmp(contents_encryption_mode, "software") ||
- !strcmp(contents_encryption_mode, "aes-256-xts")) {
- contents_mode = FS_ENCRYPTION_MODE_AES_256_XTS;
- } else if (!strcmp(contents_encryption_mode, "adiantum")) {
- contents_mode = FS_ENCRYPTION_MODE_ADIANTUM;
- } else if (!strcmp(contents_encryption_mode, "ice")) {
- contents_mode = FS_ENCRYPTION_MODE_PRIVATE;
- } else {
- LOG(ERROR) << "Invalid file contents encryption mode: "
- << contents_encryption_mode;
- return -1;
- }
-
- if (!strcmp(filenames_encryption_mode, "aes-256-cts")) {
- filenames_mode = FS_ENCRYPTION_MODE_AES_256_CTS;
- } else if (!strcmp(filenames_encryption_mode, "aes-256-heh")) {
- filenames_mode = FS_ENCRYPTION_MODE_AES_256_HEH;
- } else if (!strcmp(filenames_encryption_mode, "adiantum")) {
- filenames_mode = FS_ENCRYPTION_MODE_ADIANTUM;
- } else {
- LOG(ERROR) << "Invalid file names encryption mode: "
- << filenames_encryption_mode;
- return -1;
- }
-
- bool is_empty;
- if (!is_dir_empty(directory, &is_empty)) return -1;
- if (is_empty) {
- if (!fscrypt_policy_set(directory, policy, policy_length,
- contents_mode, filenames_mode)) return -1;
- } else {
- if (!fscrypt_policy_check(directory, policy, policy_length,
- contents_mode, filenames_mode)) return -1;
- }
- return 0;
-}
-
extern "C" bool fscrypt_set_mode() {
const char* mode_file = "/data/unencrypted/mode";
struct stat st;
@@ -292,12 +122,10 @@
std::string contents_encryption_mode_string = std::string(contents_encryption_mode);
int pos = contents_encryption_mode_string.find(":");
- PLOG(ERROR) << "contents_encryption_mode_string: " << contents_encryption_mode_string.substr(0, pos);
+ LOG(INFO) << "contents_encryption_mode_string: " << contents_encryption_mode_string.substr(0, pos);
- // if (!strcmp(contents_encryption_mode, "software")) {
if (contents_encryption_mode_string.substr(0, pos) == "software") {
encryption_mode = FS_ENCRYPTION_MODE_AES_256_XTS;
- // } else if (!strcmp(contents_encryption_mode, "ice")) {
} else if (contents_encryption_mode_string.substr(0, pos) == "ice") {
encryption_mode = FS_ENCRYPTION_MODE_PRIVATE;
} else {
@@ -309,15 +137,11 @@
return true;
}
-extern "C" void fscrypt_policy_fill_default_struct(fscrypt_encryption_policy *fep) {
- fep->version = 0;
- fep->contents_encryption_mode = encryption_mode;
- fep->filenames_encryption_mode = FS_ENCRYPTION_MODE_AES_256_CTS;
- fep->flags = 0;
- memset((void*)&fep->master_key_descriptor[0], 0, FS_KEY_DESCRIPTOR_SIZE);
-}
-
-extern "C" bool fscrypt_policy_set_struct(const char *directory, const fscrypt_encryption_policy *fep) {
+#ifdef USE_FSCRYPT_POLICY_V1
+extern "C" bool fscrypt_policy_set_struct(const char *directory, const struct fscrypt_policy_v1 *fep) {
+#else
+extern "C" bool fscrypt_policy_set_struct(const char *directory, const struct fscrypt_policy_v2 *fep) {
+#endif
int fd = open(directory, O_DIRECTORY | O_NOFOLLOW | O_CLOEXEC);
if (fd == -1) {
printf("failed to open %s\n", directory);
@@ -325,7 +149,6 @@
return false;
}
if (ioctl(fd, FS_IOC_SET_ENCRYPTION_POLICY, fep)) {
- printf("failed to set policy for '%s'\n", directory);
PLOG(ERROR) << "Failed to set encryption policy for " << directory;
close(fd);
return false;
@@ -334,56 +157,30 @@
return true;
}
-extern "C" bool fscrypt_policy_get_struct(const char *directory, fscrypt_encryption_policy *fep) {
- int fd = open(directory, O_DIRECTORY | O_NOFOLLOW | O_CLOEXEC);
+#ifdef USE_FSCRYPT_POLICY_V1
+extern "C" bool fscrypt_policy_get_struct(const char *directory, struct fscrypt_policy_v1 *fep) {
+#else
+extern "C" bool fscrypt_policy_get_struct(const char *directory, struct fscrypt_policy_v2 *fep) {
+#endif
+ int fd = open(directory, O_DIRECTORY | O_RDONLY | O_NOFOLLOW | O_CLOEXEC);
if (fd == -1) {
- printf("Failed to open '%s'\n", directory);
PLOG(ERROR) << "Failed to open directory " << directory;
return false;
}
- memset(fep, 0, sizeof(fscrypt_encryption_policy));
- if (ioctl(fd, FS_IOC_GET_ENCRYPTION_POLICY, fep) != 0) {
+#ifdef USE_FSCRYPT_POLICY_V1
+ memset(fep, 0, sizeof(fscrypt_policy_v1));
+#else
+ memset(fep, 0, sizeof(fscrypt_policy_v2));
+#endif
+
+ struct fscrypt_get_policy_ex_arg ex_policy = {0};
+ ex_policy.policy_size = sizeof(ex_policy.policy);
+ if (ioctl(fd, FS_IOC_GET_ENCRYPTION_POLICY_EX, &ex_policy) != 0) {
PLOG(ERROR) << "Failed to get encryption policy for " << directory;
close(fd);
return false;
}
- printf("fscrypt_policy_get_struct::fep->version::%d\n", fep->version);
+ memcpy(fep, &ex_policy.policy.v2, sizeof(ex_policy.policy.v2));
close(fd);
return true;
}
-
-extern "C" bool fscrypt_policy_set(const char *directory, uint8_t *policy,
- size_t policy_length, int contents_encryption_mode) {
- if (contents_encryption_mode == 0)
- contents_encryption_mode = encryption_mode;
- if (policy_length != FS_KEY_DESCRIPTOR_SIZE) {
- printf("policy wrong length\n");
- LOG(ERROR) << "Policy wrong length: " << policy_length;
- return false;
- }
- int fd = open(directory, O_DIRECTORY | O_NOFOLLOW | O_CLOEXEC);
- if (fd == -1) {
- printf("failed to open %s\n", directory);
- PLOG(ERROR) << "Failed to open directory " << directory;
- return false;
- }
-
- fscrypt_encryption_policy fep;
- fep.version = 0;
