diff --git a/crypto/fde/Android.mk b/crypto/fde/Android.mk
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..aafd7a0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/fde/Android.mk
@@ -0,0 +1,112 @@
+LOCAL_PATH := $(call my-dir)
+ifeq ($(TW_INCLUDE_CRYPTO), true)
+include $(CLEAR_VARS)
+
+LOCAL_MODULE := libcryptfsfde
+LOCAL_MODULE_TAGS := eng optional
+LOCAL_SRC_FILES := cryptfs.cpp
+LOCAL_SHARED_LIBRARIES := libcrypto libhardware libcutils libstdc++
+LOCAL_STATIC_LIBRARIES := libscrypttwrp_static
+LOCAL_C_INCLUDES := external/openssl/include $(commands_recovery_local_path)/crypto/scrypt/lib/crypto
+ifeq ($(shell test $(PLATFORM_SDK_VERSION) -lt 23; echo $$?),0)
+    LOCAL_C_INCLUDES += bionic external/stlport/stlport
+    LOCAL_SHARED_LIBRARIES += libstlport
+    LOCAL_CPPFLAGS := -std=c++11
+endif
+
+ifeq ($(shell test $(PLATFORM_SDK_VERSION) -ge 26; echo $$?),0)
+    #8.0 or higher
+    LOCAL_C_INCLUDES +=  external/boringssl/src/include
+    LOCAL_SHARED_LIBRARIES += libselinux libc libc++ libbase libcrypto libcutils libkeymaster_messages libhardware libprotobuf-cpp-lite libe4crypt android.hardware.keymaster@3.0 libkeystore_binder libhidlbase libutils libbinder
+    ifeq ($(shell test $(PLATFORM_SDK_VERSION) -ge 28; echo $$?),0)
+        #9.0 rules
+        LOCAL_CFLAGS += -Wno-unused-variable -Wno-sign-compare -Wno-unused-parameter -Wno-comment
+        LOCAL_SHARED_LIBRARIES += android.hardware.keymaster@4.0 libkeymaster4support libkeyutils
+        LOCAL_CFLAGS += -DTW_KEYMASTER_MAX_API=4
+    else
+        #8.x rules
+        ifneq ($(wildcard system/core/libkeyutils/Android.bp),)
+            #only present in some 8.0 trees and should be in all 8.1 trees
+            LOCAL_SHARED_LIBRARIES += libkeyutils
+        endif
+        LOCAL_SHARED_LIBRARIES += libsoftkeymaster
+        LOCAL_CFLAGS += -DTW_KEYMASTER_MAX_API=3
+    endif
+else
+    # <= 7.x rules
+    ifneq ($(wildcard hardware/libhardware/include/hardware/keymaster0.h),)
+        LOCAL_C_INCLUDES +=  external/boringssl/src/include
+        LOCAL_CFLAGS += -DTW_KEYMASTER_MAX_API=1
+    else
+        LOCAL_CFLAGS += -DTW_KEYMASTER_MAX_API=0
+    endif
+endif
+ifeq ($(TARGET_HW_DISK_ENCRYPTION),true)
+    ifeq ($(TARGET_CRYPTFS_HW_PATH),)
+        LOCAL_C_INCLUDES += device/qcom/common/cryptfs_hw
+    else
+        LOCAL_C_INCLUDES += $(TARGET_CRYPTFS_HW_PATH)
+    endif
+    LOCAL_SHARED_LIBRARIES += libcryptfs_hw
+    LOCAL_CFLAGS += -DCONFIG_HW_DISK_ENCRYPTION
+endif
+
+include $(BUILD_SHARED_LIBRARY)
+
+
+
+include $(CLEAR_VARS)
+LOCAL_MODULE := twrpdec
+LOCAL_MODULE_TAGS := optional
+LOCAL_MODULE_CLASS := RECOVERY_EXECUTABLES
+LOCAL_MODULE_PATH := $(TARGET_RECOVERY_ROOT_OUT)/sbin
+LOCAL_SRC_FILES := main.cpp cryptfs.cpp
+LOCAL_SHARED_LIBRARIES := libcrypto libhardware libcutils libc libstdc++
+LOCAL_C_INCLUDES := external/openssl/include $(commands_recovery_local_path)/crypto/scrypt/lib/crypto
+ifeq ($(shell test $(PLATFORM_SDK_VERSION) -lt 23; echo $$?),0)
+    LOCAL_C_INCLUDES += bionic external/stlport/stlport
+    LOCAL_SHARED_LIBRARIES += libstlport
+    LOCAL_CPPFLAGS := -std=c++11
+endif
+
+ifeq ($(shell test $(PLATFORM_SDK_VERSION) -ge 26; echo $$?),0)
+    #8.0 or higher
+    LOCAL_C_INCLUDES +=  external/boringssl/src/include
+    LOCAL_SHARED_LIBRARIES += libselinux libc libc++ libbase libcrypto libcutils libkeymaster_messages libhardware libprotobuf-cpp-lite libe4crypt android.hardware.keymaster@3.0 libkeystore_binder libhidlbase libutils libbinder
+    ifeq ($(shell test $(PLATFORM_SDK_VERSION) -ge 28; echo $$?),0)
+        #9.0 rules
+        LOCAL_CFLAGS += -Wno-unused-variable -Wno-sign-compare -Wno-unused-parameter -Wno-comment
+        LOCAL_SHARED_LIBRARIES += android.hardware.keymaster@4.0 libkeymaster4support libkeyutils
+        LOCAL_CFLAGS += -DTW_KEYMASTER_MAX_API=4
+    else
+        #8.x rules
+        ifneq ($(wildcard system/core/libkeyutils/Android.bp),)
+            #only present in some 8.0 trees and should be in all 8.1 trees
+            LOCAL_SHARED_LIBRARIES += libkeyutils
+        endif
+        LOCAL_SHARED_LIBRARIES += libsoftkeymaster
+        LOCAL_CFLAGS += -DTW_KEYMASTER_MAX_API=3
+    endif
+else
+    # <= 7.x rules
+    ifneq ($(wildcard hardware/libhardware/include/hardware/keymaster0.h),)
+        LOCAL_C_INCLUDES +=  external/boringssl/src/include
+        LOCAL_CFLAGS += -DTW_KEYMASTER_MAX_API=1
+    else
+        LOCAL_CFLAGS += -DTW_KEYMASTER_MAX_API=0
+    endif
+endif
+ifeq ($(TARGET_HW_DISK_ENCRYPTION),true)
+    ifeq ($(TARGET_CRYPTFS_HW_PATH),)
+        LOCAL_C_INCLUDES += device/qcom/common/cryptfs_hw
+    else
+        LOCAL_C_INCLUDES += $(TARGET_CRYPTFS_HW_PATH)
+    endif
+    LOCAL_SHARED_LIBRARIES += libcryptfs_hw
+    LOCAL_CFLAGS += -DCONFIG_HW_DISK_ENCRYPTION
+endif
+
+LOCAL_WHOLE_STATIC_LIBRARIES += libscrypttwrp_static
+include $(BUILD_EXECUTABLE)
+
+endif
diff --git a/crypto/fde/cryptfs.cpp b/crypto/fde/cryptfs.cpp
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..8352296
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/fde/cryptfs.cpp
@@ -0,0 +1,1763 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2010 The Android Open Source Project
+ *
+ * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+ * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+ * You may obtain a copy of the License at
+ *
+ *      http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+ *
+ * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+ * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+ * WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+ * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+ * limitations under the License.
+ */
+
+/* TO DO:
+ *   1.  Perhaps keep several copies of the encrypted key, in case something
+ *       goes horribly wrong?
+ *
+ */
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/wait.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+#include <ctype.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <inttypes.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <sys/ioctl.h>
+#include <linux/dm-ioctl.h>
+#include <libgen.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <sys/param.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <sys/mount.h>
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/sha.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+//#include <ext4_utils/ext4_crypt.h>
+//#include <ext4_utils/ext4_utils.h>
+#include <linux/kdev_t.h>
+//#include <fs_mgr.h>
+#include <time.h>
+#include <math.h>
+//#include <selinux/selinux.h>
+#include "cryptfs.h"
+//#include "secontext.h"
+#define LOG_TAG "Cryptfs"
+//#include "cutils/log.h"
+#include "cutils/properties.h"
+//#include "cutils/android_reboot.h"
+//#include "hardware_legacy/power.h"
+//#include <logwrap/logwrap.h>
+//#include "ScryptParameters.h"
+//#include "VolumeManager.h"
+//#include "VoldUtil.h"
+//#include "Ext4Crypt.h"
+//#include "f2fs_sparseblock.h"
+//#include "EncryptInplace.h"
+//#include "Process.h"
+#if TW_KEYMASTER_MAX_API == 3
+#include "../ext4crypt/Keymaster3.h"
+#endif
+#if TW_KEYMASTER_MAX_API == 4
+#include "../ext4crypt/Keymaster4.h"
+#endif
+#if TW_KEYMASTER_MAX_API == 0
+#include <hardware/keymaster.h>
+#else // so far, all trees that have keymaster >= 1 have keymaster 1 support
+#include <stdbool.h>
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/sha.h>
+#include <hardware/keymaster0.h>
+#include <hardware/keymaster1.h>
+#endif
+//#include "android-base/properties.h"
+//#include <bootloader_message/bootloader_message.h>
+#ifdef CONFIG_HW_DISK_ENCRYPTION
+#include <cryptfs_hw.h>
+#endif
+extern "C" {
+#include <crypto_scrypt.h>
+}
+#include <string>
+#include <vector>
+
+#define ALOGE(...) fprintf(stdout, "E:" __VA_ARGS__)
+#define SLOGE(...) fprintf(stdout, "E:" __VA_ARGS__)
+#define SLOGW(...) fprintf(stdout, "W:" __VA_ARGS__)
+#define SLOGI(...) fprintf(stdout, "I:" __VA_ARGS__)
+#define SLOGD(...) fprintf(stdout, "D:" __VA_ARGS__)
+
+#define UNUSED __attribute__((unused))
+
+#define DM_CRYPT_BUF_SIZE 4096
+
+#define HASH_COUNT 2000
+
+#ifndef min /* already defined by windows.h */
+#define min(a, b) ((a) < (b) ? (a) : (b))
+#endif
+
+constexpr size_t INTERMEDIATE_KEY_LEN_BYTES = 16;
+constexpr size_t INTERMEDIATE_IV_LEN_BYTES = 16;
+constexpr size_t INTERMEDIATE_BUF_SIZE =
+    (INTERMEDIATE_KEY_LEN_BYTES + INTERMEDIATE_IV_LEN_BYTES);
+
+// SCRYPT_LEN is used by struct crypt_mnt_ftr for its intermediate key.
