Switch recovery to libbase logging
Clean up the recovery image and switch to libbase logging.
Bug: 28191554
Change-Id: Icd999c3cc832f0639f204b5c36cea8afe303ad35
diff --git a/verifier.cpp b/verifier.cpp
index 996a1fd..401bd7e 100644
--- a/verifier.cpp
+++ b/verifier.cpp
@@ -22,6 +22,7 @@
#include <algorithm>
#include <memory>
+#include <android-base/logging.h>
#include <openssl/bn.h>
#include <openssl/ecdsa.h>
#include <openssl/obj_mac.h>
@@ -131,24 +132,24 @@
#define FOOTER_SIZE 6
if (length < FOOTER_SIZE) {
- LOGE("not big enough to contain footer\n");
+ LOG(ERROR) << "not big enough to contain footer";
return VERIFY_FAILURE;
}
unsigned char* footer = addr + length - FOOTER_SIZE;
if (footer[2] != 0xff || footer[3] != 0xff) {
- LOGE("footer is wrong\n");
+ LOG(ERROR) << "footer is wrong";
return VERIFY_FAILURE;
}
size_t comment_size = footer[4] + (footer[5] << 8);
size_t signature_start = footer[0] + (footer[1] << 8);
- LOGI("comment is %zu bytes; signature %zu bytes from end\n",
- comment_size, signature_start);
+ LOG(INFO) << "comment is " << comment_size << " bytes; signature is " << signature_start
+ << " bytes from end";
if (signature_start <= FOOTER_SIZE) {
- LOGE("Signature start is in the footer");
+ LOG(ERROR) << "Signature start is in the footer";
return VERIFY_FAILURE;
}
@@ -159,7 +160,7 @@
size_t eocd_size = comment_size + EOCD_HEADER_SIZE;
if (length < eocd_size) {
- LOGE("not big enough to contain EOCD\n");
+ LOG(ERROR) << "not big enough to contain EOCD";
return VERIFY_FAILURE;
}
@@ -175,7 +176,7 @@
// magic number $50 $4b $05 $06.
if (eocd[0] != 0x50 || eocd[1] != 0x4b ||
eocd[2] != 0x05 || eocd[3] != 0x06) {
- LOGE("signature length doesn't match EOCD marker\n");
+ LOG(ERROR) << "signature length doesn't match EOCD marker";
return VERIFY_FAILURE;
}
@@ -186,7 +187,7 @@
// the real one, minzip will find the later (wrong) one,
// which could be exploitable. Fail verification if
// this sequence occurs anywhere after the real one.
- LOGE("EOCD marker occurs after start of EOCD\n");
+ LOG(ERROR) << "EOCD marker occurs after start of EOCD";
return VERIFY_FAILURE;
}
}
@@ -235,12 +236,11 @@
uint8_t* signature = eocd + eocd_size - signature_start;
size_t signature_size = signature_start - FOOTER_SIZE;
- LOGI("signature (offset: 0x%zx, length: %zu): %s\n",
- length - signature_start, signature_size,
- print_hex(signature, signature_size).c_str());
+ LOG(INFO) << "signature (offset: " << std::hex << (length - signature_start) << ", length: "
+ << signature_size << "): " << print_hex(signature, signature_size);
if (!read_pkcs7(signature, signature_size, &sig_der, &sig_der_length)) {
- LOGE("Could not find signature DER block\n");
+ LOG(ERROR) << "Could not find signature DER block";
return VERIFY_FAILURE;
}
@@ -271,38 +271,38 @@
if (key.key_type == Certificate::KEY_TYPE_RSA) {
if (!RSA_verify(hash_nid, hash, key.hash_len, sig_der,
sig_der_length, key.rsa.get())) {
- LOGI("failed to verify against RSA key %zu\n", i);
+ LOG(INFO) << "failed to verify against RSA key " << i;
continue;
}
- LOGI("whole-file signature verified against RSA key %zu\n", i);
+ LOG(INFO) << "whole-file signature verified against RSA key " << i;
free(sig_der);
return VERIFY_SUCCESS;
} else if (key.key_type == Certificate::KEY_TYPE_EC
&& key.hash_len == SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH) {
if (!ECDSA_verify(0, hash, key.hash_len, sig_der,
sig_der_length, key.ec.get())) {
- LOGI("failed to verify against EC key %zu\n", i);
+ LOG(INFO) << "failed to verify against EC key " << i;
continue;
}
- LOGI("whole-file signature verified against EC key %zu\n", i);
+ LOG(INFO) << "whole-file signature verified against EC key " << i;
free(sig_der);
return VERIFY_SUCCESS;
} else {
- LOGI("Unknown key type %d\n", key.key_type);
+ LOG(INFO) << "Unknown key type " << key.key_type;
}
i++;
}
if (need_sha1) {
- LOGI("SHA-1 digest: %s\n", print_hex(sha1, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH).c_str());
+ LOG(INFO) << "SHA-1 digest: " << print_hex(sha1, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH);
}
if (need_sha256) {
- LOGI("SHA-256 digest: %s\n", print_hex(sha256, SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH).c_str());
+ LOG(INFO) << "SHA-256 digest: " << print_hex(sha256, SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH);
}
free(sig_der);
- LOGE("failed to verify whole-file signature\n");
+ LOG(ERROR) << "failed to verify whole-file signature";
return VERIFY_FAILURE;
}
@@ -323,7 +323,7 @@
}
if (key_len_words > 8192 / 32) {
- LOGE("key length (%d) too large\n", key_len_words);
+ LOG(ERROR) << "key length (" << key_len_words << ") too large";
return nullptr;
}
@@ -479,7 +479,7 @@
bool load_keys(const char* filename, std::vector<Certificate>& certs) {
std::unique_ptr<FILE, decltype(&fclose)> f(fopen(filename, "r"), fclose);
if (!f) {
- LOGE("opening %s: %s\n", filename, strerror(errno));
+ PLOG(ERROR) << "error opening " << filename;
return false;
}
@@ -529,14 +529,14 @@
return false;
}
- LOGI("read key e=%d hash=%d\n", exponent, cert.hash_len);
+ LOG(INFO) << "read key e=" << exponent << " hash=" << cert.hash_len;
} else if (cert.key_type == Certificate::KEY_TYPE_EC) {
cert.ec = parse_ec_key(f.get());
if (!cert.ec) {
return false;
}
} else {
- LOGE("Unknown key type %d\n", cert.key_type);
+ LOG(ERROR) << "Unknown key type " << cert.key_type;
return false;
}
@@ -548,7 +548,7 @@
} else if (ch == EOF) {
break;
} else {
- LOGE("unexpected character between keys\n");
+ LOG(ERROR) << "unexpected character between keys";
return false;
}
}