- fep.contents_encryption_mode = contents_encryption_mode;
- fep.filenames_encryption_mode = FS_ENCRYPTION_MODE_AES_256_CTS;
- fep.flags = 0;
- memcpy(fep.master_key_descriptor, policy, FS_KEY_DESCRIPTOR_SIZE);
- if (ioctl(fd, FS_IOC_SET_ENCRYPTION_POLICY, &fep)) {
- printf("failed to set policy for '%s' '%s'\n", directory, policy);
- PLOG(ERROR) << "Failed to set encryption policy for " << directory;
- close(fd);
- return false;
- }
- close(fd);
-
- char policy_hex[FS_KEY_DESCRIPTOR_SIZE_HEX];
- policy_to_hex(policy, policy_hex);
- LOG(INFO) << "Policy for " << directory << " set to " << policy_hex;
- return true;
-}
diff --git a/crypto/fscrypt/fscrypt_policy.h b/crypto/fscrypt/fscrypt_policy.h
index 01fc419..c99ce2e 100755
--- a/crypto/fscrypt/fscrypt_policy.h
+++ b/crypto/fscrypt/fscrypt_policy.h
@@ -25,6 +25,7 @@
__BEGIN_DECLS
#define FS_KEY_DESCRIPTOR_SIZE_HEX (2 * FS_KEY_DESCRIPTOR_SIZE + 1)
+#define FSCRYPT_KEY_IDENTIFIER_HEX_SIZE ((2 * FSCRYPT_KEY_IDENTIFIER_SIZE) + 1)
/* modes not supported by upstream kernel, so not in <linux/fs.h> */
#define FS_ENCRYPTION_MODE_AES_256_HEH 126
@@ -42,22 +43,29 @@
#define HEX_LOOKUP "0123456789abcdef"
-struct fscrypt_encryption_policy {
- uint8_t version;
- uint8_t contents_encryption_mode;
- uint8_t filenames_encryption_mode;
- uint8_t flags;
- uint8_t master_key_descriptor[FS_KEY_DESCRIPTOR_SIZE];
-} __attribute__((packed));
-
-
bool fscrypt_set_mode();
-bool lookup_ref_key(const uint8_t *policy, uint8_t* policy_type);
+
+#ifdef USE_FSCRYPT_POLICY_V1
+bool lookup_ref_key(struct fscrypt_policy_v1 *fep, uint8_t* policy_type);
+#else
+bool lookup_ref_key(struct fscrypt_policy_v2 *fep, uint8_t* policy_type);
+#endif
+
bool lookup_ref_tar(const uint8_t *policy_type, uint8_t *policy);
-void policy_to_hex(const uint8_t* policy, char* hex);
-bool fscrypt_policy_get_struct(const char *directory, struct fscrypt_encryption_policy *fep);
-bool fscrypt_policy_set_struct(const char *directory, const struct fscrypt_encryption_policy *fep);
-void fscrypt_policy_fill_default_struct(struct fscrypt_encryption_policy *fep);
+
+#ifdef USE_FSCRYPT_POLICY_V1
+bool fscrypt_policy_get_struct(const char *directory, struct fscrypt_policy_v1 *fep);
+#else
+bool fscrypt_policy_get_struct(const char *directory, struct fscrypt_policy_v2 *fep);
+#endif
+
+#ifdef USE_FSCRYPT_POLICY_V1
+bool fscrypt_policy_set_struct(const char *directory, const struct fscrypt_policy_v1 *fep);
+#else
+bool fscrypt_policy_set_struct(const char *directory, const struct fscrypt_policy_v2 *fep);
+#endif
+
+void bytes_to_hex(const uint8_t *bytes, size_t num_bytes, char *hex);
__END_DECLS
#endif // _FS_CRYPT_H_
diff --git a/crypto/fscrypt/fscryptpolicyget.cpp b/crypto/fscrypt/fscryptpolicyget.cpp
index fae06f8..05e9d6f 100755
--- a/crypto/fscrypt/fscryptpolicyget.cpp
+++ b/crypto/fscrypt/fscryptpolicyget.cpp
@@ -18,16 +18,21 @@
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include "fscrypt_policy.h"
+#include "fscrypt/fscrypt.h"
int main(int argc, char *argv[]) {
if (argc != 2) {
printf("Must specify a path\n");
return -1;
} else {
- fscrypt_encryption_policy fep;
+#ifdef USE_FSCRYPT_POLICY_V1
+ fscrypt_policy_v1 fep;
+#else
+ fscrypt_policy_v2 fep;
+#endif
if (fscrypt_policy_get_struct(argv[1], &fep)) {
- char policy_hex[FS_KEY_DESCRIPTOR_SIZE_HEX];
- policy_to_hex(fep.master_key_descriptor, policy_hex);
+ char policy_hex[FSCRYPT_KEY_IDENTIFIER_HEX_SIZE];
+ bytes_to_hex(fep.master_key_identifier, FSCRYPT_KEY_IDENTIFIER_SIZE, policy_hex);
printf("%s\n", policy_hex);
} else {
printf("No policy set\n");
diff --git a/etc/init.rc b/etc/init.rc
index 54b8a8e..362687f 100644
--- a/etc/init.rc
+++ b/etc/init.rc
@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@
on init
export PATH /sbin:/system/bin
- export LD_LIBRARY_PATH /system/lib64
+ export LD_LIBRARY_PATH /system/lib64:/vendor/lib64/hw
export ANDROID_ROOT /system
export ANDROID_DATA /data
diff --git a/libaosprecovery_defaults.go b/libaosprecovery_defaults.go
index 765814e..442f1e4 100644
--- a/libaosprecovery_defaults.go
+++ b/libaosprecovery_defaults.go
@@ -1,68 +1,74 @@
-package twrp
-
-import (
- "android/soong/android"
- "android/soong/cc"
-)
-
-func globalFlags(ctx android.BaseContext) []string {
- var cflags []string
-
- if getMakeVars(ctx, "AB_OTA_UPDATER") == "true" {
- cflags = append(cflags, "-DAB_OTA_UPDATER=1")
- }
- return cflags
-}
-
-func globalSrcs(ctx android.BaseContext) []string {
- var srcs []string
-
- if getMakeVars(ctx, "TWRP_CUSTOM_KEYBOARD") != "" {
- srcs = append(srcs, getMakeVars(ctx, "TWRP_CUSTOM_KEYBOARD"))
- }
-
- return srcs
-}
-
-func globalIncludes(ctx android.BaseContext) []string {
- var includes []string
-
- if getMakeVars(ctx, "TW_INCLUDE_CRYPTO") != "" {
- includes = append(includes, "bootable/recovery/crypto/fscrypt")
- }
-
- return includes
-}
-
-func libAospRecoveryDefaults(ctx android.LoadHookContext) {
- type props struct {
- Target struct {
- Android struct {
- Cflags []string
- Enabled *bool
- }
- }
- Cflags []string
- Srcs []string
- Include_dirs []string
- }
-
- p := &props{}
- p.Cflags = globalFlags(ctx)
- s := globalSrcs(ctx)
- p.Srcs = s
- i := globalIncludes(ctx)
- p.Include_dirs = i
- ctx.AppendProperties(p)
-}