+static_assert(INTERMEDIATE_BUF_SIZE == SCRYPT_LEN,
+              "Mismatch of intermediate key sizes");
+
+#define KEY_IN_FOOTER  "footer"
+
+#define DEFAULT_HEX_PASSWORD "64656661756c745f70617373776f7264"
+#define DEFAULT_PASSWORD "default_password"
+
+#define CRYPTO_BLOCK_DEVICE "userdata"
+
+#define TABLE_LOAD_RETRIES 10
+
+#define RSA_KEY_SIZE 2048
+#define RSA_KEY_SIZE_BYTES (RSA_KEY_SIZE / 8)
+#define RSA_EXPONENT 0x10001
+#define KEYMASTER_CRYPTFS_RATE_LIMIT 1  // Maximum one try per second
+#define KEY_LEN_BYTES 16
+
+#define RETRY_MOUNT_ATTEMPTS 10
+#define RETRY_MOUNT_DELAY_SECONDS 1
+
+#define CREATE_CRYPTO_BLK_DEV_FLAGS_ALLOW_ENCRYPT_OVERRIDE (1)
+
+static unsigned char saved_master_key[MAX_KEY_LEN];
+static char *saved_mount_point;
+static int  master_key_saved = 0;
+static struct crypt_persist_data *persist_data = NULL;
+
+static int previous_type;
+
+static char key_fname[PROPERTY_VALUE_MAX] = "";
+static char real_blkdev[PROPERTY_VALUE_MAX] = "";
+static char file_system[PROPERTY_VALUE_MAX] = "";
+
+static void get_blkdev_size(int fd, unsigned long *nr_sec)
+{
+  if ( (ioctl(fd, BLKGETSIZE, nr_sec)) == -1) {
+    *nr_sec = 0;
+  }
+}
+
+#if TW_KEYMASTER_MAX_API == 0
+static int keymaster_init(keymaster_device_t **keymaster_dev)
+{
+    int rc;
+
+    const hw_module_t* mod;
+    rc = hw_get_module_by_class(KEYSTORE_HARDWARE_MODULE_ID, NULL, &mod);
+    if (rc) {
+        printf("could not find any keystore module\n");
+        goto out;
+    }
+
+    rc = keymaster_open(mod, keymaster_dev);
+    if (rc) {
+        printf("could not open keymaster device in %s (%s)\n",
+            KEYSTORE_HARDWARE_MODULE_ID, strerror(-rc));
+        goto out;
+    }
+
+    return 0;
+
+out:
+    *keymaster_dev = NULL;
+    return rc;
+}
+#else //TW_KEYMASTER_MAX_API == 0
+static int keymaster_init(keymaster0_device_t **keymaster0_dev,
+                          keymaster1_device_t **keymaster1_dev)
+{
+    int rc;
+
+    const hw_module_t* mod;
+    rc = hw_get_module_by_class(KEYSTORE_HARDWARE_MODULE_ID, NULL, &mod);
+    if (rc) {
+        printf("could not find any keystore module\n");
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    printf("keymaster module name is %s\n", mod->name);
+    printf("keymaster version is %d\n", mod->module_api_version);
+
+    *keymaster0_dev = NULL;
+    *keymaster1_dev = NULL;
+    if (mod->module_api_version == KEYMASTER_MODULE_API_VERSION_1_0) {
+        printf("Found keymaster1 module, using keymaster1 API.\n");
+        rc = keymaster1_open(mod, keymaster1_dev);
+    } else {
+        printf("Found keymaster0 module, using keymaster0 API.\n");
+        rc = keymaster0_open(mod, keymaster0_dev);
+    }
+
+    if (rc) {
+        printf("could not open keymaster device in %s (%s)\n",
+              KEYSTORE_HARDWARE_MODULE_ID, strerror(-rc));
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    return 0;
+
+err:
+    *keymaster0_dev = NULL;
+    *keymaster1_dev = NULL;
+    return rc;
+}
+#endif //TW_KEYMASTER_MAX_API == 0
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_HW_DISK_ENCRYPTION
+static int scrypt_keymaster(const char *passwd, const unsigned char *salt,
+                            unsigned char *ikey, void *params);
+static void convert_key_to_hex_ascii(const unsigned char *master_key,
+                                     unsigned int keysize, char *master_key_ascii);
+static int test_mount_hw_encrypted_fs(struct crypt_mnt_ftr* crypt_ftr,
+                const char *passwd, const char *mount_point, const char *label);
+int cryptfs_check_passwd_hw(char *passwd);
+int cryptfs_get_master_key(struct crypt_mnt_ftr* ftr, const char* password,
+                                   unsigned char* master_key);
+
+static void convert_key_to_hex_ascii_for_upgrade(const unsigned char *master_key,
+                                     unsigned int keysize, char *master_key_ascii)
+{
+    unsigned int i, a;
+    unsigned char nibble;
+
+    for (i = 0, a = 0; i < keysize; i++, a += 2) {
+        /* For each byte, write out two ascii hex digits */
+        nibble = (master_key[i] >> 4) & 0xf;
+        master_key_ascii[a] = nibble + (nibble > 9 ? 0x57 : 0x30);
+
+        nibble = master_key[i] & 0xf;
+        master_key_ascii[a + 1] = nibble + (nibble > 9 ? 0x57 : 0x30);
+    }
+
+    /* Add the null termination */
+    master_key_ascii[a] = '\0';
+}
+
+static int get_keymaster_hw_fde_passwd(const char* passwd, unsigned char* newpw,
+                                  unsigned char* salt,
+                                  const struct crypt_mnt_ftr *ftr)
+{
+    /* if newpw updated, return 0
+     * if newpw not updated return -1
+     */
+    int rc = -1;
+
+    if (should_use_keymaster()) {
+        if (scrypt_keymaster(passwd, salt, newpw, (void*)ftr)) {
+            SLOGE("scrypt failed");
+        } else {
+            rc = 0;
+        }
+    }
+
+    return rc;
+}
+
+static int verify_hw_fde_passwd(const char *passwd, struct crypt_mnt_ftr* crypt_ftr)
+{
+    unsigned char newpw[32] = {0};
+    int key_index;
+    SLOGI("starting verify_hw_fde_passwd\n");
+    if (get_keymaster_hw_fde_passwd(passwd, newpw, crypt_ftr->salt, crypt_ftr))
+        key_index = set_hw_device_encryption_key(passwd,
+                                           (char*) crypt_ftr->crypto_type_name);
+    else
+        key_index = set_hw_device_encryption_key((const char*)newpw,
+                                           (char*) crypt_ftr->crypto_type_name);
+    return key_index;
+}
+
+static int verify_and_update_hw_fde_passwd(const char *passwd,
+                                           struct crypt_mnt_ftr* crypt_ftr)
+{
+    char* new_passwd = NULL;
+    unsigned char newpw[32] = {0};
+    int key_index = -1;
+    int passwd_updated = -1;
+    int ascii_passwd_updated = (crypt_ftr->flags & CRYPT_ASCII_PASSWORD_UPDATED);
+
+    key_index = verify_hw_fde_passwd(passwd, crypt_ftr);
+    if (key_index < 0) {
+        ++crypt_ftr->failed_decrypt_count;
+
+        if (ascii_passwd_updated) {
+            SLOGI("Ascii password was updated");
+        } else {
+            /* Code in else part would execute only once:
+             * When device is upgraded from L->M release.
+             * Once upgraded, code flow should never come here.
+             * L release passed actual password in hex, so try with hex
+             * Each nible of passwd was encoded as a byte, so allocate memory
+             * twice of password len plus one more byte for null termination
+             */
+            if (crypt_ftr->crypt_type == CRYPT_TYPE_DEFAULT) {
+                new_passwd = (char*)malloc(strlen(DEFAULT_HEX_PASSWORD) + 1);
+                if (new_passwd == NULL) {
+                    SLOGE("System out of memory. Password verification  incomplete");
+                    goto out;
+                }
+                strlcpy(new_passwd, DEFAULT_HEX_PASSWORD, strlen(DEFAULT_HEX_PASSWORD) + 1);
+            } else {
+                new_passwd = (char*)malloc(strlen(passwd) * 2 + 1);
+                if (new_passwd == NULL) {
+                    SLOGE("System out of memory. Password verification  incomplete");
+                    goto out;
+                }
+                convert_key_to_hex_ascii_for_upgrade((const unsigned char*)passwd,
+                                       strlen(passwd), new_passwd);
+            }
+            key_index = set_hw_device_encryption_key((const char*)new_passwd,
+                                       (char*) crypt_ftr->crypto_type_name);
+            if (key_index >=0) {
+                crypt_ftr->failed_decrypt_count = 0;
+                SLOGI("Hex password verified...will try to update with Ascii value");
+                /* Before updating password, tie that with keymaster to tie with ROT */
+
+                if (get_keymaster_hw_fde_passwd(passwd, newpw,
+                                                crypt_ftr->salt, crypt_ftr)) {
+                    passwd_updated = update_hw_device_encryption_key(new_passwd,
+                                     passwd, (char*)crypt_ftr->crypto_type_name);
+                } else {
+                    passwd_updated = update_hw_device_encryption_key(new_passwd,
+                                     (const char*)newpw, (char*)crypt_ftr->crypto_type_name);
+                }
+
+                if (passwd_updated >= 0) {
+                    crypt_ftr->flags |= CRYPT_ASCII_PASSWORD_UPDATED;
+                    SLOGI("Ascii password recorded and updated");
+                } else {
+                    SLOGI("Passwd verified, could not update...Will try next time");
+                }
+            } else {
+                ++crypt_ftr->failed_decrypt_count;
+            }
+            free(new_passwd);
+        }
+    } else {
+        if (!ascii_passwd_updated)
+            crypt_ftr->flags |= CRYPT_ASCII_PASSWORD_UPDATED;
+    }
+out:
+    // update footer before leaving
+    //put_crypt_ftr_and_key(crypt_ftr);
+    return key_index;
+}
+#endif
+
+void set_partition_data(const char* block_device, const char* key_location, const char* fs)
+{
+  strcpy(key_fname, key_location);
+  strcpy(real_blkdev, block_device);
+  strcpy(file_system, fs);
+}
+
+/* This signs the given object using the keymaster key. */
+static int keymaster_sign_object(struct crypt_mnt_ftr *ftr,
+                                 const unsigned char *object,
+                                 const size_t object_size,
+                                 unsigned char **signature,
+                                 size_t *signature_size)
+{
+    SLOGI("TWRP keymaster max API: %i\n", TW_KEYMASTER_MAX_API);
+    unsigned char to_sign[RSA_KEY_SIZE_BYTES];
+    size_t to_sign_size = sizeof(to_sign);
+    memset(to_sign, 0, RSA_KEY_SIZE_BYTES);
+
+    // To sign a message with RSA, the message must satisfy two
+    // constraints:
+    //
+    // 1. The message, when interpreted as a big-endian numeric value, must
+    //    be strictly less than the public modulus of the RSA key.  Note
+    //    that because the most significant bit of the public modulus is
+    //    guaranteed to be 1 (else it's an (n-1)-bit key, not an n-bit
+    //    key), an n-bit message with most significant bit 0 always
+    //    satisfies this requirement.
+    //
+    // 2. The message must have the same length in bits as the public
+    //    modulus of the RSA key.  This requirement isn't mathematically
+    //    necessary, but is necessary to ensure consistency in
+    //    implementations.
+    switch (ftr->kdf_type) {
+        case KDF_SCRYPT_KEYMASTER_UNPADDED:
+            // This is broken: It produces a message which is shorter than
+            // the public modulus, failing criterion 2.
+            memcpy(to_sign, object, object_size);
+            to_sign_size = object_size;
+            SLOGI("Signing unpadded object\n");
+            break;
+        case KDF_SCRYPT_KEYMASTER_BADLY_PADDED:
+            // This is broken: Since the value of object is uniformly
+            // distributed, it produces a message that is larger than the
+            // public modulus with probability 0.25.
+            memcpy(to_sign, object, min(RSA_KEY_SIZE_BYTES, object_size));
+            SLOGI("Signing end-padded object\n");
+            break;
+        case KDF_SCRYPT_KEYMASTER:
+            // This ensures the most significant byte of the signed message
+            // is zero.  We could have zero-padded to the left instead, but
+            // this approach is slightly more robust against changes in
+            // object size.  However, it's still broken (but not unusably
+            // so) because we really should be using a proper deterministic
+            // RSA padding function, such as PKCS1.
+            memcpy(to_sign + 1, object, min((size_t)RSA_KEY_SIZE_BYTES - 1, object_size));
+            SLOGI("Signing safely-padded object");
+            break;
+        default:
+            SLOGE("Unknown KDF type %d", ftr->kdf_type);
+            return -1;
+    }
+
+    int rc = -1;
+
+#if TW_KEYMASTER_MAX_API >= 1
+    keymaster0_device_t *keymaster0_dev = 0;
+    keymaster1_device_t *keymaster1_dev = 0;
+    if (keymaster_init(&keymaster0_dev, &keymaster1_dev)) {
+#else
+    keymaster_device_t *keymaster0_dev = 0;
+    if (keymaster_init(&keymaster0_dev)) {
+#endif
+        printf("Failed to init keymaster 0/1\n");
+        goto initfail;
+    }
+    if (keymaster0_dev) {
+        keymaster_rsa_sign_params_t params;
+        params.digest_type = DIGEST_NONE;
+        params.padding_type = PADDING_NONE;
+
+        rc = keymaster0_dev->sign_data(keymaster0_dev,
+                                      &params,
+                                      ftr->keymaster_blob,
+                                      ftr->keymaster_blob_size,
+                                      to_sign,
+                                      to_sign_size,
+                                      signature,
+                                      signature_size);
+        goto out;
+    }
+#if TW_KEYMASTER_MAX_API >= 1
+    else if (keymaster1_dev) {
+        keymaster_key_blob_t key = { ftr->keymaster_blob, ftr->keymaster_blob_size };
+        keymaster_key_param_t params[] = {
+            keymaster_param_enum(KM_TAG_PADDING, KM_PAD_NONE),
+            keymaster_param_enum(KM_TAG_DIGEST, KM_DIGEST_NONE),
+        };
+        keymaster_key_param_set_t param_set = { params, sizeof(params)/sizeof(*params) };
+        keymaster_operation_handle_t op_handle;
+        keymaster_error_t error = keymaster1_dev->begin(keymaster1_dev, KM_PURPOSE_SIGN, &key,
+                                                        &param_set, NULL /* out_params */,
+                                                        &op_handle);
+        if (error == KM_ERROR_KEY_RATE_LIMIT_EXCEEDED) {
+            // Key usage has been rate-limited.  Wait a bit and try again.
+            sleep(KEYMASTER_CRYPTFS_RATE_LIMIT);
+            error = keymaster1_dev->begin(keymaster1_dev, KM_PURPOSE_SIGN, &key,
+                                          &param_set, NULL /* out_params */,
+                                          &op_handle);
+        }
+        if (error != KM_ERROR_OK) {
+            printf("Error starting keymaster signature transaction: %d\n", error);
+            rc = -1;
+            goto out;
+        }
+
+        keymaster_blob_t input = { to_sign, to_sign_size };
+        size_t input_consumed;
+        error = keymaster1_dev->update(keymaster1_dev, op_handle, NULL /* in_params */,
+                                       &input, &input_consumed, NULL /* out_params */,
+                                       NULL /* output */);
+        if (error != KM_ERROR_OK) {
+            printf("Error sending data to keymaster signature transaction: %d\n", error);
+            rc = -1;
+            goto out;
+        }
+        if (input_consumed != to_sign_size) {
+            // This should never happen.  If it does, it's a bug in the keymaster implementation.
+            printf("Keymaster update() did not consume all data.\n");
+            keymaster1_dev->abort(keymaster1_dev, op_handle);
+            rc = -1;
+            goto out;
+        }
+
+        keymaster_blob_t tmp_sig;
+        error = keymaster1_dev->finish(keymaster1_dev, op_handle, NULL /* in_params */,
+                                       NULL /* verify signature */, NULL /* out_params */,
+                                       &tmp_sig);
+        if (error != KM_ERROR_OK) {
+            printf("Error finishing keymaster signature transaction: %d\n", error);
+            rc = -1;
+            goto out;
+        }
+
+        *signature = (uint8_t*)tmp_sig.data;
+        *signature_size = tmp_sig.data_length;
+        rc = 0;
+    }
+#endif // TW_KEYMASTER_API >= 1
+
+    out:
+#if TW_KEYMASTER_MAX_API >= 1
+        if (keymaster1_dev)
+            keymaster1_close(keymaster1_dev);
+#endif
+        if (keymaster0_dev)
+#if TW_KEYMASTER_MAX_API >= 1
+            keymaster0_close(keymaster0_dev);
+#else
+            keymaster_close(keymaster0_dev);
+#endif
+
+        if (rc == 0)
+            return 0; // otherwise we'll try for a newer keymaster API
+
+initfail:
+#if TW_KEYMASTER_MAX_API == 3
+    return keymaster_sign_object_for_cryptfs_scrypt(ftr->keymaster_blob, ftr->keymaster_blob_size,
+            KEYMASTER_CRYPTFS_RATE_LIMIT, to_sign, to_sign_size, signature, signature_size,
+            ftr->keymaster_blob, KEYMASTER_BLOB_SIZE, &ftr->keymaster_blob_size);
+#endif //TW_KEYMASTER_MAX_API == 3
+#if TW_KEYMASTER_MAX_API >= 4
+    //for (;;) {
+        auto result = keymaster_sign_object_for_cryptfs_scrypt(
+            ftr->keymaster_blob, ftr->keymaster_blob_size, KEYMASTER_CRYPTFS_RATE_LIMIT, to_sign,
+            to_sign_size, signature, signature_size);
+        switch (result) {
+            case KeymasterSignResult::ok:
+                return 0;
+            case KeymasterSignResult::upgrade:
+                break;
+            default:
+                return -1;
+        }
+        SLOGD("Upgrading key\n");
+        if (keymaster_upgrade_key_for_cryptfs_scrypt(
+                RSA_KEY_SIZE, RSA_EXPONENT, KEYMASTER_CRYPTFS_RATE_LIMIT, ftr->keymaster_blob,
+                ftr->keymaster_blob_size, ftr->keymaster_blob, KEYMASTER_BLOB_SIZE,
+                &ftr->keymaster_blob_size) != 0) {
+            SLOGE("Failed to upgrade key\n");
+            return -1;
+        }
+        /*if (put_crypt_ftr_and_key(ftr) != 0) {
+            SLOGE("Failed to write upgraded key to disk");
+        }*/
+        SLOGD("Key upgraded successfully\n");
+        return 0;
+    //}
+#endif
+    return -1;
+}
+
+static void ioctl_init(struct dm_ioctl *io, size_t dataSize, const char *name, unsigned flags)
+{
+    memset(io, 0, dataSize);
+    io->data_size = dataSize;
+    io->data_start = sizeof(struct dm_ioctl);
+    io->version[0] = 4;
+    io->version[1] = 0;
+    io->version[2] = 0;
+    io->flags = flags;
+    if (name) {
+        strlcpy(io->name, name, sizeof(io->name));
+    }
+}
+
+namespace {
+
+struct CryptoType;
+
+// Use to get the CryptoType in use on this device.
+const CryptoType &get_crypto_type();
+
+struct CryptoType {
+    // We should only be constructing CryptoTypes as part of
+    // supported_crypto_types[].  We do it via this pseudo-builder pattern,
+    // which isn't pure or fully protected as a concession to being able to
+    // do it all at compile time.  Add new CryptoTypes in
+    // supported_crypto_types[] below.
+    constexpr CryptoType() : CryptoType(nullptr, nullptr, 0xFFFFFFFF) {}
+    constexpr CryptoType set_keysize(uint32_t size) const {
+        return CryptoType(this->property_name, this->crypto_name, size);
+    }
+    constexpr CryptoType set_property_name(const char *property) const {
+        return CryptoType(property, this->crypto_name, this->keysize);
+    }
+    constexpr CryptoType set_crypto_name(const char *crypto) const {
+        return CryptoType(this->property_name, crypto, this->keysize);
+    }
+
+    constexpr const char *get_property_name() const { return property_name; }
+    constexpr const char *get_crypto_name() const { return crypto_name; }
+    constexpr uint32_t get_keysize() const { return keysize; }
+
+ private:
+    const char *property_name;
+    const char *crypto_name;
+    uint32_t keysize;
+
+    constexpr CryptoType(const char *property, const char *crypto,
+                         uint32_t ksize)
+        : property_name(property), crypto_name(crypto), keysize(ksize) {}
+    friend const CryptoType &get_crypto_type();
+    static const CryptoType &get_device_crypto_algorithm();
+};
+
+// We only want to parse this read-only property once.  But we need to wait
+// until the system is initialized before we can read it.  So we use a static
+// scoped within this function to get it only once.
+const CryptoType &get_crypto_type() {
+    static CryptoType crypto_type = CryptoType::get_device_crypto_algorithm();
+    return crypto_type;
+}
+
+constexpr CryptoType default_crypto_type = CryptoType()
+    .set_property_name("AES-128-CBC")
+    .set_crypto_name("aes-cbc-essiv:sha256")
+    .set_keysize(16);
+
+constexpr CryptoType supported_crypto_types[] = {
+    default_crypto_type,
+    CryptoType()
+        .set_property_name("Speck128/128-XTS")
+        .set_crypto_name("speck128-xts-plain64")
+        .set_keysize(32),
+    // Add new CryptoTypes here.  Order is not important.
+};
+
+
+// ---------- START COMPILE-TIME SANITY CHECK BLOCK -------------------------
+// We confirm all supported_crypto_types have a small enough keysize and
+// had both set_property_name() and set_crypto_name() called.