-
-func init() {
- android.RegisterModuleType("libaosprecovery_defaults", libAospRecoveryDefaultsFactory)
-}
-
-func libAospRecoveryDefaultsFactory() android.Module {
- module := cc.DefaultsFactory()
- android.AddLoadHook(module, libAospRecoveryDefaults)
-
- return module
-}
+package twrp
+
+import (
+ "android/soong/android"
+ "android/soong/cc"
+)
+
+func globalFlags(ctx android.BaseContext) []string {
+ var cflags []string
+
+ if getMakeVars(ctx, "AB_OTA_UPDATER") == "true" {
+ cflags = append(cflags, "-DAB_OTA_UPDATER=1")
+ }
+
+ if getMakeVars(ctx, "TW_USE_FSCRYPT_POLICY") == "1" {
+ cflags = append(cflags, "-DUSE_FSCRYPT_POLICY_V1")
+ } else {
+ cflags = append(cflags, "-DUSE_FSCRYPT_POLICY_V2")
+ }
+ return cflags
+}
+
+func globalSrcs(ctx android.BaseContext) []string {
+ var srcs []string
+
+ if getMakeVars(ctx, "TWRP_CUSTOM_KEYBOARD") != "" {
+ srcs = append(srcs, getMakeVars(ctx, "TWRP_CUSTOM_KEYBOARD"))
+ }
+
+ return srcs
+}
+
+func globalIncludes(ctx android.BaseContext) []string {
+ var includes []string
+
+ if getMakeVars(ctx, "TW_INCLUDE_CRYPTO") != "" {
+ includes = append(includes, "bootable/recovery/crypto/fscrypt")
+ }
+
+ return includes
+}
+
+func libAospRecoveryDefaults(ctx android.LoadHookContext) {
+ type props struct {
+ Target struct {
+ Android struct {
+ Cflags []string
+ Enabled *bool
+ }
+ }
+ Cflags []string
+ Srcs []string
+ Include_dirs []string
+ }
+
+ p := &props{}
+ p.Cflags = globalFlags(ctx)
+ s := globalSrcs(ctx)
+ p.Srcs = s
+ i := globalIncludes(ctx)
+ p.Include_dirs = i
+ ctx.AppendProperties(p)
+}
+
+func init() {
+ android.RegisterModuleType("libaosprecovery_defaults", libAospRecoveryDefaultsFactory)
+}
+
+func libAospRecoveryDefaultsFactory() android.Module {
+ module := cc.DefaultsFactory()
+ android.AddLoadHook(module, libAospRecoveryDefaults)
+
+ return module
+}
diff --git a/libtar/Android.mk b/libtar/Android.mk
index 9b051e6..9209da9 100755
--- a/libtar/Android.mk
+++ b/libtar/Android.mk
@@ -14,15 +14,9 @@
LOCAL_SHARED_LIBRARIES += libselinux
ifeq ($(TW_INCLUDE_CRYPTO_FBE), true)
- ifeq ($(shell test $(PLATFORM_SDK_VERSION) -ge 29; echo $$?),0)
- LOCAL_SHARED_LIBRARIES += libtwrpfscrypt
- LOCAL_CFLAGS += -DUSE_FSCRYPT
- LOCAL_C_INCLUDES += $(LOCAL_PATH)/../crypto/fscrypt
- else
- LOCAL_SHARED_LIBRARIES += libe4crypt
- LOCAL_CFLAGS += -DHAVE_EXT4_CRYPT
- LOCAL_C_INCLUDES += $(LOCAL_PATH)/../crypto/ext4crypt
- endif
+ LOCAL_SHARED_LIBRARIES += libtwrpfscrypt
+ LOCAL_CFLAGS += -DUSE_FSCRYPT
+ LOCAL_C_INCLUDES += $(LOCAL_PATH)/../crypto/fscrypt
endif
ifeq ($(TW_LIBTAR_DEBUG),true)
@@ -45,15 +39,9 @@
LOCAL_STATIC_LIBRARIES += libselinux
ifeq ($(TW_INCLUDE_CRYPTO_FBE), true)
- ifeq ($(shell test $(PLATFORM_SDK_VERSION) -ge 29; echo $$?),0)
- LOCAL_SHARED_LIBRARIES += libtwrpfscrypt
- LOCAL_CFLAGS += -DUSE_FSCRYPT
- LOCAL_C_INCLUDES += $(LOCAL_PATH)/../crypto/fscrypt
- else
- LOCAL_SHARED_LIBRARIES += libe4crypt
- LOCAL_CFLAGS += -DHAVE_EXT4_CRYPT
- LOCAL_C_INCLUDES += $(LOCAL_PATH)/../crypto/ext4crypt
- endif
+ LOCAL_SHARED_LIBRARIES += libtwrpfscrypt
+ LOCAL_CFLAGS += -DUSE_FSCRYPT
+ LOCAL_C_INCLUDES += $(LOCAL_PATH)/../crypto/fscrypt
endif
ifeq ($(TW_LIBTAR_DEBUG),true)
diff --git a/libtar/append.c b/libtar/append.c
index 3075a61..860ab46 100755
--- a/libtar/append.c
+++ b/libtar/append.c
@@ -38,16 +38,16 @@
#include <selinux/selinux.h>
-#ifdef HAVE_EXT4_CRYPT
-#include "ext4crypt_tar.h"
-#endif
-
#ifdef USE_FSCRYPT
#include "fscrypt_policy.h"
#endif
#include "android_utils.h"
+#ifdef TW_LIBTAR_DEBUG
+#define DEBUG 1
+#endif
+
struct tar_dev
{
dev_t td_dev;
@@ -84,8 +84,8 @@
char path[MAXPATHLEN];
#ifdef DEBUG
- printf("==> tar_append_file(TAR=0x%lx (\"%s\"), realname=\"%s\", "
- "savename=\"%s\")\n", t, t->pathname, realname,
+ printf("==> tar_append_file(TAR=0x%p (\"%s\"), realname=\"%s\", "
+ "savename=\"%s\")\n", (void*) t, t->pathname, realname,
(savename ? savename : "[NULL]"));
#endif
@@ -134,45 +134,6 @@
}
}
-#ifdef HAVE_EXT4_CRYPT
- if (TH_ISDIR(t) && t->options & TAR_STORE_EXT4_POL)
- {
- if (t->th_buf.eep != NULL)
- {
- free(t->th_buf.eep);
- t->th_buf.eep = NULL;
- }
-
- t->th_buf.eep = (struct ext4_encryption_policy*)malloc(sizeof(struct ext4_encryption_policy));
- if (!t->th_buf.eep) {
- printf("malloc ext4_encryption_policy\n");
- return -1;
- }
-
- if (e4crypt_policy_get_struct(realname, t->th_buf.eep))
- {
- char tar_policy[EXT4_KEY_DESCRIPTOR_SIZE];
- memset(tar_policy, 0, sizeof(tar_policy));
- char policy_hex[EXT4_KEY_DESCRIPTOR_SIZE_HEX];
- policy_to_hex(t->th_buf.eep->master_key_descriptor, policy_hex);
- if (lookup_ref_key(t->th_buf.eep->master_key_descriptor, &tar_policy[0])) {
- printf("found policy '%s' - '%s' - '%s'\n", realname, tar_policy, policy_hex);
- memcpy(t->th_buf.eep->master_key_descriptor, tar_policy, EXT4_KEY_DESCRIPTOR_SIZE);
- } else {
- printf("failed to lookup tar policy for '%s' - '%s'\n", realname, policy_hex);
- free(t->th_buf.eep);
- t->th_buf.eep = NULL;
- return -1;
- }
- }
- else
- {
- // no policy found, but this is not an error as not all dirs will have a policy
- free(t->th_buf.eep);
- t->th_buf.eep = NULL;
- }
- }
-#endif
#ifdef USE_FSCRYPT
if (TH_ISDIR(t) && t->options & TAR_STORE_FSCRYPT_POL)