+
+template <typename T, size_t N>
+constexpr size_t array_length(T (&)[N]) { return N; }
+
+constexpr bool indexOutOfBoundsForCryptoTypes(size_t index) {
+    return (index >= array_length(supported_crypto_types));
+}
+
+constexpr bool isValidCryptoType(const CryptoType &crypto_type) {
+    return ((crypto_type.get_property_name() != nullptr) &&
+            (crypto_type.get_crypto_name() != nullptr) &&
+            (crypto_type.get_keysize() <= MAX_KEY_LEN));
+}
+
+// Note in C++11 that constexpr functions can only have a single line.
+// So our code is a bit convoluted (using recursion instead of a loop),
+// but it's asserting at compile time that all of our key lengths are valid.
+constexpr bool validateSupportedCryptoTypes(size_t index) {
+    return indexOutOfBoundsForCryptoTypes(index) ||
+        (isValidCryptoType(supported_crypto_types[index]) &&
+         validateSupportedCryptoTypes(index + 1));
+}
+
+static_assert(validateSupportedCryptoTypes(0),
+              "We have a CryptoType with keysize > MAX_KEY_LEN or which was "
+              "incompletely constructed.");
+//  ---------- END COMPILE-TIME SANITY CHECK BLOCK -------------------------
+
+
+// Don't call this directly, use get_crypto_type(), which caches this result.
+const CryptoType &CryptoType::get_device_crypto_algorithm() {
+    constexpr char CRYPT_ALGO_PROP[] = "ro.crypto.fde_algorithm";
+    char paramstr[PROPERTY_VALUE_MAX];
+
+    property_get(CRYPT_ALGO_PROP, paramstr,
+                 default_crypto_type.get_property_name());
+    for (auto const &ctype : supported_crypto_types) {
+        if (strcmp(paramstr, ctype.get_property_name()) == 0) {
+            return ctype;
+        }
+    }
+    ALOGE("Invalid name (%s) for %s.  Defaulting to %s\n", paramstr,
+          CRYPT_ALGO_PROP, default_crypto_type.get_property_name());
+    return default_crypto_type;
+}
+
+}  // namespace
+
+#define SCRYPT_PROP "ro.crypto.scrypt_params"
+#define SCRYPT_DEFAULTS "15:3:1"
+
+bool parse_scrypt_parameters(const char* paramstr, int *Nf, int *rf, int *pf) {
+    int params[3] = {};
+    char *token;
+    char *saveptr;
+    int i;
+
+    /*
+     * The token we're looking for should be three integers separated by
+     * colons (e.g., "12:8:1"). Scan the property to make sure it matches.
+     */
+    for (i = 0, token = strtok_r(const_cast<char *>(paramstr), ":", &saveptr);
+            token != nullptr && i < 3;
+            i++, token = strtok_r(nullptr, ":", &saveptr)) {
+        char *endptr;
+        params[i] = strtol(token, &endptr, 10);
+
+        /*
+         * Check that there was a valid number and it's 8-bit.
+         */
+        if ((*token == '\0') || (*endptr != '\0') || params[i] < 0 || params[i] > 255) {
+            return false;
+        }
+    }
+    if (token != nullptr) {
+        return false;
+    }
+    *Nf = params[0]; *rf = params[1]; *pf = params[2];
+    return true;
+}
+
+uint32_t cryptfs_get_keysize() {
+    return get_crypto_type().get_keysize();
+}
+
+const char *cryptfs_get_crypto_name() {
+    return get_crypto_type().get_crypto_name();
+}
+
+static int get_crypt_ftr_info(char **metadata_fname, off64_t *off)
+{
+  static int cached_data = 0;
+  static off64_t cached_off = 0;
+  static char cached_metadata_fname[PROPERTY_VALUE_MAX] = "";
+  int fd;
+  //char key_loc[PROPERTY_VALUE_MAX];
+  //char real_blkdev[PROPERTY_VALUE_MAX];
+  int rc = -1;
+
+  if (!cached_data) {
+    //fs_mgr_get_crypt_info(fstab_default, key_loc, real_blkdev, sizeof(key_loc));
+
+    if (!strcmp(key_fname, KEY_IN_FOOTER)) {
+      if ( (fd = open(real_blkdev, O_RDWR|O_CLOEXEC)) < 0) {
+        SLOGE("Cannot open real block device %s\n", real_blkdev);
+        return -1;
+      }
+
+      unsigned long nr_sec = 0;
+      get_blkdev_size(fd, &nr_sec);
+      if (nr_sec != 0) {
+        /* If it's an encrypted Android partition, the last 16 Kbytes contain the
+         * encryption info footer and key, and plenty of bytes to spare for future
+         * growth.
+         */
+        strlcpy(cached_metadata_fname, real_blkdev, sizeof(cached_metadata_fname));
+        cached_off = ((off64_t)nr_sec * 512) - CRYPT_FOOTER_OFFSET;
+        cached_data = 1;
+      } else {
+        SLOGE("Cannot get size of block device %s\n", real_blkdev);
+      }
+      close(fd);
+    } else {
+      strlcpy(cached_metadata_fname, key_fname, sizeof(cached_metadata_fname));
+      cached_off = 0;
+      cached_data = 1;
+    }
+  }
+
+  if (cached_data) {
+    if (metadata_fname) {
+        *metadata_fname = cached_metadata_fname;
+    }
+    if (off) {
+        *off = cached_off;
+    }
+    rc = 0;
+  }
+
+  return rc;
+}
+
+static int get_crypt_ftr_and_key(struct crypt_mnt_ftr *crypt_ftr)
+{
+  int fd;
+  unsigned int cnt;
+  off64_t starting_off;
+  int rc = -1;
+  char *fname = NULL;
+  struct stat statbuf;
+
+  if (get_crypt_ftr_info(&fname, &starting_off)) {
+    SLOGE("Unable to get crypt_ftr_info\n");
+    return -1;
+  }
+  if (fname[0] != '/') {
+    SLOGE("Unexpected value for crypto key location\n");
+    return -1;
+  }
+  if ( (fd = open(fname, O_RDWR|O_CLOEXEC)) < 0) {
+    SLOGE("Cannot open footer file %s for get\n", fname);
+    return -1;
+  }
+
+  /* Make sure it's 16 Kbytes in length */
+  fstat(fd, &statbuf);
+  if (S_ISREG(statbuf.st_mode) && (statbuf.st_size != 0x4000)) {
+    SLOGE("footer file %s is not the expected size!\n", fname);
+    goto errout;
+  }
+
+  /* Seek to the start of the crypt footer */
+  if (lseek64(fd, starting_off, SEEK_SET) == -1) {
+    SLOGE("Cannot seek to real block device footer\n");
+    goto errout;
+  }
+
+  if ( (cnt = read(fd, crypt_ftr, sizeof(struct crypt_mnt_ftr))) != sizeof(struct crypt_mnt_ftr)) {
+    SLOGE("Cannot read real block device footer\n");
+    goto errout;
+  }
+
+  if (crypt_ftr->magic != CRYPT_MNT_MAGIC) {
+    SLOGE("Bad magic for real block device %s\n", fname);
+    goto errout;
+  }
+
+  if (crypt_ftr->major_version != CURRENT_MAJOR_VERSION) {
+    SLOGE("Cannot understand major version %d real block device footer; expected %d\n",
+          crypt_ftr->major_version, CURRENT_MAJOR_VERSION);
+    goto errout;
+  }
+
+  // We risk buffer overflows with oversized keys, so we just reject them.
+  // 0-sized keys are problematic (essentially by-passing encryption), and
+  // AES-CBC key wrapping only works for multiples of 16 bytes.
+  if ((crypt_ftr->keysize == 0) || ((crypt_ftr->keysize % 16) != 0) ||
+      (crypt_ftr->keysize > MAX_KEY_LEN)) {
+    SLOGE("Invalid keysize (%u) for block device %s; Must be non-zero, "
+          "divisible by 16, and <= %d\n", crypt_ftr->keysize, fname,
+          MAX_KEY_LEN);
+    goto errout;
+  }
+
+  if (crypt_ftr->minor_version > CURRENT_MINOR_VERSION) {
+    SLOGW("Warning: crypto footer minor version %d, expected <= %d, continuing...\n",
+          crypt_ftr->minor_version, CURRENT_MINOR_VERSION);
+  }
+
+  /* Success! */
+  rc = 0;
+
+errout:
+  close(fd);
+  return rc;
+}
+
+int cryptfs_check_footer()
+{
+    int rc = -1;
+    struct crypt_mnt_ftr crypt_ftr;
+
+    rc = get_crypt_ftr_and_key(&crypt_ftr);
+
+    return rc;
+}
+
+/* Convert a binary key of specified length into an ascii hex string equivalent,
+ * without the leading 0x and with null termination
+ */
+static void convert_key_to_hex_ascii(const unsigned char *master_key,
+                                     unsigned int keysize, char *master_key_ascii) {
+    unsigned int i, a;
+    unsigned char nibble;
+
+    for (i=0, a=0; i<keysize; i++, a+=2) {
+        /* For each byte, write out two ascii hex digits */
+        nibble = (master_key[i] >> 4) & 0xf;
+        master_key_ascii[a] = nibble + (nibble > 9 ? 0x37 : 0x30);
+
+        nibble = master_key[i] & 0xf;
+        master_key_ascii[a+1] = nibble + (nibble > 9 ? 0x37 : 0x30);
+    }
+
+    /* Add the null termination */
+    master_key_ascii[a] = '\0';
+
+}
+
+static int load_crypto_mapping_table(struct crypt_mnt_ftr *crypt_ftr,
+        const unsigned char *master_key, const char *real_blk_name,
+        const char *name, int fd, const char *extra_params) {
+  alignas(struct dm_ioctl) char buffer[DM_CRYPT_BUF_SIZE];
+  struct dm_ioctl *io;
+  struct dm_target_spec *tgt;
+  char *crypt_params;
+  // We need two ASCII characters to represent each byte, and need space for
+  // the '\0' terminator.