{
@@ -181,21 +142,31 @@
free(t->th_buf.fep);
t->th_buf.fep = NULL;
}
-
- t->th_buf.fep = (struct fscrypt_encryption_policy*)malloc(sizeof(struct fscrypt_encryption_policy));
+#ifdef USE_FSCRYPT_POLICY_V1
+ t->th_buf.fep = (struct fscrypt_policy_v1 *)malloc(sizeof(struct fscrypt_policy_v1));
+#else
+ t->th_buf.fep = (struct fscrypt_policy_v2 *)malloc(sizeof(struct fscrypt_policy_v2));
+#endif
if (!t->th_buf.fep) {
printf("malloc fs_encryption_policy\n");
return -1;
}
if (fscrypt_policy_get_struct(realname, t->th_buf.fep)) {
- uint8_t tar_policy[FS_KEY_DESCRIPTOR_SIZE];
+ uint8_t tar_policy[FSCRYPT_KEY_IDENTIFIER_SIZE];
memset(tar_policy, 0, sizeof(tar_policy));
- char policy_hex[FS_KEY_DESCRIPTOR_SIZE_HEX];
- policy_to_hex(t->th_buf.fep->master_key_descriptor, policy_hex);
- if (lookup_ref_key(t->th_buf.fep->master_key_descriptor, &tar_policy[0])) {
- printf("found fscrypt policy '%s' - '%s' - '%s'\n", realname, tar_policy, policy_hex);
- memcpy(t->th_buf.fep->master_key_descriptor, tar_policy, FS_KEY_DESCRIPTOR_SIZE);
+ char policy_hex[FSCRYPT_KEY_IDENTIFIER_HEX_SIZE];
+ bytes_to_hex(t->th_buf.fep->master_key_identifier, FSCRYPT_KEY_IDENTIFIER_SIZE, policy_hex);
+ if (lookup_ref_key(t->th_buf.fep, &tar_policy[0])) {
+ if (strncmp((char *) tar_policy, "0CE0", 4) == 0 || strncmp((char *) tar_policy, "0DE0", 4) == 0
+ || strncmp((char *) tar_policy, "0DK", 3) == 0) {
+ memcpy(t->th_buf.fep->master_key_identifier, tar_policy, FSCRYPT_KEY_IDENTIFIER_SIZE);
+ printf("found fscrypt policy '%s' - '%s' - '%s'\n", realname, t->th_buf.fep->master_key_identifier, policy_hex);
+ } else {
+ printf("failed to match fscrypt tar policy for '%s' - '%s'\n", realname, policy_hex);
+ free(t->th_buf.fep);
+ t->th_buf.fep = NULL;
+ }
} else {
printf("failed to lookup fscrypt tar policy for '%s' - '%s'\n", realname, policy_hex);
free(t->th_buf.fep);
@@ -266,7 +237,7 @@
else
{
#ifdef DEBUG
- printf("+++ adding hash for device (0x%lx, 0x%lx)...\n",
+ printf("+++ adding hash for device (0x%x, 0x%x)...\n",
major(s.st_dev), minor(s.st_dev));
#endif
td = (tar_dev_t *)calloc(1, sizeof(tar_dev_t));
@@ -292,9 +263,9 @@
else
{
#ifdef DEBUG
- printf("+++ adding entry: device (0x%lx,0x%lx), inode %ld "
+ printf("+++ adding entry: device (0x%d,0x%x), inode %lu"
"(\"%s\")...\n", major(s.st_dev), minor(s.st_dev),
- s.st_ino, realname);
+ (unsigned long) s.st_ino, realname);
#endif
ti = (tar_ino_t *)calloc(1, sizeof(tar_ino_t));
if (ti == NULL)
@@ -332,7 +303,7 @@
if (th_write(t) != 0)
{
#ifdef DEBUG
- printf("t->fd = %d\n", t->fd);
+ printf("t->fd = %ld\n", t->fd);
#endif
return -1;
}
@@ -448,7 +419,7 @@
if (th_write(t) != 0)
{
#ifdef DEBUG
- fprintf(stderr, "tar_append_file_contents(): could not write header, t->fd = %d\n", t->fd);
+ fprintf(stderr, "tar_append_file_contents(): could not write header, t->fd = %ld\n", t->fd);
#endif
return -1;
}
diff --git a/libtar/block.c b/libtar/block.c
index 6285547..db97222 100755
--- a/libtar/block.c
+++ b/libtar/block.c
@@ -22,10 +22,6 @@
#define DEBUG 1
#endif
-#ifdef HAVE_EXT4_CRYPT
-#include "ext4crypt_tar.h"
-#endif
-
#ifdef USE_FSCRYPT
#include "fscrypt_policy.h"
#endif
@@ -37,10 +33,6 @@
#define SELINUX_TAG "RHT.security.selinux="
#define SELINUX_TAG_LEN strlen(SELINUX_TAG)
-// Used to identify e4crypt_policy in extended ('x')
-#define E4CRYPT_TAG "TWRP.security.e4crypt="
-#define E4CRYPT_TAG_LEN strlen(E4CRYPT_TAG)
-
// Used to identify fscrypt_policy in extended ('x')
#define FSCRYPT_TAG "TWRP.security.fscrypt="
#define FSCRYPT_TAG_LEN strlen(FSCRYPT_TAG)
@@ -153,10 +145,6 @@
free(t->th_buf.gnu_longlink);
if (t->th_buf.selinux_context != NULL)
free(t->th_buf.selinux_context);
-#ifdef HAVE_EXT4_CRYPT
- if (t->th_buf.eep != NULL)
- free(t->th_buf.eep);
-#endif
#ifdef USE_FSCRYPT
if (t->th_buf.fep != NULL)
@@ -362,71 +350,41 @@
printf(" th_read(): android user.inode_code_cache xattr detected\n");
#endif
} // end android user.inode_code_cache xattr
-#ifdef HAVE_EXT4_CRYPT
- start = strstr(buf, E4CRYPT_TAG);
- if (start && start+E4CRYPT_TAG_LEN < buf+len)
- {
- t->th_buf.eep = (struct ext4_encryption_policy*)malloc(sizeof(struct ext4_encryption_policy));
- if (!t->th_buf.eep) {
- printf("malloc ext4_encryption_policy\n");
- return -1;
- }
- start += E4CRYPT_TAG_LEN;
- if (*start == '2')
- {
- start++;
- char *newline_check = start + sizeof(struct ext4_encryption_policy);
- if (*newline_check != '\n')
- printf("did not find newline char in expected location, continuing anyway...\n");
- memcpy(t->th_buf.eep, start, sizeof(struct ext4_encryption_policy));
-#ifdef DEBUG
- printf(" th_read(): E4Crypt policy v2 detected: %i %i %i %i %s\n",
- (int)t->th_buf.eep->version,
- (int)t->th_buf.eep->contents_encryption_mode,
- (int)t->th_buf.eep->filenames_encryption_mode,
- (int)t->th_buf.eep->flags,
- t->th_buf.eep->master_key_descriptor);
-#endif
- }
- else
- {
- e4crypt_policy_fill_default_struct(t->th_buf.eep);
- char *end = strchr(start, '\n');
- if(!end)
- end = strchr(start, '\0');
- if(end)
- {
- strncpy(t->th_buf.eep->master_key_descriptor, start, end-start);
-#ifdef DEBUG
- printf(" th_read(): E4Crypt policy v1 detected: %s\n", t->th_buf.eep->master_key_descriptor);
-#endif