+  char master_key_ascii[MAX_KEY_LEN * 2 + 1];
+  size_t buff_offset;
+  int i;
+
+  io = (struct dm_ioctl *) buffer;
+
+  /* Load the mapping table for this device */
+  tgt = (struct dm_target_spec *) &buffer[sizeof(struct dm_ioctl)];
+
+  ioctl_init(io, DM_CRYPT_BUF_SIZE, name, 0);
+  io->target_count = 1;
+  tgt->status = 0;
+  tgt->sector_start = 0;
+  tgt->length = crypt_ftr->fs_size;
+  crypt_params = buffer + sizeof(struct dm_ioctl) + sizeof(struct dm_target_spec);
+  buff_offset = crypt_params - buffer;
+  SLOGI("Extra parameters for dm_crypt: %s\n", extra_params);
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_HW_DISK_ENCRYPTION
+  if(is_hw_disk_encryption((char*)crypt_ftr->crypto_type_name)) {
+    strlcpy(tgt->target_type, "req-crypt",DM_MAX_TYPE_NAME);
+    if (is_ice_enabled())
+      convert_key_to_hex_ascii(master_key, sizeof(int), master_key_ascii);
+    else
+      convert_key_to_hex_ascii(master_key, crypt_ftr->keysize, master_key_ascii);
+  }
+  else {
+    convert_key_to_hex_ascii(master_key, crypt_ftr->keysize, master_key_ascii);
+    strlcpy(tgt->target_type, "crypt", DM_MAX_TYPE_NAME);
+  }
+  snprintf(crypt_params, sizeof(buffer) - buff_offset, "%s %s 0 %s 0 %s 0",
+           crypt_ftr->crypto_type_name, master_key_ascii,
+           real_blk_name, extra_params);
+
+  SLOGI("target_type = %s", tgt->target_type);
+  SLOGI("real_blk_name = %s, extra_params = %s", real_blk_name, extra_params);
+#else
+  convert_key_to_hex_ascii(master_key, crypt_ftr->keysize, master_key_ascii);
+  strlcpy(tgt->target_type, "crypt", DM_MAX_TYPE_NAME);
+  snprintf(crypt_params, sizeof(buffer) - buff_offset, "%s %s 0 %s 0 %s",
+           crypt_ftr->crypto_type_name, master_key_ascii, real_blk_name,
+           extra_params);
+#endif
+
+  crypt_params += strlen(crypt_params) + 1;
+  crypt_params = (char *) (((unsigned long)crypt_params + 7) & ~8); /* Align to an 8 byte boundary */
+  tgt->next = crypt_params - buffer;
+
+  for (i = 0; i < TABLE_LOAD_RETRIES; i++) {
+    if (! ioctl(fd, DM_TABLE_LOAD, io)) {
+      break;
+    }
+    usleep(500000);
+  }
+
+  if (i == TABLE_LOAD_RETRIES) {
+    /* We failed to load the table, return an error */
+    return -1;
+  } else {
+    return i + 1;
+  }
+}
+
+static int get_dm_crypt_version(int fd, const char *name,  int *version)
+{
+    char buffer[DM_CRYPT_BUF_SIZE];
+    struct dm_ioctl *io;
+    struct dm_target_versions *v;
+
+    io = (struct dm_ioctl *) buffer;
+
+    ioctl_init(io, DM_CRYPT_BUF_SIZE, name, 0);
+
+    if (ioctl(fd, DM_LIST_VERSIONS, io)) {
+        return -1;
+    }
+
+    /* Iterate over the returned versions, looking for name of "crypt".
+     * When found, get and return the version.
+     */
+    v = (struct dm_target_versions *) &buffer[sizeof(struct dm_ioctl)];
+    while (v->next) {
+#ifdef CONFIG_HW_DISK_ENCRYPTION
+        if (! strcmp(v->name, "crypt") || ! strcmp(v->name, "req-crypt")) {
+#else
+        if (! strcmp(v->name, "crypt")) {
+#endif
+            /* We found the crypt driver, return the version, and get out */
+            version[0] = v->version[0];
+            version[1] = v->version[1];
+            version[2] = v->version[2];
+            return 0;
+        }
+        v = (struct dm_target_versions *)(((char *)v) + v->next);
+    }
+
+    return -1;
+}
+
+#ifndef CONFIG_HW_DISK_ENCRYPTION
+static std::string extra_params_as_string(const std::vector<std::string>& extra_params_vec) {
+    if (extra_params_vec.empty()) return "";
+    char temp[10];
+    snprintf(temp, sizeof(temp), "%zd", extra_params_vec.size());
+    std::string extra_params = temp; //std::to_string(extra_params_vec.size());
+    for (const auto& p : extra_params_vec) {
+        extra_params.append(" ");
+        extra_params.append(p);
+    }
+    return extra_params;
+}
+#endif
+
+static int create_crypto_blk_dev(struct crypt_mnt_ftr* crypt_ftr, const unsigned char* master_key,
+                                 const char* real_blk_name, char* crypto_blk_name, const char* name,
+                                 uint32_t flags) {
+    char buffer[DM_CRYPT_BUF_SIZE];
+    struct dm_ioctl* io;
+    unsigned int minor;
+    int fd = 0;
+    int err;
+    int retval = -1;
+    int version[3];
+    int load_count;
+#ifdef CONFIG_HW_DISK_ENCRYPTION
+    char encrypted_state[PROPERTY_VALUE_MAX] = {0};
+    char progress[PROPERTY_VALUE_MAX] = {0};
+    const char *extra_params;
+#else
+    std::vector<std::string> extra_params_vec;
+#endif
+
+    if ((fd = open("/dev/device-mapper", O_RDWR | O_CLOEXEC)) < 0) {
+        SLOGE("Cannot open device-mapper\n");
+        goto errout;
+    }
+
+    io = (struct dm_ioctl*)buffer;
+
+    ioctl_init(io, DM_CRYPT_BUF_SIZE, name, 0);
+    err = ioctl(fd, DM_DEV_CREATE, io);
+    if (err) {
+        SLOGE("Cannot create dm-crypt device %s: %s\n", name, strerror(errno));
+        goto errout;
+    }
+
+    /* Get the device status, in particular, the name of it's device file */
+    ioctl_init(io, DM_CRYPT_BUF_SIZE, name, 0);
+    if (ioctl(fd, DM_DEV_STATUS, io)) {
+        SLOGE("Cannot retrieve dm-crypt device status\n");
+        goto errout;
+    }
+    minor = (io->dev & 0xff) | ((io->dev >> 12) & 0xfff00);
+    snprintf(crypto_blk_name, MAXPATHLEN, "/dev/block/dm-%u", minor);
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_HW_DISK_ENCRYPTION
+    if(is_hw_disk_encryption((char*)crypt_ftr->crypto_type_name)) {
+      /* Set fde_enabled if either FDE completed or in-progress */
+      property_get("ro.crypto.state", encrypted_state, ""); /* FDE completed */
+      property_get("vold.encrypt_progress", progress, ""); /* FDE in progress */
+      if (!strcmp(encrypted_state, "encrypted") || strcmp(progress, "")) {
+        if (is_ice_enabled()) {
+          if (flags & CREATE_CRYPTO_BLK_DEV_FLAGS_ALLOW_ENCRYPT_OVERRIDE)
+            extra_params = "fde_enabled ice allow_encrypt_override";
+          else
+            extra_params = "fde_enabled ice";
+        } else {
+          if (flags & CREATE_CRYPTO_BLK_DEV_FLAGS_ALLOW_ENCRYPT_OVERRIDE)
+            extra_params = "fde_enabled allow_encrypt_override";
+          else
+            extra_params = "fde_enabled";
+        }
+      } else {
+          if (flags & CREATE_CRYPTO_BLK_DEV_FLAGS_ALLOW_ENCRYPT_OVERRIDE)
+            extra_params = "fde_enabled allow_encrypt_override";
+          else
+            extra_params = "fde_enabled";
+      }
+    } else {
+      extra_params = "";
+      if (! get_dm_crypt_version(fd, name, version)) {
+        /* Support for allow_discards was added in version 1.11.0 */
+        if ((version[0] >= 2) || ((version[0] == 1) && (version[1] >= 11))) {
+          if (flags & CREATE_CRYPTO_BLK_DEV_FLAGS_ALLOW_ENCRYPT_OVERRIDE)
+            extra_params = "2 allow_discards allow_encrypt_override";
+          else
+            extra_params = "1 allow_discards";
+          SLOGI("Enabling support for allow_discards in dmcrypt.\n");
+        }
+      }
+    }
+    load_count = load_crypto_mapping_table(crypt_ftr, master_key, real_blk_name, name, fd,
+                                           extra_params);
+#else
+    if (!get_dm_crypt_version(fd, name, version)) {
+        /* Support for allow_discards was added in version 1.11.0 */
+        if ((version[0] >= 2) || ((version[0] == 1) && (version[1] >= 11))) {
+            extra_params_vec.push_back(std::string("allow_discards")); // Used to be extra_params_vec.emplace_back("allow_discards"); but this won't compile in 5.1 trees
+        }
+    }
+    if (flags & CREATE_CRYPTO_BLK_DEV_FLAGS_ALLOW_ENCRYPT_OVERRIDE) {
+        extra_params_vec.push_back(std::string("allow_encrypt_override")); // Used to be extra_params_vec.emplace_back("allow_encrypt_override"); but this won't compile in 5.1 trees
+    }
+    load_count = load_crypto_mapping_table(crypt_ftr, master_key, real_blk_name, name, fd,
+                                           extra_params_as_string(extra_params_vec).c_str());
+#endif
+    if (load_count < 0) {
+        SLOGE("Cannot load dm-crypt mapping table.\n");
+        goto errout;
+    } else if (load_count > 1) {
+        SLOGI("Took %d tries to load dmcrypt table.\n", load_count);
+    }
+
+    /* Resume this device to activate it */
+    ioctl_init(io, DM_CRYPT_BUF_SIZE, name, 0);
+
+    if (ioctl(fd, DM_DEV_SUSPEND, io)) {
+        SLOGE("Cannot resume the dm-crypt device\n");
+        goto errout;
+    }
+
+    /* We made it here with no errors.  Woot! */
+    retval = 0;
+
+errout:
+  close(fd);   /* If fd is <0 from a failed open call, it's safe to just ignore the close error */
+
+  return retval;
+}
+
+int delete_crypto_blk_dev(const char *name)
+{
+  int fd;
+  char buffer[DM_CRYPT_BUF_SIZE];
+  struct dm_ioctl *io;
+  int retval = -1;
+
+  if ((fd = open("/dev/device-mapper", O_RDWR|O_CLOEXEC)) < 0 ) {
+    SLOGE("Cannot open device-mapper\n");
+    goto errout;
+  }
+
+  io = (struct dm_ioctl *) buffer;
+
+  ioctl_init(io, DM_CRYPT_BUF_SIZE, name, 0);
+  if (ioctl(fd, DM_DEV_REMOVE, io)) {
+    SLOGE("Cannot remove dm-crypt device\n");
+    goto errout;
+  }
+
+  /* We made it here with no errors.  Woot! */
+  retval = 0;
+
+errout:
+  close(fd);    /* If fd is <0 from a failed open call, it's safe to just ignore the close error */
+
+  return retval;
+
+}
+
+static int pbkdf2(const char *passwd, const unsigned char *salt,
+                  unsigned char *ikey, void *params UNUSED)
+{
+    SLOGI("Using pbkdf2 for cryptfs KDF\n");
+