- }
- }
- }
-#endif // HAVE_EXT4_CRYPT
#ifdef USE_FSCRYPT
start = strstr(buf, FSCRYPT_TAG);
if (start && start+FSCRYPT_TAG_LEN < buf+len) {
- t->th_buf.fep = (struct fscrypt_encryption_policy*)malloc(sizeof(struct fscrypt_encryption_policy));
+#ifdef USE_FSCRYPT_POLICY_V1
+ t->th_buf.fep = (struct fscrypt_policy_v1*)malloc(sizeof(struct fscrypt_policy_v1));
+#else
+ t->th_buf.fep = (struct fscrypt_policy_v2*)malloc(sizeof(struct fscrypt_policy_v2));
+#endif
if (!t->th_buf.fep) {
- printf("malloc fscrypt_encryption_policy\n");
+ printf("malloc failed for fscrypt policy\n");
return -1;
}
start += FSCRYPT_TAG_LEN;
if (*start == '0') {
start++;
- char *newline_check = start + sizeof(struct fscrypt_encryption_policy);
+#ifdef USE_FSCRYPT_POLICY_V1
+ char *newline_check = start + sizeof(struct fscrypt_policy_v1);
+#else
+ char *newline_check = start + sizeof(struct fscrypt_policy_v2);
+#endif
if (*newline_check != '\n')
printf("did not find newline char in expected location, continuing anyway...\n");
- memcpy(t->th_buf.fep, start, sizeof(struct fscrypt_encryption_policy));
+#ifdef USE_FSCRYPT_POLICY_V1
+ memcpy(t->th_buf.fep, start, sizeof(struct fscrypt_policy_v1));
+#else
+ memcpy(t->th_buf.fep, start, sizeof(struct fscrypt_policy_v2));
+#endif
#ifdef DEBUG
- printf(" th_read(): FSCrypt policy v1 detected: %i %i %i %i %s\n",
+ printf(" th_read(): FSCrypt policy detected: %i %i %i %i %s\n",
(int)t->th_buf.fep->version,
(int)t->th_buf.fep->contents_encryption_mode,
(int)t->th_buf.fep->filenames_encryption_mode,
(int)t->th_buf.fep->flags,
- t->th_buf.fep->master_key_descriptor);
+ t->th_buf.fep->master_key_identifier);
#endif
}
else {
@@ -632,48 +590,20 @@
ptr += sz;
}
-#ifdef HAVE_EXT4_CRYPT
- if((t->options & TAR_STORE_EXT4_POL) && t->th_buf.eep != NULL)
- {
-#ifdef DEBUG
- printf("th_write(): using e4crypt_policy %s\n",
- t->th_buf.eep->master_key_descriptor);
-#endif
- /* setup size - EXT header has format "*size of this whole tag as ascii numbers* *space* *version code* *content* *newline* */
- // size newline
- sz = E4CRYPT_TAG_LEN + sizeof(struct ext4_encryption_policy) + 1 + 3 + 1;
-
- if(sz >= 100) // another ascci digit for size
- ++sz;
-
- if (total_sz + sz >= T_BLOCKSIZE)
- {
- if (th_write_extended(t, &buf[0], total_sz))
- return -1;
- ptr = buf;
- total_sz = sz;
- }
- else
- total_sz += sz;
-
- snprintf(ptr, T_BLOCKSIZE, "%d "E4CRYPT_TAG"2", (int)sz);
- memcpy(ptr + sz - sizeof(struct ext4_encryption_policy) - 1, t->th_buf.eep, sizeof(struct ext4_encryption_policy));
- char *nlptr = ptr + sz - 1;
- *nlptr = '\n';
- ptr += sz;
- }
-#endif
-
#ifdef USE_FSCRYPT
if((t->options & TAR_STORE_FSCRYPT_POL) && t->th_buf.fep != NULL)
{
#ifdef DEBUG
printf("th_write(): using fscrypt_policy %s\n",
- t->th_buf.fep->master_key_descriptor);
+ t->th_buf.fep->master_key_identifier);
#endif
/* setup size - EXT header has format "*size of this whole tag as ascii numbers* *space* *version code* *content* *newline* */
// size newline
- sz = FSCRYPT_TAG_LEN + sizeof(struct fscrypt_encryption_policy) + 1 + 3 + 1;
+#ifdef USE_FSCRYPT_POLICY_V1
+ sz = FSCRYPT_TAG_LEN + sizeof(struct fscrypt_policy_v1) + 1 + 3 + 1;
+#else
+ sz = FSCRYPT_TAG_LEN + sizeof(struct fscrypt_policy_v2) + 1 + 3 + 1;
+#endif
if(sz >= 100) // another ascci digit for size
++sz;
@@ -689,7 +619,11 @@
total_sz += sz;
snprintf(ptr, T_BLOCKSIZE, "%d "FSCRYPT_TAG"0", (int)sz);
- memcpy(ptr + sz - sizeof(struct fscrypt_encryption_policy) - 1, t->th_buf.fep, sizeof(struct fscrypt_encryption_policy));
+#ifdef USE_FSCRYPT_POLICY_V1
+ memcpy(ptr + sz - sizeof(struct fscrypt_policy_v1) - 1, t->th_buf.fep, sizeof(struct fscrypt_policy_v1));
+#else
+ memcpy(ptr + sz - sizeof(struct fscrypt_policy_v2) - 1, t->th_buf.fep, sizeof(struct fscrypt_policy_v2));
+#endif
char *nlptr = ptr + sz - 1;
*nlptr = '\n';
ptr += sz;
diff --git a/libtar/extract.c b/libtar/extract.c
index fd5e3c9..064ba9b 100755
--- a/libtar/extract.c
+++ b/libtar/extract.c
@@ -35,14 +35,14 @@
#include <selinux/selinux.h>
-#ifdef HAVE_EXT4_CRYPT
-#include "ext4crypt_tar.h"
-#endif
-
#ifdef USE_FSCRYPT
#include "fscrypt_policy.h"
#endif
+#ifdef TW_LIBTAR_DEBUG
+#define DEBUG 1
+#endif
+
#include "android_utils.h"
const unsigned long long progress_size = (unsigned long long)(T_BLOCKSIZE);
@@ -554,44 +554,24 @@
}
}
-#ifdef HAVE_EXT4_CRYPT
- if(t->th_buf.eep != NULL)
- {
-#ifdef DEBUG
- printf("tar_extract_file(): restoring EXT4 crypt policy %s to dir %s\n", t->th_buf.eep->master_key_descriptor, realname);
-#endif
- char binary_policy[EXT4_KEY_DESCRIPTOR_SIZE];
- if (!lookup_ref_tar(t->th_buf.eep->master_key_descriptor, &binary_policy[0])) {
- printf("error looking up proper e4crypt policy for '%s' - %s\n", realname, t->th_buf.eep->master_key_descriptor);
- return -1;
- }
- char policy_hex[EXT4_KEY_DESCRIPTOR_SIZE_HEX];
- policy_to_hex(binary_policy, policy_hex);
- printf("restoring policy %s > '%s' to '%s'\n", t->th_buf.eep->master_key_descriptor, policy_hex, realname);
- memcpy(&t->th_buf.eep->master_key_descriptor, binary_policy, EXT4_KEY_DESCRIPTOR_SIZE);
- if (!e4crypt_policy_set_struct(realname, t->th_buf.eep))
- {
- printf("tar_extract_file(): failed to restore EXT4 crypt policy to dir '%s' '%s'!!!\n", realname, policy_hex);
- //return -1; // This may not be an error in some cases, so log and ignore
- }
- }
-#endif
-
#ifdef USE_FSCRYPT
if(t->th_buf.fep != NULL)
{
+ char policy_hex[FSCRYPT_KEY_IDENTIFIER_HEX_SIZE];
#ifdef DEBUG
- printf("tar_extract_file(): restoring fscrypt policy %s to dir %s\n", t->th_buf.fep->master_key_descriptor, realname);
+ bytes_to_hex(t->th_buf.fep->master_key_identifier, FSCRYPT_KEY_IDENTIFIER_SIZE, policy_hex);
+ printf("tar_extract_dir(): restoring fscrypt policy %s to dir %s\n", (char *)policy_hex, realname);
#endif
- uint8_t binary_policy[FS_KEY_DESCRIPTOR_SIZE];
- if (!lookup_ref_tar(t->th_buf.fep->master_key_descriptor, &binary_policy[0])) {
- printf("error looking up proper fscrypt policy for '%s' - %s\n", realname, t->th_buf.fep->master_key_descriptor);
+ uint8_t binary_policy[FSCRYPT_KEY_IDENTIFIER_SIZE];
+ memset(&binary_policy, 0, FSCRYPT_KEY_IDENTIFIER_SIZE);
+
+ if (!lookup_ref_tar(t->th_buf.fep->master_key_identifier, &binary_policy[0])) {
+ printf("error looking up fscrypt policy for '%s' - %s\n", realname, t->th_buf.fep->master_key_identifier);
return -1;
}
- char policy_hex[FS_KEY_DESCRIPTOR_SIZE_HEX];
- policy_to_hex(binary_policy, policy_hex);
- printf("restoring policy %s > '%s' to '%s'\n", t->th_buf.fep->master_key_descriptor, policy_hex, realname);
- memcpy(&t->th_buf.fep->master_key_descriptor, binary_policy, FS_KEY_DESCRIPTOR_SIZE);
+ memcpy(&t->th_buf.fep->master_key_identifier, binary_policy, FSCRYPT_KEY_IDENTIFIER_SIZE);
+ bytes_to_hex(t->th_buf.fep->master_key_identifier, FSCRYPT_KEY_IDENTIFIER_SIZE, policy_hex);
+ printf("attempting to restore policy: %s\n", policy_hex);
if (!fscrypt_policy_set_struct(realname, t->th_buf.fep))
{
printf("tar_extract_file(): failed to restore fscrypt policy to dir '%s' '%s'!!!\n", realname, policy_hex);
diff --git a/libtar/libtar.h b/libtar/libtar.h
index 19ddd06..04782b2 100755
--- a/libtar/libtar.h
+++ b/libtar/libtar.h
@@ -20,10 +20,6 @@
#include "libtar_listhash.h"
-#ifdef HAVE_EXT4_CRYPT
-# include "ext4crypt_tar.h"
-#endif
-
#ifdef USE_FSCRYPT
#include "fscrypt_policy.h"
#endif
@@ -72,11 +68,12 @@
char *gnu_longname;
char *gnu_longlink;
char *selinux_context;
-#ifdef HAVE_EXT4_CRYPT
- struct ext4_encryption_policy *eep;
-#endif
#ifdef USE_FSCRYPT
- struct fscrypt_encryption_policy *fep;
+#ifdef USE_FSCRYPT_POLICY_V1
+ struct fscrypt_policy_v1 *fep;
+#else
+ struct fscrypt_policy_v2 *fep;
+#endif
#endif
int has_cap_data;
struct vfs_cap_data cap_data;
@@ -127,12 +124,11 @@
#define TAR_IGNORE_CRC 64 /* ignore CRC in file header */
#define TAR_STORE_SELINUX 128 /* store selinux context */
#define TAR_USE_NUMERIC_ID 256 /* favor numeric owner over names */
-#ifdef HAVE_EXT4_CRYPT
-#define TAR_STORE_EXT4_POL 512 /* store ext4 crypto policy */
-#endif
+
#ifdef USE_FSCRYPT
#define TAR_STORE_FSCRYPT_POL 512 /* store fscrypt crypto policy */
#endif
+
#define TAR_STORE_POSIX_CAP 1024 /* store posix file capabilities */
#define TAR_STORE_ANDROID_USER_XATTR 2048 /* store android user.* xattr */
diff --git a/libtar/output.c b/libtar/output.c
index 68c3e5f..5e724e5 100755
--- a/libtar/output.c
+++ b/libtar/output.c
@@ -24,10 +24,6 @@
# include <string.h>
#endif
-#ifdef HAVE_EXT4_CRYPT
-#include "ext4crypt_tar.h"
-#endif
-
#ifdef USE_FSCRYPT
#include "fscrypt_policy.h"
#endif
@@ -64,13 +60,10 @@
(t->th_buf.gnu_longname ? t->th_buf.gnu_longname : "[NULL]"));
printf(" gnu_longlink = \"%s\"\n",
(t->th_buf.gnu_longlink ? t->th_buf.gnu_longlink : "[NULL]"));
-#ifdef HAVE_EXT4_CRYPT
- printf(" eep = \"%s\"\n",
- (t->th_buf.eep ? t->th_buf.eep->master_key_descriptor : "[NULL]"));
-#endif
+
#ifdef USE_FSCRYPT
printf(" fep = \"%s\"\n",
- (t->th_buf.fep ? t->th_buf.fep->master_key_descriptor : (uint8_t*) "[NULL]"));
+ (t->th_buf.fep ? t->th_buf.fep->master_key_identifier : (uint8_t*) "[NULL]"));
#endif
}
diff --git a/partition.cpp b/partition.cpp
index f21b6a3..cf5c881 100755
--- a/partition.cpp
+++ b/partition.cpp
@@ -48,9 +48,7 @@
#include "adbbu/libtwadbbu.hpp"
#ifdef TW_INCLUDE_CRYPTO
#include "crypto/fde/cryptfs.h"
- #ifdef TW_INCLUDE_FBE
- #include "crypto/ext4crypt/Decrypt.h"
- #endif
+ #include "Decrypt.h"
#else
#define CRYPT_FOOTER_OFFSET 0x4000
#endif
@@ -763,11 +761,13 @@
ExcludeAll(Mount_Point + "/misc/gatekeeper");
ExcludeAll(Mount_Point + "/misc/keystore");
ExcludeAll(Mount_Point + "/drm/kek.dat");
- ExcludeAll(Mount_Point + "/system_de/0/spblob"); // contains data needed to decrypt pixel 2
- ExcludeAll(Mount_Point + "/system/users/0/gatekeeper.password.key");
- ExcludeAll(Mount_Point + "/system/users/0/gatekeeper.pattern.key");
+ ExcludeAll(Mount_Point + "/system_de/0/spblob"); // contains data needed to decrypt synthetic password
+ // ExcludeAll(Mount_Point + "/system/users/0/gatekeeper.password.key");
+ // ExcludeAll(Mount_Point + "/system/users/0/gatekeeper.pattern.key");
ExcludeAll(Mount_Point + "/cache");
+ ExcludeAll(Mount_Point + "/system/users/0");
ExcludeAll(Mount_Point + "/per_boot"); // removed each boot by init
+
int retry_count = 3;
while (!Decrypt_DE() && --retry_count)
usleep(2000);
@@ -1018,6 +1018,7 @@
break;
case TWFLAG_KEYDIRECTORY:
Key_Directory = str;