+    /* Turn the password into a key and IV that can decrypt the master key */
+    return PKCS5_PBKDF2_HMAC_SHA1(passwd, strlen(passwd), salt, SALT_LEN,
+                                  HASH_COUNT, INTERMEDIATE_BUF_SIZE,
+                                  ikey) != 1;
+}
+
+static int scrypt(const char *passwd, const unsigned char *salt,
+                  unsigned char *ikey, void *params)
+{
+    SLOGI("Using scrypt for cryptfs KDF\n");
+
+    struct crypt_mnt_ftr *ftr = (struct crypt_mnt_ftr *) params;
+
+    int N = 1 << ftr->N_factor;
+    int r = 1 << ftr->r_factor;
+    int p = 1 << ftr->p_factor;
+
+    /* Turn the password into a key and IV that can decrypt the master key */
+    crypto_scrypt((const uint8_t*)passwd, strlen(passwd),
+                  salt, SALT_LEN, N, r, p, ikey,
+                  INTERMEDIATE_BUF_SIZE);
+
+   return 0;
+}
+
+static int scrypt_keymaster(const char *passwd, const unsigned char *salt,
+                            unsigned char *ikey, void *params)
+{
+    SLOGI("Using scrypt with keymaster for cryptfs KDF\n");
+
+    int rc;
+    size_t signature_size;
+    unsigned char* signature;
+    struct crypt_mnt_ftr *ftr = (struct crypt_mnt_ftr *) params;
+
+    int N = 1 << ftr->N_factor;
+    int r = 1 << ftr->r_factor;
+    int p = 1 << ftr->p_factor;
+
+    rc = crypto_scrypt((const uint8_t*)passwd, strlen(passwd),
+                       salt, SALT_LEN, N, r, p, ikey,
+                       INTERMEDIATE_BUF_SIZE);
+
+    if (rc) {
+        SLOGE("scrypt failed");
+        return -1;
+    }
+
+    if (keymaster_sign_object(ftr, ikey, INTERMEDIATE_BUF_SIZE,
+                              &signature, &signature_size)) {
+        SLOGE("Keymaster signing failed");
+        return -1;
+    }
+
+    rc = crypto_scrypt(signature, signature_size, salt, SALT_LEN,
+                       N, r, p, ikey, INTERMEDIATE_BUF_SIZE);
+    free(signature);
+
+    if (rc) {
+        SLOGE("scrypt failed");
+        return -1;
+    }
+
+    return 0;
+}
+
+static int decrypt_master_key_aux(const char *passwd, unsigned char *salt,
+                                  const unsigned char *encrypted_master_key,
+                                  size_t keysize,
+                                  unsigned char *decrypted_master_key,
+                                  kdf_func kdf, void *kdf_params,
+                                  unsigned char** intermediate_key,
+                                  size_t* intermediate_key_size)
+{
+  unsigned char ikey[INTERMEDIATE_BUF_SIZE] = { 0 };
+  EVP_CIPHER_CTX d_ctx;
+  int decrypted_len, final_len;
+
+  /* Turn the password into an intermediate key and IV that can decrypt the
+     master key */
+  if (kdf(passwd, salt, ikey, kdf_params)) {
+    SLOGE("kdf failed");
+    return -1;
+  }
+
+  /* Initialize the decryption engine */
+  EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&d_ctx);
+  if (! EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&d_ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL, ikey, ikey+INTERMEDIATE_KEY_LEN_BYTES)) {
+    return -1;
+  }
+  EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_padding(&d_ctx, 0); /* Turn off padding as our data is block aligned */
+  /* Decrypt the master key */
+  if (! EVP_DecryptUpdate(&d_ctx, decrypted_master_key, &decrypted_len,
+                            encrypted_master_key, keysize)) {
+    return -1;
+  }
+  if (! EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(&d_ctx, decrypted_master_key + decrypted_len, &final_len)) {
+    return -1;
+  }
+
+  if (decrypted_len + final_len != static_cast<int>(keysize)) {
+    return -1;
+  }
+
+  /* Copy intermediate key if needed by params */
+  if (intermediate_key && intermediate_key_size) {
+    *intermediate_key = (unsigned char*) malloc(INTERMEDIATE_KEY_LEN_BYTES);
+    if (*intermediate_key) {
+      memcpy(*intermediate_key, ikey, INTERMEDIATE_KEY_LEN_BYTES);
+      *intermediate_key_size = INTERMEDIATE_KEY_LEN_BYTES;
+    }
+  }
+
+  EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&d_ctx);
+
+  return 0;
+}
+
+static void get_kdf_func(struct crypt_mnt_ftr *ftr, kdf_func *kdf, void** kdf_params)
+{
+    if (ftr->kdf_type == KDF_SCRYPT_KEYMASTER) {
+        *kdf = scrypt_keymaster;
+        *kdf_params = ftr;
+    } else if (ftr->kdf_type == KDF_SCRYPT) {
+        *kdf = scrypt;
+        *kdf_params = ftr;
+    } else {
+        *kdf = pbkdf2;
+        *kdf_params = NULL;
+    }
+}
+
+static int decrypt_master_key(const char *passwd, unsigned char *decrypted_master_key,
+                              struct crypt_mnt_ftr *crypt_ftr,
+                              unsigned char** intermediate_key,
+                              size_t* intermediate_key_size)
+{
+    kdf_func kdf;
+    void *kdf_params;
+    int ret;
+
+    get_kdf_func(crypt_ftr, &kdf, &kdf_params);
+    ret = decrypt_master_key_aux(passwd, crypt_ftr->salt, crypt_ftr->master_key,
+                                 crypt_ftr->keysize,
+                                 decrypted_master_key, kdf, kdf_params,
+                                 intermediate_key, intermediate_key_size);
+    if (ret != 0) {
+        SLOGW("failure decrypting master key");
+    }
+
+    return ret;
+}
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_HW_DISK_ENCRYPTION
+static int test_mount_hw_encrypted_fs(struct crypt_mnt_ftr* crypt_ftr,
+             const char *passwd, const char *mount_point, const char *label)
+{
+  /* Allocate enough space for a 256 bit key, but we may use less */
+  unsigned char decrypted_master_key[32];
+  char crypto_blkdev[MAXPATHLEN];
+  //char real_blkdev[MAXPATHLEN];
+  unsigned int orig_failed_decrypt_count;
+  int rc = 0;
+
+  SLOGD("crypt_ftr->fs_size = %lld\n", crypt_ftr->fs_size);
+  orig_failed_decrypt_count = crypt_ftr->failed_decrypt_count;
+
+  //fs_mgr_get_crypt_info(fstab_default, 0, real_blkdev, sizeof(real_blkdev));
+
+  int key_index = 0;
+  if(is_hw_disk_encryption((char*)crypt_ftr->crypto_type_name)) {
+    key_index = verify_and_update_hw_fde_passwd(passwd, crypt_ftr);
+    if (key_index < 0) {
+      rc = -1;
+      goto errout;
+    }
+    else {
+      if (is_ice_enabled()) {
+#ifndef CONFIG_HW_DISK_ENCRYPT_PERF
+        if (create_crypto_blk_dev(crypt_ftr, (unsigned char*)&key_index,
+                            real_blkdev, crypto_blkdev, label, 0)) {
+          SLOGE("Error creating decrypted block device");
+          rc = -1;
+          goto errout;
+        }
+#endif
+      } else {
+        if (create_crypto_blk_dev(crypt_ftr, decrypted_master_key,
+                            real_blkdev, crypto_blkdev, label, 0)) {
+          SLOGE("Error creating decrypted block device");
+          rc = -1;
+          goto errout;
+        }
+      }
+    }
+  }
+
+  if (rc == 0) {
+    /* Save the name of the crypto block device
+     * so we can mount it when restarting the framework. */
+#ifdef CONFIG_HW_DISK_ENCRYPT_PERF
+    if (!is_ice_enabled())
+#endif
+    property_set("ro.crypto.fs_crypto_blkdev", crypto_blkdev);
+    master_key_saved = 1;
+  }
+
+ errout:
+  return rc;
+}
+#endif
+
+static int try_mount_multiple_fs(const char *crypto_blkdev,
+                                 const char *mount_point,
+                                 const char *file_system)
+{
+    if (!mount(crypto_blkdev, mount_point, file_system, 0, NULL))
+        return 0;
+    if (strcmp(file_system, "ext4") &&
+        !mount(crypto_blkdev, mount_point, "ext4", 0, NULL))
+        return 0;
+    if (strcmp(file_system, "f2fs") &&
+        !mount(crypto_blkdev, mount_point, "f2fs", 0, NULL))
+        return 0;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static int test_mount_encrypted_fs(struct crypt_mnt_ftr* crypt_ftr,
+                                   const char *passwd, const char *mount_point, const char *label)
+{
+  unsigned char decrypted_master_key[MAX_KEY_LEN];
+  char crypto_blkdev[MAXPATHLEN];
+  //char real_blkdev[MAXPATHLEN];
+  char tmp_mount_point[64];
+  unsigned int orig_failed_decrypt_count;
+  int rc;
+  int use_keymaster = 0;
+  unsigned char* intermediate_key = 0;
+  size_t intermediate_key_size = 0;
+  int N = 1 << crypt_ftr->N_factor;
+  int r = 1 << crypt_ftr->r_factor;
+  int p = 1 << crypt_ftr->p_factor;
+
+  SLOGD("crypt_ftr->fs_size = %lld\n", crypt_ftr->fs_size);
+  orig_failed_decrypt_count = crypt_ftr->failed_decrypt_count;
+
+  if (! (crypt_ftr->flags & CRYPT_MNT_KEY_UNENCRYPTED) ) {
+    if (decrypt_master_key(passwd, decrypted_master_key, crypt_ftr,
+                           &intermediate_key, &intermediate_key_size)) {
+      SLOGE("Failed to decrypt master key\n");
+      rc = -1;
+      goto errout;
+    }
+  }
+
+  //fs_mgr_get_crypt_info(fstab_default, 0, real_blkdev, sizeof(real_blkdev));
+
+  // Create crypto block device - all (non fatal) code paths
+  // need it
+  if (create_crypto_blk_dev(crypt_ftr, decrypted_master_key, real_blkdev, crypto_blkdev, label, 0)) {
+      SLOGE("Error creating decrypted block device\n");
+      rc = -1;
+      goto errout;
+  }
+
+  /* Work out if the problem is the password or the data */
+  unsigned char scrypted_intermediate_key[sizeof(crypt_ftr->
+                                                 scrypted_intermediate_key)];
+
+  rc = crypto_scrypt(intermediate_key, intermediate_key_size,
+                     crypt_ftr->salt, sizeof(crypt_ftr->salt),
+                     N, r, p, scrypted_intermediate_key,
+                     sizeof(scrypted_intermediate_key));
+
+  // Does the key match the crypto footer?