+ LOGINFO("setting Key_Directory to: %s\n", Key_Directory.c_str());
break;
case TWFLAG_DM_USE_ORIGINAL_PATH:
Use_Original_Path = true;
diff --git a/partitionmanager.cpp b/partitionmanager.cpp
index a4652c6..284fe2b 100755
--- a/partitionmanager.cpp
+++ b/partitionmanager.cpp
@@ -92,12 +92,10 @@
#include "gui/rapidxml.hpp"
#include "gui/pages.hpp"
#ifdef TW_INCLUDE_FBE
-#include "crypto/ext4crypt/Decrypt.h"
+#include "Decrypt.h"
#ifdef TW_INCLUDE_FBE_METADATA_DECRYPT
#ifdef USE_FSCRYPT
- #include "crypto/fscrypt/MetadataCrypt.h"
- #else
- #include "crypto/ext4crypt/MetadataCrypt.h"
+ #include "MetadataCrypt.h"
#endif
#endif
#endif
@@ -404,13 +402,9 @@
#ifdef TW_INCLUDE_FBE_METADATA_DECRYPT
#ifdef USE_FSCRYPT
if (fscrypt_mount_metadata_encrypted(Decrypt_Data->Actual_Block_Device, Decrypt_Data->Mount_Point, false)) {
- std::string crypto_blkdev =android::base::GetProperty("ro.crypto.fs_crypto_blkdev", "error");
+ std::string crypto_blkdev = android::base::GetProperty("ro.crypto.fs_crypto_blkdev", "error");
Decrypt_Data->Decrypted_Block_Device = crypto_blkdev;
LOGINFO("Successfully decrypted metadata encrypted data partition with new block device: '%s'\n", crypto_blkdev.c_str());
-#else
- if (e4crypt_mount_metadata_encrypted(Decrypt_Data->Mount_Point, false, Decrypt_Data->Key_Directory, Decrypt_Data->Actual_Block_Device, &Decrypt_Data->Decrypted_Block_Device)) {
- LOGINFO("Successfully decrypted metadata encrypted data partition with new block device: '%s'\n",
- Decrypt_Data->Decrypted_Block_Device.c_str());
#endif
Decrypt_Data->Is_Decrypted = true; // Needed to make the mount function work correctly
int retry_count = 10;
@@ -1768,12 +1762,10 @@
dat->Symlink_Path = dat->Storage_Path;
DataManager::SetValue("tw_storage_path", "/data/media/0");
DataManager::SetValue("tw_settings_path", "/data/media/0");
- dat->UnMount(false);
}
DataManager::LoadTWRPFolderInfo();
Update_System_Details();
Output_Partition(dat);
- UnMount_Main_Partitions();
} else
LOGERR("Unable to locate data partition.\n");
}
@@ -1794,8 +1786,9 @@
// Attempt to get name of user. Fallback to user ID if this fails.
char* userFile = PageManager::LoadFileToBuffer("/data/system/users/" + to_string(userId) + ".xml", NULL);
- if (userFile == NULL)
+ if (userFile == NULL) {
user.userName = to_string(userId);
+ }
else {
xml_document<> *userXml = new xml_document<>();
userXml->parse<0>(userFile);
diff --git a/partitions.hpp b/partitions.hpp
index ef70f37..a3c4528 100755
--- a/partitions.hpp
+++ b/partitions.hpp
@@ -26,7 +26,9 @@
#include "exclude.hpp"
#include "tw_atomic.hpp"
#include "progresstracking.hpp"
-#include "crypto/fscrypt/fscrypt_policy.h"
+#ifdef TW_INCLUDE_CRYPTO
+#include "fscrypt_policy.h"
+#endif
#include "twrpApex.hpp"
#define MAX_FSTAB_LINE_LENGTH 2048
diff --git a/prebuilt/Android.mk b/prebuilt/Android.mk
index 8371907..eef2ebf 100755
--- a/prebuilt/Android.mk
+++ b/prebuilt/Android.mk
@@ -50,7 +50,7 @@
RECOVERY_LIBRARY_SOURCE_FILES += $(TARGET_RECOVERY_ROOT_OUT)/system/lib64/libdl.so
RECOVERY_LIBRARY_SOURCE_FILES += $(TARGET_RECOVERY_ROOT_OUT)/system/lib64/libm.so
RECOVERY_LIBRARY_SOURCE_FILES += $(TARGET_RECOVERY_ROOT_OUT)/system/lib64/libfs_mgr.so
-RECOVERY_LIBRARY_SOURCE_FILES += $(TARGET_RECOVERY_ROOT_OUT)/system/lib64/libfscrypt.so
+RECOVERY_LIBRARY_SOURCE_FILES += $(TARGET_OUT_SHARED_LIBRARIES)/libfscrypt.so
RECOVERY_LIBRARY_SOURCE_FILES += $(TARGET_RECOVERY_ROOT_OUT)/system/lib64/libgsi.so
RECOVERY_LIBRARY_SOURCE_FILES += $(TARGET_RECOVERY_ROOT_OUT)/system/lib64/libkeyutils.so
RECOVERY_LIBRARY_SOURCE_FILES += $(TARGET_RECOVERY_ROOT_OUT)/system/lib64/liblogwrap.so
@@ -189,6 +189,9 @@
RECOVERY_LIBRARY_SOURCE_FILES += $(TARGET_OUT_SHARED_LIBRARIES)/android.hardware.vibrator@1.0.so
RECOVERY_LIBRARY_SOURCE_FILES += $(TARGET_OUT_SHARED_LIBRARIES)/android.hardware.vibrator@1.1.so
RECOVERY_LIBRARY_SOURCE_FILES += $(TARGET_OUT_SHARED_LIBRARIES)/android.hardware.vibrator@1.2.so
+ RECOVERY_LIBRARY_SOURCE_FILES += $(TARGET_OUT_SHARED_LIBRARIES)/libstatslog.so
+ RECOVERY_LIBRARY_SOURCE_FILES += $(TARGET_OUT_SHARED_LIBRARIES)/libsoft_attestation_cert.so
+ RECOVERY_LIBRARY_SOURCE_FILES += $(TARGET_OUT_SHARED_LIBRARIES)/libxml2.so
ifneq ($(wildcard system/keymaster/keymaster_stl.cpp),)
RECOVERY_LIBRARY_SOURCE_FILES += $(TARGET_OUT_SHARED_LIBRARIES)/libkeymaster_portable.so
@@ -206,13 +209,17 @@
endif
RECOVERY_LIBRARY_SOURCE_FILES += $(TARGET_OUT_SHARED_LIBRARIES)/libsoftkeymaster.so
RECOVERY_LIBRARY_SOURCE_FILES += $(TARGET_OUT_SHARED_LIBRARIES)/android.hardware.keymaster@4.0.so
+ RECOVERY_LIBRARY_SOURCE_FILES += $(TARGET_OUT_SHARED_LIBRARIES)/android.hardware.keymaster@4.1.so
RECOVERY_LIBRARY_SOURCE_FILES += $(TARGET_OUT_SHARED_LIBRARIES)/libkeymaster4support.so
+ RECOVERY_LIBRARY_SOURCE_FILES += $(TARGET_OUT_SHARED_LIBRARIES)/libkeymaster4_1support.so
RECOVERY_LIBRARY_SOURCE_FILES += $(TARGET_OUT_SHARED_LIBRARIES)/libkeystore_aidl.so
RECOVERY_LIBRARY_SOURCE_FILES += $(TARGET_OUT_SHARED_LIBRARIES)/libkeystore_parcelables.so
RECOVERY_LIBRARY_SOURCE_FILES += $(TARGET_OUT_SHARED_LIBRARIES)/libutilscallstack.so
RECOVERY_LIBRARY_SOURCE_FILES += $(TARGET_OUT_SHARED_LIBRARIES)/libdexfile.so
RECOVERY_LIBRARY_SOURCE_FILES += $(TARGET_OUT_SHARED_LIBRARIES)/libservices.so