+  if (rc == 0 && memcmp(scrypted_intermediate_key,
+                        crypt_ftr->scrypted_intermediate_key,
+                        sizeof(scrypted_intermediate_key)) == 0) {
+    SLOGI("Password matches");
+    rc = 0;
+  } else {
+    /* Try mounting the file system anyway, just in case the problem's with
+     * the footer, not the key. */
+    snprintf(tmp_mount_point, sizeof(tmp_mount_point), "%s/tmp_mnt",
+             mount_point);
+    mkdir(tmp_mount_point, 0755);
+    if (try_mount_multiple_fs(crypto_blkdev, tmp_mount_point, file_system)) {
+      SLOGE("Error temp mounting decrypted block device\n");
+      delete_crypto_blk_dev(label);
+
+      rc = -1;
+    } else {
+      /* Success! */
+      SLOGI("Password did not match but decrypted drive mounted - continue");
+      umount(tmp_mount_point);
+      rc = 0;
+    }
+  }
+
+  if (rc == 0) {
+    /* Save the name of the crypto block device
+     * so we can mount it when restarting the framework. */
+    property_set("ro.crypto.fs_crypto_blkdev", crypto_blkdev);
+
+    /* Also save a the master key so we can reencrypted the key
+     * the key when we want to change the password on it. */
+    memcpy(saved_master_key, decrypted_master_key, crypt_ftr->keysize);
+    saved_mount_point = strdup(mount_point);
+    master_key_saved = 1;
+    SLOGD("%s(): Master key saved\n", __FUNCTION__);
+    rc = 0;
+  }
+
+ errout:
+  if (intermediate_key) {
+    memset(intermediate_key, 0, intermediate_key_size);
+    free(intermediate_key);
+  }
+  return rc;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Called by vold when it's asked to mount an encrypted external
+ * storage volume. The incoming partition has no crypto header/footer,
+ * as any metadata is been stored in a separate, small partition.  We
+ * assume it must be using our same crypt type and keysize.
+ *
+ * out_crypto_blkdev must be MAXPATHLEN.
+ */
+int cryptfs_setup_ext_volume(const char* label, const char* real_blkdev,
+        const unsigned char* key, int keysize, char* out_crypto_blkdev) {
+    int fd = open(real_blkdev, O_RDONLY|O_CLOEXEC);
+    if (fd == -1) {
+        SLOGE("Failed to open %s: %s", real_blkdev, strerror(errno));
+        return -1;
+    }
+
+    unsigned long nr_sec = 0;
+    get_blkdev_size(fd, &nr_sec);
+    close(fd);
+
+    if (nr_sec == 0) {
+        SLOGE("Failed to get size of %s: %s", real_blkdev, strerror(errno));
+        return -1;
+    }
+
+    struct crypt_mnt_ftr ext_crypt_ftr;
+    memset(&ext_crypt_ftr, 0, sizeof(ext_crypt_ftr));
+    ext_crypt_ftr.fs_size = nr_sec;
+    ext_crypt_ftr.keysize = cryptfs_get_keysize();
+    strlcpy((char*) ext_crypt_ftr.crypto_type_name, cryptfs_get_crypto_name(),
+            MAX_CRYPTO_TYPE_NAME_LEN);
+    uint32_t flags = 0;
+    /*if (e4crypt_is_native() &&
+        android::base::GetBoolProperty("ro.crypto.allow_encrypt_override", false))
+        flags |= CREATE_CRYPTO_BLK_DEV_FLAGS_ALLOW_ENCRYPT_OVERRIDE;*/
+
+    return create_crypto_blk_dev(&ext_crypt_ftr, key, real_blkdev, out_crypto_blkdev, label, flags);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Called by vold when it's asked to unmount an encrypted external
+ * storage volume.
+ */
+int cryptfs_revert_ext_volume(const char* label) {
+    return delete_crypto_blk_dev(label);
+}
+
+int check_unmounted_and_get_ftr(struct crypt_mnt_ftr* crypt_ftr)
+{
+    char encrypted_state[PROPERTY_VALUE_MAX];
+    property_get("ro.crypto.state", encrypted_state, "");
+    if ( master_key_saved || strcmp(encrypted_state, "encrypted") ) {
+        SLOGE("encrypted fs already validated or not running with encryption,"
+              " aborting");
+        return -1;
+    }
+
+    if (get_crypt_ftr_and_key(crypt_ftr)) {
+        SLOGE("Error getting crypt footer and key");
+        return -1;
+    }
+
+    return 0;
+}
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_HW_DISK_ENCRYPTION
+int cryptfs_check_passwd_hw(const char* passwd)
+{
+    struct crypt_mnt_ftr crypt_ftr;
+    int rc;
+    unsigned char master_key[KEY_LEN_BYTES];
+    /* get key */
+    if (get_crypt_ftr_and_key(&crypt_ftr)) {
+        SLOGE("Error getting crypt footer and key");
+        return -1;
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * in case of manual encryption (from GUI), the encryption is done with
+     * default password
+     */
+    if (crypt_ftr.flags & CRYPT_FORCE_COMPLETE) {
+        /* compare scrypted_intermediate_key with stored scrypted_intermediate_key
+         * which was created with actual password before reboot.
+         */
+        rc = cryptfs_get_master_key(&crypt_ftr, passwd, master_key);
+        if (rc) {
+            SLOGE("password doesn't match");
+            return rc;
+        }
+
+        rc = test_mount_hw_encrypted_fs(&crypt_ftr, DEFAULT_PASSWORD,
+            DATA_MNT_POINT, CRYPTO_BLOCK_DEVICE);
+
+        if (rc) {
+            SLOGE("Default password did not match on reboot encryption");
+            return rc;
+        }
+    } else {
+        rc = test_mount_hw_encrypted_fs(&crypt_ftr, passwd,
+            DATA_MNT_POINT, CRYPTO_BLOCK_DEVICE);
+        SLOGE("test mount returned %i\n", rc);
+    }
+
+    return rc;
+}
+#endif
+
+int cryptfs_check_passwd(const char *passwd)
+{
+    /*if (e4crypt_is_native()) {
+        SLOGE("cryptfs_check_passwd not valid for file encryption");
+        return -1;
+    }*/
+
+    struct crypt_mnt_ftr crypt_ftr;
+    int rc;
+
+    rc = check_unmounted_and_get_ftr(&crypt_ftr);
+    if (rc) {
+        SLOGE("Could not get footer");
+        return rc;
+    }
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_HW_DISK_ENCRYPTION
+    if (is_hw_disk_encryption((char*)crypt_ftr.crypto_type_name))
+        return cryptfs_check_passwd_hw(passwd);
+#endif
+
+    rc = test_mount_encrypted_fs(&crypt_ftr, passwd,
+                                 DATA_MNT_POINT, CRYPTO_BLOCK_DEVICE);
+
+    if (rc) {
+        SLOGE("Password did not match");
+        return rc;
+    }
+
+    if (crypt_ftr.flags & CRYPT_FORCE_COMPLETE) {
+        // Here we have a default actual password but a real password
+        // we must test against the scrypted value
+        // First, we must delete the crypto block device that
+        // test_mount_encrypted_fs leaves behind as a side effect
+        delete_crypto_blk_dev(CRYPTO_BLOCK_DEVICE);
+        rc = test_mount_encrypted_fs(&crypt_ftr, DEFAULT_PASSWORD,
+                                     DATA_MNT_POINT, CRYPTO_BLOCK_DEVICE);
+        if (rc) {
+            SLOGE("Default password did not match on reboot encryption");
+            return rc;
+        }
+    }
+
+    return rc;
+}
+
+int cryptfs_verify_passwd(const char *passwd)
+{
+    struct crypt_mnt_ftr crypt_ftr;
+    unsigned char decrypted_master_key[MAX_KEY_LEN];
+    char encrypted_state[PROPERTY_VALUE_MAX];
+    int rc;
+
+    property_get("ro.crypto.state", encrypted_state, "");
+    if (strcmp(encrypted_state, "encrypted") ) {
+        SLOGE("device not encrypted, aborting");
+        return -2;
+    }
+
+    if (!master_key_saved) {
+        SLOGE("encrypted fs not yet mounted, aborting");
+        return -1;
+    }
+
+    if (!saved_mount_point) {
+        SLOGE("encrypted fs failed to save mount point, aborting");
+        return -1;
+    }
+
+    if (get_crypt_ftr_and_key(&crypt_ftr)) {
+        SLOGE("Error getting crypt footer and key\n");
+        return -1;
+    }
+
+    if (crypt_ftr.flags & CRYPT_MNT_KEY_UNENCRYPTED) {
+        /* If the device has no password, then just say the password is valid */
+        rc = 0;
+    } else {
+#ifdef CONFIG_HW_DISK_ENCRYPTION
+        if(is_hw_disk_encryption((char*)crypt_ftr.crypto_type_name)) {
+            if (verify_hw_fde_passwd(passwd, &crypt_ftr) >= 0)
+              rc = 0;
+            else
+              rc = -1;
+        } else {
+            decrypt_master_key(passwd, decrypted_master_key, &crypt_ftr, 0, 0);
+            if (!memcmp(decrypted_master_key, saved_master_key, crypt_ftr.keysize)) {
+                /* They match, the password is correct */
+                rc = 0;
+            } else {
+              /* If incorrect, sleep for a bit to prevent dictionary attacks */
+                sleep(1);
+                rc = 1;
+            }
+        }
+#else
+        decrypt_master_key(passwd, decrypted_master_key, &crypt_ftr, 0, 0);
+        if (!memcmp(decrypted_master_key, saved_master_key, crypt_ftr.keysize)) {
+            /* They match, the password is correct */
+            rc = 0;
+        } else {
+            /* If incorrect, sleep for a bit to prevent dictionary attacks */
+            sleep(1);
+            rc = 1;
+        }
+#endif
+    }
+
+    return rc;
+}
+
+/* Returns type of the password, default, pattern, pin or password.
+ */
+int cryptfs_get_password_type(void)
+{
+    struct crypt_mnt_ftr crypt_ftr;
+
+    if (get_crypt_ftr_and_key(&crypt_ftr)) {
+        SLOGE("Error getting crypt footer and key\n");
+        return -1;
+    }
+
+    if (crypt_ftr.flags & CRYPT_INCONSISTENT_STATE) {
+        return -1;
+    }
+
+    return crypt_ftr.crypt_type;
+}
+
+int cryptfs_get_master_key(struct crypt_mnt_ftr* ftr, const char* password,
+                           unsigned char* master_key)
+{
+    int rc;
+
+    unsigned char* intermediate_key = 0;
+    size_t intermediate_key_size = 0;
+
+    if (password == 0 || *password == 0) {
+        password = DEFAULT_PASSWORD;
+    }
+
+    rc = decrypt_master_key(password, master_key, ftr, &intermediate_key,
+                            &intermediate_key_size);
+
+    if (rc) {
+        SLOGE("Can't calculate intermediate key");
+        return rc;
+    }
+
+    int N = 1 << ftr->N_factor;
+    int r = 1 << ftr->r_factor;
+    int p = 1 << ftr->p_factor;
+
+    unsigned char scrypted_intermediate_key[sizeof(ftr->scrypted_intermediate_key)];
+
+    rc = crypto_scrypt(intermediate_key, intermediate_key_size,
+                       ftr->salt, sizeof(ftr->salt), N, r, p,
+                       scrypted_intermediate_key,
+                       sizeof(scrypted_intermediate_key));
+
+    free(intermediate_key);
+
+    if (rc) {
+        SLOGE("Can't scrypt intermediate key");
+        return rc;
+    }
+
+    return memcmp(scrypted_intermediate_key, ftr->scrypted_intermediate_key,
+                  intermediate_key_size);
+}
+
diff --git a/crypto/fde/cryptfs.h b/crypto/fde/cryptfs.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c67113a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/fde/cryptfs.h
@@ -0,0 +1,208 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2010 The Android Open Source Project
+ *
+ * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+ * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+ * You may obtain a copy of the License at
+ *
+ *      http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+ *
+ * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+ * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+ * WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+ * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+ * limitations under the License.