RECOVERY_LIBRARY_SOURCE_FILES += $(TARGET_OUT_SHARED_LIBRARIES)/libkeymaster_portable.so
+ RECOVERY_LIBRARY_SOURCE_FILES += $(TARGET_OUT_SHARED_LIBRARIES)/libhwbinder.so
+ RECOVERY_LIBRARY_SOURCE_FILES += $(TARGET_OUT_SHARED_LIBRARIES)/libkeystore-attestation-application-id.so
# lshal can be useful for seeing if you have things like the keymaster working properly, but it isn't needed for TWRP to work
#RECOVERY_BINARY_SOURCE_FILES += $(TARGET_OUT_EXECUTABLES)/lshal
#RECOVERY_LIBRARY_SOURCE_FILES += $(TARGET_OUT_SHARED_LIBRARIES)/liblshal.so
@@ -295,9 +302,6 @@
ifneq ($(wildcard system/core/libkeyutils/Android.bp),)
RECOVERY_LIBRARY_SOURCE_FILES += $(TARGET_OUT_SHARED_LIBRARIES)/libkeyutils.so
endif
-ifeq ($(wildcard system/libhidl/transport/HidlTransportUtils.cpp),)
- RECOVERY_LIBRARY_SOURCE_FILES += $(TARGET_OUT_SHARED_LIBRARIES)/android.hidl.base@1.0.so
-endif
ifeq ($(TARGET_ARCH), arm64)
RECOVERY_LIBRARY_SOURCE_FILES += $(TARGET_OUT_SHARED_LIBRARIES)/libclang_rt.ubsan_standalone-aarch64-android.so
endif
diff --git a/twrp-functions.cpp b/twrp-functions.cpp
index ff04e92..50511ce 100755
--- a/twrp-functions.cpp
+++ b/twrp-functions.cpp
@@ -1333,7 +1333,12 @@
}
}
-bool TWFunc::Get_Encryption_Policy(fscrypt_encryption_policy &policy, std::string path) {
+#ifdef TW_INCLUDE_CRYPTO
+#ifdef USE_FSCRYPT_POLICY_V1
+bool TWFunc::Get_Encryption_Policy(struct fscrypt_policy_v1 &policy, std::string path) {
+#else
+bool TWFunc::Get_Encryption_Policy(struct fscrypt_policy_v2 &policy, std::string path) {
+#endif
if (!TWFunc::Path_Exists(path)) {
LOGERR("Unable to find %s to get policy\n", path.c_str());
return false;
@@ -1345,20 +1350,25 @@
return true;
}
-bool TWFunc::Set_Encryption_Policy(std::string path, const fscrypt_encryption_policy &policy) {
+#ifdef USE_FSCRYPT_POLICY_V1
+bool TWFunc::Set_Encryption_Policy(std::string path, struct fscrypt_policy_v1 &policy) {
+#else
+bool TWFunc::Set_Encryption_Policy(std::string path, struct fscrypt_policy_v2 &policy) {
+#endif
if (!TWFunc::Path_Exists(path)) {
LOGERR("unable to find %s to set policy\n", path.c_str());
return false;
}
uint8_t binary_policy[FS_KEY_DESCRIPTOR_SIZE];
- char policy_hex[FS_KEY_DESCRIPTOR_SIZE_HEX];
- policy_to_hex(binary_policy, policy_hex);
+ char policy_hex[FSCRYPT_KEY_IDENTIFIER_HEX_SIZE];
+ bytes_to_hex(binary_policy, FS_KEY_DESCRIPTOR_SIZE, policy_hex);
if (!fscrypt_policy_set_struct(path.c_str(), &policy)) {
LOGERR("unable to set policy for path: %s\n", path.c_str());
return false;
}
return true;
}
+#endif
string TWFunc::Check_For_TwrpFolder() {
string oldFolder = "";
diff --git a/twrp-functions.hpp b/twrp-functions.hpp
index 1b9c694..8979a66 100755
--- a/twrp-functions.hpp
+++ b/twrp-functions.hpp
@@ -115,8 +115,15 @@
static bool Is_TWRP_App_In_System(); // Check if the TWRP app is installed in the system partition
static void checkforapp();
static int Property_Override(string Prop_Name, string Prop_Value); // Override properties (including ro. properties)
- static bool Get_Encryption_Policy(fscrypt_encryption_policy &policy, std::string path); // return encryption policy for path
- static bool Set_Encryption_Policy(std::string path, const fscrypt_encryption_policy &policy); // set encryption policy for path
+#ifdef TW_INCLUDE_CRYPTO
+#ifdef USE_FSCRYPT_POLICY_V1
+ static bool Get_Encryption_Policy(struct fscrypt_policy_v1 &policy, std::string path); // return encryption policy for path
+ static bool Set_Encryption_Policy(std::string path, struct fscrypt_policy_v1 &policy); // set encryption policy for path
+#else
+ static bool Get_Encryption_Policy(struct fscrypt_policy_v2 &policy, std::string path); // return encryption policy for path
+ static bool Set_Encryption_Policy(std::string path, struct fscrypt_policy_v2 &policy); // set encryption policy for path
+#endif
+#endif
static void List_Mounts();
static void Clear_Bootloader_Message();
static string Check_For_TwrpFolder();
diff --git a/twrpTar.cpp b/twrpTar.cpp
index 6c9e758..71a5b15 100755
--- a/twrpTar.cpp
+++ b/twrpTar.cpp
@@ -57,18 +57,12 @@
#ifdef TW_INCLUDE_FBE
#ifdef USE_FSCRYPT
#include "fscrypt_policy.h"
-#else
-#include "crypto/ext4crypt/ext4crypt_tar.h"
#endif
#endif
-#ifdef TW_INCLUDE_FBE
#ifdef USE_FSCRYPT
#define TWTAR_FLAGS TAR_GNU | TAR_STORE_SELINUX | TAR_STORE_POSIX_CAP | TAR_STORE_ANDROID_USER_XATTR | TAR_STORE_FSCRYPT_POL
#else
-#define TWTAR_FLAGS TAR_GNU | TAR_STORE_SELINUX | TAR_STORE_POSIX_CAP | TAR_STORE_ANDROID_USER_XATTR | TAR_STORE_EXT4_POL
-#endif
-#else
#define TWTAR_FLAGS TAR_GNU | TAR_STORE_SELINUX | TAR_STORE_POSIX_CAP | TAR_STORE_ANDROID_USER_XATTR
#endif
@@ -90,12 +84,9 @@
input_fd = -1;
output_fd = -1;
backup_exclusions = NULL;
-#ifdef TW_INCLUDE_FBE
+
#ifdef USE_FSCRYPT
fscrypt_set_mode();
-#else
- e4crypt_set_mode();
-#endif
#endif
}
diff --git a/twrpinstall/Android.bp b/twrpinstall/Android.bp
index 656a4a7..81fe3fb 100755
--- a/twrpinstall/Android.bp
+++ b/twrpinstall/Android.bp
@@ -64,7 +64,8 @@
include_dirs: [
"bootable/recovery",
"bootable/recovery/install/include",
- "bootable/recovery/recovery_utils/include"
+ "bootable/recovery/recovery_utils/include",
+ "bootable/recovery/crypto/fscrypt"
],
srcs: [