+ */
+
+#ifndef ANDROID_VOLD_CRYPTFS_H
+#define ANDROID_VOLD_CRYPTFS_H
+
+/* This structure starts 16,384 bytes before the end of a hardware
+ * partition that is encrypted, or in a separate partition.  It's location
+ * is specified by a property set in init.<device>.rc.
+ * The structure allocates 48 bytes for a key, but the real key size is
+ * specified in the struct.  Currently, the code is hardcoded to use 128
+ * bit keys.
+ * The fields after salt are only valid in rev 1.1 and later stuctures.
+ * Obviously, the filesystem does not include the last 16 kbytes
+ * of the partition if the crypt_mnt_ftr lives at the end of the
+ * partition.
+ */
+
+#include <stdbool.h>
+#include <stdint.h>
+#include <cutils/properties.h>
+
+/* The current cryptfs version */
+#define CURRENT_MAJOR_VERSION 1
+#define CURRENT_MINOR_VERSION 3
+
+#define CRYPT_FOOTER_OFFSET 0x4000
+#define CRYPT_FOOTER_TO_PERSIST_OFFSET 0x1000
+#define CRYPT_PERSIST_DATA_SIZE 0x1000
+
+#define MAX_CRYPTO_TYPE_NAME_LEN 64
+
+#define MAX_KEY_LEN 48
+#define SALT_LEN 16
+#define SCRYPT_LEN 32
+
+/* definitions of flags in the structure below */
+#define CRYPT_MNT_KEY_UNENCRYPTED 0x1 /* The key for the partition is not encrypted. */
+#define CRYPT_ENCRYPTION_IN_PROGRESS 0x2 /* Encryption partially completed,
+                                            encrypted_upto valid*/
+#define CRYPT_INCONSISTENT_STATE 0x4 /* Set when starting encryption, clear when
+                                        exit cleanly, either through success or
+                                        correctly marked partial encryption */
+#define CRYPT_DATA_CORRUPT 0x8 /* Set when encryption is fine, but the
+                                  underlying volume is corrupt */
+#define CRYPT_FORCE_ENCRYPTION 0x10 /* Set when it is time to encrypt this
+                                       volume on boot. Everything in this
+                                       structure is set up correctly as
+                                       though device is encrypted except
+                                       that the master key is encrypted with the
+                                       default password. */
+#define CRYPT_FORCE_COMPLETE 0x20 /* Set when the above encryption cycle is
+                                     complete. On next cryptkeeper entry, match
+                                     the password. If it matches fix the master
+                                     key and remove this flag. */
+#ifdef CONFIG_HW_DISK_ENCRYPTION
+/* This flag is used to transition from L->M upgrade. L release passed
+ * a byte for every nible of user password while M release is passing
+ * ascii value of user password.
+ * Random flag value is chosen so that it does not conflict with other use cases
+ */
+#define CRYPT_ASCII_PASSWORD_UPDATED 0x1000
+#endif
+
+/* Allowed values for type in the structure below */
+#define CRYPT_TYPE_PASSWORD 0 /* master_key is encrypted with a password
+                               * Must be zero to be compatible with pre-L
+                               * devices where type is always password.*/
+#define CRYPT_TYPE_DEFAULT  1 /* master_key is encrypted with default
+                               * password */
+#define CRYPT_TYPE_PATTERN  2 /* master_key is encrypted with a pattern */
+#define CRYPT_TYPE_PIN      3 /* master_key is encrypted with a pin */
+#define CRYPT_TYPE_MAX_TYPE 3 /* type cannot be larger than this value */
+
+#define CRYPT_MNT_MAGIC 0xD0B5B1C4
+#define PERSIST_DATA_MAGIC 0xE950CD44
+
+/* Key Derivation Function algorithms */
+#define KDF_PBKDF2 1
+#define KDF_SCRYPT 2
+/* Algorithms 3 & 4 deprecated before shipping outside of google, so removed */
+#define KDF_SCRYPT_KEYMASTER_UNPADDED 3
+#define KDF_SCRYPT_KEYMASTER_BADLY_PADDED 4
+#define KDF_SCRYPT_KEYMASTER 5
+
+/* Maximum allowed keymaster blob size. */
+#define KEYMASTER_BLOB_SIZE 2048
+
+/* __le32 and __le16 defined in system/extras/ext4_utils/ext4_utils.h */
+#define __le8  unsigned char
+
+#if !defined(SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH)
+#define SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH 32
+#endif
+
+struct crypt_mnt_ftr {
+  __le32 magic;         /* See above */
+  __le16 major_version;
+  __le16 minor_version;
+  __le32 ftr_size;      /* in bytes, not including key following */
+  __le32 flags;         /* See above */
+  __le32 keysize;       /* in bytes */
+  __le32 crypt_type;    /* how master_key is encrypted. Must be a
+                         * CRYPT_TYPE_XXX value */
+  __le64 fs_size;       /* Size of the encrypted fs, in 512 byte sectors */
+  __le32 failed_decrypt_count; /* count of # of failed attempts to decrypt and
+                                  mount, set to 0 on successful mount */
+  unsigned char crypto_type_name[MAX_CRYPTO_TYPE_NAME_LEN]; /* The type of encryption
+                                                               needed to decrypt this
+                                                               partition, null terminated */
+  __le32 spare2;        /* ignored */
+  unsigned char master_key[MAX_KEY_LEN]; /* The encrypted key for decrypting the filesystem */
+  unsigned char salt[SALT_LEN];   /* The salt used for this encryption */
+  __le64 persist_data_offset[2];  /* Absolute offset to both copies of crypt_persist_data
+                                   * on device with that info, either the footer of the
+                                   * real_blkdevice or the metadata partition. */
+
+  __le32 persist_data_size;       /* The number of bytes allocated to each copy of the
+                                   * persistent data table*/
+
+  __le8  kdf_type; /* The key derivation function used. */
+
+  /* scrypt parameters. See www.tarsnap.com/scrypt/scrypt.pdf */
+  __le8  N_factor; /* (1 << N) */
+  __le8  r_factor; /* (1 << r) */
+  __le8  p_factor; /* (1 << p) */
+  __le64 encrypted_upto; /* If we are in state CRYPT_ENCRYPTION_IN_PROGRESS and
+                            we have to stop (e.g. power low) this is the last
+                            encrypted 512 byte sector.*/
+  __le8  hash_first_block[SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH]; /* When CRYPT_ENCRYPTION_IN_PROGRESS
+                                                    set, hash of first block, used
+                                                    to validate before continuing*/
+
+  /* key_master key, used to sign the derived key which is then used to generate
+   * the intermediate key
+   * This key should be used for no other purposes! We use this key to sign unpadded 
+   * data, which is acceptable but only if the key is not reused elsewhere. */
+  __le8 keymaster_blob[KEYMASTER_BLOB_SIZE];
+  __le32 keymaster_blob_size;
+
+  /* Store scrypt of salted intermediate key. When decryption fails, we can
+     check if this matches, and if it does, we know that the problem is with the
+     drive, and there is no point in asking the user for more passwords.
+
+     Note that if any part of this structure is corrupt, this will not match and
+     we will continue to believe the user entered the wrong password. In that
+     case the only solution is for the user to enter a password enough times to
+     force a wipe.
+
+     Note also that there is no need to worry about migration. If this data is
+     wrong, we simply won't recognise a right password, and will continue to
+     prompt. On the first password change, this value will be populated and
+     then we will be OK.
+   */
+  unsigned char scrypted_intermediate_key[SCRYPT_LEN];
+
+  /* sha of this structure with this element set to zero
+     Used when encrypting on reboot to validate structure before doing something
+     fatal
+   */
+  unsigned char sha256[SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH];
+};
+
+#define DATA_MNT_POINT "/data"
+
+/* Return values for cryptfs_crypto_complete */
+#define CRYPTO_COMPLETE_NOT_ENCRYPTED  1
+#define CRYPTO_COMPLETE_ENCRYPTED      0
+#define CRYPTO_COMPLETE_BAD_METADATA  (-1)
+#define CRYPTO_COMPLETE_PARTIAL       (-2)
+#define CRYPTO_COMPLETE_INCONSISTENT  (-3)
+#define CRYPTO_COMPLETE_CORRUPT       (-4)
+
+/* Return values for cryptfs_enable_inplace*() */
+#define ENABLE_INPLACE_OK 0
+#define ENABLE_INPLACE_ERR_OTHER (-1)
+#define ENABLE_INPLACE_ERR_DEV (-2)  /* crypto_blkdev issue */
+
+typedef int (*kdf_func)(const char* passwd, const unsigned char* salt, unsigned char* ikey,
+                        void* params);
+
+int cryptfs_check_passwd(const char* pw);
+int cryptfs_verify_passwd(const char* pw);
+int cryptfs_setup_ext_volume(const char* label, const char* real_blkdev, const unsigned char* key, int keysize, char* out_crypto_blkdev);
+int cryptfs_revert_ext_volume(const char* label);
+int cryptfs_get_password_type(void);
+
+uint32_t cryptfs_get_keysize();
+const char* cryptfs_get_crypto_name();
+
+void set_partition_data(const char* block_device, const char* key_location, const char* fs);
+int cryptfs_check_footer();
+int delete_crypto_blk_dev(const char *name);
+
+#endif /* ANDROID_VOLD_CRYPTFS_H */
diff --git a/crypto/fde/main.cpp b/crypto/fde/main.cpp
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..7051a6d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/fde/main.cpp
@@ -0,0 +1,47 @@
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <linux/types.h>
+#include <sys/wait.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+#include <ctype.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <inttypes.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <sys/ioctl.h>
+#include <linux/dm-ioctl.h>
+#include <libgen.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <sys/param.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <sys/mount.h>
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <linux/kdev_t.h>
+#include <time.h>
+#include "cryptfs.h"
+#include "cutils/properties.h"
+#include "crypto_scrypt.h"
+
+void usage() {
+	printf("  Usage:\n");
+	printf("    twrpdec /path/to/userdata /path/to/metadata filesystem password\n");
+	printf("\n");
+	printf("  The metadata path is the path to the footer. If no metadata\n");
+	printf("  partition is present then use footer for this argument.\n");
+	printf("\n");
+	printf("  Example:\n");
+	printf("    twrpdec /dev/block/bootdevice/by-name/userdata footer ext4 0000\n");
+}
+
+int main(int argc, char **argv) {
+	if (argc != 5) {
+		usage();
+		return -1;
+	}
+	set_partition_data(argv[1], argv[2], argv[3]);
+	//int ret = cryptfs_check_passwd("30303030");
+	int ret = cryptfs_check_passwd(argv[4]);
+	return 0;
+}